****

AIPRD Yogya Reconstruction Program

**Yogyakarta – Central Java Community Assistance Program** **(YCAP)**

**AidWorks Initiative Number:**

**INDEPENDENT COMPLETION REPORT**

**Colin Reynolds (** **colin@reynoldsconsulting.com.au** **)**

**Methodius Kusumahadi (****m.kusumahadi@gmail.com****)**

**Final Report March, 2010**

### Aid Activity Summary

*< To be completed by the AusAID evaluation manager before template is provided to evaluation team. >*

| Aid Activity Name |  |
| --- | --- |
| AidWorks initiative number | ING 646 |
| Commencement date | 3 September 2006 | Completion date | 30 April 2010 |
| Total Australian $ | AUD30,000,000 |
| Total other $ |  |
| Delivery organisation(s) | RHK Management in association with IDSS |
| Implementing Partner(s) | International and National NGOs |
| Country/Region | Yogyakarta and Central Java Province, Indonesia |
| Primary Sector | School Construction, Improving Livelihood and Disaster Risk Reduction |

### Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank all stakeholders who made themselves available to the ICR team. Special appreciation is extended to those AusAID and YCAP Program staff who managed the difficult logistics of the field visit, and to our very effective and professional interpreter Ms. Mia Badib.

### Author’s Details

Colin Reynolds: Consultant, Reynolds Consulting, colin@reynoldsconsulting.com.au

Methodius Kusumahhadi: Chairperson of Board of Trustees, SATUNAMA Foundation, meth@satunama.org

**Contents**

[Executive Summary 1](#_Toc255895353)

[1.0 Introduction 1](#_Toc255895354)

[1.1 Activity Background 1](#_Toc255895355)

[1.2 Evaluation Objectives and Questions 2](#_Toc255895356)

[1.3 Evaluation Scope and Methods 2](#_Toc255895357)

[1.4 Evaluation Team 4](#_Toc255895358)

[2.0 Evaluation Findings 5](#_Toc255895359)

[3.0 ICR Evaluative Criteria 6](#_Toc255895360)

[3.1 Relevance 6](#_Toc255895361)

[3.2 Effectiveness 8](#_Toc255895362)

[3.3 Efficiency 10](#_Toc255895363)

[3.4 Impact 12](#_Toc255895364)

[3.5 Sustainability 13](#_Toc255895365)

[3.6 Gender Equality 15](#_Toc255895366)

[3.7 Monitoring and Evaluation 16](#_Toc255895367)

[3.8 Analysis and Learning 17](#_Toc255895368)

[3.9 Other Cross-cutting Issues 18](#_Toc255895369)

[3.10 Evaluation Criteria Ratings -Summary 19](#_Toc255895370)

[4.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 20](#_Toc255895371)

[ANNEX A. TORs and Key Dates 1](#_Toc255895372)

[ANNEX B. Persons Consulted 8](#_Toc255895373)

[ANNEX C. Comments from AusAID Disaster Management Adviser 21](#_Toc255895374)

[ANNEX D. YCAP Schools Costings 23](#_Toc255895375)

[ANNEX E. Draft Costings of Recommended Ongoing Support Options. 24](#_Toc255895376)

##

**List of Abbreviations:**

AIPRD Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development

BAPPEDA Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah / Regional Development Planning Agency

BAPPENAS Badan Perencanaan Pembangungan Nasional / National Development Planning Agency

BPR Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (Community Credit Bank)

CBAP Community Based Assistance Provider

CE Community Engagement

CSO Community Service Organization

Diffability Diffability (as against disability) is now the preferred terminology by those with different abilities

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

DM Disaster Management

FHO Final Handover

GOA Government of Australia

GOI Government of Indonesia

IDSS International Development Support Services

IP Implementing Partner

JRF Java Reconstruction Fund

KPI Key Performance Indicator

M&E     Monitoring & Evaluation

MCA Mobile Community Assistance

MTR Mid Term Review

MSME Micro Small-Medium Enterprise

NGO         Non-Government Organisation

PDD Project Design Documents

PM Program Manager

PEL Pembangunan Ekonomi Local (Local Economic Development)

PKK Pembinaan Kesejahteran Keluarga (Family Welfare Education)

PMG Program Management Group

PMO Program Manager’s Office

QIL         Quick Impact Livelihood

SES Self Evaluation Study

SG Steering Group

SME        Small-Medium Enterprise

# Executive Summary

##### Activity Background

An earthquake in May 2006 caused widespread death and devastation to the Indonesian provinces of Central Java and Yogyakarta. Thousands were killed and injured, while many more lost their livelihoods. The most affected areas included the districts of Bantul (Yogyakarta Special Region) and Klaten (Central Java Province). In responding to the event, the Australian Government initiated the Yogyakarta – Central Java Community Assistance Program (YCAP). The goal of YCAP was to assist affected families and communities to return as quickly as possible to normality in the three areas most severely affected by the earthquake: household life, income producing activities, and community schooling/health services. The activities within YCAP are designed to be flexible and responsive to changing needs and priorities of the Government of Indonesia (GOI), local governments and communities. The program commenced in September 2006 for an initial period of two years, and following an AusAID Mid Term Review and Scoping Mission, has recently been extended in a second phase ending in March 2010.

