FUTURE OPERATIONAL USE AND COMMAND OF THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY
FORCES

FUTURE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF THE R.A.A.F.

With reference to my letter of 15th February [1] relative to the
Australian War Effort and the relation of your operational plans
to the strength of the Australian Forces, I have now been informed
by General Blarney that subsequent messages received from Lieut-
General Berryman indicate that the arrangements for the movement
of the First Australian Corps are now going ahead, the necessary
shipping apparently being available.

2. It was understood, following our discussions last June when
your directive of 12th July was issued for the Australian Forces
to assume the responsibility for the continued neutralisation of
the Japanese in Australian and British territory and Mandates in
the Southwest Pacific Area, that two A.I.F. Divisions would be
used in the advance to the Philippines. The 7th and 9th Divisions
were nominated for this purpose, and the 6th Division was included
in the Forces disposed in New Guinea. The only operational
formation that it is planned should remain in Australia is a
brigade at Darwin, so long as this is necessary for the protection
of the naval and air bases there. The remaining strength on the
mainland, which includes 60,000 B class men and 20,000 women, is
necessary for the maintenance of forces engaged or to be engaged
in active operations.

3. General Blarney now states that it is your desire that the 6th
Division should also be allotted as a support for the 7th and 9th
Divisions in their prospective operations. He has emphasised the
small forces which would be left for the tasks in New Guinea and
the other Islands, and has pointed out that when the organisation
of six divisions was agreed to, it had not been contemplated that
the Australian Forces would be actively engaged on operations on
several fronts. As the use of a corps of two divisions would alone
entail the provision of 30,000 men for base and line of
communications units, the proposed use of the 6th Division,
together with the position facing the remaining Forces in the
islands, would make heavy demands on the capacity of Australian
manpower to maintain the Australian Army at strength.

4. I had hoped that by now it would have been possible to
associate the Australian forces in greater or lesser strength with
the re-conquest of the Philippines, as a reciprocal Australian
gesture to the aid which the Commonwealth has received from the
United States, as well as military desirability of using the
Forces which have been inactive for some time. Their earlier use
would also have been the logical preliminary step to the re-
adjustment of the Australian manpower position which is indicated
to be necessary in my letter of 15th February. However, it is
necessary to await advice of your plans in order to determine the
stage at which this can be done. In the meantime, I feel that we
should adhere to the basis of our previous discussion and limit
the Australian component of your spearhead forces to the 7th and
9th Divisions.

5. General Blamey has also mentioned the question of the higher
operational control of the Australian Forces. It is understood
from him that the original intention was that the First Australian
Corps would be commanded by the United States 8th Army and not by
the Commander of the Allied Land Forces, but that the latest
intention is for it to be under the direct command of General
Headquarters.

6. It was laid down in the 1914-18 war that the Australian Forces
serving outside Australia should be organised into and operate as
a homogeneous formation appropriate to their strength, and that
they should be commanded by an Australian Officer. This course was
followed in the Middle East in the present war. When the Southwest
Pacific Area was established, Commanders of the Allied Naval, Land
and Air Forces were appointed in your General Order No. 1 of 18th
April 1942. The principle which I have mentioned was achieved by
the Royal Australian Navy operating under its own Flag Officer who
is responsible to the Commander, Allied Naval Forces. In the case
of the Royal Australian Air Force, an R.A.A.F. Command was created
for operational control of the R.A.A.F. under an Australian
Officer who is responsible to the Commander, Allied Air Forces.

General Blamey was appointed Commander of the Allied Land Forces
which provided for the observance of the principle in respect of
the command of the Australian Army. I shall be glad, therefore, if
you could inform me of the arrangement that is contemplated in
regard to the operational control and command of the First
Australian Corps in particular, and of the Australian Land Forces
in New Guinea and adjacent islands, and of the manner in which it
is proposed to ensure the observance of the basic principle I have
mentioned.

7. A similar question of principle relating to operational control
and command of the R.A.A.F. in the Southwest Pacific Area has also
arisen. You will recall from earlier discussions, that the
arrangement for operational control by the R.A.A.F. Command and
administrative control by the R.A.A.F. Headquarters has never
worked satisfactorily. The suggestion for the appointment of Air
Marshal Sir Keith Park, now Commander, Allied Air Forces, South
East Asia Area, as Air Officer Commanding, R.A.A.F., with
operational responsibility to the Commander, Allied Air Forces,
Southwest Pacific Area, which was originally endorsed by you was
later abandoned on your advice. [2]

8. As a result of the advance in recent months, Allied Air
Headquarters has moved far from Australia, but the R.A.A.F.

Command is still in Brisbane. R.A.A.F. representation on the
operational sections of Allied Air Headquarters consists of a
small number of lower ranking officers only, and the control of
the First Tactical Air Force, R.A.A.F. (our main striking force in
the Southwest Pacific Area), passed first to the United States 5th
Air Force and later to the 13th Air Force.

9. In order to ensure that the R.A.A.F. takes its rightful place
in operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, and to provide the
necessary measure of co-operation and control of our field
formations and units with Allied Air Headquarters, the Minister
for Air has recommended to me [3] that R.A.A.F. Command should
move to New Guinea (or other forward base, as operational
necessity may require) and take over command of all R.A.A.F.

formations in that and the more advanced areas. In such event, the
Air Officer Commanding, R.A.A.F. Command, would be vested with
operational and administrative control of all R.A.A.F. formations
in the Southwest Pacific Area, outside the mainland of Australia,
being responsible to Allied Air Headquarters for operational
control and to R.A.A.F. Headquarters for command and
administrative matters.

10. The adoption of such a course would also enable the units on
the mainland to be placed under the operational control of
R.A.A.F. Headquarters, subject to operational responsibility to
the Commander, Allied Air Forces. I shall therefore be glad to
have your observations on the recommendations of the Minister for
Air, in so far as your responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of
the Southwest Pacific Area are concerned.

JOHN CURTIN
Minister for Defence