Cablegram 237 LONDON, 12 April 1940, 4.07 p.m.
MOST SECRET FOR THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF
Present position appears that the Germans have established
themselves at Oslo, Stavanger-the importance of which is valuable
aerodrome-Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, with naval losses in the
open seas and Norwegian harbours indicated in Churchill's speech.
[1] Heavy losses of transport and supply ships have been inflicted
by submarines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak, precise details of
which not yet available. The Norwegians still resisting and Allied
diplomatic and military missions including Admiral Evans now in
Norway to encourage the maintenance of resistance.
Following is my personal appreciation of the position. The period
that Norwegian resistance can be maintained and linking of
southern German forces with forces at Trondheim, Bergen et cetera
prevented depends on (a) the rate of flow of reinforcements and
supplies via Oslo; and (b) assistance the Allies can afford to the
Norwegians.
With regard to (a) heavy toll can be taken by submarine and air
action but these not sufficient to stop the flow. Surface vessels
which could be completely effective by blocking the entrance to
Oslo Fjord unable to operate owing to narrowness of the waters and
proximity to German air bases.
With regard to (b) recapture of seized ports not considered
practicable by naval attack followed by landing. Recapture should
quite satisfactorily be possible by landing at other points and
attacking from landward side in co-operation with the Norwegians.
Action of this character to be effective must be immediate in
order to anticipate linking of isolated German forces with the
main body.
If Trondheim and Bergen recaptured they would constitute bases for
future operations to serious embarrassment of the Germans. If
these points consolidated with main German forces recapture would
appear impracticable and they would constitute points of serious
embarrassment to the Allies.
Narvik in my view not so urgent as the Germans cannot reinforce or
consolidate with their forces there and action in southern area
should have precedence.
Above is the position as I see it and which I have put to
individual members of the War Cabinet. [2] Present decision
however is to postpone action in the south pending liquidation of
Narvik position which is being undertaken.
BRUCE
[AA: A981, EUROPE 30, ii]