I am most grateful to you for your long letter of 2nd January
regarding peace aims. [1]

In consequence of this letter and of your related cables [2], I
had some discussion with my Ministers about the whole matter, but
found them, with one or two exceptions, quite unresponsive. [3]
There is, as one might perhaps have expected, a growing feeling
among them in favour of the so-called realistic approach, and an
almost pathetic belief that the dismemberment of Germany would
alter the German spirit and outlook. This seems to me to be a
tragic misconception and I shall continue to work upon their minds
but the process will be slow.

My impression from your various communications is that Chamberlain
[4] and Halifax [5] are very largely in accord with your own
views, while Winston [6] is opposed to them. I cannot tell you
adequately how much I am convinced that Winston is a menace. He is
a publicity seeker; he stirs up hatreds in a world already
seething with them and he is lacking in judgment, as witness his
recent speech on the position of the Neutrals.

One cannot help sharing to the full your obvious fear that, unless
some reasoned view can shortly be arrived at, it will become
impossible, and that unless it has been formulated the heat of
battle and the bitterness and privations of war will inevitably
lead us to another Versailles. I have for a long time believed
(though I admit to being wise after the event, and I have no
criticism of the treaty-makers under the circumstances in which
they met) that in 1919 the Allies had a choice of two practical
courses. They could have said, as I think Foch [7] would have
liked, that they were going to keep Germany subdued by sheer force
of arms and convert her into a sort of slave state; on the other
hand they could have said that the war being over they were going
to forget it and that instead of exacting reparations they would
be prepared to grant even financial assistance to Germany to
restore the world's trade, and with it the world's good-will and
happiness. I know that the second course would be regarded by many
people as 'sappy sentimentality', and as ignoring the brutality of
the German spirit, but after all we have tried to alter the German
spirit by force. Is it not possible that it might be more
effectively altered by conspicuous generosity following on
conspicuous defeat? In effect, of course, the Allies took neither
course, they alternated between an intransigent French policy and
a 'pussy-footing' Henderson [8] policy, and so they made the worst
of both worlds.

It is a great pity that the political waters here are so muddy
because there is nothing that I should like better than a direct
exchange of views upon these matters with members of the British
Government.

At the risk of repeating myself, I must say that the policy of
conquering and dividing is hopeless; that it completely
underestimates the virility of the German people and ignores the
fact that such a policy breeds a fierce desire for revenge and
must inevitably produce results like those of 1938 and 1939.

It is true that we must be careful not to cause a division in the
united front which exists at present between Great Britain and
France. But like yourself, I have a feeling that the problem
cannot be postponed forever and that, if it were deferred until
the peace negotiations after the war, divisions might then occur
which would be even more dangerous in a Europe enfeebled by years
of war than they would be at present.

The one aspect of your letter about which I feel real doubt
relates to the degree of particularity with which we should state
our aims. My own view is that, during the currency of the war at
least, our statements should be as general as possible, the
objectives of a community of nations freely, honourably and
equally negotiating with each other being put in the forefront,
but the particular questions relating to such matters as economic
adjustments, access to raw materials, etc., being left for future
consideration.

Your remarks about Russia seem to me to be most appropriate. I
cannot doubt that if the war lasts long enough there will be a
rapid spread of Bolshevism in Germany and in the Danubian States.

Under these circumstances a new alignment of nations in which not
only Great Britain and France, but Germany and Italy, combined to
resist Bolshevism is by no means impossible, and so long as it is
a possibility it must affect our view as to the nature of the war
objectives which we now state to the German (and incidentally to
the Italian) people.

As you say, no nation will indefinitely be prepared to shoulder
the burden of giving effect to a repressive military policy. It is
perhaps more easily contemplated at present, when the full burden
of war expenditure has not been felt, than it will be later on
when people will realise vividly that an indefinite continuance of
the war burden will mean an indefinite postponement of social
amelioration and growing dissatisfaction on the part of ordinary
men and women, with results that cannot be foreseen. So far as
Australia is concerned, there would be a violent unwillingness to
continue the burden of armaments for the mere purpose of keeping
some other great power in a state of submission. The fact is that
we British people, while we are seldom magnanimous to our friends,
are invariably magnanimous to our enemies, and the more experience
our people have of war the stronger and not the weaker will that
feeling be.

