Statement by the Chair of the 2026 Australia Group Plenary

12 June 2026

1. The Australia Group (AG), comprising of 42 countries and the European Union, met for the Annual Plenary in Paris from 8 to 12 June 2026. All participants reaffirmed their shared commitment to countering the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).

2. Through the AG, participants harmonise national export controls, exchange information and technical expertise and discuss emerging technology to ensure that exports do not inadvertently contribute to CBW programs.

3. All participants maintain sovereign control over their licensing and enforcement measures and determine proliferation risks for themselves. Participants agree that effective national export controls provide the confidence, trust and assurance necessary to make trade in sensitive dual-use items possible.

4. Participants advocate for responsible export control practices which are essential for preventing the spread of CBW. During the Plenary, technical experts gathered to discuss proliferation risks related to new and emerging technologies. This allows participants to ensure that the AG Common Control Lists are updated to prevent proliferation of CBW and facilitate legitimate trade of sensitive goods and technology.

5. The publicly available AG Common Control Lists make a significant contribution to global security. Many countries which are not AG participants use the Common Control Lists in their own sovereign export control systems, which enhances the global non-proliferation architecture. Through the transparent publication of the Common Control Lists, the AG strengthens norms against the development and use of CBW.

6. Participants work together to ensure that sensitive items can be exported for peaceful purposes and that AG activities facilitate the operation and growth of essential industries that require chemicals, biological agents and related dual-use equipment for legitimate applications.

Key Outcomes

7. AG Participants reaffirmed their commitment to working together to counter the proliferation of CBW. Participants emphasised that the use of CBW anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable and prohibited under international law.

8. Participants underscored their continuing unequivocal support for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Participants voiced their support for the Chair of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC and encouraged progress on all items identified by the Review Conference in 2022, including on compliance and verification and the two mechanisms pertaining to International Cooperation and Assistance and Science and Technology Review.

9. Participants urged all countries to uphold their obligations under international law to not develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons. Participants underscored their continuing unequivocal support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as cornerstones of disarmament and the elimination of chemical weapons.

10. Participants noted the role of the AG in assisting countries to implement their BWC and CWC obligations.

11. Participants continued to express concern regarding the use of chemical warfare agents against individuals in recent years as referenced in previous AG Chair Statements.

12. Participants expressed concern at the alleged Russian involvement in the poisoning of opposition figure Alexei Navalny.

13. Participants took note of the United Kingdom's independent inquiry into the death of Dawn Sturgess, a British National, by Novichok poisoning. Participants noted that the use of chemical warfare agents against individuals such as the Skripals, and a disregard for the foreseeable harm to others was deeply troubling and reflects a historical pattern by Russia. Noting this, participants called on all states, including Russia, to comply with their obligations under the CWC and BWC.

14. Participants deplored the confirmed use of riot control agents as a method of warfare on the battlefield against Ukraine, as outlined by three successive OPCW reports. Participants strongly condemned any use of chemical weapons. In this regard, participants reiterated grave concern at the alleged use against Ukraine of hazardous chemicals, including chloropicrin, a choking agent included in Schedule 3 of the CWC and called upon the OPCW to investigate and identify perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons.

15. Participants renewed their call to the international community to subject exports of chloropicrin and other dual-use chemicals of concern to strict and effective controls to ensure that transfers of these chemicals do not contribute to chemical weapons proliferation and use.

16. Participants welcomed Syria's commitment to the elimination of the former regime's chemical weapons and its ongoing cooperation with the OPCW. Participants expressed support for the progress of the OPCW's work and emphasised the importance of securing any facilities and stockpiles as quickly as possible. Participants welcomed the report of the OPCW Director-General on 24 May 2026 which identified a significant discovery of undeclared munitions, chemicals and related equipment. Since December 2024, the OPCW has entered a new and critical phase in its efforts to uncover and define the full extent of the former regime's clandestine chemical weapons programme, and to ensure that all elements are declared and irreversibly destroyed by Syria under strict verification by the OPCW.

17. Participants discussed concerns about CBW proliferation activities in and by several countries, including Russia, Iran and North Korea.

18. Noting the AG's Common Control Lists serve as a benchmark for global best practice, participants continued their work to refine controls applied to the chemical and biological items on these lists. This included updates to the AG's Common Control Lists in response to the changing threat landscape. Updated Common Control Lists and the AG Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items are publicly available.