##### Evaluation Objectives and Questions

The objectives of the ICR mission were to:

1. Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of YCAP Program, in order to provide information on accountability and generation of lessons learnt that could be applied across the aid program;
2. Review the effectiveness of the DRR approach applied by YCAP program. The review should also assess how well the program addressed issues of gender equality, poverty and vulnerability in its design and implementation.
3. Identify factors constraining success and lessons learnt from the program and recommend mechanisms in order to enhance overall effectiveness of future and wider AusAID engagement in this DRR area;
4. Validate and follow-up the performance data and relevant assessments made by Activity Completion Reports.

##### Overview of Findings

This program is considered to have achieved above average outcomes, particularly in the second phase of its operation. A key strength of the program has been its ability to successfully undertake a transition from ‘emergency’ to ‘development’ approaches between phase 1 and phase 2 of the program, despite initial management and other design parameters that were not conducive to such a transition. Many of these problematic initial approaches to design and management resulted from incorrect assumptions regarding transitional approaches.

In short, the emergency response aspect of YCAP is considered satisfactory, as is its incorporation of DRR into relevant activities. More notably, the success of development-oriented approaches adopted under phase 2 has been outstanding, particularly in regard to establishment of highly productive implementation ‘partnerships’ between the program, local government, NGOs and communities. Hence, the exemplar model that might be drawn from this program is one that pertains to stakeholder engagement.

The level of success of the development approaches adopted under phase 2 has been particularly impressive given the limited (8 month) implementation period available. This success is far beyond the norm, even when compared with longer-term development programs that have not had to negotiate the shift between emergency and development priorities.

There is a need to learn from the design shortcomings of this 2006 disaster response approach, especially given more recent events and current interventions in Padang. It would also be a waste of the resources invested in phase 2 of the program not to follow-up this success in a way that consolidates the sustainability of benefits and identifies appropriate approaches to transferring this good practice example to other contexts.

### Lessons:

*Lesson 1. Clarity in communication of program intent (particularly in relation to levels of funding directly available) to stakeholders on program governance bodies is vital, if a cascade of related implementation disputes and issues are to be avoided.*

*Lesson 2: Transition between emergency and development assistance does not happen automatically, it must be managed. The need to manage the transition should be explicitly recognised in the initial design (see Recommendations 1 & 2).*

*Lesson 3: While a single coordinated program of emergency and transitional assistance is an appropriate model and ‘two team’ approach to such transitional programs may be appropriate, the model adopted for phase 1 of YCAP in which key consultative roles were segregated and thereby distanced from direct implementers should not be repeated (see Recommendation 2).*

*Lesson 4: M&E frameworks of transitional programs need to be designed to recognise (and record the success of) the transition between emergency and development priorities (see Recommendation 6)*

*Lesson 5: Application of Paris Declaration principles should not be pursued blindly, but tailored to implementation contexts.*

*Lesson 6: In developing a DRR strategy for a transitional program such as YCAP, DRR will be most effective when defined broadly, and explicit decisions should be made regarding the priority to be given to each aspect of DRR (particularly preventative and educational aspects). This prioritisation should be reflected in budget allocations and appropriate performance indicators for construction activities which have the primary purpose of mitigating impacts of future disasters and/or providing long-term examples of the benefits of improved or modified construction standards (see Recommendation 3 below).*

*Lesson 7: Care should be taken to prevent perceptions of DRR outputs/outcomes of transitional programs from exceeding actual standards maintained. If this is not done DRR activities may become self-defeating. In cases where perceptions are difficult to control, the DRR-related responsibility of DRR program implementers is to err on the side of maintaining as high standards as indicated necessary by risk assessments, even if this carries financial implications and associated opportunity costs.*

*Lesson 8: The prioritisation and associated timing of various DRR activities to be undertaken by a program must be based on a contextual assessment of ongoing risks. Later evaluative exercises should consider the information upon which such considerations were based and not attempt to retrospectively discount the validity of past risk assessments if these were made with the best information available at the time.*

*Lesson 9: Raising the profile of DRR activities within a transitional program should be achieved using an appropriately designed M&E framework, rather than attempting to artificially segregate DRR ‘activities’ from other emergency or development-related components of the program.*

*Lesson 10: One of the most important determinants of success of community based endeavours is the ability of community themselves to seek, mobilise and optimally use any services offered by external sources, in addition to a community’s own resources mobilization.*

### Recommendations:

**Recommendation 1: Future AusAID programs seeking to span a transition between emergency and development assistance should consider explicitly declaring these two parts of program and defining how and when respective activities and modification of program priorities will occur (see also Recommendations 2 & 3).**

**Recommendation 2: A coordinated, two-team approach to transitional programs (viz. an initial response team and a transitional/development-oriented team) should be used in future, provided the approach has the following characteristics:**

