Germany so soon as the operation in Belgium and Northern France is
completed will either attempt a lightning drive on Paris or an
intensive attack on the United Kingdom.

It is unlikely that the two would be combined as her Air Force
would need to be employed to the maximum extent in either
operation and after the recent losses it has sustained even with
the numerical superiority it possesses, it is improbable that
Germany is in a position simultaneously to undertake the dual
task.

The possibility cannot however be ignored that a dual attack might
be undertaken the object being to draw off part of our air
strength to prevent the French being overwhelmed and thus to
weaken our defence against an all-in attack on the United Kingdom.

In my view a thrust on Paris is the more likely move.

In face of the rapid and overwhelming success of the German drive
to the coast it is foolish not to recognise the possibility of
this thrust achieving its objective.

If it did, we cannot exclude the possibility that in face of two
such shattering blows French morale might go and they might
capitulate. On the other hand the French may prove staunch and re-
establish their line south of Paris.

In either event Hitler's course would probably be the same-namely
to broadcast to the world as soon as he was in Paris, that the
Allies are now beaten, that to continue the struggle only means
the shedding of unnecessary blood and, probably in conjunction
with Mussolini, that he is prepared for a just peace with a
proviso that if the offer is not accepted the war will be
ruthlessly continued with Italy in on the German side until the
Allies, or the British Empire if France has collapsed, are
destroyed.

In this broadcast he may indicate the outlines of the peace he
contemplates and the more moderate he is the more difficult will
our position be.

Hitler's most moderate terms would inevitably be such as we could
not agree to but even if on their face value they were not wholly
unacceptable there would be no guarantee that Hitler would carry
them out.

We are therefore faced with the position that either with or
without the French we have to fight on even if the appreciation by
the General Staff showed that sooner or later we must be defeated
as annihilation would be preferable to German domination.

We however do not desire to be annihilated nor do we want to fight
on with incalculable loss of life and suffering merely in the end
to achieve a peace of compromise in which we retain something but
Nazism is left powerful in the world. Our task is to defeat the
enemy vindicate the great ideals we are fighting for and establish
a decent world.

Our job is to determine how we can set about this task.

The fundamentals are:-

(1) to save France from collapse;

(2) to obtain the maximum and earliest assistance from the U.S.A.;

(3) to detach progressively the U.S.S.R. from Germany;

(4) to create gradually a position in which Italy will be enabled
to shake off her German shackles;

(5) to bring home to Japan, as the position develops, that her
best interests will be in the defeat of Germany.

The most important of these fundamentals is the immediate attitude
and action of the U.S.A. A prompt declaration by the U.S.A. that
she is not prepared to allow the Allies to be defeated with the
consequence of a completely dominant Germany in Europe threatening
the American continent and the ideals upon which the U.S.A. and
every democracy in the world is founded might well save France
from collapse and change the whole position. How could this be
brought about?
Only (1) by bringing home to the President [1] how real and
imminent is the danger to the U.S.A.; (2) by suggesting to him a
course which he could pursue which would ensure to him the support
of the overwhelming majority of the people of the U.S.A. in the
action he took.

With regard to (1) the seriousness of the position has been put to
the President but I venture to think not with the stark reality of
all its possibilities set out with brutal frankness. This I
believe should with the utmost urgency now be done.

The possibility would have to be put to him of a French collapse
not on the basis of their laying down their arms and continuing
the struggle in the colonies and by the French Navy with the
Government functioning somewhere out of France, but of their
having come to terms, handed over the French Navy and all the
French ports being available to the enemy.

The effect of this French collapse with the possession by the
Germans of the French Navy, coupled with the entry of Italy into
the war, would have to be shown covering the position in the
Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East and the isolation of
Turkey.

The situation of the United Kingdom in these circumstances would
have to be ruthlessly driven home even up to the point of
visualising the possibility of our eventual defeat and of our
having to surrender the British Fleet in order to obtain not too
intolerable terms.

The exact case to be presented to the President would need careful
thought in the light of appreciations by the General Staff and the
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Even on the most optimistic view it would be a desperate one. If
in fact it showed the possibility of the British French and
Italian Fleets eventually coming under the domination of the
Germans it would be one to galvanise the President into any action
necessary to prevent such an eventuality.

As to (2) if the President can be convinced of the necessity of
immediate action by the U.S.A. I suggest the form of such action
should be somewhat down the following lines:-

(1) An immediate declaration that the U.S.A. cannot allow the
domination of Europe by an aggressive power whose ideas include
world domination since such domination constitutes a threat to the
American continent and everything American civilisation stands
for;

(2) That the ruthless aggression of Germany and her military
successes are now threatening such a domination;

(3) That the time has come when either the nations must meet in
conference to formulate a peace settlement which, taking into
account the present position and the necessity for profound
readjustments, such as will ensure to all nations justice,
equality of opportunity and freedom from aggression, or that the
U.S.A. must throw the whole of her support and assistance behind
the Allies to prevent the domination of Germany [2];

(4) That the further shedding of blood and the continuance of
hideous suffering is unnecessary;

and finishing with an appeal to the belligerents to cease the
struggle and to all non-belligerents to support his efforts for
peace.

Repeated to Australian Minister Washington. [3]

BRUCE