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184 Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in London, to Mr R. G. Menzies, Prime Minister

Cablegram 284 LONDON, 28 April 1940, 6.20 p.m.

FOR PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY

Norway-Supreme War Council has decided owing to inadequacy of
bases for supplying forces and German air superiority which can
not be overcome owing to lack of aerodromes troops North and South
of Trondheim to be withdrawn and attempt recapture Trondheim
abandoned.

In discussion conclusion apparently arrived at that even if
Trondheim could be captured holding it would impose too great
strain on Allies. This conclusion might well be challenged in view
of repercussions that will flow from Allied abandonment of Norway
save Narvik area and suggests the question why were the operations
for its recapture ever undertaken.

Notwithstanding the view which has now been accepted by the
Supreme War Council my own opinion remains unchanged that if
immediately on German seizure Allies had concurrently attacked by
sea (although admittedly this operation would have involved risks
and possible losses which in my view would have been well worth
while) and by landings North and South we could have recaptured
Trondheim and could have held it without undue strain in fact with
less strain than we will now be subjected to as I believe such a
success would have steadied position in Mediterranean and S.E.

Europe where I fear Allies reverse in having to abandon Southern
Norway will lead to immediate developments.

Supreme War Council consider capture of Narvik which being
concentrated on and which proposed hold in strength including
large air force will off-set damage to Allies prestige resulting
from withdrawal in Southern Norway. This I do not agree with and I
have grave doubts how far position can be maintained with rest of
Norway in German hands.

Also am not clear as to usefulness of such force vis-a-vis
Gallivare iron ore fields so long as Germany does not attack
Sweden or whether it could do anything effective if Germany
attacked and overran Sweden as she presumably could do rapidly,
her forces in Norway enabling her to turn Swedish main defensive
line of the Lakes.

With regard to Italy latest advice indicates decision postponed
for moment but I still feel Mussolini only waiting on developments
in Norway. Record of Supreme War Council which Dominions Office
cabling you [1] in my view does not give a clear picture as to
Allies attitude and action in event of Italy entering war or
taking independent action e.g. attack on Dalmatian Coast. I have
tried to get definite information but without success. Also cannot
ascertain what plans are envisaged for countering any of the
possible moves by Germany with or without Russian co-operation in
South East Europe.

I am sending the above for your personal information to show you
the thoughts which are in my mind. I realise they may not be well
based.

Do you think it would be useful if you cabled me the points you
would desire information on so that I could either follow them up
myself or suggest to you to cable them direct to United Kingdom
Government.

BRUCE

1 See cablegram Z62 of 28 April 1940 on file AA: A1608, C41/1/1.


[AA: M100, APRIL 1940]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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