* **A standing offer should be established to allow rapid deployment of an initial, emergency response team**
* **Design of a more detailed transitional approach should take place while the initial response team is operating (deployment of the initial response team should never be held up by more detailed design or contracting processes for transitional/development elements of the program)**
* **The initial response team should have clear responsibilities, including:**
	+ **Identify and deliver necessary emergency assistance as quickly as possible (the use of direct implementation or delivery through local counterparts should be undertaken as contextually justified[[1]](#footnote-1))**
	+ **Gather information to inform the second stage of the design process (and possibly assist with identification and contracting of appropriate organizations to undertake transitional approaches)**
* **The initial response team should always have a clear exit date, with the period of their overlapping activity with the development-oriented team inclusive of a requirement for initial joint consultation approaches, followed by a progressive hand-over of consultative duties to the development-oriented team.**

**Recommendation 3: AusAID should set construction strength standards applicable to the natural disaster risks of a particular location and adhere to these strength standards regardless of other contextual factors.**

**Recommendation 4: Future programs providing physical assets at local government level in Indonesia should be cognizant of this asset transfer issue, and prompt and assist targeted local governments to apply for these transfers in order to enable the local allocation of maintenance budgets.**

**Recommendation 5: It is strongly recommended that AusAID consider allocating 12 months of modest additional funding to provide limited ongoing support to existing YCAP activities, specifically to:**

* **continue efforts to empower working cooperation between GoI-NGO-community**
* **continue efforts to empower working cooperation between SME-NGO- bigger business entities, especially in regard to increasing market access of cooperative groups**
* **continue efforts to strengthen women as income earners as a way to encourage ongoing cultural change**

This funding provision should have the multiple aims of consolidating the sustainability of phase 2 achievements, monitoring future independent uptake of program approaches and researching the best means of replicating YCAP successes related to stakeholder engagement and participation.

**Recommendation 6: M&E frameworks of programs wishing to transition from emergency to development assistance should define indicators relevant to both forms of assistance and recognise that optimal performance levels against the various indicators is something that should change over time.**

### Evaluation Criteria Ratings

| Evaluation Criteria | Rating (1-6) |
| --- | --- |
| Relevance | 5 |
| Effectiveness | 5 |
| Efficiency | 4 |
| Sustainability | 4 |
| Gender Equality | 5 |
| Monitoring & Evaluation | 4 |
| Analysis & Learning | 5 |

*Rating scale: 6 = very high quality; 1 = very low quality. Below 4 is less than satisfactory.*

# Introduction

Note: the Independent Completion Report (ICR) is intended to be read in conjunction with the Activity Completion Report (ACR). Hence, in the interests of efficiency the authors have tried to avoid simply reiterating the content of the ACR, and do so only where it is necessary for clarity.

## 1.1 Activity Background

An earthquake in May 2006 caused widespread death and devastation to the Indonesian provinces of Central Java and Yogyakarta. Thousands were killed and injured, while many more lost their livelihoods. The most affected areas included the districts of Bantul (Yogyakarta Special Region) and Klaten (Central Java Province). In responding to the event, the Australian Government initiated the Yogyakarta – Central Java Community Assistance Program (YCAP). The goal of YCAP was to assist affected families and communities to return as quickly as possible to normality in the three areas most severely affected by the earthquake: household life, income producing activities, and community schooling/health services. The activities within YCAP are designed to be flexible and responsive to changing needs and priorities of the Government of Indonesia (GoI), local governments and communities. The program commenced in September 2006 for an initial period of two years, and following an AusAID Mid Term Review and Scoping Mission, was extended in a second phase ending in March 2010. (A more detailed background is already provided by the ToRs to this ICR, attached as Annex A. A table of key dates which was provided in the Activity Completion Report is also included in Annex A.)

**Comparison of Goal, Purpose and Objectives for YCAP Phase 1 and 2 *(taken from ACR)***

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Phase 1 (Imprest Account of AUD15M)** | **Phase 2 (Imprest Account of AUD5M)** |
| GoalTo assist affected families and communities to return as quickly as possible to normality in the three areas most severely affected by the earthquake:Household lifeIncome producing activities, andSchooling and health services | GoalTo assist the affected families and communities to return as quickly as possible to normality. |
| Component 1: Sustaining Household LifeTo help households recover, improve access to water and sanitation, increase access to health services and improve resilience of communities. | Component 1: Disaster Risk ReductionStrengthening efforts of local authorities’ disaster planning and preparednessandStrengthening the capacity of communities to cope with the impacts of shocks and disasters by addressing the root causes of vulnerability to hazards. |
| Component 2: Restoring Local IncomesEarthquake affected households and businesses are assisted to recover their livelihoods and increase resilience. | Component 2: Improving LivelihoodsIncreased access for those made vulnerable by the earthquake to livelihoods enhancing opportunities. |
| Component 3: School ReadinessTo reconstruct school facilities so that students, teachers and communities have facilities comparable to, or improved from, conditions pre-earthquake. | Component 3: Enhanced Community Infrastructure Assist NGOs and civil society organisations to continue repairing lightly damaged, or to renovate inadequate, community infrastructure that is identified by communities as a priority in addressing vulnerability to shocksandAssist NGOs and civil society organisations to replace damaged and/or lost equipment, and provide additional equipment to assist in addressing vulnerability. |
| Component 4: Program Management The objective of Program management is effective and efficient support for the delivery of component activities, including financial management. | Component 4: Program Management The objective of Program management is effective and efficient support for the delivery of component activities, including financial management.  |

## 1.2 Evaluation Objectives and Questions

The objectives of the ICR mission were to:

1. Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of YCAP Program, in order to provide information on accountability and generation of lessons learnt that could be applied across the aid program;
2. Review the effectiveness of the DRR approach applied by YCAP program. The review should also assess how well the program-addressed issues of gender equality, poverty and vulnerability in its design and implementation.
3. Identify factors facilitating and constraining success and lessons learnt from the program and recommend mechanisms in order to enhance overall effectiveness of future and wider AusAID engagement in this DRR area;
4. Validate and follow-up the performance data and relevant assessments made by Activity Completion Reports.

