Annual Report 1998-99 |
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IAEA SAFEGUARDS STATEMENT FOR 1998
Each year the IAEA’s Board of Governors considers a detailed account and analysis of all the IAEA’s safeguarding activities. Based on this, the IAEA makes a statement in its Annual Report in relation to nuclear material under international safeguards, giving a definitive conclusion on the results of its safeguarding operations during the year.
The statement in the IAEA’s Annual Report for 1998 is as follows:
‘In fulfilling the safeguards obligations of the Agency in 1998, the Secretariat did not find any indication that nuclear material which had been declared and placed under safeguards had been diverted for any military purpose or for purposes unknown, or that facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards were being misused. All the information available to the Agency supports the conclusion that the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for.
The Agency is still unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK. The safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the Agency remains binding and in force, and the Agency is continuing to implement safeguards measures in the DPRK. These measures include monitoring the ‘freeze’ on the DPRK’s graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, as requested by the United Nations Security Council and as foreseen in the ‘Agreed Framework’ of October 1994 between the DPRK and the United States of America.’
Additional statements on safeguards activities in 1998 include the following, drawn from the IAEA’s Press Release PR 99/6 of 17 June 1999, ‘Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in 1998’:
‘In 1998, the Agency continued to make progress in the development and implementation of measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of its safeguards system.’
‘During 1998, the strengthening measures pursuant to existing legal authority were being implemented. Examples of such measures are environmental sampling, remote monitoring, and enhanced evaluation of information about States’ nuclear programmes. In 1998, additional protocols concluded on the basis of the Model Additional Protocol entered into force with four States (The Holy See, Jordan, New Zealand and Uzbekistan). Additional protocols with a further 27 States were approved by the Board of Governors and were awaiting ratification by the respective States. The additional protocol with Australia, which entered into force in December 1997, was being implemented.’
Quantities of nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards, and the IAEA’s regular budget expenditure on safeguards, are given in Annex F.