The failure of the Allies to save Finland from having to
capitulate to Russia and accept the penalty of the terms of peace
has had most grave repercussions in all neutral countries, has
created deep public anxiety here and has caused a serious
political crisis in France.

So far-reaching may these consequences be that they compel an
examination not only of the causes of the failure to aid Finland,
but of the whole conduct of the war by the Allies.

FINLAND. The defence this week to attacks in the United Kingdom
and French Parliaments will be that the Allies had forces
available and were ready to despatch them, but were precluded from
doing so by the refusal of Finland to appeal for assistance and of
Norway and Sweden to agree to the transit across their
territories. This explanation may meet political threat but will
do nothing to restore the confidence of small neutrals and in my
view is no answer to the charge.

The real answer is that the Allies failed to face the issue until
too late and instead of from the day of Russian aggression
starting organising to aid Finland and pursuing an active and
intensive diplomacy in Norway and Sweden no serious consideration
was given to the problem until the Supreme War Council on 5th
February and both before and after that date our diplomacy in
Scandinavia was feeble and hesitating.

It is not sufficient to appreciate the cause of the present
failure, it is necessary to take steps to avoid a repetition and
to prevent, so far as possible, the adverse effects to it.

In my view to do these things it is essential (a) to pursue a more
active and determined diplomacy in all neutral countries; (b) to
determine in advance, with the maximum practicable precision, the
Allies' action in the light of all developments that can be
forecast; (c) to create an efficient method for the direction of
high policy of the war.

With regard to (a)-Scandinavia. Attitude of Norway and Sweden
during the Finnish crisis was due to the fear of Germany and the
conviction that the Allies were not in a position to afford them
adequate assistance. Germany will now exploit the present position
and intensify her efforts by propaganda, diplomacy and threats in
order to bring Scandinavia under her dominance.

In view of the importance to the Allies of supplies and shipping
from this source it is imperative that we should counter these
efforts by propaganda, by material and financial assistance in
their rearmament and by an active and robust diplomacy both
officially and unofficially directed to showing that the Allies
are in a position to provide adequate military assistance and that
moral and economic interests of Scandinavia will be best served by
dose co-operation with the Allies. Such a policy, pursued with
imagination and force, should succeed as there is an overwhelming
sympathy in Norway and Sweden with the Allies. At the moment both
countries, rather less particularly Sweden, feel that they have
let Finland down.

(end of part one. Part two follows in telegram No. 191).

BRUCE