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178 Commonwealth Government to Addison

Cablegram 230 CANBERRA, 12 August 1945

MOST IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET

Your D.1415. [1] Proposed United States reply is much to be
preferred in respect of requirement on the Emperor to sign the
actual surrender. Such signature will not weaken but greatly
strengthen the act for the purpose of immediate obedience by
Japanese forces wherever they are. We are convinced of the
advantage of associating the Emperor personally with the collapse
and defeat of Japanese Militarism thus greatly helping to destroy
any legend that he is outside and above responsibility for the
conduct of the war and its ultimate disaster for Japan.

2. The amendment suggested by you in respect of more explicit
orders to the Japanese Military, Naval and Air authorities is an
obvious improvement, provided the Emperor is fully associated with
the Act of Surrender.

3. As stated in our telegram yesterday [2] there must be clear
recognition of supreme and exclusive Allied authority over Japan.

It is vital therefore to make it clear that from the moment of the
signing of the surrender all the powers and prerogatives of the
Emperor will lapse indefinitely and that all authority in relation
to the Japanese Empire will be vested exclusively in the Allied
Command and remain so vested until the final peace settlement.

4. Neither the United States draft nor your own comment on it
meets point of prime importance implicit in the Japanese message,
namely whether the prerogative of the Emperor includes immunity
from charge and possibility of conviction arising out of Emperor's
responsibility for commencement of war of aggression and for
atrocious methods used in the conduct of the war by Japan. Reply
to Japanese message must therefore make it clear that every person
to whom war crimes can be justly imputed shall be liable to
punishment and that under the Potsdam principles no exception to
this general rule is admissible.

5. There is undoubtedly a small but influential school of thought
in some Allied countries which is prepared to save the face of the
Emperor. To this view we are resolutely opposed. Even now the
atrocities which have been proved in the Pacific Campaign through
Japanese action cannot be fully known or appreciated by the Allied
Governments. Even the ultimate fate of our prisoners of war who
have been barbarously ill-treated under the Emperor's orders is
still unknown. In the circumstances we must appeal to you to
undertake to resist any claim of the Emperor or on his behalf to
immunity from punishment, to support us in bringing him to justice
and to deprive him of any authority to rule from the moment of the
surrender. We submit that any other course will effectually
prevent the emergence of a democratic and peace-loving regime in
Japan.

6. Our earlier messages on the above points have been unambiguous
and we earnestly hope that they will be taken into the fullest
consideration and given effect ... both by yourself and the other
governments with whom you are in communication in this matter.

However, we are left with the feeling that our views previously
stated have not in fact so far had adequate consideration and
could not in the circumstances have been taken into account by the
other governments. Because of the time factor and the vital
importance of this matter we are therefore making our views known
direct in Washington, Chungking and Moscow.

7. If a final agreement is reached as to the proposed answer and
our views as stated herein are accepted we would ask that
Australia be expressly associated and by name with the reply.

1 Document 177.

2 Document 176.


[AA : A1066, P45/10/3, ii]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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