Following is summarized report of official discussions during the
week ended 28th February, the references being to parts of brief
PART I
(1) Political
Far East and Anglo-French policy discussed with Foreign Office.

Following are main points:

(a) Far Eastern policy
The Japanese Ambassador in London [1] has been warned of serious
view of situation taken by His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom and efforts are being made to intensify propaganda
designed to persuade Japan that her policy will end in disaster.

Much will depend on the strength and vigour of reactions which
United States may be prepared to display to any further Japanese
encroachments. I can add nothing further regarding United States
to my observations in No. 153 [2] but this aspect will shortly be
reviewed again.

I urged however that diplomatic policy towards Japan should not be
one of resignation to inevitability of a conflict.

There is nothing to add to the position of China as reported
before I left Australia and importance of assisting her to carry
on conflict with Japan in order to handicap the latter in new
adventures elsewhere.

The United Kingdom Government are keeping in close touch with the
United States Government and are trying to, so far as possible,
co-operate with their assistance to China with United States
measures of a like purpose.

The latter position in regard to co-operation with the Netherlands
East Indies is governed by recent staff talks at Singapore. The
report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East [3] is just to
hand and is being examined.

The situation in regard to Thailand is obscure and is governed by
the outcome of present negotiations in Tokyo. These will also no
doubt determine the future of Indo-China.

The United Kingdom Government's policy is to maintain friendly
contact with [... ] [4] Governor-General of Indo-China [5] in
order to encourage the French to protect the independence of the
territory against Japanese infiltration.

(b) Franco-British Relations
It was reported that only satisfactory elements in situation from
our point of view are that the French in occupied zone are
intensely anti-German and almost unanimously [sic] (apart from a
handful of pro-German agitators in Paris) in longing for a British
victory and that majority of Frenchmen in unoccupied France feel
the same although less intense, that we have Petain's [6] word
that he will not surrender fleet or bases to Germany, that he will
never forget that Great Britain his ally, and that he is
stubbornly resolved not to go beyond Armistice terms in his
collaboration with Germany.

The United Kingdom Government find it impossible to establish any
direct touch with Vichy and they have recently refused to accept
even a British financial representative in France. I find,
however, that for obvious reasons Vichy prefers not to appear too
friendly to us and that on the whole Petain feels that criticism
of him in England, provided it is restrained, strengthens his
position.

(2) Strategy
(a) Far East appreciation.

(b) Staff conversations.

(c) Singapore conference report.

These were discussed with Service Ministers and Chiefs of Staff
Far East appreciation furnished in your telegram No. 97 [7] to
Dominions Office is being examined by the Chiefs of Staff and will
be discussed shortly.

Staff conversations with the Dutch are subject of a report by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Far East just received.

The Staff conversations with United States are now in progress and
further advice will be furnished later.

Singapore Conference Report is related to recent conference held
at Singapore and will be discussed further at a later date. I am
examining measures taken or proposed for strengthening the defence
of Singapore in comparison with recommendations of original
conference and will make appropriate representations where
necessary. In the meantime I am pressing most strongly for
despatch of additional fighter squadrons which the Commander-in-
Chief pronounced are his greatest need and in which subtraction
from fighter strength here would be much less significant than
addition to strength of Singapore.

(d) Middle East appreciation. This was covered by my telegram No.

153.

MENZIES