Prime Minister's statement yesterday [1] as to withdrawal from
South [of] [2] Trondheim undoubtedly serious shock here and has
created grave anxiety as to Government conduct of the war which
will intensify when known that Namsos also evacuated. Government
will be in difficult position in the debate next week and if there
were any conceivable alternative the Government I believe might
have been in danger.

As there is not and Winston Churchill [3] is primarily responsible
and fully supporting the Prime Minister I do not anticipate any
political crisis here.

Prime Minister saw High Commissioners last night [4] and I
understand that the Dominions Office are sending report. [5]

In my view he underrates the repercussions of the forced
abandonment of the Allies' efforts in Southern Norway and attaches
too much importance to the possibilities with regard to Narvik.

While indicating my appreciation of the necessity of holding
Narvik, particularly in view of the withdrawal from Southern
Norway, I expressed the anxieties with regard to holding it and
the doubts as to its effective closure vis-a-vis Gallivare iron
ore fields set out in my telegram No. 284. [6]

The Prime Minister's reply did not remove these anxieties and
doubts.

With regard to Italy, the Prime Minister considers it unlikely
that Mussolini will take action in near future. This may be right
but if it is in my view it will be due to Roosevelt's warning-
information of this is most secret-rather than to the
redisposition of the Allied naval forces or to any doubts by
Mussolini as to the success of Hitler's Norwegian adventure.

At the end of the interview I put to the Prime Minister that
Dominions had been subjected to a number of shocks culminating
with Norwegian one, that it was inevitable they should be asking
themselves how do United Kingdom Government visualise winning the
war, and that I felt in fairness to them an appreciation should be
prepared giving the views of the United Kingdom Government in
broad outline, e.g. growth of air strength to the point of air
supremacy, progressive effect of industrial blockade, increase in
army and [further] additions to naval strength, and while this
position developing capacity to resist attack on Western Front or
against any vital point including air attack on United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister agreed something of the sort should be done and
I am hopeful of having a finger in it as it would afford an
opportunity of ensuring a complete survey of whole position.

BRUCE