A number of more detailed questions were posed by the ToRs for this mission. The discussions of findings provided in this ICR are intended to directly address these questions.

## 1.3 Evaluation Scope and Methods

It is important to note that an ICR is not a full-scale evaluation. As recent ICR guidance points out, the function of the ICR is to provide basic ground-truthing of the information provided by the MC’s Completion Report and to look for possible alternate interpretations of the analysis already provided:

 ‘Generally the ICR process will involve a field visit. An ICR field visit should not have to duplicate the function of basic gathering of performance information, which is the responsibility of the delivery organisation. Rather, the visit should be question-based and research-oriented. It should focus on checking the key assumptions and methodological risks apparent in the evidence and analytical base of the CR; and in gathering and analysing new, additional data (qualitative or quantitative) when there is a real value in this being done by the independent team’. ([www.ode.**ausaid**.gov.au/publications/pdf/guidelines\_**completion**.pdf](http://www.ode.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/guidelines_completion.pdf) )

The methodology used for the YCAP ICR specifically recognises this ground-truthing function, and is designed to provide the greatest possible opportunity to canvass unprompted stakeholder perspectives.

Given the range of considerations addressed by this ICR and the fact that many of them are quite complex constructs, the SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunity and Threat) framework was applied as a simple, but robust means of structuring information gathering. The SWOT framework ensures that any issues or observations raised by respondents are tested for relevance to program progress or performance[[2]](#footnote-2). SWOT is also an effective means of identifying the key issues *as perceived by respondents,* compared to necessarily more preconceived, prescriptive question sets.

In recognition that a significant percentage of the information available to the team would be derived from interviews or focus group discussions (and therefore largely qualitative), the SWOT approach was combined with the basic structure of a ‘Qualitative Compilation Table’ (QCT). This compilation table approach is based on the coordinated collection of pertinent structural data with a consistent set of related dependent information. In practice, this means firstly allowing respondents to raise any SWOT issues (the ‘structural’ data) that “they think are important”; either in an (always initial) unprompted part of an interview or in relation to suggested prompt topics (presented later in interview). Once an issue is raised, the collection of ‘dependent’ information means asking a consistent set of questions about that issue.

For the purposes of this ICR the prompt topics used in interviews were:

* **Balancing emergency and development approaches**
* **DRR approaches and standards over the life of the program (includes follow-up prompt on relevant opportunity costs)**
* **The relationships between YCAP staff, local government, NGOs and communities**
* **Maximizing economic recovery**
* **Alignment with local and higher-level government systems (GoI respondents only)**
* **Program management structures**

Most interviews were limited to less than one hour (due to logistic considerations and respondent availability), so a larger set of prompt topics was impractical.

The set of consistent follow-up questions applied to each SWOT issue raised were:

1. **How did this issue affect the YCAP Program?**
2. **Who were the main players in relation to the issue?**
3. **What is the suggested response to the issue? (or if it has already been resolved, how was it resolved?)**

The information compiled in this way was combined with information derived from document review and considered under relevant ICR format headings.

##### Information Gathering

This was largely limited to document review and stakeholder interviews. Direct observations of outputs were also made, but without grounding in stakeholder reactions, these were often of marginal analytical benefit. The timeframe of an ICR does not lend itself to broad-scale surveys of potential respondents. Interviews were semi-structured and adhered to the methodology provided above. It was important to ensure that a full cross-section of stakeholders, including the range of beneficiaries for both phases, was accessed by the ICR team. Where necessary, phone interviews of past program staff were conducted. The seven-day field visit included:

In depth interviewing in Yogya (Bantul, Sleman, Kulonprogo, Gunungkidul) and Klaten with Bappeda representatives, NGOs (National: GITA PERTIWI, LPTP, PERSWEPSI, DAMAR, LPPM-ATMAJAYA, YAKKUM, YSBD, PKPEK, KYPA, FIDES, EPM-CDA, DAYA ANNISA, KERABAT DRESA KOTA, JHS, LPPSP; International: IOM, IRD, MUSLIM AID); Community economic improvement groups [including Women’s Cooperatives] (Jangkaran, Kulonprogo; Tlingsing, Klaten; Pundong, Srihardono, Bantul; Wukirsari, Bantul; Girilaya, Imogiri, Bantul, Banyusoco, Gunungkidul, Tanjung, Berbah, Sleman); The Diffabled Association (Imogiri); Private Business Enterprises/Marketers: (MIROTA, CV KWAS); and users of housing and community infrastructure (House at Srihardono, School Building at Basin, Klaten; Village Clinic at Sukorejo, Klaten; Market at Srowot; Flood mitigation/irrigation channel at Tlingsing Village, Klaten; Fishponds at Tanjung, Prambanan, Sleman, Mangrove Replanting at Jangkaran; Community latrine at Wukirsari )

Meetings with central agencies in Jakarta consisted mainly of AusAID and Bappenas representatives.

