Dr. Evatt has informed us [1] that you are anxious that we should
reconsider the decision communicated in our cablegram No. 240 of
17th August [2] and reaffirmed in cablegram No. 286 of 10th
September [3], that the Australian Force to take part in the
occupation of Japan will operate under an Australian Commander who
will be subject only to the Supreme Allied Commander and that it
should not form part of a British Commonwealth Force.

2. You will recall that, prior to the termination of hostilities,
the United Kingdom Government had proposed, in cablegram No. 219
of 4th July [4], the formation of a British Commonwealth Force to
participate in the operations against the Japanese main islands.

The Commonwealth Government agreed in cablegram No. 197 of 20th
July 1945 [5], that the organisation of a British Commonwealth
Force, with an Australian component, would be most desirable for
the maintenance of the prestige of the British Commonwealth in the
Pacific. The Government made it clear, however, in cablegram No.

197 and its subsequent cablegram No. 208 of 1st August [6], that
its agreement was subject to the following conditions:

(a) That Australia, as a Pacific Dominion, should not fail to
participate in the main offensive against Japan. The paramount
consideration was whether the time required to organise and train
a British Commonwealth Force would permit of this.

(b) That any arrangements made for a change in the command setup
relating to the control of the Australian Forces should continue
to provide for Australia having an effective voice in the policy
governing the use of its Forces. This had hitherto been achieved
by the link between the Australian Government and the Commander-
in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and by the following principles
embodied in General MacArthur's directive at the request of the
Australian Government:

'The right of the Government to refuse the use of its Forces for
any project which it considers inadvisable.

The right of the Commanders of the Australian Forces to
communicate direct with the Australian Government.'

(c) Clarification was also sought on the principles to be followed
in the appointment of British Commonwealth Commanders, and it was
pointed out that there are, in the Australian Forces, officers who
have distinguished themselves in the campaigns in the Middle East
and the Pacific who have claims for consideration in the
appointment of Commanders and Staffs.

3. No reply had been received to the questions of principle
referred to in paragraph 2 above, when hostilities terminated, nor
were they referred to when the new proposals for a British
Commonwealth Force to take part in the occupation of Japan were
submitted in your cablegram No. 290 of 13th August. [7] The
previous decision of the Government that an independent Australian
Force should be organised to participate in the occupation of
Japan, safeguarded the principles mentioned, conformed with the
view on Dominion status developed since the Statute of
Westminster, and ensured appropriate recognition of Australia's
status as a separate belligerent of Japan and of her contribution
to the victory in the Pacific.

4. In reviewing its previous decision, the Government has had
regard to the following factors relating to the Organisation of a
British Commonwealth Force of occupation with special reference to
the Australian component:

(a) It had not been possible to achieve, in the initial forces of
occupation, the position contemplated for the Australian Forces in
the spearhead of the advance under the operational plans as
mentioned in paragraph 2(a). This has been due to various causes
and the time factor has, therefore, been largely discounted.

(b) In regard to the provision of maintenance requirements, such
as shipping, base installations, repair facilities, common
technical supplies and stores, fuel and lubricants, it is
appreciated by the Government that these could be better and more
economically arranged as part of a British Commonwealth Force than
as an independent Force.

(c) The proposal that an Australian officer be appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the unified British Commonwealth Force of
Occupation and the procedure under which he would function, would
safeguard the principles referred to in paragraph 2(b) and (c), in
so far as he is concerned, subject, however, to certain
observations in paragraph 6 below.

5. In view of the proposals made by the Australian Prime Minister
in London in May 1944, for the improvement of the machinery of
Empire Co-operation, the organisation of the British Commonwealth
Force and the provision of machinery and procedure for its higher
control along the lines mentioned in paragraph 6 would also afford
an opportunity for experience in the joint higher direction of
British Commonwealth Forces in the Pacific.