19. Participants supported a cooperative approach to strengthening existing counter-proliferation arrangements while continuing to facilitate legitimate trade. Participants agreed that multilateral export control regimes provided the confidence and assurance necessary to facilitate the legitimate trade of sensitive dual-use items and help countries fulfil their relevant international obligations.

20. Participants welcomed the valuable work of other non-proliferation groups such as the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) and the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. Participants noted the GP played an important role in coordinating international efforts to combat the proliferation of WMD including through exchanging information, coordinating action, fighting WMD-related disinformation and delivering capacity building assistance to deter, prevent, detect and respond to CBW threats. Participants welcomed deeper ties between the AG and the GP, including cooperation on the GP's WMD Disinformation Steering Group.

21. Participants reiterated the importance of the OPCW's role in monitoring compliance with the CWC and commended its professional and impartial work in this regard. Where there are credible allegations of CWC non-compliance, the OPCW should act as mandated by the CWC and provide assistance as requested. Participants commended the OPCW (including the Technical Secretariat) for its leadership and professionalism in implementing the CWC.

22. Participants welcomed the appointment of Her Excellency Sabrina Dallafior as the next Director-General of the OPCW and thanked His Excellency Fernando Arias for his leadership of the OPCW as Director-General throughout his tenure.

Technical issues

23. AG licensing and enforcement experts exchanged experiences, case studies and information on enforcement best practices to prevent the proliferation of sensitive dual-use chemicals, biological materials and related equipment and technology. Discussions highlighted the value of sharing challenges, lessons learned, and enhancements across the export controls enforcement community. Participants also discussed the importance of enforcement capability and effective controls governing Intangible Technology Transfer (ITT).

24. Participants shared approaches for keeping pace with rapidly evolving dual-use technologies and discussed the relevance of these technologies for non-proliferation and export controls. Participants discussed chemical and biological convergence, novel production of chemicals, case studies of dual-use research of concern and ways to mitigate risks, including the misuse of emerging technologies. Participants also discussed emerging technology including artificial intelligence and noted both its benefits and risks.

Outreach

25. Participants agreed that outreach by AG members on AG matters is essential to enhance global efforts to prevent the spread of CBW. Participants discussed priorities and opportunities to continue outreach to countries outside the AG. The AG Chair and participants agreed to increase individual and joint outreach.

26. Participants thanked all guest speakers who provided their insights and expertise on key proliferation challenges. This included Christian Nissen, a Senior Political Affairs Officer for the OPCW who addressed participants on the OPCW's work in Syria. Julia Wind-Falk, a visiting fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), shared her expertise on the post-pandemic transformation of the bio-pharmaceutical industry. The Head of the Implementation Support Unit for the Biological Weapons Convention, Daniel Feakes, provided an update on the progress of the two mechanisms pertaining to International Cooperation and Assistance and Science and Technology Review. Dr Nathan McGill, a researcher at the OPCW Laboratory, presented on the work of OPCW's ChemTech Centre. All presentations were extremely valuable to participants.

27. Participants reiterated the AG's pre-existing standing offer of support for all states who require assistance with implementing their BWC and CWC obligations.

Adherence and Membership

28. Participants acknowledged that 2025, which marked the AG's 40th Anniversary, was a historic year for the AG. Both Albania and Montenegro declared unilateral adherence to the AG, making them the first formal adherents since Kazakhstan in 2015. Participants welcomed Albania's and Montenegro's respective declarations and noted it indicated the commitment of each to countering the proliferation of CBW.

29. Participants reaffirmed their commitment to encourage further declarations of unilateral adherence. The AG sets the international benchmark for export controls on sensitive chemical and biological materials and related equipment. Advocacy and capacity building to encourage broad adoption of the AG Common Control Lists and Guidelines is central to the AG's role.

30. Participants encouraged non-members who were interested in engaging with the AG to reach out to individual members or the Secretariat.

Next Intersessional and Plenary

31. Participants thanked the Czech Republic for its generous hosting of the AG Intersessional meeting in Prague in January 2026.

32. Participants looked forward to the next AG Intersessional in Bratislava and thanked the Slovak Republic for its generous offer to host the meeting.

33. Participants welcomed and accepted France's offer to host the AG Plenary in Paris in mid-2027.

34. Further information on the Australia Group is available at australiagroup.net