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314 Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, U.K. High Commissioner to Australia, to Mr R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister

Letter CANBERRA, 30 October 1939

SECRET

On the 9th September I sent to you a copy of my Government's
telegram No. 191 of the 8th September, containing certain
suggestions as to naval, army and air force co-operation in the
present war.

As regards paragraph 4 of this telegram, relating to naval co-
operation, enquiry was subsequently made of the Commonwealth
Government through their High Commissioner in London [2] whether
they would be prepared to allow five destroyers of the Royal
Australian Navy to proceed to Singapore to replace United Kingdom
destroyers and undergo intensive training. The Commonwealth
Government agreed to this proposal, adding that owing to the
international situation it was contemplated that, should Far
Eastern complications arise, all Australian vessels would return
forthwith to Australian waters, which is their pre-arranged
station in an Eastern war. [3]

The Admiralty have since been in telegraphic communication with
the Commonwealth Navy Office as to the possibility of the movement
of the Australian destroyers from Singapore to the Mediterranean.

It is understood that the Commonwealth Government would be
prepared to agree to such a movement, though with some misgiving,
having regard to (a) the dearth of suitable anti-submarine vessels
in Australian waters, (b) the possibility of the extension of
submarine operations to these waters, and (c) the possibility of
serious deterioration in the situation in the Far East as regards
both Japan and Russia. [4] In these circumstances I have been
requested by my Government to make the following communication to
the Commonwealth Government:-

(1) While Germany remains the only enemy, U-boat activity in
Australian waters is considered by the United Kingdom authorities
to be most unlikely, and the greatest threat to Australian
shipping from submarine attack is expected to be in home waters
and in the Atlantic. The only form of attack on shipping in
Australian waters which the United Kingdom authorities consider
probable is by an enemy surface raider.

(2) The Admiralty would accordingly propose the following
movements, which they feel would be to mutual advantage:-

(a) the R.A.N. destroyers to be available for service in the
Mediterranean;

(b) two C. or D. Class cruisers to be sent to Australia.

(3) As regards (b) in the preceding paragraph, these cruisers are
suitable ships for operations against an armed merchant cruiser
type of raider and have over one-third greater endurance than V.

and W. Class destroyers. The two cruisers could leave the United
Kingdom next month.

(4) Although in the event of Japanese or Soviet intervention it is
considered doubtful whether submarines of those countries would be
sent to Australian waters, the anxiety of the Commonwealth
Government on this account is fully appreciated. In such a
contingency, therefore, the R.A.N. destroyers would either be
returned or be relieved by ships of the Royal Navy fitted for
anti-submarine operations.

My Government would be grateful if they could receive at the
earliest possible moment the observations of the Commonwealth
Government on the above proposals.

GEOFFREY WHISKARD

1 Document 214.

2 S.M. Bruce. The request was communicated to Canberra in
cablegram 516 from Bruce to Menzies, 2 October 1939, not printed
(on file AA: A461, AB 337/1/5).

3 War Cabinet agreed to the proposal on 6 October 1939 (see AA:

A2673, vol. 1, 6 October 1939, Minute 16) and Bruce was advised
the same day by an unnumbered cablegram, not printed (on file AA:

A461, AB 337/1/5)
4 See War Cabinet Minute 42, 17 October 1939, on AA: A2673, vol.

1.


[AA: A1608, H33/1/1]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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