Cablegrams 153, 520 CANBERRA, 2 April 1946
IMMEDIATE SECRET
UNY 18
Your telegram D.293 Persia.
1. It is noted that instructions to United Kingdom representative
on Security Council do not distinguish between 'dropping' and
'adjourning' the Persian question. Under these instructions it
would appear that United Kingdom Government opposes any
adjournment whatsoever until watertight guarantees are given-
(a) that Soviet troops will be withdrawn unconditionally, and
(b) Persian integrity and independence will be fully respected.
2. Australia has from the outset of the present meetings of the
Security Council taken the view that under certain circumstances a
reasonable adjournment could be granted and that this might, in
the long run, prove to be wisest course if a long-term solution of
the difficulties in Persia is to be achieved.
3. In accordance with instructions, the Australian representative
on the Security Council voted in favour of the Persian question
being placed on the agenda. On 27th March, he moved that
consideration of this item be postponed until such time as the
Iranian Government has submitted a written statement with
documents, when the Council could again consider the request of
the Soviet delegate for postponement until 10th April -it being
understood that in the meantime the item remained on the agenda
and that the parties would not take action to alter the existing
position or prejudice the settlement. On the following day the
Chairman rejected the suggestion of the Polish representative that
this Australian proposal should be considered first by the
Security Council. The Soviet proposal for an adjournment until
10th April was thereupon put to the Council and when it failed to
secure the necessary support, the Soviet representative left the
meeting.
4. In our opinion the Chairman's ruling was unfortunate as we are
of opinion that a quick decision on the Persian issue is less
important than a long-term solution based upon a full
investigation of the facts in accordance with an orderly method of
procedure. Our view of course would be different if an adjournment
were used by either party to gain some special advantage. it was
for this reason that the Australian representative on the Security
Council was instructed before the opening of the Council's
proceedings that it should be a condition of any adjournment
granted that 'the Soviet Union should be asked to give an
undertaking not to take unilateral action to alter the existing
position to the prejudice of Iran.'
5. As the situation now stands, both the Soviet Union and Iran
have been asked to report on the existing status of the
negotiations between the two governments, and in particular on the
question whether the reported withdrawal of Soviet troops is
'conditioned upon the conclusion of agreements between the two
Governments on other subjects. 'The action to be taken by the
Council when it next meets will partly depend upon the reports
which it receives. In our view, however, it may be undesirable for
the Council to reach some final decision at its next meeting, as
it is unlikely that it will then be in possession of all the
facts. It has been the general view of Australia, expressed both
in London and New York, that all matters brought before the
Security Council should be fully investigated [and] that if
necessary, a committee should be set up to investigate the facts.
6. We have every desire to maintain the prestige of the Security
Council and ensure respect for treaties and we are also conscious
of the need to avoid if at all possible a serious rift between the
Soviet Union and other members of the United Nations. We feel,
therefore, that provided guarantees can be obtained to ensure that
any postponement is not being used to the advantage of the party
requesting postponement, the adoption of an orderly procedure for
examining the dispute, including reasonable postponement for
preparation and answering of charges, may be desirable.
7. It is reported in the press that the United Kingdom and United
States may be disposed to drop the matter if it is found that
Soviet troops are in fact being withdrawn. We would be entirely
opposed to such a course, which would treat the jurisdiction of
the Security Council as being controllable by the interests of one
or more powers. In our view, when the Security Council becomes
seized of a dispute Council should deal with it fully before
disposing of it.
[AA:A1838 T189, 854/10/2, i]