After some discussion the PRIME MINISTER suggested, and Mr. Curtin
agreed, that Australia's war effort might be apportioned as
follows:-

(a) The maintenance of six divisions for active operations.

(b) The maintenance of the Royal Australian Navy at its present
strength plus additions arising from the Australian naval
construction programme.

(c) The maintenance of the Royal Australian Air Force at the
strength of 53 squadrons to be achieved under the present
programme by December 1944. This excludes:-

3 R.A.F. squadrons in Australia
2 N.E.I. " " "

2 Permanent R.A.A.F. squadrons serving overseas
R.A.A.F. E.A.T.S. squadrons and personnel serving overseas.

(d) Food for Great Britain (including India) to be exported on the
1944 scale.

MR. CURTIN said that now the threat to Australia had receded, it
would probably be possible to effect a reduction in home defence
personnel, although the manner in which an overall reduction was
effected in the Army, so as to avoid hardship to those soldiers
who had been away from their homes for some years, would need
careful working out by the Commonwealth Government.

Mr. Curtin also stated that, in the light of the strengths laid
down for the Forces, the Commonwealth Government would be able to
review the extent and nature of other aspects of the Australian
war effort. This would enable it to assess what could be done for
the supply and maintenance of British Forces which might be based
on Australia, in addition to the present similar commitments for
the United States Forces. As demands would exist somewhere for
supplies that could be produced, it might be feasible to go ahead
with increased production. For example, if increase in food
production were not required for United Kingdom Forces, they could
be sent to the United Kingdom or the ceilings at present imposed
on the United States Forces could be raised to some degree.

THE PRIME MINISTER then outlined the present stage that had been
reached in the studies which had been devoted during the past nine
months to our strategy for the war against Japan, with particular
reference to the employment of British Forces. Referring to
paragraph 13(a) of Mr. Curtin's letter of the 17th May, the Prime
Minister suggested that Mr. Curtin, with such advisers as he might
wish to accompany him, should meet him and the Chiefs of Staff at
a conference the following Friday to discuss the general question
of our strategy and the employment of our forces in the Far East.

He hoped that by that time some progress would have been made in
formulating our own views on the subject, but it would be
necessary to discuss these matters ultimately with General
Marshall and Admiral King, either in London or Washington.

MR. CURTIN said that his own views were very closely akin to those
expressed by the Prime Minister.

IT WAS AGREED:-

(a) That the matter raised in paragraph 13(a) of Mr. Curtin's
letter of the 17th May should be discussed at a meeting to be held
on Friday morning, the 26th May.

(b) That the Admiralty should be invited to furnish their views on
the matter referred to in sub-paragraph 9(a) of Mr. Curtin's
letter.

(c) That the Air Ministry should be invited to furnish their views
on the matter referred to in sub-paragraph 9(b) of Mr. Curtin's
letter.

3. RETURN TO AUSTRALIA OF R.A.A.F. UNITS NOW IN THE U.K.

MR. CURTIN said that he was anxious to start a return flow of
Royal Australian Air Force personnel from the U.K. back to
Australia. He would prefer that complete units should return.

THE PRIME MINISTER felt certain that this matter could be arranged
satisfactorily. The flow could be accelerated if and when the
strength of the G.A.F. [3] had been further reduced.

4. AUSTRALIAN MEAT SUPPLIES FOR U.S. FORCES
After a short discussion the PAYMASTER-GENERAL undertook to
prepare an Aide-Memoire for Mr. Curtin on the above subject.

[AA:A5954, BOX 5]

1 The letter published as Document 153 was attached to these
minutes.

2 On file AA:A5954, box 5.

3 German Air Force (i.e. Luftwaffe).