Total number of respondents interviewed in the field visit was (at least) 205 people consisting of 105 males and 100 females. A schedule these meetings and list of stakeholders consulted is provided as Annex B.

The sensitivity of information being sort and the perceived willingness of individuals to speak freely in front of their peers or associates determined whether Individual or focus group interviews were used. Focus group approaches were used whenever appropriate to maximise the range of stakeholder feedback. Where possible, focus group interviews were gender segregated, but as many of the later activities of YCAP specifically focussed on women’s groups, this was not always necessary. AusAID and Program staff accompanying the team were consistently requested to exclude themselves from any meetings in which their presence may have compromised the frankness of information provided. All interviews were held on a confidential basis, and the team will not reveal the specific sources of potentially sensitive comments.

 *Limits to Study*

Two limitations challenged and sometimes hindered the team in this assignment. The first related to the actual program implementation period for Phase 2. This was meant to be in the order of around 17months (September 2008 – March 2010), but after a major hiatus caused primarily by arguments over the application of funding within the SGs and the PMG, this was effectively reduced to about 8 months. Such a short period amounts to a ‘honeymoon period’ for community involvement, hence it was difficult to objectively assess the status of the project sustainability. The Second limitation was imposed by the trade-off between the time needed to access a sufficiently large and representative sample of stakeholders and the time required to explore their issues in depth. An average time limit of roughly 30 minutes per interview was logistically imposed. The effects of these time limitations were also exacerbated by Javanese culture, which is complex and based on the spirit of harmony[[3]](#footnote-3).

## 1.4 Evaluation Team

The ICR Team consisted of two core members

* Colin Reynolds (International Consultant)
* Methodius Kusumahadi (National Consultant)

The International Consultant brought a cross-country perspective to program assessment drawn from direct experience with similar transitional interventions elsewhere. The National Consultant brought a higher level of local knowledge and contextual experience. Given his background, the National Consultant also led investigations into the community engagement aspects of the program. These two members thereby complemented each other in ensuring all relevant factors are taken into account when attempting to obtain objectivity in assessments.

The team was accompanied and assisted by:

* Ms Melinda Hutapea (AusAID Program Officer, Infrastructure and Rural Productivity Unit)
* Mr Jeong Park (AusAID Disaster Management Adviser) - an independent contribution by this Adviser is provided as Annex C.
* Ms Mia Badib (Contracted Interpreter)

All AusAID input was considered on par with other stakeholder input and was not permitted to unduly influence findings.

# 2.0 Evaluation Findings[[4]](#footnote-4)

***2.1 Initial Overview:***

This program is considered to have achieved above average outcomes, particularly in the second phase of its operation. A key strength of the program has been its ability to successfully undertake a transition from ‘emergency’ to ‘development’ approaches between phase 1 and phase 2 of the program, despite initial management and other design parameters that were not conducive to such a transition. Many of these problematic initial approaches to design and management resulted from incorrect assumptions regarding the level of design direction required to achieve smooth transitional approaches.

In short, the emergency response aspect of YCAP is considered satisfactory, as is its incorporation of DRR into relevant activities. More notably, the success of development-oriented approaches adopted under phase 2 has been outstanding, particularly in regard to establishment of highly productive implementation ‘partnerships’ between the program, local government, NGOs and communities. Hence, the exemplar model that might be drawn from this program is one that pertains to stakeholder engagement.

The level of success of the development approaches adopted under phase 2 has been particularly impressive given the limited (8 month) implementation period available. This success is far beyond the norm, even when compared with longer-term development programs that have not had to negotiate the shift between emergency and development priorities.

While phase 1 of the program was clearly imperfect in many regards, the problems that arose were not beyond the norm in an emergency setting[[5]](#footnote-5). Many of the criticisms levelled at phase 1 the program by earlier evaluative assessments were not corroborated by the input of direct beneficiaries or government officials consulted in the formulation of this ICR. Many of these earlier criticisms related to either a lack of community and local government engagement, or application of construction standards that were not in line with local, pre-earthquake norms. This divergence from earlier findings appears not to be due to any flawed data collection by previous assessments. Rather it appears to stem from two influences. The first is a growing understanding on behalf of respondents that many aspects of their preferred participatory approaches simply could not have been practically applied in the emergency contexts of phase 1. the second is the lapse of time which has allowed for early YCAP construction standards to be comparatively assessed, given the advent of new minor disasters such as tremors and high winds. The DRR role of high construction standards appears to thereby have recently received greater appreciation.

Earlier evaluative findings that phase 1 of the program experienced avoidable problems, such as those associated with staffing of construction and community engagement aspects of the program, and the poor applicability of the PMO-CBAB management model to the program context, are upheld by this ICR. However, the ICR suggests that analysis of the problems that arose could have been conducted in framework that better recognised the trade-offs necessarily involved in programs required to transition between emergency and development approaches. The explicit recognition of these trade-offs also allows this ICR to make clearer and more practical recommendations regarding optimal approaches to future interventions addressing such contexts.

