Extract LONDON, 26 May 1944, 11.30 a.m.

TOP SECRET

PRESENT
The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.,
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (in the Chair)
The Rt. Hon. John Curtin, M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia
The Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister
The Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production
Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the War Cabinet, War Council
and
Department of Defence (Australia)
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, First Sea Lord and
Chief of Naval Staff
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of
the Air Staff
The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs The Rt. Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport
General Sir Thomas Blamey, General Officer Commanding Australian
Military Forces
Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Office of the Minister of
Defence

SECRETARIAT
Major General L. C. Hollis
Lieut.-Colonel D. Capel-Dunn

1. STRATEGY FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
THE PRIME MINISTER said that, as Mr. Curtin was aware, discussions
had been proceeding over many months on the best contribution that
the British Empire could make in the operations for the overthrow
of Japan. The plan which was outlined in the document that had
been sent to Mr. Curtin [1] did not represent a compromise between
conflicting points of view, but was a new project altogether. The
Prime Minister said that his principal objection to the so-called
'Pacific' strategy had been that the long lines of communication
would mean the expenditure of a formidable effort resulting in the
end in only a small operational dividend. For long he had favoured
an operation for the occupation of the tip of Sumatra with the
object of securing air domination over Malaya and Siam. The
present proposal dealt with a situation which was remote in the
sense that it was unlikely that we would have many land or air
forces available during this year. The sooner, however, we began
to plan, the sooner could our operations begin. It was, in his
view, essential that the British Empire as a whole should play an
important part in the overthrow of Japan, so that the slur on our
reputation that the earlier Japanese successes had inflicted
should be wiped out.

MR. CURTIN said that he had not had time to consider the Chiefs of
Staff proposal, and it would be quite impossible for him to
express any firm opinion on it, or to offer any reasonable
criticism. Neither was it possible for him, in the absence of any
discussion with his colleagues in the Commonwealth Government, to
commit himself to any changes in the Command arrangements in the
South-West Pacific area. He referred to the history of those
Command arrangements. First there had been the A.B.D.A. Command.

This had been arranged by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
and the President of the United States, and the Australian
Government had had no say in its creation nor in the instructions
given. Subsequently, there had been established the Pacific War
Councils in London and Washington. The London body had, to all
extents and purposes, ceased to exist, and the Washington body was
completely defunct. He, therefore, had had to deal with General
MacArthur as an Allied Commander with Headquarters established in
Australia. He feared that there was a danger of the gravest
misunderstandings with the United States if Australian forces were
taken away from General MacArthur's direct command and placed
under a new Commander.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he wished to make it quite clear that
there was no intention whatever of submitting firm proposals that
day. It was essential that these matters be fully discussed with
the United States Chiefs of Staff, but it was also desirable that
Mr. Curtin should know the way in which our minds were working. It
was now 6 months since there had been any meeting between the
British and American Chiefs of Staff, and it was essential that
such a meeting should take place shortly. All that we were asking
of the Australian Government at this stage was that they should
help us to find out what base facilities existed, or could be
developed, in Australia. Upon the result of this enquiry might well
depend the shape our strategy took.

MR. CURTIN, reverting to the question of command, pointed out that
the decision on this issue could not be taken without
consideration of the past. There was a heritage of successful
association and collaboration between the Australian Government
and General MacArthur's Headquarters. That was a fact which was
bound to influence the Australian attitude in this matter.

Mr. Curtin referred to the letter which he had addressed on 17th
May to the Prime Minister [2], in which he had set out a number of
questions upon which he would like to have answers for
communication to his Government on his return. His principal
requirement was a decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to
whether additional forces were ultimately to be sent to the
Pacific or not. The Australia Government had to take decisions
regarding the balance of their war effort, and upon the size of
the forces likely to be based on Australia would depend the
measures to be taken by the Australian Government for their supply
and maintenance. He would like an expression of opinion regarding
the desirability of Australia proceeding with such measures.

THE MINISTER OF PRODUCTION said that Mr. Curtin should know that
we in this country should be able to give Australia relief in the
production of primary munitions to almost any extent likely to be
required. This should make available considerable Australian
productive capacity in other directions.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that it was not proposed that all the
forces sent from the European theatre to Australia should be
maintained by Australia. On the question of command, he wished to
make it clear that we were not suggesting an immediate change, but
that since we hoped to build up to a substantial share in the
operations in the Pacific war, we felt that we had the right to
some say in the control of those operations. At present General
MacArthur took his directions from the American Chiefs of Staff
and we had no say whatsoever.

MR. CURTIN said that he understood that it was the wish of the
United Kingdom Government to maintain imports from Australia at
their present level, but not to increase them. There were
interests in Australia which pressed for increased exports to the
United Kingdom. He would like Lord Leathers' opinion on this
matter.

THE MINISTER OF WAR TRANSPORT said that there were certain
limitations, particularly as regards refrigerated ships, which
made an increase of certain imports from Australia out of the
question. He undertook to prepare a note for Mr. Curtin on the
transport aspects of exports from Australia to this country.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, at the request of Mr. Curtin, undertook to
provide a note on the help in manning the naval units that we
would like to have from Australia. He pointed out that towards the
end of this year it was hoped to hand over to the Royal Australian
Navy one aircraft carrier and two cruisers.

MR. CURTIN enquired regarding the transfer of R.A.A.F. squadrons
back to Australia.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was most anxious to meet Mr.

Curtin's wishes in this matter, but it was not possible to give a
firm undertaking at this stage, as much would depend upon the
course events took in the OVERLORD [3] battle. Once we could see
daylight, we would arrange the transfer according to Mr. Curtin's
wishes.

IT WAS AGREED:-

(i) That the Prime Minister would send a reply to Mr. Curtin's
letter of the 17th May, in the light of the above discussion and
of the conference held at Chequers on 21st May [4], answering so
far as possible the various questions set out therein, and
including an indication of the line which His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom would like Mr. Curtin to take during his
forthcoming discussions with the American Chiefs of Staff.

(ii) To invite the Minister of War Transport to prepare a note for
Mr. Curtin on the transport aspects of the export trade from
Australia to the United Kingdom.

(iii) To invite the First Sea Lord to prepare for Mr. Curtin a
note on the return of Australian naval personnel serving overseas,
and upon the possible assistance in the transfer of warships that
the Admiralty might be able to afford to the Royal Australian
Navy.

[matter omitted]