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250 Memorandum by Department of External Affairs

Extract 13 January 1941

SECRET

FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

[matter omitted]

Free French Movement in Australia
43. In Australia, while, in accordance with the wishes of the
French Government that its diplomatic and consular relations with
the British Dominions should be retained, the Commonwealth
Government has continued to recognise the French Consulates, it
has openly co-operated with M. Brenac, General de Gaulle's
appointee as leader of the Free French Movement. It is true that,
in view of the continued recognition of the French Consulates in
Australia, it has not been possible for the Commonwealth
Government to grant any form of official recognition to M. Brenac,
but at the same time close contact has been maintained with him
and the Movement. The position in Australia in this respect
differs from that which obtains in Canada where the situation has
remained ambiguous. The French Ministern [1] is still in Ottawa,
but a nation-wide organisation, formed by General de Gaulle in the
Dominion soon after the collapse of France, is also in existence.

This organisation, however, does not appear to have received any
encouragement or 'unofficial' recognition as yet from the Dominion
Government, nor is anything known of any active steps being taken
for the recruitment of volunteers for General de Gaulle.

44. From the foregoing summary, it will be seen that the attitude
of the Commonwealth Government towards New Caledonia and the Free
French Movement in general has been largely dictated by practical
necessities. For the political and economic reasons already
mentioned, there has been no alternative to a policy of co-
operation with and assistance to New Caledonia. So far as the
French Government is concerned, the action taken by the
Commonwealth Government in relation to New Caledonia cannot be
regarded as inimical to its interests. On the contrary our policy
is calculated in the long run to preserve the integrity of French
possessions in the Pacific with a view to the eventual restoration
of the French Empire.

CONCLUSIONS
45. Even so, the degree of association between the French National
Committee and the United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand
Governments represents a substantial incursion into the
jurisdiction of the French Government. The accusation made in July
by the Vichy Government that we were interfering with French
overseas possessions can be refuted on the simple grounds that in
each case in which a territory has gone over to de Gaulle it has
been in accordance with the will of the local population. As
against this can be set the undertaking given by the United
Kingdom Government of naval assistance in the defence, even
against Vichy, of all French Colonies which adhere to de Gaulle,
together, of course, with the various financial subsidies and
other forms of economic help which are already in operation.

46. The fact must be faced that in proceeding to these lengths on
the one hand and in being compelled by force of circumstances on
the other to continue to recognise the local representatives of
Vichy, British policy has brought about an anomalous, and in the
long run untenable, situation. From this there seem to be only two
ways of escape:

(a) By breaking entirely with Vichy; or
(b) By so conducting relations both with de Gaulle and with Vichy
as in due course to restore something of French unity, although
this would necessarily fall short for a long time to come of
renewed participation in the war of the French as a whole.

47. Alternative (a) is not in question and at no time has it been,
except as a possible consequence of the actions of the Vichy
Government itself. On the other hand it does not seem that (b) has
yet been clearly envisaged. Co-operation with de Gaulle has been
accompanied by a genuine endeavour on the part of the United
Kingdom Government to improve relations with Vichy, but the two
objectives have so far been unrelated. It is a matter for
consideration now whether events have not moved far enough to
warrant some attempt to co-ordinate the two aims. If the actual
assistance we are likely to get in the prosecution of the war from
the Free French is weighed against the long term advantages of at
least the benevolence of Metropolitan France, French North Africa,
Syria and Indo-China, there can be little doubt which will count
the more heavily. Certainly the first is not worth pursuing at the
expense of the second.

1 Rene Ristelhueber.


[AA:A981, FAR EAST 14A]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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