ONE. The following is the text of the detailed reply to our
proposals of 20th October [1] for British Commonwealth occupation
force.

Begins:-

I have the honour to refer to your note of 20th October, 1945
containing a proposal regarding the use of British Commonwealth
occupation forces in Japan and to my note of 23rd November, 1945
[2] stating that the Government of the United States accepts in
principle such participation.

The United States Government now wishes to propose certain general
principles, on which, if agreeable to the Australian Government,
such participation may be based from a military standpoint. It is
considered that the statement of these principles which follows
should form an adequate basis on which the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers can initiate detailed discussions with
representatives of the Australian Government in Tokyo. If during
these conversations questions should arise which would indicate
the need for further discussion on the political level the points
in question might be referred to Washington for consideration.

Statement of general principles regarding participation of British
Commonwealth forces in occupation of Japan.

1. The ground elements will consist of a composite British
Commonwealth Land force of approximately four brigades with
necessary supporting units and services the exact composition of
the force to be determined on the basis of deployment and
employment ascertained as a result of discussions in Tokyo. This
force will be integrated into the occupation forces under the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

2. The participation of Air forces is accepted in principle. The
strength of the air component will be determined after
conversations in Tokyo on the basis of the requirements of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

3. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will be free to
locate and move the British Commonwealth forces within the
Japanese Home Islands as he sees fit to accomplish the missions
assigned him with due regard to the problem of supply and
maintenance in so far as the operational situation permits.

4. No area will be assigned the British Commonwealth forces as an
exclusive area of control. All areas occupied by these forces will
additionally be subordinate to the appropriate higher corps Army
or other Commander.

5. These forces will be withdrawn entirely or in part upon
agreement between the United States and the Commonwealth of
Australia or at the expiration of six months after formal
notification by either party in the event of no agreement.

6. The manner of integration of ground Air and Naval forces of the
British Commonwealth in the occupation of Japan will be as agreed
between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the
Commander of the British Commonwealth forces.

7. British Commonwealth force Commanders will be free to
communicate with their Governments. Other channels of
communication will be as follows:-

(a) for policy from the Australian Government as representative of
the British Commonwealth of Nations through the United States
Government and United States Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers and thence through the occupation
force command organization. Appropriate representation will be
accorded on the staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers and Intermediate echelons.

(b) for administration within the British forces such as supply
from the force Commanders to under general co-ordination of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers any agency designated by
the Commonwealth Governments.

(c) details of supply administration and communications such as
provision of port facilities and airfields are matters for local
arrangement between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
and the British Commonwealth force representatives.

8. The Commonwealth Governments concerned will be responsible for
supply and maintenance of their forces.

9. Details as to timing of movements of the parts of the
Commonwealth force to Japan and their disembarkation will be
arranged directly with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
by the British Commonwealth representatives. The force or portions
thereof will pass to command of the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers on arrival at the port of debarkation. It is
understood informally that the Australian Government wishes to
begin movement of the Brigade now at Morotai and a Royal
Australian Air Force component about 15th December 1945.

I would appreciate an indication of the acceptance by your
Government of the foregoing statement of principles in order that
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may be authorized to
initiate conversations with the British Commonwealth
representatives Tokyo.

TWO. We understand that the terms of the United States reply were
governed by two basic considerations viz:-

(a) desire to avoid creating an awkward precedent vis-a-vis other
Allied Powers.

(b) desire to leave as much detail as possible to be settled
direct between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Commander in
Chief British Commonwealth Occupation force.

THREE. With regard to the specific paragraphs of the United States
statement of general principles contained in the reply we have the
following comments and observations to make.

(I) The term 'exact composition' is understood to have referred
inter alia to the question of using Japanese nationals in
substitution for certain administrative units a practice which the
Americans are employing extensively in the case of their own
forces.

(II) It is understood from the United States War Department that
the proposed air component of British Commonwealth Occupation
forces is relatively twice that of the United States Occupation
forces and that this may in their view establish an undesirable
precedent.

(III) It is understood that the words 'with due regard to the
problem of supply and maintenance' were included to enable
discussions between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Commander
in Chief of British Commonwealth Occupation forces on the general
question of the location of the whole force in one area and in due
proximity to the necessary port, airfield and administrative
facilities.

(IV) It is understood that it is MacArthur's desire to place the
British Commonwealth Occupation forces land and air components
under senior United States Land and Air Commanders respectively.

As indicated in our E12 of 1st November [3] we consider this would
be extremely difficult to resist. We consider however, that we
should insist on Organization of the land force as a corps and
subordinate to not lower than a United States Army Commander. At
the same time the Air component might be similarly organized at as
high a level as possible.

(V) It is understood to be the American view that by the end of
1946 the total force of occupation in Japan shall not exceed
135,000. If other powers participate and this figure is adhered to
it is obvious that there will have to be a considerable reduction
in American strength and possibly certain progressive reductions
in the strength of the British Commonwealth Occupation forces and
any other occupying Allied force. Consequently whilst our
proposals did not include anything of the nature of this paragraph
we think the paragraph itself is understandable and one on which
it is not worth while making an issue.

FOUR. We have the following general comments to make in regard to
certain matters of principle.

(a) Chain of Command. We refer you to our E12 of 1st November. It
is understood that the United States authorities agree that the
Commander in Chief of British Commonwealth Occupation force should
have the usual right of appeal but we feel that you should press
for the inclusion of a statement of this right in the main
document.

(b) It was understood also that a safeguarding provision would be
included in the document whereby British Commonwealth troops would
not be divided into smaller formations for command purposes except
on the basis of,
(1) operational necessity and,
(2) furnishing a token force in the Tokyo prefecture. This
safeguard has however been omitted and we feel that you should
press for its inclusion in the document and for its application to
air as well as to ground forces.

(c) We think further that you should press for inclusion of a
statement of the principle that in the event of operations the
Commonwealth Air Forces should be used where possible in support
of the Commonwealth ground forces.

FIVE. We feel that you should know that the above reply was
obtained from the State Department only after we and the Legation
here had exerted great pressure in order to expedite its delivery.

The document was practically pushed from desk to desk in the State
and War Departments. Consequently we suggest that as an
alternative it might be more expedient for General Northcott to
press General MacArthur with a view to obtaining agreement on
points raised in our paragraphs 3 and 4 above. If this mode of
approach were employed it would save protracted discussion here by
many authorities as is bound to be the case in Washington.