STRATEGICAL APPRECIATION IN RELATION TO EMPIRE CO-OPERATION AND
LOCAL DEFENCE

(The three Chiefs of Staff were present for the discussion of this
subject).

Consequent upon Italy's entry into the war on 11th June there
arose from the Chiefs of Staff's reports a general discussion on
the strategical position in the light of the military situation in
France and the outlook in the Mediterranean now that Italy is a
belligerent.

In response to questions by Ministers, the following is a summary
of the main expressions of opinion by the Chiefs of Staff:-

(i) In reply to the Minister for External Affairs [1] the Chief of
the Air Staff [2] said that it would be impossible to use the Red
Sea until the Italian air forces in the East African colonies had
been rendered ineffective. The most likely manner in which this
would be carried out would be by the destruction of air bases and
petrol dumps and the denial of fuel supplies through the cutting
off of importations.

(ii) In reply to an enquiry by the Treasurer [3] as to the naval
strategical situation should France be defeated, the Chief of the
Naval Staff [4] expressed the view that Britain would, in such
event, have to withdraw from the Mediterranean, except for the use
that could be made by entry through the eastern end at Port Said.

In the event of France's defeat, the enemy would probably base
naval vessels on the French Atlantic ports and, should Spain and
Portugal be brought in on the side of Germany and Italy, their
ports might be used also. Should the war take such a course an
entire recasting of naval strategy to meet the situation would be
necessary.

(iii) The Chief of the General Staff [5] stated that, on the
present basis of Allied naval strength, the local defence of
Australia could be considered secondary to Empire co-operation,
and he was of the opinion that the Army could provide a reasonable
defence against raids.

The situation in Europe required a readjustment of the balance of
the War Programme, with emphasis on the Air effort, as the Chief
of the Naval Staff had already stated that Australia was doing all
that is possible in the naval sphere. The Chief of the General
Staff emphasized, however, that this did not mean there should be
any diminution in the military effort of Australia, as troops
would still be required and, even if the worst situation came to
pass, as indicated by the Chief of the Naval Staff, troops would
be necessary for the capture of enemy naval bases in order to deny
their use to the enemy. It would also be necessary to ensure the
security of our own bases for the full exercise of British naval
power.

It was decided by War Cabinet that the Chiefs of Staff should
furnish an appreciation of the position from the Australian point
of view, along the following lines:-

(i) What new local problems arise as the result of the military
situation.

(ii) What local military resources are available for offer to the
United Kingdom.

(iii) What new local measures are necessary.