Skip to main content

Historical documents

16 Bruce to Curtin

Cablegram 13[A] LONDON, 26 January 1945, 7.37 p.m.

PERSONAL HIMSELF TOP SECRET

The forthcoming meeting of the Big Three, which is now imminent,
has for some time been causing me considerable concern. So far as
I am aware no information has been sent to you even by the method
of a Prime Minister to Prime Minister telegram giving you an
indication of the subjects likely to be discussed and the line
which the Prime Minister proposes to take with regard to them. [1]
This is embarrassing for us as there will certainly be a number of
questions discussed at the meeting which are of vital concern to
Australia.

While one can indicate the probable subjects that will be dealt
with and can give you some indication of the trend of thought here
upon them, including in some cases the recommendations embodied in
papers that have been prepared on the departmental level, not even
the members of the War Cabinet here know the line the Prime
Minister will take when they are under discussion. This is
particularly true in respect to all matters concerning the
prosecution of the war. As clearly plans for the conduct of the
war in the Pacific will be a major preoccupation of the
conference, Australia is again placed in a position similar to
that prior to the Cairo and Quebec meetings.

While the issues that will have to be determined in respect to the
Pacific and Far East will be present to your mind, I would
emphasise the following:

(1) Possible re-arrangement of commands between Nimitz, MacArthur
and Mountbatten.

(2) Direction of future operations in the South West Pacific Area-
MacArthur in his drive to the Philippines having reached the
northern limit of his command.

(3) Employment of the British fleet under Bruce Fraser.

(4) Employment of Dutch, French and even Portuguese forces for the
reconquest of their respective territories with possible demands
on Australia for assistance in accommodation, equipment and
supplies.

(5) The part to be played by Australian air, sea and land forces
in implementing the strategy agreed.

It is clearly intolerable that we should be faced with a series of
faits accomplis but this would appear to be what is again going to
happen.

The future of Germany, Soviet-Polish relations, Yugoslavia,
Greece, and, in fact, the Balkan problem in its widest aspects,
the basis of world organisation, in addition to the conduct of the
war, are some of the subjects which are certain to be considered.

The question of Russo-Japanese relations may also arise.

While the need for maintaining the utmost secrecy is, I recognise,
imperative, it should not extend to consultation on the highest
level with Dominion Governments.

I suggest for your consideration, if, indeed, you have not already
done so, that a telegram from yourself to the Prime Minister
reminding him of Australia's vital concern in the questions to be
discussed at the meeting would be most valuable. [2]

1 In cablegram D176, dispatched 30 January, Cranborne listed some
probable agenda items. On file AA:A1066, H45/1016/4.

2 Curtin replied that there was little point in repeating views
already expressed to the U.K. Govt, the more when repetition might
cause misunderstandings with Churchill. See his cablegram 31,
dispatched 8 February, on file AA:M100, February 1945.


[AA: A5954, BOX 577]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
Back to top