Cablegram 219 LONDON, 4 July 1945, 11.40 p.m.
IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL
As you are aware plans for British participation in the Japanese
war have, until now, been restricted to the British Pacific Fleet,
the V.L.R. Bomber Force [2], to operations in S.E.A.C. and to
Australian operations under United States command in the South
West Pacific Area.
2. The overall objective in the war against Japan is to force the
unconditional surrender of the Japanese by:-
(a) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing
sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and
destroying Japanese naval and air strength.
(b) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of
Japan.
We have not hitherto planned to provide land forces to take part
in the operations against the Japanese main islands, but with the
early capture of Rangoon, and the prospect of the opening of the
Malacca Straits before the end of the year, it has been possible
to reconsider the whole problem.
3. A preliminary examination has shown that it might now be
possible to provide a British Commonwealth force of some three to
five divisions carried in British shipping, supported by British
naval forces and a small tactical air component. The whole force
would be placed under United States command.
4. I am well aware that the Australian Government wish to take
part in the main operations against Japan and therefore it would
be most welcome if the Australian Division, which I understand
will be available, would join this force, the R.A.N. form part of
the naval forces involved and the R.A.A.F. squadrons form part of
the air component.
5. I am sending a similar proposal to the Prime Minister of New
Zealand.
6. I am sure you will agree with me that a joint Commonwealth
Force of British, Australian, New Zealand, British-Indian and
possibly Canadian divisions would form a striking demonstration of
Commonwealth solidarity, and that it is important that we should
share with the Americans the burden of the assault on Japan.
If you concur, I will approach the President to obtain agreement
in principle to a proposal on these lines. It would be for the
staffs to work out the exact size, composition and role of the
British Commonwealth force.
7. In presenting our proposal to the Americans, we wish also to
discuss the question of command in the South West Pacific Area.
8. The United States Chiefs of Staff have recently proposed that
they should hand over the South West Pacific Area, less the
Philippines and the Admiralty Islands bases, to British command.
They do not intend, however, to leave in this area any resources
which it is possible to move further forward, and we are therefore
loath to accept responsibility for this area at the time proposed
(15th August).
9. If our proposals for participation in the assault on Japan are
accepted however, it would clearly be desirable eventually to
assume responsibility for South West Pacific Area, particularly if
the Australian Division were taken from that area.
10. Our tentative proposals therefore would take the form that the
United States should hand over responsibility for the South West
Pacific Area, less the Philippines, as soon as practicable,
probably after the recapture of Singapore, and that the Australian
Chiefs of Staff, linked with combined Chiefs of Staff through the
British Chiefs of Staff, should take over that part of the area
east of the Celebes, while the remainder should come under
S.A.C.S.E.A. Details of the boundaries must, of course, await
broad agreement.
11. I would be grateful if you could give me your views on these
proposals. A very early reply would be appreciated in order that
the proposals may be discussed at the next Conference.
[AA : A5954, BOX 2313]