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190 Commonwealth Government to Cranborne

Cablegram 133 CANBERRA, 10 June 1944

MOST SECRET

Your telegram D.765 of 23rd May. [1]

Australian Government is interested to learn of proposed course of
action with regard to Italy and on the assumption that replacement
of Badoglio by Bonomi [2] does not affect your willingness to
proceed with it, would appreciate further details. We should be
glad to learn in the first instance what is envisaged by
preliminary peace treaty.

2. We note that fulfilment of conditions (a) and (b) in paragraph
3 of your telegram, which we agree would have to be insisted upon,
would postpone treaty for a considerable time. It would not,
however, necessarily involve its postponement until the end of the
war.

3. As you know the Australian and New Zealand Governments have set
on record [3] their firm view that final peace settlement should
be made in respect of all our enemies after hostilities with all
of them are concluded. We should therefore be reluctant in the
extreme to see a preliminary peace with Italy, especially as this
might serve as a precedent for similar treaties with other
countries, particularly Axis satellites. In case of Italy final
peace settlement will no doubt involve territorial adjustments and
other concessions & we would expect these to be influenced by the
development of events in France, Austria and Yugoslavia. We fail
to see how freedom of action to insist on these requirements can
be retained once some form of peace treaty has been concluded.

4. In the circumstances we should be reluctant to see anything
more than a revised armistice agreement arise from your proposals
leaving us free to make such demands on Italy as may be necessary
at the appropriate time in the interests of the general European
settlement.

5. The terms of your telegram D.728 of 13th May [4] suggest that
there need be no great hurry to concede Badoglio's requests.

Togliatti [5] has apparently dissociated himself from them and as
a gradual transformation of the Italian Government in a leftward
direction is highly probable his views are important. Even an
undertaking now to consider a preliminary peace later is, we
think, open to the objections set out in paragraph 3 above.

6. We should be very glad to be kept informed of the development
of this matter.

1 On file AA:A989, 44/455/2/1. The cable advised that following an
approach from Badoglio (Italian Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister until 9 June) for recognition of Italy as an ally, the
U.K. Govt was considering its policy towards that country. It was
thought that Allied public opinion would not favour the immediate
granting of Allied status to Italy. Cranborne suggested instead, a
preliminary peace treaty based on two conditions: a) the military
position and b) Allied satisfaction that the Italian Govt
represented the majority of Italians. This proposal was to be put
to both the U.S. and Soviet Govts.

2 Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from 9 June.

3 See Document 26.

4 In AA:A3195, 1944, 1.18217.

5 Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party.


[AA:A989, 44/455/2/1]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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