Cablegram EC4 LONDON, 12 September 1945, 4 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET
On the first day after arrival in London I saw both Addison and
Bevin and put fully to them the case for direct participation of
Australia in activities of the Council of Foreign Ministers, at
any rate where Australia was specially concerned. I have seen them
both again subsequently and also Attlee on the same matter.
2. All three Ministers are receptive of Australia's viewpoint and
gave evidence of desiring to be helpful.
3. Subsequent to my second interview with Bevin and Addison, the
latter informed me that the United Kingdom Government would make
an opportunity early in the proceedings of the Council to secure
the assent of the other four Governments to the proposition that
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have a 'direct
interest' in the questions of the Italian Peace Treaty, the
disposal of the Italian colonies and any Far Eastern questions
which may come before the Council. The note further stated that
the United Kingdom representative would also propose that the
Council might pass an early resolution expressing its intention to
invite the representatives of Governments thus directly concerned
for consultation and naming the States to whom this invitation
would be sent.
4. The United Kingdom Government also undertook to arrange for
myself to have regular consultations day by day through personal
meetings with Addison which Bevin or his Deputy would attend. This
proposal, while not without considerable value, is not an adequate
substitute for direct participation. Therefore, I sent Bevin a
letter explaining that the test of 'direct interest' did not
adequately meet the case presented by Australia and supported by
the Canadian viewpoint as expressed in the telegram from Mackenzie
King of the 28th of August. The letter stated that the strength of
our case for direct participation in the Council is quite
independent of any 'direct interest' in particular and general
questions and is based on the claim of justice and fair dealing
between the Allies. The case derives from the fact that our war
effort from 1939 to 1945 played a very substantial part in the
defeat of Italy, Germany and Japan and that the right of taking
part in the preparation of the Peace terms is an ordinary incident
of active and successful belligerency, each belligerent nation
being entitled to such a share in the making of the peace as is
commensurate with its contribution towards victory.
5. I pointed out that the general principles of the peace would
probably be settled in the Council and that some representation on
a just basis should be extended so as to include the nations, not
many in number, which have contributed substantially as
belligerents to victory. Certain positive suggestions are now
being taken up by Bevin with a view to our being actually present
at the meetings in the near future. However, the rule adopted at
Potsdam was that no extra representation should be granted without
Five Power unanimity so that we will probably have some setbacks
in the great struggle to safeguard the just claim of Australia.
6. A principal object is to ensure our participation in all
Pacific and Far Eastern matters and this object I always have to
keep in view. The whole matter bristles with difficulties and I
know you will not underrate them.
[AA : A1066, H45/1016/5/2]