1. With reference to the command of the Australian Military Forces
in the field, I think it is desirable that I should put the
position, as I see it, for the information of the Prime Minister.

You will recall that, on the establishment of the South West
Pacific Area, General MacArthur was appointed Commander-in-Chief
and I was appointed Commander, Allied Land Forces. I understand my
appointment was made as part of the general agreement for the
acceptance of the set up of the command of the SWP Area. Except
during the offensive campaign in the field in New Guinea up to the
end of 1943, I have never operated as such.

My requests for American officers to establish a joint staff were
met with a face saving acceptance that was completely ineffective.

American troops were brought to this country and later an American
army command established. At no stage was I given any information
as to the proposals for their arrival or the development of the
organisation. In fact, General MacArthur took upon himself the
functions of Commander, Allied Land Forces and my own functions
were limited to command of the Australian Military Forces.

I have never raised this question definitely before, as I was
always of the opinion that the Prime Minister and General
MacArthur worked in close consultation and the former was fully
informed of and acquiesced in the position, in view of para 4 of
his letter of 25 April, 1942. [1] I was satisfied therefore to
continue my responsibility for the control of the development in
administration and operations of the Australian Military Forces.

2. With the forward advance, however, the situation has undergone
a further change. It has been, throughout this war, a definitely
accepted principle that our Australian national forces should be
under the control of our own Australian commanders. Where, on
those odd occasions, this restriction has been lifted, it has been
very greatly to the detriment of the Australian Army.

In the position which has now arisen, the Australian Army has been
sharply divided into two components:

(a) The First Australian Army, which is dealing with the enemy
elements left behind in the New Guinea and adjacent islands area.

(b) The First Australian Corps, which has been made available for
offensive operations.

GHQ, SWPA asserts its authority to exercise direct control over
the First Australian Army and, in a wire received from General
Berryman on 20th inst, intends to assume direct control of First
Australian Corps for operations now under consideration.

3. In order to ensure an effective Australian command over its own
forces, I have transferred my Advanced Headquarters from Brisbane
to Hollandia and established a Forward Section, with Lieut-General
Berryman as Chief of Staff, at Leyte with GHQ.

It is obvious to me that the intention of GHQ SWPA is to treat my
Headquarters as a purely liaison element. You will recall that a
wire received from General Berryman last week stated that the
staff of GHQ SWPA intended to utilise the First Australian Corps
under command of the 8th American Army. I instructed General
Berryman to oppose this strongly and to put my views fully and
frankly before General Chamberlin [2] with a view to informing
General MacArthur.

As a result of these conversations, General Berryman now informs
me that First Australian Corps will operate directly under GHQ as
already mentioned.

4. With regard to the command of New Guinea area, the position is
completely unsatisfactory. GHQ claims to exercise direct command,
whereas effective command of the land forces is exercised by
myself. This is inevitable but, unfortunately, the means to secure
fully effective control are not at my disposal.

In addition to the army command, there is an independent air force
command, the control of which is exercised by General Kenney from
the Philippines. The command of naval forces is also an
independent command as far as New Guinea army command is
concerned.

There are also seven New Zealand air squadrons operating in the
area which do not operate under the Australian air force command,
but under direct control from General Kenney in the Philippines.

Air Vice Marshal Isitt, Chief of the Air Staff of New Zealand, who
recently visited here, said he proposed to take this up with
General Kenney immediately, and have these placed under Australian
command, although General MacArthur informed me personally that
the present arrangement was by desire of the Chief of the Air
Staff, New Zealand.

The set-up of command in New Guinea is completely unsatisfactory.

It is impossible to secure reasonable attention even to
maintenance requirements. For example, over 4,000 personnel due
for return to their units have been awaiting shipping for weeks at
Townsville.

It would be a long story to give all the details of the
difficulties of supply and provision resulting from the fact of
distant, and I cannot help but feel not sufficiently interested,
control of the First Australian Army.

A sidelight of the question of command of the Australian Military
Forces is the objection raised by GHQ, at a fairly recent stage,
to Australian corps command. The view given by them at that time
was that it was not possible to exercise a corps command in view
of the widely distributed fighting areas. Nevertheless, there does
exist a complete set-up of 6th and 8th American armies with the
respective corps headquarters under their control.

5. It is my view that, unless the authority of the Australian
command over Australian national forces is effectively asserted,
an undesirable position will arise as far as the Australian troops
are concerned, by which they will be distributed under American
control and Australian national control of its forces will be
greatly weakened.

The insinuation of American control and the elimination of
Australian control has been gradual, but I think the time has come
when the matter should be faced quite squarely, if the Australian
Government and the Australian Higher Command are not to become
ciphers in the control of the Australian Military Forces.

T. A. BLAMEY