I am very much obliged to you for your telegram July 27th [1] and
for the opportunity of perusing the instructions you have
forwarded to your High Commissioner in London [2] with reference
to the Far East situation. Our own views remain very much as
expressed in my telegram July 3rd [3] and while we entirely agree
that it is in the highest degree advisable to avoid hostilities
with Japan in our present circumstances, we have never felt that
the concession to aggression and threats is the best or indeed at
all a promising way of achieving that end. We have never believed
and we do not now believe that it was either wise or proper to
attempt to placate Japan on the question of Burma Road, especially
as any concession in this respect was necessarily at the expense
of China, was a violation of International undertakings to which
we are a party and involved a grave risk of misunderstanding and
resentment in the United States of America.

We have never understood why the policy set out in the Secretary
of State for Dominion Affairs' telegram to us No. 201 [4] of 2nd
July (containing British reply to your telegram 27th June [5],
which seemed to us to be as reasonable and sensible as
circumstances would allow, and with which we, and I believe you
also, expressed agreement, was changed without further
consultation with us to one of retreat and concession. The policy
of 'appeasement' is in our view no more likely to be successful in
the Far East than it was in Europe; if indeed, as evidenced for
example by the recent change of Government in Japan, it has not
already failed, and we would be most reluctant to associate
ourselves with any further attempt of this nature which would, we
feel, be wrong in principle and in practice more likely to
precipitate aggression even against us than to provide a solution
of the difficulties between Japan and China, or still less form a
foundation for a better international order in the Far East. It
may well be, however, and we say it with regret, that having now
adopted a policy of concession, any alteration, and particularly
any reversal of that policy, may now have become very dangerous.

In short, while we neither understand nor sympathize with the
policy that has been adopted vis-a-vis Japan, we are nevertheless
unwilling by stressing this view to add unnecessarily and perhaps
uselessly to the difficulties of His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom whose decision on this difficult and delicate
matter we have accepted in the past and will no doubt accept in
the future.

We have no specific comments and no objections to make to the
considerations set out in your telegram except that we gravely
question the possibility of enlisting United States support for
any policy of concession to Japanese aggression and, while we
would support your suggested attempt to obtain United States and
Russian collaboration in this matter, we would not feel that this
offers any substantial promise of success.

We warmly endorse your suggestion that His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom should be requested to afford to us in future
the opportunity of considering and commenting upon any further
proposed action with [sic] the Far East and, particularly in
respect of any further negotiations with Japan, in ample time to
allow expression and consideration of our views before the
position is compromised.

Finally we attach the greatest importance to the fullest possible
exchange of views on this matter between New Zealand and Australia
of which we for our part fully assure you and which we confidently
assume is the policy of Australia also.

In our opinion, the position in the Far East whatever its day to
day fluctuation is very serious.

The text of this communication is being repeated to the Secretary
of State for Dominion Affairs as telegram No. 299.