Extract [LONDON], 18 February 1941
The Dutch Minister came to see me [1] and told me that he had
recently drafted a note to the Foreign Office on behalf of his
Government. He pointed out that as Australia had been mentioned in
the note he felt he should come and show it to me. He then read to
me the memorandum attached which he left with me. In reading the
memorandum he amplified some of the points slightly. The
amplifications were down the lines that a Declaration without the
United States of America being associated with it would be a
mistake and would probably do more harm than good. The Dutch
Minister also emphasised the danger, even if the United States
were associated, of its being made public for the reasons stressed
in the third paragraph of the Memorandum that such publicity would
possibly give an opportunity to the wilder spirits in Japan.
After expressing my appreciation of his having shown me the
Memorandum I agreed that any action without the co-operation of
the United States of America would be a mistake. I also told him
that I thought there was much to be said for his point that a
public declaration might give an opportunity to the extremists to
inflame the passions in Japan. I said, however, that I thought it
was essential if we could induce America to come in that the
warning should be conveyed through diplomatic channels to Japan.
I put it to the Minister, however, that it seemed to me we should
not wait, as appeared to be suggested in the second last
paragraph, for further aggressive action by Japan, but that the
warning should be conveyed before Japan had committed herself to
any further aggression. In any event I indicated that in my view
the Memorandum was all to the good as it would tend to clarify the
situation and make it necessary for the United Kingdom Government
to determine upon the line they proposed to pursue.
S. M. B[RUCE]
[AA:A2937, NETHERLANDS LEGATION NO. 1 (PRELIMINARY) (9.10.40 TO