Following for Prime Minister-
In reply to request recently received for advice 'as to military
position which would be created in the event of Russia declaring
war and cooperating with Germany in military action", following
appreciation has been prepared:-

2. It should be stated at the outset that His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom consider it unlikely that Russia will adopt
this course, for the following reasons:-

(1) She is in process of realising her ambitions in the Baltic,
has barred Germany's path to Roumania and the Black Sea, has
extended her influence in South Eastern Europe, and, acting
through Turkey, will probably be able to exclude the naval forces
of other countries from the Black Sea. AU this has been achieved
without war and its accompanying risks.

(2) Her abiding aim is to spread world revolution. To achieve that
object her policy is likely to be to induce Germany and other
countries to exhaust themselves in war while herself remaining
outside the struggle. (3) Too close a co-operation between Russia
and Germany is likely to antagonise Italy, Spain and Portugal, and
thus to encourage the building up against Russia of a new
political coalition.

3. Assuming that, despite the above, Russia decided to fight on
Germany's side, the salient features of the military position
which would arise are summarized in the paragraphs that follow:

4. At sea, submarine warfare would probably be intensified in home
waters. More determined action by German surface vessels would
have to be expected, and the availability of the ice-free port of
Murmansk would broaden the base of the enemy's operations. A minor
threat to British trade might develop in the Pacific.

5. On land and in the air, direct military co-operation with
Germany seems unlikely on any appreciable scale. Germany already
has large land forces and a preponderance in aircraft, and there
would be political dangers in the acceptance of Russian troops on
German soil. Russia might, however, supply some technical troops
and certain types of aircraft for use on the Western Front.

6. In the economic sphere, Russian support would slow up the
effect of our economic pressure on Germany, who might feel she
could afford to play a waiting game on the Western Front in the
hope that the pressure of neutral opinion and of our own people
would compel us to make peace while her military strength was
still unimpaired. At the same time, any economic assistance which
Russia might render to Germany would correspondingly restrict her
own military activities and vice versa.

7. Russian propaganda, which is an immediate menace to our
interests, would be excessive, particularly in the Middle East. By
the use of this weapon, combined with military action, she could
cause us serious embarrassment by locking up allied forces in the
secondary theatres, and in particular Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan.

8. So far as Iran is concerned, Russia could easily penetrate both
with propaganda and with small military forces into the northern
provinces, and such penetration might develop into a threat to
Anglo-Iranian oilfields, which we should have to resist.

9. Russian penetration in Iran would of itself cause disturbances
in Iraq, and a further advance would threaten the Mosul oil fields
and our overland communications from the Persian Gulf to Egypt. We
should be bound to resist any such advance.

10. Russia might, without any great military effort-(1) Absorb the
northern provinces of Afghanistan; and (2) Launch light scale air
attacks on India itself The general effect in India of the near
approach of Russian menace might be to rally all classes of
Indians in the prosecution of the war, though it has to be
remembered that there is an appreciable Communist element in the
Left Wing, the most powerful political party in India, which looks
to Russia for inspiration, and that Russian propaganda might
therefore have unfortunate repercussions in India itself On the
other hand, (i) above would make it difficult for the Afghanistan
Government to maintain its position, and unless we could assist it
to do so there would almost certainly be serious tribal
disturbances on both sides of Indo Afghan communications; while
(2) might create considerable demoralisation in the unprotected
cities of Northern India and thus complicate the internal security
problem.

In either event no reinforcements could be drawn from India. On
the contrary there might be calls from India for land and air
reinforcements particularly the latter.

11. Unless Italy were a definite friend, the despatch of adequate
forces particularly air forces to Iran, Iraq and India would be
extremely difficult, (but see paragraphs 2 and 14).

12. Even if Russia did not openly fight on Germany's side but were
benevolently neutral towards her, many embarrassments summarised
in paragraphs 4 to 10 would operate though in some cases to an
extreme extent.

13. It will be seen from the above that a close association
between Germany and Russia would have serious military
implications. On the other hand this association can be bought by
Germany only by sacrificing German interests in the Baltic and
South East Europe. This may well lead to a revulsion feeling in
Germany which may bring the Russo-German antagonism to the surface
sooner than Herr Hitler intends.

14. In many quarters particularly the Mediterranean area the
United States of America and in the Roman Catholic countries
generally the Russo-German agreement is likely to influence
sentiment in our favour. In short we may later be in a position to
mobilize the world opinion to rally to Christian front as against
anti-Christian forces.

15. This appreciation is being telegraphed also to the other Prime
Ministers.