My telegram of 28th March Circular Z. 39. [1] Please give the
following message to the Prime Minister [2] for his Most Secret
and Personal information.

The meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council on 28th March was
the first to be held with M. Reynaud as French Prime Minister. The
meeting was most satisfactory. The following is a summary of the
principal resolutions.

(1) Communications should be addressed on behalf of the French and
the British Governments to the Governments of Norway and Sweden on
Monday, April 1st, on the following lines:

(a) The Allied Governments cannot acquiesce in any further attack
on Finland by either the Soviet Government or the German
Government. In the event therefore of such an attack taking place,
any refusal by the Swedish or Norwegian Governments to facilitate
the efforts of the Allied Governments to come to the assistance of
Finland in whatever manner they think fit, and still more any
attempt to prevent such assistance, would be considered by them as
endangering their vital interests.

(b) Any exclusive political agreement with [sic] Sweden and Norway
may enter into with Germany would be considered by the Allied
Governments as an unfriendly act, even though it ostensibly was
intended for the defence of Finland. Any Scandinavian alliance
which provided for the acceptance of aid from Germany, and which
thus brought Scandinavian countries into special political
relationship with Germany, would be considered by us as directed
against ourselves.

(c) Any attempt by the Soviet Union to obtain from Norway a
footing on the Atlantic seaboard would be contrary to the vital
interests of the Allied Governments.

(d) The Allied Governments would have to take appropriate measures
to safeguard their interests if the Swedish and Norwegian
Governments were to refuse, withdraw, or curtail facilities in the
matter of commerce and shipping which the Allied Governments
consider essential for the prosecution of the war, and which it is
not unreasonable for the two Scandinavian Governments to concede.

(e) Further, seeing that the Allies are waging their war for aims
which are as much in the interest of small states as in their own,
the Allies cannot allow the course of the war to be influenced
against them by advantages derived by Germany from Sweden and
Norway. They therefore give notice that they reserve the right to
take such measures as they may think necessary to hinder or
prevent Germany from obtaining in Sweden and Norway resources or
facilities which for the purpose of war would be to her advantage
or to the disadvantage of the Allies.

(2) These communications should be followed a few days later by
the laying of minefields in Norwegian territorial waters and by
operations against German shipping thus forced out of those
waters. This operation would be timed to take place shortly after
a military operation of a special character on the western front.

(3) Plans should be prepared for interrupting German trade from
Lulea as soon as the Gulf of Bothnia is open to shipping.

(4) Such action as might prove possible should be taken to
diminish oil traffic from Rumania to Germany.

(5) A study should be undertaken by French and British experts
into proposals to bombard from the air Russian oil supplies to the
Caucasus with reference to (a) the likelihood that the operation
can be carried out effectively (b) the probable effect of the
operation on the U.S.S.R. (c) the extent and effect of possible
retaliation by the U.S.S.R. (d) the probable attitude of Turkey.

Detailed plans should be prepared so that the operation could be
carried out without delay if decided upon.

(6) As regards Holland and Belgium, the Allied policy should be as
follows:

(a) If Germany invades Belgium Allied forces should immediately
move into that country without waiting for a formal invitation to
do so but this intention should not be made known to the Belgian
Government lest it should give them the impression that it was a
matter of indifference to us whether or not they gave us a formal
invitation to enter their country.

(b) If Germany invades Holland and the Belgian Government go to
the help of Holland, the Allied policy would be to support Belgium
at once.

(c) If Germany invades Holland and Belgium does not go to the
assistance of Holland the Allies should regard themselves as
entitled to enter Belgium for the purpose of assisting Holland but
would reserve liberty of action as to the precise course to be
adopted.

(d) If Holland were to grant naval and/or air bases to Germany,
this would be an unneutral act entitling the Allies to take any
counter-action they might think fit but the precise action which
they would take in any particular case would depend on the
circumstances existing at the time.

(e) The contingencies in (c) and (d) should be the subject of
study by the French and British staffs.

(7) Approval was given to the text of a joint Anglo-French
declaration on unity of purpose. The declaration was published
forthwith.

(8) The French and British authorities should undertake an
examination into the possibility of making the blockade more
effective by imposing quotas on such neutral countries as might be
necessary.

(9) The application of contraband control to Asiatic Russia as
follows-
(a) The first stage should be to restrict the export to the
U.S.S.R. of all commodities on the contraband list derived from
the United Kingdom and France and their colonial Empire.

(b) The Allied naval authorities in the Far East should be
instructed to arrange for the diversion, preferably into Indo-
Chinese ports, of any vessels from the Philippines, Netherlands
East Indies, etc., thought to be carrying cargo of enemy
destination if their interception is practicable.

(c) The second stage should be for the Allied Governments to
endeavour to reach some understanding with the Chinese Government
regarding Chinese exports to Russia and to examine together how
best to induce the Japanese Government to agree to the strictest
possible limitation of goods carried in Japanese ships or on
Japanese controlled railways and destined for Soviet Russia.

(d) Simultaneously with (c) above the French and United Kingdom
Ambassadors in Washington and the Anglo-French Mission should be
furnished with all material calculated to move the United States
Government to take parallel action and if possible lead them to
admit the necessity of Japanese co-operation.

(10) Approval was given in principle to the suggestion that more
frequent meetings of the Supreme War Council should be held. [3]