My telegram 297. Italy.

(1) We could not restore our prestige by immediate declaration of
war against Italy unless we could render effective aid to
Yugoslavia. On the other hand to sit passively by and allow Italy
to work her will would be a further serious blow to Allied
prestige.

Certainly no desire to add to enemies but consequence of letting
Mussolini get away with it have to be considered.

Would not his attitude be-have successfully held the Allies to
ransom for eight months for my neutrality-having quickly overrun
Yugoslavia would he not hold the Allies to higher ransom for
neutrality and be able to pick his own time for further adventures
up to the point of entering the war on Germany's side.

Argument as to dispersion does not seem sound save on basis that
attack on Yugoslavia is a trap to get the Allies to declare war on
Italy. If dispersion is the objective it must be the result of
agreement between Hitler and Mussolini. Allies' failure to walk
into the trap would be followed by Italy coming into war on German
side.

(2) I find difficulty in accepting the view that there is nothing
the Allies could do to interfere with Italy in her adventure
against Yugoslavia. At least having declared war on Italy we could
endeavour to induce Turkey and Greece to take some co-operative
action to help Yugoslavia whereas if we keep out we could do
nothing in this direction.

(3) Suggestion of possibility of a quarrel between Hitler and
Mussolini appears to me in view of the facts like wishful
thinking.

Hitler at Brenner meeting apparently convinced Mussolini that he,
Hitler, was going to win. That view will be greatly strengthened
by Allies' forced withdrawal in southern Norway. Until Hitler
suffers some serious reverses, Mussolini will see to it he does
not quarrel with what he is convinced is the winning side. It is
difficult to see such reverses being inflicted for a considerable
time to come.

(4) Mussolini's attitude-Allies no match for Germany, therefore
decide to risk an adventure notwithstanding opposition of King,
great part of the population and Vatican.

The Italian people's attitude-uncertain. True that Germany strong
but cannot forget history. Allies in a position to react quickly
against Italian soil and would do so. Very doubtful adventure. Is
Mussolini right or is this not too perilous?
I feel that the Allies' failure to react immediately vindicates
Mussolini's action and shows people their hesitancy and doubts
unjustified. In reaction enthusiasm would grow with possible
popular demands for realisation of Italian aspirations in the
Mediterranean and with regard to Italian Empire. Mussolini would
then be exactly where he wants to get vis-a-vis his own people.

On the other hand immediate Allied action against Italy has
possibilities in proportion to the effectiveness of action taken
of rousing people against their German ally and their own leaders
and making the King the popular figure instead of Mussolini.

Against this must be set the possibility of the people being
roused against their seeming friends who suddenly attack them.

(5) Between these two arguments the balance would appear to be in
favour of immediate action. By it Italy may be prevented from
growing in strength. On the other hand unless it were visualized
that immediate bringing in of Italy could result in a knock-out
blow to the Allies our strength will progressively grow.

(6) The arguments in favour of immediate action here are very
strong. The arguments against would be effective if our capacity
to meet the suggested attacks was going to be increased very
rapidly.

A period of months at least must elapse before the position is
materially altered and during that period Mussolini's intervention
would appear extremely likely.

On the other hand one point which causes me the gravest anxiety is
the position in Egypt vis-a-vis the air. I have not sufficient
information however to express a view upon this point.

(7) In view of possible developments in South East Europe the
sooner we get Turkey in the better. We cannot ignore the
possibility that there might be such a deterioration in South East
Europe as to render it extremely doubtful if Turkey would be able
to live up to her undertakings to come in on the Allied side.

(8) The benefit of more effective blockade that would be possible
would appear extremely valuable. The arguments against do not
appear to me to be substantial in comparison.

Could not Roumanian oil supplies be diverted without bringing them
through the Mediterranean to other Empire countries, at present
acquiring supplies for payment in 'hard' currencies?
(9) If Italy could be knocked out it would be admirable but this
is extremely doubtful. Is this point however a very real one as it
is difficult to see how Mussolini could have kept out of joining
in on the German side if she achieved successes to the point of
being in a position of being a threat to the Dardanelles?
(10) On latest information it appears unlikely that Italy could
draw Spain in and, if this were the only danger in immediately
reacting to an Italian adventure in Yugoslavia, I feel that it
would have to be risked.

BRUCE