The High Commissioner of the Commonwealth has communicated to me
your telegram to him, No. 53. [1] The following are replies to
your various questions, so far as they are available-
(1) The B.E.F. in France was composed of:-

(a) 10 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armoured Division, 3 untrained and
partially equipped Divisions which were sent out to provide
labour.

(b) Of the above, one Infantry Division and the bulk of the
Armoured Division are South of the River Somme. The remainder are
in the Northern group of armies.

(2) So far as is known, the Belgians had until recently 22
Divisions fighting: 18 Infantry; 2 Cavalry; 2 Chasseurs Ardennais.

(3) In deference to the wishes of the French, we are precluded
from disclosing the number of their Divisions in France.

(4) There is nothing to add at present to paragraph 3 of my
telegram Circular Z.77. [2]

(5) No troop carrying vessels have been sunk other than those
reported in D.W. telegrams.

(6) The necessity for such an attack, if it could have been made
in time, was apparent. The reasons why it was not made were
probably-
(a) The shock to the French High Command caused by the unexpected
rapidity and completeness of the German breakthrough;

(b) The time required for the re-disposition of available French
reserves;

(c) The action of the German Air Force;

(d) The speed of movement of German tank formations;

(e) Losses which reduced the reserves, and insufficient tanks.

(7) The apparent ability of the German tanks to go straight
through can be explained as follows:-

The German initial attack was made by a very large number of tanks
heavily supported by dive bombers: they were prepared to accept
very heavy casualties to effect the break-through. The only method
of stopping an attack of this nature is a continuous and complete
tank obstacle held by determined troops: in the initial stages of
the German attack on the Ninth French Army, neither of these
factors was present. Some of the Meuse bridges were left
undestroyed and the French troops in this sector had not all taken
up their positions on the Meuse when the Germans arrived; the
French troops here were not so well trained as in other sectors
and the value of the Meuse as an obstacle was over-estimated.

Having broken through the French main line of defence, the German
Armoured Divisions found themselves in country favourable for
their employment with no prepared positions and no continuous
obstacles; the speed of their advance made it impossible for the
French to stabilize on a River line. Moreover, such opposition as
could be hastily organized was quickly overcome by a slow tank
attack supported by dive bombers and motor-borne Infantry.

It must, however, be emphasized that if the factors of a
continuous obstacle and determined troops are present, there is no
reason to assume that German tanks cannot be stopped. The British
and French anti-tank guns have shown themselves capable of
penetrating the armour of any German tank which has yet been used.

The following factors also contributed to the German success:-

(a) A general under-estimation by the French of the tank material
at the disposal of the German Army.

(b) A River is no longer an obstacle unless defended along its
entire length. The Germans have paid great attention to bridging
with armoured formations.

(c) The Germans reinforcing success by rapid transfer of
additional armoured formations to point of break-through. The
flexibility of the armoured formations and the high standard of
trail-ling of their personnel is noteworthy.

(d) German armoured formations were supplied by air, and, where
necessary, they lived and supplied themselves from the country.

(e) The French probably never expected a tank attack here and the
French defences were not in sufficient depth.

(8) German concentrations opposite Switzerland remain materially
unchanged, though the tension in Switzerland is believed to have
lessened. This and the Italian threat are containing comparatively
few French Divisions.

(9) The French Air Force, both fighters and bombers, has been very
fully engaged in operations and is believed to have had
substantial success. French losses from all causes rather over 500
aircraft; those inflicted on the enemy probably greater but not
yet known to us in detail. According to information received from
the French authorities under strictest secrecy, the French
factories produced 330 operational and 98 training aircraft during
April. 90 operational and 41 training aircraft were obtained
abroad. No attacks likely to cause extensive dislocation have yet
been made on aircraft factories.

(10) The report that Allied casualties have been heavier where
American aircraft employed is quite untrue, and bears the mark of
enemy propaganda. Hudson aircraft are the only American type yet
in operational use by the R.A.F. Their reliability has made them
invaluable for their primary task of long distance reconnaissance,
particularly over the sea. They are adequately armed and have not
suffered disproportionate losses even on dangerous missions.

American bombers are only now coming into service with the French
Air Force, and no details as to their performance in battle can
yet be made available to us or to anyone else. American Curtiss
fighters with the French proved definitely superior in
manoeuvrability to Messerschmitts 109 and were very successful in
the early months of the war. This seems to have continued in
recent weeks, though we do not as yet have details.

(11) The matter is the subject of conflicting views on the part of
the various Departments but the least favourable view is as
follows-Home production just under 4,000,000 tons a year, imports
2 1/2 million tons a year, mobile about 8,000,000 tons, leaving an
approximate deficiency of just over 1 1/2 million tons a year.

Stocks 1st May estimated at 2 3/4 million tons. If stocks were
reduced to 1,000,000 tons, it is believed that internal
distribution mechanism would break down, as happened in the last
war. On this basis stocks would be sufficient to make good the
deficiency for about one year. But it is thought that figures for
consumption do not include sufficient margin for operational
expenditure on the present scale. About 70 per cent of German
synthetic oil production plant is situated in RUHR district and
these installations have been included in the list of bombing
targets. The area is, however, heavily defended and the possible
scale of attack must be dictated by the air situation from day to
day.