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93 Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in London, to Mr R. G. Menzies, Prime Minister

Cablegram 169 LONDON, 7 March 1940

IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET FOR THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF ONLY

Finland. War Cabinet this morning decided would be prepared to
send fifty bombers immediately if Finns make request for aid.

Still feel strongly issues involved have not been clearly
visualised and have accordingly prepared questionnaire to which
have so far received no answer.

Will endeavour to do so tonight at meeting with the Prime
Minister. [1]

It is as follows:

(1) Does the United Kingdom Government regard the prevention of
Finland being forced to accept peace on Soviet terms as a major
objective?
(2) If it does, is this view due to (a) effect on prestige of
Allies with consequent results on attitude of neutrals and morale
of our own people? (b) consequences by enabling Germany to take
action in Scandinavian countries detrimental to Allied prosecution
of the war? (c) elimination of possibility of obtaining control of
Gallivare iron ore fields in conjunction with rendering assistance
to Finland?
(3) What are the views of the General Staff as to military aspects
of the problem? (a) What troops could be sent, having regard to
available transport facilities? (b) What air forces could be sent,
having regard both to their availability and facilities for
maintenance in Finland? (c) Would forces under (a) and (b),
assuming that they can arrive before Finnish collapse, be
sufficient to enable Finns to hold out indefinitely and if not for
how long? Objections [sic] [2] assuming answer to (c) satisfactory
is any immediate aid necessary, e.g. bombers and if so [what]
number to prevent Finnish collapse before main forces arrive? (e)
Would transport across non-resisting but non-co-operating Norway
and Sweden of necessary forces and maintenance of their lines of
communication through these countries present practical
difficulties and/or dangers of a serious character? (f) If answer
to (e) of such a character as to preclude sending contemplated
organised assistance through Norway and Sweden could necessary aid
be sent as to men, munitions and supplies on existing basis with
(i) Norway and Sweden fully co-operating (ii) Norway and Sweden
non-co-operative? (g) If attitude of Norway and Sweden as
suggested in (f) (ii) could necessary assistance be sent by air by
utilising all United Kingdom and French troop carriers and
requisitioning all available air liners to supply ground staff
replacements etc. for air force and to transport troops?
(4) If co-operation of Norway and Sweden could be obtained and
General Staffs view is that necessary aid could be sent, or if
notwithstanding continuance of present attitude of Norway and
Sweden General Staff advise necessary assistance could be rendered
under (e), (f) (i) and (ii) or (g) would action be taken by the
United Kingdom Government if result would be only to continue
Finnish resistance for a time e.g. until May?
(5) If by assistance United Kingdom and France Finnish resistance
could be prolonged indefinitely or for period acceptable under (4)
would United Kingdom Government be prepared to send immediate air
assistance even at some risk in the event of major air action by
Germany on the Western Front and against the United Kingdom?
(6) Is it considered likely that action adequate to save Finland
from being overwhelmed would create a state of war between the
Allies and the Soviet? If yes, what is appreciation of General
Staff and what offensive action, if any, against the Soviet is
contemplated?
(7) In the event of Germany taking military action against Sweden
and/or Norway as a result of the Allies intervention in Finland do
the General Staff consider the assistance that could be rendered
[would] be sufficient to prevent these countries being overrun?

1 Neville Chamberlain.

2 This word does not appear in Bruce's file copy (on AA: M100,
March 1940) and it is not clear why it was inserted when the
cablegram was deciphered in Canberra.


[AA: A981, EUROPE 30, ii]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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