Reference Norwegian position, we were and are naturally disturbed
and think effect on prestige most serious but as we had no
detailed facts upon which to base opinion we preferred to express
none. At the same time feel strongly that authorities in Great
Britain open to serious criticism for the handling of the
Norwegian news. Even after evacuation had been practically decided
upon and notified to us, both B.B.C. and Cable services continued
to publish optimistic accounts of Allied victories around
Trondheim and Namsos. We did our best to discourage criticism by a
statement at this end but this had little effect having regard to
nature of broadcasts and cables. Result is that when evacuations
publicly announced there was most adverse public reaction and
criticism of conduct of war, which has not only gravely shaken
belief in B.B.C. official news but has also unnecessarily affected
morale.

I want you to inform Government of this and also to emphasise that
public want facts and can take them. Should add that B.B.C.

announcement that QUEEN MARY at Capetown when hundreds of
thousands of Australians were seeing her daily in Sydney Harbour
has had similarly bad effect. Likewise B.B.C. announcement that
Australian destroyers at Alexandria, when we have all along
suppressed this news at request of Admiralty, puts us in foolish
position. [1]

Reference Italy and your telegrams 297 and 298 [2], I have had
exhaustive discussion in War Cabinet. [3] Agree with your view and
while favouring preserving Mediterranean peace as long as possible
would regard prompt action against Italy in the event of Italian
attack upon Yugoslavia as essential. Chiefs of Staff appreciation
[4] supplied to us is very meagre but if Naval success in
Mediterranean could be reasonably anticipated and adequate steps
were taken to deal effectively with Italian air forces around Red
Sea would anticipate that the intervention of Italy should lead to
the loss of Italian Empire in Africa and might, in the long run,
turn out to be a great source of weakness to Germany. For us to do
nothing in the event of Italian invasion of Yugoslavia would
surely be to weaken the spirit of resistance in all the Balkan
countries and render Turkish action extremely dubious. With the
Balkans absorbed and Turkey out, our whole position in Middle East
and down to India would be menaced. Quite convinced that a prompt
retaliation upon Italy with hard hitting and no apologies would
work wonders in South-eastern Europe and might well tip scale in
Spain, the importance of which should not be under-estimated.

Are you satisfied that British diplomacy and intelligence in
neutral countries, all of whom should be regarded as potential
enemies and as the subject of Nazi activities and infiltration,
are sufficiently vigorous? It is difficult for us at this distance
to understand why allies should be compelled to make landings at
unsuitable places in Norway with inadequate material unless
British Intelligence in Norway was hopelessly defective.

Similarly, we still feel that in Southern and South-eastern Europe
our activities may be conducted on conventional and genteel lines
with insufficient realisation that we are dealing with people who
act first and argue afterwards.

I have no sympathy with kind of newspaper manhunt that is now
going on in England and think it represents the very kind of
hysteria which it is Hitler's strategy to create. But at the same
time there is a real criticism of the kind indicated above and it
must be recognised if the spirit of our people is to be kept high.

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