In connection with Mr. Churchill's cable No. 219 [1] 4th July,
that proposal for a British Commonwealth Land Force to take part
in the operations against the main Japanese Islands has reached
only an exploratory stage as the details of the American plan for
assaulting the main Japanese Islands are not known here. It is
intended to proceed with detailed planning with the Americans and
with the Dominions involved if the offer is accepted in principle
at the forthcoming Conference in Berlin. In the meantime it might
be helpful if I give you some of the thoughts on detail on which I
understand the United Kingdom proposal has been based.

1. It is expected that future operations in the Malayan area will
lead to the capture of Singapore and the opening of the Straits of
Malacca by November, 1945.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff expect to accept responsibility for
the area offered by the Americans after the capture of Singapore
when Admiral Mountbatten will be in a better position to control
his part. It is thought that the Australian Chiefs of Staff may
wish to take over their part of the area by mutual agreement with
General MacArthur at any convenient time after the proposal to
transfer the area to British Control has been agreed to.

3. The proposed dividing line east of the Celebes is tentative.

Admiral Mountbatten will need to plan first for clearing the main
Dutch Islands west of the proposed boundary and for the time being
he can do nothing about the eastern half of the Netherlands East
Indies. The Australian services know the area and are in a better
position to have control of it. It is not intended that this
should automatically involve the Australian Forces in any new
commitments for offensive operations, and it is thought that
alterations by mutual agreement will be desirable when detailed
plans for clearing the Netherlands East Indies are drawn up.

4. Operation against the main Japanese Islands in which a British
Commonwealth Land Force may take part is not likely to begin
before March, 1946. I am not aware of our expectation of a date
for a successful conclusion of the operations in Borneo but there
should be sufficient time before March, 1946, for rearrangement,
if necessary, and reorganisation if you decide to use troops in
Borneo for the proposed task. The arrangements for linking up the
Australian Division with the rest of the Force will, of course, be
a matter for subsequent planning. The main Force is expected to
assemble in India. It is not intended that the Australian Division
will join them there but that they would leave for a forward
rendezvous direct from the Australian area.

5. The Force will need a Tactical Air component of some fifteen
squadrons and again subject to detailed planning it is hoped that
Australia and New Zealand will be able to provide most of this
contingent.

6. You will realise that this information should be treated with
great discretion. Admiral Mountbatten has not yet been told of the
proposal and is expected to be given a directive on the matter
after the Conference in Berlin. He is paying a visit to General
MacArthur almost immediately (not via Australia) but is not to
discuss at this meeting plans for the final stage of the war
against Japan.

In view of the Big Three meeting it would be most helpful if you
could reply not later than 15th July.

BRUCE