Your telegrams D.1223, 1304 [1], 1305, 1306 [2] Siam.

We fully agree it is undesirable that United States Government
take unilateral action and favour the procedure proposed, viz., a
political agreement to be followed by military and other special
arrangements. In the meantime we desire to be associated in the
consultations with the United States and upon advice as to whether
these will be held in London or Washington will instruct our
representative accordingly.

2. We support your view that the state of war with Siam is not to
be treated as a mere technicality. Australia declared war on Siam
as from 2nd March, 1942, on substantial grounds that Siamese
Government had permitted passage of Japanese troops to attack
Malaya, that Siamese troops had invaded Burma and Siam had
declared war on Britain and on our ally the United States. The
Siamese also interned British, American, and Netherlands
nationals, and in other ways assisted Japan. We appreciate the
difficulties of the Siamese Government in 1941 faced with superior
Japanese force and also the reason for American sympathy with
Siamese people, but these should not outweigh realities.

Chauvinist and anti-Western elements in Siam contributed to the
acutely dangerous situation in the Pacific in 1942. Allied
policies toward the future of Siam should be such as to discourage
such influences. While we concede that it is expedient to accept a
resistance Government as an ally against Japan we wish to
emphasise two things.

(i) that the new government must be democratic in character, and
(ii) that because Siam made and assisted Japan to make war against
us treatment of Siam must be stern.

We would oppose any toleration of Fascist elements or tendencies
in government or administration and would resist any endeavour by
the United States to soften the proposed terms.

3. The proposed terms are in general satisfactory. We have the
following suggestions:-

(i) Leaders of pro-Japanese groups and any Siamese who have been
notable for active assistance to Japan to be placed under arrest.

(ii) It should be made clear that Siamese as well as Japanese are
covered by the provision concerning war criminals and that Siamese
who have treated Allied prisoners of war or internees harshly will
be apprehended and punished.

(iii) Siamese obligations in regard to future security to be more
specific, e.g., an undertaking to place at the disposal of a power
or powers specified by the Security Council such maritime,
aviation and other facilities as the Security Council may require.

We would prefer your paragraph E.1. to read (after Indo-China)
'and the security of the Indian Ocean and South West Pacific
Areas'.

(iv) Amnesty for Siamese who have assisted United Nations, e.g.,
in propaganda work. (In this connection we wish to draw your
attention to the distinction between 'APHAIYATHOS' (pardon for a
particular offence) and 'NIRUTHOSAKARM' (complete amnesty) and to
suggest that consideration be given to the use of the latter.) It
might also be considered whether the amnesty should be extended to
cover political offences against the Pibul regime.

4. Reverting to the United States views (your D.1223) the
admission of Siam to membership of the United Nations would depend
on its conduct and on the judgment of the United Nations. We see
no reason for haste about this. We would expect to see Siam pass
through a period akin to tutelage, the first stage of which would
be the occupation and Allied military control through a Siamese
Resistance Government. We would wish to be represented directly on
control bodies at all levels. These and subsequent arrangements
should be compatible with the emergence of indigenous Siamese
government on democratic lines and Siamese co-operation in
international and regional welfare arrangements. We think it
likely that measures of foreign assistance to Siam will be
necessary for these purposes even after the military period,
though it should be a basic policy to modify any such measures
progressively with evidence of Siamese capacity for effective
internal administration and international co-operation. As regards
(2), our concern with security arrangements in this region is as
vital as that of France or China. [3] We find nothing
exceptionable in (3) (Commercial arrangements) or in your
suggestions on Commerce, Navigation and Aviation, provided
Australia's position is not prejudiced. In regard to frontiers, we
think it is not right to discriminate against France even to the
slight extent proposed in (4) (Indo-China Border). [4] Our views
on (5) and (6) [5] have been stated above.