Please communicate to the Prime Minister [1] the following
personal and most secret message from the Prime Minister. [2]
(Begins).

The combined staffs are preparing a paper on the Pacific situation
but I venture to send you in advance a brief foreword. We are
trying our best to avoid war with Japan both by conceding on
points where Japanese military clique can perhaps force a rupture
and by standing up where ground is less dangerous as in arrests of
individuals. I do not think myself that Japan will declare war
unless Germany can make a successful invasion of Britain. Once
Japan sees that Germany has either failed or dares not try I look
for easier times in the Pacific. In adopting against the grain a
yielding policy towards Japanese threat we have always in mind
your interests and safety.

2. Should Japan nevertheless declare war on us her first objective
outside the Yellow Sea would probably be the Dutch East Indies.

Evidently the United States would not like this. What they would
do we cannot tell. They give no undertaking of support but their
main Fleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to the
Japanese Admiralty. In this first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war
we should of course defend Singapore which if attacked, which is
unlikely, ought to stand a long seige. We should also be able to
base on Ceylon a battle cruiser and a fast aircraft carrier which
with Australian and New Zealand ships which would return to you
would exercise a very powerful deterrent upon hostile raiding
cruisers.

3. We are about to reinforce with more first-class units the
Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. This Fleet could of course at any
time be sent through the Canal into the Indian Ocean or to relieve
Singapore. We do not want to do this even if Japan declares war
until it is found to be vital to your safety. Such a transference
would entail complete loss of Middle East and all prospects of
beating the Italians in the Mediterranean would be gone. We must
expect heavy attacks on Egypt in the near future and the Eastern
Mediterranean Fleet is needed to help in repelling them. If these
attacks succeed the Eastern Fleet would have to leave the
Mediterranean either through the Canal or by Gibraltar. In either
case a large part of it would be available for your protection. We
hope however to maintain ourselves in Egypt and to keep the
Eastern Fleet at Alexandria during the first phase of an Anglo-
Japanese war should that occur. No one can lay down beforehand
what is going to happen. We must first weigh events from day to
day and use our available resources to the utmost.

4. A final question arises whether Japan having declared war would
attempt to invade Australia or New Zealand with a considerable
army. We think this very unlikely because Japan is first absorbed
in China secondly would be gathering rich prizes in the Dutch East
Indies and thirdly would fear very much to send an important part
of her Fleet far to the southward leaving American Fleet between
it and home. If however contrary to prudence and self-interest
Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale
I have explicit authority of Cabinet to assure you that we should
then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid
sacrificing every interest except only defence position of this
island on which all depends.

5. We hope however that events will take a different turn. By
gaining time with Japan the present dangerous situation may be got
over. We are vastly stronger here at home than when I cabled to
you on 16th June. [3] We have a large army now beginning to be
well-equipped. We have fortified our beaches. We have a strong
reserve of mobile troops including our regular army and
Australian, New Zealand and Canadian contingents with several
armoured divisions or brigades ready to strike in counter attack
at head of any successful lodgments. We have ferried over from the
United States their grand aid of nearly one thousand guns, six
hundred thousand rifles with ammunition complete. Relieved of the
burden of defending France our army is becoming daily more
powerful and munitions are gathering. Besides this we have a home
guard of 1,500,000 men many of them war veterans and most with
rifle or other arms.

6. The R.A.F. continue to show the same individual superiority
over the enemy on which I counted so much in my aforesaid cable to
you. Thursday's important air action in the Channel showed that we
could attack against odds of three to one and inflict losses of
three and a half to one.

Astounding progress has been made by Lord Beaverbrook [4] in
output of best machines. Our fighter and bomber strength is nearly
double what it was when I cabled you and we have a very large
reserve of machines in hand. I do not think that the German Air
Force has the numbers or quality to overpower our air defences.

7. The Navy increases in strength each month and we are now
beginning to receive immense programme started at the declaration
of war. Between June and December 1940 over 500 vessels large and
small but many most important will join the Fleet. The German Navy
is weaker than it has ever been. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are
both in dock damaged. Bismarck has not yet done her trials.

Tirpitz is three months behind Bismarck. There are available now
in this critical fortnight after which time invasion is getting
very late one pocket-battleship, a couple of 8 inch Hipper, two
light cruisers, perhaps a score of destroyers. To try to transport
large army as would now be needed for success across seas
virtually without naval escort in face of our navy and air force
only to meet our powerful military force on shore still less to
maintain such an army and its lodgments with munitions and
supplies would be a very unreasonable act. On the other hand if
Hitler fails to invade and conquer Britain before the weather
breaks he has received his first and probably his fatal check.

8. We therefore feel a sober and growing conviction of our power
to persevere through the year or two that may be necessary to gain
victory. Ends.