6. In the light of the foregoing and by the adoption of the
following arrangement, the Government feels that its views on
questions of principle and status will be satisfactorily met. It
is therefore agreeable to participating in a British Commonwealth
Force on the following basis:

(i) Commander-in-Chief. As proposed in your cablegram No. 349 [8],
an Australian Officer to be appointed as the Inter-Service
Commander-in-Chief of the Unified British Commonwealth Force of
Occupation.

(ii) Staff. The bulk of the Headquarters to be provided by
Australia, but provision should be made for adequate
representation by other Forces included in the British
Commonwealth Force.

(iii) Strength of Australian Component: The Australian component
of the British Commonwealth Force of Occupation is to comprise:

Navy: Two cruisers and two destroyers. This is an interim strength
which is subject to review later.

Army: The initial organisation to be one brigade group, and
consideration to be given later to the raising of a second
brigade.

Air Force: Three Mustang Fighter Squadrons.

(iv) Commander-in-Chiefs Responsibility to General MacArthur: It
is agreed that on operational matters, the Force Commander should
be under the control of and have direct access to General
MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander. It is noted, however, that
units of the British Pacific Fleet in Japanese waters will remain
under the operational control of the Commander-inChief, British
Pacific Fleet.

(v) Commander-in-Chief's Responsibility to United Kingdom and
Australian Governments: On policy and administrative matters, the
Commancler-in-Chief will be jointly responsible to the United
Kingdom and Australian Governments through the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, comprising the Australian Chiefs of Staff and a
representative or representatives of the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff acting for them and exercising authority on their behalf.

All instructions to the Commander-in-Chief will be issued by the
Australian Chiefs of Staff as the agents of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

A directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth
Force will be drawn up by consultation between the Governments
concerned.

(vi) Communications between Governments and between Governments
and the Supreme Allied Commander: The established procedure of
inter-Governmental communication on all matters of policy or
import-ant questions of principle will not be affected by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff arrangement. Governments will also retain
their right to communicate direct with the Supreme Allied
Commander as at present established. These channels must, in fact,
be observed on all matters of policy and important questions of
principle originated by the Commander-in-Chief through the Joint
Chiefs, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or by the Chiefs of Staff
directly with their respective Governments. Technical matters may
be dealt with by Chiefs of Staff through Service channels.

(vii) Relation of Joint Chiefs of Staff Machinery to Australian
Government Machinery: For general administrative purposes and for
submission of matters requiring an inter-governmental exchange of
views, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be viewed as an extension of
the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee which is part of the
machinery of the Defence Department of which the Minister for
Defence is the Ministerial Head.

The same principle will apply to special committees created by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, or where the extension of membership of
existing committees to provide for representation of the Forces of
other parts of the Empire is necessary. Postings of officers to
the joint Service machinery of the Defence Department may be made
by arrangement.

7. The Government would be glad to have your early concurrence in
the arrangements proposed above. [9]

8. It is considered to be of vital importance for the maintenance
of the prestige of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific that
the Force should be organised and despatched to Japan as soon as
possible. The Government is most anxious that the Australian
component should proceed there with the least avoidable delay.

Three Royal Australian Navy ships are already in Tokyo Bay, and
the organisation of the R.A.A.F. component has reached an advanced
stage. The initial Army component is being organised immediately.

The Government has informed General MacArthur of the action which
is being taken, and it is arranging for the immediate despatch of
a small mission, representative of the three Australian Services,
to Tokyo to make necessary preliminary arrangements on a Service
level for the despatch of the Australian Force to Japan. The
Government will be glad to arrange for the Mission to co-operate
with United Kingdom and Dominion representatives concerned in
regard to any preliminary action that may be taken in relation to
other components of the British Commonwealth Force.

9. It is proposed that arrangements be made for the simultaneous
announcement of the organisation of the British Commonwealth
Forces by the Governments concerned as soon as possible, and
urgent advice would be appreciated as to the action proposed in
this respect.

CHIFLEY