The changes in management models (i.e. discontinuing the separate PMO) and aid modality (from partially direct implementation to a facility-based approach), were very beneficial to phase 2 implementation. However, the disruptions caused to the program by these necessary changes provide an example of the disbenefits of failing to initially ‘design in’ and subsequently manage the transition between emergency and development approaches[[6]](#footnote-6).

Other disruptions experienced early in phase 2 were primarily related to a misunderstanding amongst stakeholders represented on the SGs and PMG about the level of AusAID funding available for activity delivery in each district. This misunderstanding resulted in internal disputes that prevented release of funds and delivery of phase 2 activities for a number of months. The hiatus was eventually overcome by AusAID clarifying funding availability to these stakeholders, but this hiatus left phase 2 with effectively only an 8-month implementation period. This hiatus also caused considerable dissatisfaction amongst community stakeholders who became impatient, given the apparent lag between planning and delivery aspects of affected phase 2 activities. This stakeholder dissatisfaction therefore added another significant factor that required redress when implementing phase 2.

*Lesson 1. Clarity in communication of program intent (particularly in relation to levels of funding directly available) to stakeholders on program governance bodies is vital, if a cascade of related implementation disputes and issues are to be avoided.*

***2.2 Emergency or development program?***

The YCAP design document makes it very clear that the program includes an emergency response (including implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction [DRR] necessary to the immediate context). Emergency responses always involve two imperatives. The first is the imperative to act quickly, such that assistance does not come too late to those in greatest need, and the second is the ‘humanitarian imperative’, which effectively requires a suspension of other aid principles insofar as they conflict with the provision of life-saving assistance. The precedence of the humanitarian imperative is clearly stated under UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182*[[7]](#footnote-7)*:

**‘1. Humanitarian assistance is of cardinal importance for the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies.’**

This is also in line with the stated policy adopted of most major NGOs under *The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster[[8]](#footnote-8):*

**‘1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first.’**

This means that when dealing with a disaster response, AusAID’s core evaluative criteria of ‘relevance, effectiveness, efficiency sustainability and impact’ should be applied such that the primary emphasis is on assessing the ‘relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact’ of humanitarian action.

The concept of ‘sustainability’ is often difficult to relate to emergency contexts[[9]](#footnote-9). Application of the other four criteria is much more straightforward and reveals some basic conflicts in attempting to ‘integrate’ humanitarian and development approaches. Indicators of ‘effectiveness’ of an emergency response are often related to the immediate humanitarian output/outcomes (including the speed with which assistance is provided), whereas in a development context appropriate indicators will more commonly relate to contribution to longer-term, systemic objectives[[10]](#footnote-10).

Appropriate approaches to achieving success against emergency indicators can therefore be in direct conflict with approaches that might achieve success against development-oriented indicators. For example, if time is taken to establish and implement exhaustive consultation and engagement programs prior to application of assistance, it may come too late for the most vulnerable[[11]](#footnote-11).

***2.3 Evolution of management and delivery approaches in transitional programs***

The fact that humanitarian and development approaches often compete *does* mean that any program that attempts a single approach to implementation in a transitional context will render both emergency and development outcomes sub-optimal. It *does not* mean that a single program should not attempt to do both. A recognition of the sometimes-competing nature of humanitarian and development approaches merely means that a very pragmatic approach to their ‘integration’ needs to be adopted. While it is logically impossible to ‘combine’ approaches that are in direct competition into a single unified approach[[12]](#footnote-12), it is perfectly feasible to run a number of approaches concurrently and/or sequence their application and priority. This combined model provides a planned basis for transition and is therefore much superior to segregated programs of emergency and development assistance.

Possibly the simplest example of an improved YCAP model would be one in which:

* Initial assistance is delivered and assessed primarily in regard to the humanitarian imperative (e.g. 0-9 months from onset of crisis[[13]](#footnote-13)).
* Initiation of consultation and other participatory processes aimed at supporting longer-term development approaches starts as soon as appropriate (e.g. 3-4 months onwards7)[[14]](#footnote-14).
* Input into overall program decision-making from consultation processes initiated under item 2 may begin as soon as it becomes available, but a clear ‘cut-off point’ should also established, after which all activities implemented *must* have gone through full development-oriented consultation and planning processes (e.g. at 12 months7)[[15]](#footnote-15).

In the context of a model in which application of emergency and development approaches are explicitly identified and appropriately overlapped or sequenced, a three-stage program management structure may be useful.

* In stage 1, on-the-ground presence of a team of locally experienced personnel as soon as possible is crucial to effectiveness of humanitarian action in emergency context. The primary role of this team is necessarily reactionary. The team should be responsible for identifying appropriate emergency action and facilitating its implementation as soon as practical[[16]](#footnote-16).
* In stage 2, a development-oriented team is deployed as soon as this becomes practical and appropriate. Stage 2 includes an initial period of joint (coordinated) responsibilities across both teams (including all engagement/consultation responsibilities). However, as application of development approaches[[17]](#footnote-17) becomes more feasible, a handover process of these shared responsibilities takes place, such that the emergency team phases out its involvement.
* In stage 3, handover of all responsibilities to the development-oriented team is complete and the emergency response team is withdrawn. The start of stage 3 also represents the point in time after which it is expected that all current activities will have gone through full development-oriented processes (including desired stakeholder engagement models).

