Your cable No. 386 regarding the Middle East [1] much appreciated.

With no desire to add to your anxieties but so that you will know
the views which we strongly entertain, I send the following for
your consideration-
1. The opinion that an attack upon Cyprus on a large scale by
airborne troops is impracticable should, in the light of recent
experience, be heavily discounted. If the Germans attack it, they
will certainly throw in enough numbers for the task.

2. The present garrison of Cyprus seems hopelessly inadequate,
while the Air Force, on our latest information, is negligible.

3. It therefore seems to us that Cyprus must be either abandoned
or reinforced to the point at which it can be held. Public opinion
would be greatly strained by what would be regarded as a useless
sacrifice of an inadequate force.

4. We are concerned about the delay in the movement into Syria,
though we recognise that at this distance the difficulties in
allotting and marshalling troops and establishing bases are not
always clearly visible.

5. There is some professional support at this end for the view,
which I understand has been put forward by Smuts [2], that Syria
should have priority over Cyrenaica. If it were possible to take
decisive action in Syria without so weakening the Egyptian
frontier as to permit of successful German attack from Libya, I
would agree with this. But the impression I formed in England was
that any real subtraction from the Force which you design to move
into Cyrenaica might jeopardise the Canal from that side. If this
is not so, an early blocking of the Syrian Inlet may well be of
more immediate urgency than a Cyrenaican advance, since it is the
one move which can avoid a battle on two fronts.

6. Such Army appreciations from the Middle East as we have seen
still appear to us gravely to under-estimate the extent of the use
which the enemy may make of airborne troops and to over-emphasise
purely land operations rather than joint land and air operations.

Moreover, the German speed of movement upsets all time-tables, and
estimates of the possible date or period by which he may make some
particular move are usually falsified. It is for these reasons
that we attach such tremendous importance to air reinforcement,
since it would appear that it is only by a full use of fighting
planes that a dangerous German footing in Syria can be avoided.

And, after all, if we hold Syria we ought to be able to command
Cyprus. [3]

Kindest regards and thoughts in your great responsibilities. You
will appreciate immense Government and public interest here, and
our desire to be kept constantly in touch with developments and
movements. [4]

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