I had a most important talk with Sumner Welles [1] at noon today.

I can talk freely and easily with him and he is friendly and
receptive.

I painted the following picture to him:

I said that it was Bruce's strongly-held opinion that the French
would crack sooner or later, probably sooner. [2] It was
problematical whether Germany would exert her great effort on
France or Britain first, but that he thought they would endeavour
to clean up France first probably with the help of Italy, and that
when that was successfully accomplished they would be free and in
good position to concentrate all efforts by sea and air on
Britain.

Welles asked if it was our belief that Germany could succeed in
destroying the British resistance by land and air. I said that it
was our strong belief that if Germany were prepared to lose
sufficient men she could overwhelm Britain. I reminded him of the
enormous superiority of Germany over Britain in land troops and
their equipment.

I reminded him that with France defeated German air strength was
quite certainly considerably more than double and possibly treble
that of Britain herself, and that Britain had suffered very heavy
losses in the only type of naval vessel that was any use in
combating attempts at German landings on British soil, and that
was destroyers.

I asked him to visualise the effect of large numbers of parachute
troops dropped on Britain at and before dawn, and also to
visualise the degree of dive bombing and machine gunning that
could and would undoubtedly be brought to bear in a supreme effort
to create confusion and chaos.

He asked me several times if I believed it was possible for a
successful landing of any considerable number of German troops to
be carried out in Britain. I said that such landing in force was
perfectly possible although the German losses would undoubtedly be
very great.

He asked if we thought that Germany could land tanks in Britain. I
said that once an effective land area of Britain had been made
good by Germany it was quite possible.

He asked me what function the British Fleet would play in such
circumstances. I said that I could not conceive any useful
function other than that of attempting to destroy any major units
of the German Fleet that might venture out. Germany would use
submarines fast motor torpedo boats and destroyers against which
only destroyers were deterrents and Britain was now very short of
destroyers.

I said that it was undoubtedly the conviction of the British
Government today that there was no hope of the United States
entering the war on our side. He questioned this but I persisted
in this point of view and said that I knew that it was impossible
for the Government and people in Britain to believe otherwise.

He knew of my recent discussion with the President [3] and he
asked what I thought the British Fleet would do if Britain were
overwhelmed. I said that I believed that the British Fleet would
not give itself up under any circumstances but that they would
probably immolate themselves by an attack on German naval ports.

He said that this would be an extremely unwise and illogical thing
to do because whilst the British Fleet remained in existence it
was possible to retrieve the situation at some later date.

In reply to this I said that if they thought in Britain that there
was some eventual chance of the United States entering the war on
our side that they might go to some lengths to maintain the
British Fleet in existence, but that if they were convinced that
America would never enter the war I believed that logic would be
supplanted by spirit and passion as I had described. I said that I
believed that there was only one person in the world who could
save the British, French and Dutch Empires, and that was the
President.

Welles said that the logic of the situation was that the British
Fleet ceasing to exist was against the vital interests of the
British Dominions. I said that I entirely agreed but that in the
terrible conditions that Germany would probably be able and
determined to bring about in Britain logic was most unlikely to be
uppermost in British minds. Under certain violent circumstances
even the sturdiest people ceased to take a long range view and
would think only of themselves and their honour. There was only
one thing that was likely to influence their minds and that was
whether at some point in time not too remote America would be in
the war with them. If they knew this it would quite certainly
influence them as to what the British Fleet would be ordered or
allowed to do with itself.

Welles said that I had painted a much graver picture than he had
conceived. I said that I was convinced from the sources of
information that were available to me that it was far from being
an exaggerated picture.

I said finally that I believed that the time when material
assistance was of real value was passing and that political
assistance in the shape of a declaration by the United States
would soon be the only thing that could save the world.

At the end Welles said that he accepted what I had said to him as
genuine and that he would speak to the President at once. He said
that in the present state and trend of public opinion here a week
or ten days could produce great changes.

You will realise from this telegram and from telegram No. 100 [4]
that the eventual fate of the British Fleet is of great interest
to this country. They have woken up to the fact lately that the
British Fleet has been protecting the United States and the Monroe
doctrine for a hundred years. [5]