The unavoidable lag between the onset of an emergency and the ability to apply standard development approaches should therefore be seen as an opportunity allowing the formulation of a more comprehensive design (and the contracting of those responsible for implementing it). Thus, in the first part of a transitional design a rapid response team may deployed and given two key roles:

* Identify and deliver necessary emergency assistance as quickly as possible (the use of direct implementation or delivery through local counterparts should be undertaken as contextually justified[[18]](#footnote-18))
* Gather information to inform the second stage of the design process (and possibly assist with identification and contracting of appropriate organizations to undertake transitional approaches)

While the roles of such a rapid response team emphasize flexibility, the contractual requirements upon which these roles are based can be highly standardised and therefore should not be subject to lengthy design processes in regard to each particular emergency to be addressed[[19]](#footnote-19). The second, more detailed part of the design process should begin once this initial team is in place[[20]](#footnote-20), and address the evolution of responsibilities and approaches over the full life of the program. Diagram 1. Provides a very basic illustration of this two-team approach.

YCAP loosely approximated this approach with the PMO-CBAB split, but unfortunately did not define the roles of these two bodies appropriately. The PMO did have some early response functions, but greater emphasis appears to have been placed on separating consultative roles between the two bodies. No cut-off point was defined for phasing out of the dual structures.

It is difficult conceive of any development or emergency context in which it would be appropriate to exclude direct implementers from consultation with certain key stakeholder (most importantly in the YCAP context, local government). Adding an extra layer to such relationships can only lead to compromises in communication. In contrast, the dedicated ‘Program Manager’ model adopted under YCAP phase 2 (in which specific program implementing staff were assigned the duty of being a ‘one-stop’ focal point for all stakeholders in a specified area), is widely regarded as a key factor in the marked success of engagement processes of that phase.

*Lesson 2: Transition between emergency and development assistance does not happen automatically, it must be managed. The need to manage the transition should be explicitly recognised in the initial design (see Recommendation 1 below).*

*Lesson 3: While a single coordinated program of emergency and transitional assistance is an appropriate model and ‘two team’ approach to such transitional programs may be appropriate, the model adopted for phase 1 of YCAP in which key consultative roles were segregated and thereby distanced from direct implementers should not be repeated (see Recommendation 2 below).*

###### 2.4 Monitoring and evaluation frameworks for transitional programs

The M&E framework of such a joint approach need not be overly complex, provided the overlapped sequencing of emergency/development priorities is made explicit from the outset. A single set of indicators may still be used, with the understanding that the desired performance against each is expected (and required) to change over time. A detailed M&E framework was not applied in the early stages of phase 1 of YCAP, and even when one was developed, it struggled to accommodate the competing priorities of emergency and development objectives. Given the significant shift in phase 2 towards a dominant emphasis on development approaches, these problems became progressively less pronounced.

*Lesson 4: M&E frameworks of transitional programs need to be designed to recognise (and record the success of) the transition between emergency and development priorities (see Recommendation 6 below).*

### *2.5 Application of Paris Declaration (PD) and related principles*

Application of additional sets of development-related principles, such as those presented by the Paris Declaration and other documents should also be staged over time. In the case of YCAP, feedback from local government respondents would strongly suggest that given the need for flexibility and responsiveness of transitional programs, a distinction should be made in relation to two stages of application of PD principles requiring utilisation and involvement of government systems. Alignment with government policy-making and planning approaches may be undertaken early in the transition from emergency to development approaches, but direct utilisation of government financial disbursement systems may only become appropriate as part of a final, ‘exit strategy’ stage of program implementation. In short, application of Paris Declaration principles always needs to be contextualised. In cases in which it is inefficient and ineffective to directly utilise government financial systems (given that the program itself may have little ability to influence reforms of such systems), attempts at integration with them should be approached as part of a handover strategy towards the end of the program. To do otherwise is to unnecessarily and unproductively impede the effectiveness and efficiency of the program in regard to achieving its own more specific objectives.

###### Lesson 5: Application of Paris Declaration principles should not be pursued blindly, but tailored to implementation contexts.

###### 2.6 DRR-specific aspects of the program

The scoping study upon which the design of phase 2 of the program was based identified the need to raise the profile of DRR in program implementation and render it a more explicit requirement within program activities. The ICR fully agrees with the recommendations of the scoping study in this regard. Unfortunately the initial reaction to this advice appears to have been somewhat misplaced. Instead of encouraging true ‘mainstreaming’ of DRR, which would involve not only new actions, but also a more explicit recognition of the DRR contributions of existing approaches, DRR initially became regarded as a ‘new requirement’. In consequence, considerations such as application of earthquake resistant building standards and other construction or economic recovery activities aimed specifically at mitigating the severity of future disasters seem to have discounted in favour of purely educational strategies pertaining to ‘what to do in a disaster’. Many activities therefore tried to incorporate such educational elements, while failing to optimise more fundamental DRR contributions.

