1. Your telegram 85. [1] We agree fully with the view that it is
important that Australia should continue to play a notable and
worthy part until final victory is achieved and that Australia's
war record entitles her to carry out an adjustment in her manpower
position which is equitable in comparison with similar action
being taken by other Allied countries.

2. We fully appreciate the manpower difficulties confronting the
Government, particularly in regard to housing and primary
production. We fear, however, that publication at this juncture
that a further fifty thousand men will be released from the
fighting services by the end of this year might have an adverse
effect on various Conference proposals and also on the part we
shall be able to play in the final Pacific settlement. We have
stressed here repeatedly that the major effort Australia has made
and intends to continue until Japan is defeated entitles us to
special consideration of our views and this is generally accepted.

3. We are not clear as to [2] on the Army and Air Force of the
decision to release a further fifty thousand and would like some
information on the following points:-

(a) Having regard to the anticipated repatriation within six
months of 17,000 R.A.A.F. and 6,500 prisoners of war, that
proportionate corresponding reductions are to be made in the Army
and Air Force and that reduction will also be effected in base and
L. of C. [3] units, what is the contemplated operational strength
of the Army at the end of 1945, and at what date will the Army be
reduced to three divisions?
(b) What are the present and proposed intakes of males into the
Army and Air Force?
(c) Will the proposed intakes be sufficient to replace wastage in
the three services and to maintain for the duration of the war the
tentative objectives of strength referred to in paragraph 13?
(d) The tentative objective of strength for the Army involves
reduction of the present operational forces from six to three
divisions and it is stated that corresponding proportionate
reductions will be made in the Air Force. Does this mean that the
Air Force organisation will be reduced from 53 to approximately 26
squadrons?
4. In paragraph 7 it is stated that the Government views with some
anxiety the possibility that the use of two divisions in Borneo
may result in a prolonged commitment. We feel that, in any case,
it would be difficult to avoid such a commitment wherever the two
assault divisions are employed. This will certainly be so if they
are associated with American forces in forward movement against
Japan under General MacArthur (see paragraph 18 of your
cablegram).

5. Re paragraph 14. Information will be sought from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff as to whether more definite advice can be given as
to the period to be adopted as basis for planning for the war
against Japan. 6. We agree with the views expressed in paragraphs
16 and 17 regarding operational control of Australian forces and
the necessity for allocation of sufficient shipping, equipment,
etc., to sustain operations under Australian control.

7. Re paragraph 19. What is the size of the token force proposed
to be assigned to South East Asia Command? Would this force be
part of the objective strengths mentioned in paragraph 13?
8. Are we right in assuming that General Blamey and the Chiefs of
Staff concur in these Proposals?
9. Will await your reply and any further information before any
action is taken with the United States authorities.

FORDE
EVATT