Your summarised reasons why a policy of repression is
impracticable are entirely in line with my own ideas. Two years
ago, I would have said that the idea of an international force to
keep the world's peace was hopelessly academic. But when this war
is over, I think the nations will find themselves immeasurably
more disposed to accept it than they ever have been before. When I
say this I am referring not only to the air force, but to an
international army and navy. None of the three is, I think,
practicable if the war comes to an inconclusive end, but an
unequivocal defeat of Germany, accompanied by great financial and
commercial and nervous exhaustion in all the relevant countries,
might, in my opinion, provide the right atmosphere for its
establishment.

One cannot, of course, shut one's eyes to the fact that the latent
fear in our minds in Australia is that when this war has been
finished we will need to prepare for another and defensive war
against Japan. Personally, I do not rate this possibility very
high, but I would feel more satisfied about it if I really
believed that the British Foreign Office had a practical and
realistic view of the Far Eastern position. One's instinctive
judgment is that the Japanese have a marked inferiority complex
and that a real gesture of friendship with some real assistance in
the settlement of the Chinese question, accompanied by a proper
recognition of Japanese trading ambitions, might very easily
produce peace in the Far East, particularly if Japan was, by that
time, feeling the impact of Russian Bolshevism.

Speaking without much knowledge I have had a feeling that
America's approach to these matters has been over-sentimental and
that much good work is to be done in persuading America that she
has her real interests in common with the British Empire in the
Pacific and that a generous understanding would be more effective
than prejudice and a series of somewhat pontifical moral reproofs.

Your remarks about the relative merits of a future international
organisation upon a world or a regional basis appeal to me very
much. Right through the Abyssinian trouble, I felt that the
failure of the League was not due to its attempting to do too
little, but to its attempting to do too much. The view of the
League that I had, therefore, would indicate that it should be
remodelled in such a fashion as to make it workable. Nations will
much more readily undertake obligations in relation to an area in
which they have an immediate interest than in relation to an area
some of the countries in which are remote. As you say, regions
might in some instances overlap. For example, Australia has an
immediate and vital concern in the Pacific, it also has a mediate
but none the less vital interest in any region of which Great
Britain is a member.

These remarks, of course, apply with special force to any
organisation in which direct obligations affecting peace and war
are to be assumed. You are no doubt right in saying that the
solution of economic and social problems requires a collaboration
of all the principal nations on a world basis. I have read your
practical proposals for such economic and social adjustments with
great interest, but I feel that any attempt to be precise in
relation to them would be doomed to failure because it would
prejudice acceptance of the general scheme by diverting the
discussion to particular issues.

I am a good deal concerned to know just how I should move in this
matter. As you point out, the Dominion Prime Ministers might
easily exercise a desirable influence in the direction of
rationalising our war effort and not letting it degenerate into a
mere 'hymn of hate'. But misunderstanding both in our own
countries and in the enemy country might easily arise. Several
newspapers in Australia are already quite disposed to criticise me
violently for having what they believe to be a philosophic
approach to a matter in which they think my proper function is a
mixture of swashbuckling and rhetoric. The Germans, in their turn,
would be quick to seize upon anything which they could construe as
a weakening of the Allied war effort or as a desire to obtain
peace without victory.

If only a kindly Providence would remove from the active political
scene a few minds which are heavily indoctrinated by the 'old
soldiers' and by the 'Versailles' point of view, my task here
would be easier.

I cannot tell you how much I have appreciated your letters and how
relieved I am to find that my own point of view is not dissimilar
to that of one with your own immense experience and balanced
judgment.

[R. G. MENZIES]