Cablegram CAB210 CANBERRA, 18 May 1945
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL
I would refer to the following passages in the Prime Minister's
letter [1] 15th February:-
'In its recent review, War Cabinet reached the conclusion that, as
you had made your operational plans on the assigned strength of
the Australian Forces, it would be impossible to make further
reductions in the strength at this stage if your plans are being
adhered to, and I was requested by War Cabinet to ascertain if
such is the case.
If there has been no variation in your plans, I was asked to
consult you regarding the contemplated use of the Australian
forces, with a view to determining the stage at which appropriate
reductions can be made and deciding the future strengths which
should be maintained. As the war effort is still in a state of
disequilibrium, War Cabinet considered that the earliest
opportunity should be taken to rectify it as soon as the
operational situation will permit.'
2. In your reply of 5th March [2], you stated:-
'In categorical reply to your basic question, I would state that
my plans contemplate the use of all of the Australian forces now
assigned to the Southwest Pacific area.'
3. War Cabinet concurred in the view expressed by the Prime
Minister and Minister for Defence that, except for such measures
as may be possible to ensure the economical use of manpower in the
forces, it would not appear, in view of your reply, that any
further steps should be taken for the reduction of the present
approved operational strength of six divisions and two armoured
brigades, until after the completion of the next phase of
operations. [3]
4. With the end of the war in Europe and the assurance that the
strength of the United Nations can be concentrated against Japan,
the Government has been considering the adjustments that can be
made in the strength of the Australian forces, in order to relieve
the manpower stringencies and at the same time maintain a fighting
effort of appropriate strength to the present stage of the war.
5. The Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces has
pointed out [4] that, if there is to be a substantial reduction in
the strength of the Australian Military Forces, the 7th Division
should not be committed to operations on the Borneo mainland,
since it will form a commitment where there may be considerable
fighting and where we may ultimately be committed to a very large
garrison.
6. I shall be glad if you can give urgent consideration to this
matter in relation to the present stage of your plans for the
Borneo campaign, and furnish me with your observations. I would
add that it is the desire of the Government that Australian forces
should continue to be associated with your command in the forward
movement against Japan, but the Commander-in-Chief of the
Australian Military Forces advises that, if a reduction in our
strength is to be made, the 7th Division should not be employed
for further operations until the overall plan is known.
J. B. CHIFLEY
[AA : A5954, BOX 2313]