299 Churchill to Curtin
Cablegram Winch 11 LONDON, 25 September 1944, 12.10 a.m.
IMMEDIATE PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET
Further to my WINCH number 8. 
The First Sea Lord has, at my request, prepared the following
notes upon the facilities for which we shall ask Australia through
regular channels to enable the main British Fleet to operate in
decisive operations against Japan. I hope we can count on your
aid: I shall be glad to hear from you on this point.
1. The maintenance of the British Fleet in the Pacific so that it
can participate in main operations against Japan will necessitate
the use of Australian facilities to provide our main fleet base
2. A broad picture of our requirements is listed below in order to
give some idea of problems. The list is neither complete nor
3. Our main requirements are:-
(A) Use and expansion of existing ship repair facilities at Sydney
and other ports on the east coast of Australia.
(B) Development of existing British storage facilities for all
types of stores, chiefly in the Sydney and Brisbane area, but also
to a lesser extent in the Darwin area and minor Queensland ports.
Small facilities may also be required at Fremantle.
(C) Establishment of necessary assembly, repairs and storage
facilities for naval aircraft chiefly in the Sydney and Brisbane
area and to a limited extent in the Darwin area.
(D) Provision for accommodation and hospital accommodation for the
personnel who will be concerned with the above undertakings and
with the administration of the Fleet.
4. It is intended to make the fullest possible use of
installations which the Americans will vacate as they move forward
in the Pacific. This question has been discussed in some detail
with Admiral King who is agreeable and is taking action with the
United States Navy and Army Commanders in the Australian area, who
no doubt will discuss the matter with the Australian Chiefs of
5. The plans of the broad requirements supplied by above have of
course been provisionally worked out under the order of the
Australian Chiefs of Staff by the British S.O.  now in
6. It is suggested that the details of arrangements should be
discussed between the British and Australian Chiefs of Staff and
between the Admiralty and the Australian Navy Board.
[AA:A5954, BOX 560]