Since I had a conversation with you on August 2nd in Canberra
concerning the training of Dutch troops in Australia, the matter
under discussion has, greatly to my displeasure, been aired by the
press.

I am not primarily interested in what is being published in this
matter; I made it a point not to comment on it, however strongly I
have been pressed to do so. I further can assure you that not only
I, but the Netherlands Indies Government and the Netherlands
military authorities, thoroughly disapprove of this publicity and
deplore the mischief it brews.

As an immediate reaction on the first publications in the
Melbourne 'Herald', I have therefore issued a communique, together
with the abovementioned authorities, copy of which I enclose for
your information [1], in which communique it was made quite clear
that no Netherlands or Netherlands Indies official had a hand in
the publication, and that we regret all publicity given to the
matter.

I may add that we expressly prohibited or refused any publicity on
this subject. I have told you and I repeat, that, being accredited
with the Australian Government, I decline to discuss these things
with anybody but the Commonwealth Ministers.

What you told me on the 2nd of August, my dear Prime Minister,
means such a serious disappointment for us and such a serious
setback in our efforts to increase our participation in the war
against Japan, that I venture to approach you once again.

Although, of course, the Commonweath Government has the ultimate
decision in this matter, the change of attitude has come so
unexpectedly and so late that our position has been complicated by
it in an almost irreparable manner.

Ever since the Commonwealth Government, by the letter of the
Minister for External Affairs of September 25th 1944 [2] agreed in
principle to the plan of training about 30,000 troops here,
preparations and details have been discussed between the
Australian Army authorities and the N.E.I. Army Command, both by
experts and on the highest level, on the assumption that the
project would stand, provided they could agree about its
execution. As you will know, these discussions took place, inter
alia, between General Sir Thomas Blamey, Admiral Helfrich and
General van Oyen. [3] Full agreement on the execution was reached,
and it was never even intimated that difficulties of the nature
mentioned in the letter of Mr. Makin of July 11th 1945 [4] would
stand in its way. There was the less reason for us to expect any
objections, as the letter of September 1944 explicitly stated that
a further communication would at once be made to me concerning the
progress of the discussion; from which it may be concluded a
fortiori that I was entitled to a warning if the whole plan would
be endangered. Such a warning, however, did not reach me until
very recently, by rumours to the effect that something was wrong,
but even then no communications were made to me until I asked for
them in my letter of June 16th 1945 [5] and in the conversation
which the Lieutenant Governor-General Dr. van Mock, General van
Oyen and I had with the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Forde, on July
2nd 1945.

The fact that a partial demobilisation was contemplated in this
country had added to our conviction that the project would meet
with no obstacles; it also increased our desire to expedite the
execution in order to contribute to the alleviation of the burden
of war carried by Australia.

It is true that the original schedule provided for a much earlier
arrival of the first troops. The delay, however, is not of our
making, but was caused by difficulties raised, first by S.H.A.E.F.

with regard to the release of the first batches of volunteers, and
then by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with regard to the provision
of transport. We could not foresee that just when these
difficulties were solved or being overcome, the whole project
would be made impossible by a completely unexpected change of
attitude of the Commonwealth Government.

I told you the other day, and I repeat, that I fail to understand
and that I am at a loss how to explain to the Netherlands nation
that-as intimated in Mr. Makin's letter-the training of 27,000
troops, who provide their own Service personnel and for whom a
great part of the equipment is already in stock, would upset the
balance of the Australian manpower position.

I may stress that this decision of the Commonwealth Government
comes at a moment, when a change in the limits between the
American and British operational theatres is pending, which change
may imply a relatively greater share and a greater responsibility
of Australia in the liberation of her nearest neighbour. This will
render the decision still more inexplicable in the eye of the
public.

On the other hand, the development of the last few days may hasten
demobilisation and as a consequence thereof, the availability in
the nearest future of more manpower than originally expected. This
will make a revision of the problem easier.

I may emphasise once more that a definite withdrawal of the
Australian Government's agreement in principle would have most
serious consequences and completely upset our military
preparations.

Taking all this into consideration, you will agree with me, my
dear Prime Minister, that a deterioration in the relations between
our two nations as a result of these unhappy events, should be
avoided.

We on our side have, I can assure you, always tried our very best,
from the first days after the occupation of the Netherlands East
Indies, to stimulate co-operation and friendly feeling between our
countries. I may perhaps remember the fact that in those days we
made available to Australia, at the shortest notice, all the war
material on its way to this theatre in our ships. I cannot help
thinking of the Hospital ship 'Oranje' which entered an Australian
port one of these days on her 37th voyage since she was handed
over by us to the Australian and New Zealand Governments after
transformation to a hospital ship at very high cost.

Personally, I have had the privilege to maintain excellent
relations with your Government and the Australian nation during
three and a half years, and it would be the greatest deception of
my career to see the relations between our countries, who cherish
the same principles and are fighting the common enemy, endangered
by difficulties which, I am convinced, can be overcome with
goodwill on both sides.

I therefore venture to suggest that the decision be reconsidered.

On my side, in order to facilitate the attainment of a modus
vivendi, I would propose a modification of the original plan
consisting in a slight reduction in numbers.

I hope and trust that a satisfactory revision of the problem will
soon be reached. However, I must insist on the urgency of an
answer with the least possible delay. We shall have to promptly
inform the Netherlands Government, the British Chiefs of Staff and
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as decisions are pending which may
have to be fundamentally revised.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Dr. Evatt, and I hope to be
favoured with an answer from you, my dear Prime Minister, at your
earliest convenience.

VAN AERSSEN BEYEREN