Your telegram of 23rd March. [1] I think that either direct cable
from you to the Prime Minister [2] or cable to me to pass on to
him win have much more weight than views conveyed to Eden. [3]
Form of communication might be somewhat down the following lines:-

Feel that frank expressions of view from time to time from you
upon matters concerning the conduct of the war will be welcome.

Loss of Allied prestige and effect on neutrals resulting from
failure to save Finland causing you serious misgivings. Appreciate
that being so far away you are not in a position to form a
definite judgment but that you cannot free yourself from a feeling
that all is not well with the Allies' conduct of the war both in
diplomatic and military fields. That you want to put some of your
anxieties to the Prime Minister, realizing that they may be ill-
founded, and some of your thoughts, in the hope that they may be
of some assistance to him.

While appreciating the arguments and force of the facts set out in
the Prime Minister's speech to the House of Commons with regard to
Finland [4], the feeling remains that if from the date of the
first threat to Finland a more definite and resolute diplomatic
policy had been pursued in Norway and Sweden the story to be told
might have been different.

Similar position appears to be developing in south east Europe-
meeting of Hitler and Mussolini [5] generally regarded as having
strengthened the axis and may be followed by co-operation in
regard to the Danubian and Balkan countries, even possibly in
conjunction with Russia.

Developments of this character at least suggest such a German-
Russian dominance in these areas as to render small neutral
countries concerned incapable of resisting dictation whatever form
it might take. Should this position arise Turkey's situation would
be an unhappy one and co-operative action on her part with the
Allies would be extremely doubtful even if circumstances did not
force her to abrogate her treaties with the United Kingdom and
France.

In face of these possibilities the natural questions to ask are
(a) what steps should we be taking to prevent their coming about
and (b) what will be the effect upon the result of the war if we
are unable to do so.

With regard to (a) the answer would appear to be imaginative and
active diplomacy both official and unofficial and first class
propaganda backed by the fact that we could give assurances of
effective military aid in the event of aggression.

From a careful study of daily Dominions Office cables I do not
gain the impression that Allies' diplomacy has been either
sufficiently imaginative or active. From information available
here our propaganda does not appear to have been as effective as
might have been desired.

With regard to our plans and preparations to afford military
assistance in the event of aggression they do not at this distance
seem to be of such a character as to inspire confidence in
countries likely to be menaced and to stiffen their determination
and will to resist.

With regard to (b) it is difficult to visualize how the Allies'
eventual victory is to be brought about if valuable supplies
including oil of south eastern Europe are available without
restriction to Germany, which will be the case if what are clearly
Germany's present plans succeed.

So serious are the consequences if Germany succeeds that immediate
counter-measures are vital. These clearly embrace intensive
diplomatic [action and I welcome the calling to London of our
diplomatic representatives in South Eastern] [6] Europe although I
venture the suggestion that this action might well have been taken
earlier. Diplomatic action however is not sufficient unless backed
by convincing assurances of capacity to render military aid. These
can only be given if Turkey's full co-operation is forthcoming,
including the right of passage for Allied warships through the
Dardanelles.

Immediate conversations with Turkey would appear imperative and I
trust that the suggestion which I understand has been considered
that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [7] should proceed
to Ankara will immediately be given effect to.

In these conversations all aspects of the situation should be
reviewed and line of action considered in the event of aggression
in south east Europe including counter-measures against the Soviet
in the event of her being involved, e.g. Baku.

A definite understanding with Turkey as to joint action should
have a considerable effect upon Italy and should materially
strengthen our diplomacy in weaning Mussolini from his recent
tendency towards a greater co-operation with Hitler.

If Mussolini can be held [plus] [8] a definitely co-operative
policy agreed with Turkey in regard to south eastern Europe the
way might then be opened for a diplomacy based on German-Soviet
threat to Europe and the world, including the possibility of co-
operation by Japan and even conceivably of the United States in
resisting this menace.

BRUCE