Circular cablegram Z38 LONDON, 7 February 1941, 1.20 a.m.
MOST SECRET
Please give the following message to the Prime Minister [1] for
his most secret and personal information. BEGINS. Far East.
Evidence is accumulating that the Japanese may already have
decided to push on southward even if this means war. Press reports
indicate that Japan is using her position as mediator between
Thailand and Indo-China to gain (besides a preferential economic
position) naval base at Camranh Bay, air bases in southern Indo-
China and control of Indo-China customs. There is also reason to
suppose that some military agreement with Thailand directed
against our territories and the Netherlands East Indies is under
consideration.
2. Following are a few 'straws in the wind'.
(a) H.M. Ambassador at Tokyo [2] has reported general feeling
among Japanese that crisis in Far East will come within the next
few weeks (my Circular telegram D. No. 46 [3]).
(b) Cancellation of sailings of certain Japanese ships to the
United States of America and reports of their being commandeered
by the Japanese Government. Reports so far received from our naval
authorities in Singapore do not confirm that general measures of
this kind have been taken.
(c) Continued supply of Japanese munitions to Thailand.
(d) Intercepted telephone conversation between two Japanese at
Surabaya and Lawang to the effect that Japanese attack would take
place on 10th February. Governor of East Java [4] attaches no
undue importance to conversation but thinks that it cannot be
disregarded.
(e) Statement by Japanese naval officer to students of the Malay
language that the time was very short indeed.
(f) Japanese ship Asaka Maru intended to carry Japanese naval
personnel to Berlin for which Japanese have requested safe conduct
from us. (Japanese Ministry of Marine admit that Asaka Maru is
taking some naval stores as well to Lisbon. We have reason to
suspect that Japanese also intend to bring back 3,000 tons of
German machinery from Lisbon). The time-table of this ship,
however, seems to indicate action not contemplated until mid-
March.
(g) Reports from French source in Indo-China of concentrations in
Formosa and Hainan.
3. We have moreover received sure indications that on 4th February
the Japanese Embassy here were warned to reduce to a minimum
contacts with British friends and to be ready to leave London at
short notice. On 5th February meeting was called at the Japanese
Embassy to discuss supplementary (?) instructions which appear to
relate to some scheme of co-operation with Germany advocated by
Army Party in Japan.
4. While none of these pointers may be conclusive in themselves
they suggest further move is impending.
5. H.M. Ambassador Washington has been instructed to communicate
the above in strict confidence to the United States State
Department. [5]
6. H.M. Ambassador Tokyo has drawn attention once more to the
danger of Japanese squeezing out Singapore through Indo-China and
Thailand. The situation in this area is being urgently reviewed in
the light of most recent developments and estimate of the position
will be sent you as soon as possible. ENDS. [6]
[AA:A1608, J41/1/7, i]