An illustrative example directly observed by the ICR was a market place built by the program at Srowot, Klaten. In this new market, earthquake evacuation routes were clearly signposted, but market roofing consisted of unsecured clay tiles that were not either tied to their supports or underpinned by netting. While some educational approaches are a necessary part of DRR activities, their application must be given appropriate priority in the greater scheme of things. Given that a large proportion of injuries which occurred during the 2006 earthquake occurred in markets and were also disproportionally due to falling roof tiles[[21]](#footnote-21), the lack of emphasis on reducing potential for injury in this case represents a significant failure in relation to application of DRR principles[[22]](#footnote-22). To balance this point, it is noted that other, highly positive and innovative examples of approaches to earthquake resistant construction were also introduced by the program, including a particularly impressive bamboo-based, furniture factory (Karya Wahana Sentosa -KWS).

Fortunately, these shortcomings in approach to DRR in phase 2 were both short-lived and limited to a subset of implementation partners. They were also usually comparatively less extreme than those of government and other programs[[23]](#footnote-23). Emphasis of YCAP DRR approaches in phase 2 quickly returned to preventative activities such as construction of flood mitigation channels and more robust water/sanitation facilities. The initial problems appear to have been the result of the Scoping Study highlighting the term ‘DRR’, while a level of training and practical experience remained necessary to impart an understanding of its full meaning amongst some local staff and implementing partners (including both contracted NGOs and local government).

A similar evolution of views can be seen in stakeholders opinions regarding the high standards of earthquake resistant construction upheld in phase 1 of the program. The comparative expense and divergence from local standards associated with these high standards seems to have been heavily criticised during previous evaluative exercises. However, feedback to the ICR about the quality of such construction from both government and community stakeholders was unanimously and exclusively positive. Local government saw clear benefits in establishing long lasting community assets and the communities consistently identified these structures as ‘safe-havens’ that might be sort out during future disasters.

It is noted that some compromising of these construction standards did take place during phase 2 of the program, most likely in direct response to the earlier criticism, as was illustrated by the above example of unsecured tiles being used for marketplace roofing. This example also reveals the dangers of actively promoting the DRR aspects of a program, but compromising on their application. Given that stakeholders now have the impression that program-built structures have been constructed to ‘earthquake-proof’ standards, any compromise of these standards may prove disastrous for those who (rightly or wrongly) identify these structures as safe havens.

A common overall sentiment expressed by respondents to the ICR was that the program’s standards were not too high, but rather that local standards were too low. Although they could not replicate the construction standards immediately, the provision of such high standard community infrastructure was seen to be of great long-term benefit, despite there being an opportunity cost involved in relation to the numbers of such structures therefore able to be provided. Even the provision of earthquake resistant examples of individual housing was regarded to have long-term benefits, but greater care may be needed in future in clearly defining the purpose of provision of such housing as one solely related to DRR, not the re-housing of individuals. One area of earlier criticism that remains valid in relation to early phase 1 construction standards is that they primarily focussed on existing steel-reinforced concrete structures, rather than attempting greater levels of innovation, as introduced under phase 2.

As mentioned earlier, this change in perspective of stakeholders was largely self-attributed to recognition of the comparative durability of program structures in more recent destructive events such as minor tremors and strong winds. However, the effects of program educational activities (as part of DRR) may also have contributed to a heightened understanding of the potential benefits of high building standards.

*Lesson 6: In developing a DRR strategy for a transitional program such as YCAP, DRR will be most effective when defined broadly, and explicit decisions should be made regarding the priority to be given to each aspect of DRR (particularly preventative and educational aspects). This prioritisation should be reflected in budget allocations and appropriate performance indicators for construction activities which have the primary purpose of mitigating impacts of future disasters and/or providing long-term examples of the benefits of improved or modified construction standards (see Recommendation 3 below).*

*Lesson 7: Care should be taken to prevent perceptions of DRR outputs/outcomes of transitional programs from exceeding actual standards maintained. If this is not done DRR activities may become self-defeating. In cases where perceptions are difficult to control, the DRR-related responsibility of DRR program implementers is to err on the side of maintaining as high standards as indicated necessary by risk assessments, even if this carries financial implications and associated opportunity costs.*

###### 2.7 DRR in the context of transitional programs

In the context of YCAP phase 1, there was a clearly acknowledged threat that the 2006 earthquake may have been a precursor to an even larger earthquake soon to occur in the region[[24]](#footnote-24). Under such a situation, DRR may be considered as part of the ‘lifesaving’ rapid response to a disaster. Both educational and construction-related DRR approaches should therefore have been applied from the outset of assistance. The fact that a second, greater quake has not yet eventuated should not result in retrospective discounting of the importance and appropriateness of such considerations. All such considerations should (and can only be), based on the best available information at time of implementation. From this perspective, maintaining high earthquake resistant standards of construction under Phase 1, particularly for community infrastructure, was wholly appropriate. Building or repairing non-earthquake resistant structures under the impending threat of another earthquake would have been both irresponsible and potentially a highly inefficient use of resources. In this sense, the original design document was somewhat self-contradictory (i.e. in regard to repairing partially damaged buildings), and the role of implementers in pointing this out should be commended.

The real shortcomings of DRR in phase 1 may be that it partially neglected o balance construction activities with educational and awareness approaches. The ability of communities to participate in such activities in the immediate aftermath of a disaster always needs to be assessed, but given that the phase 1 did not start until around 6 months after the earthquake it is likely that greater scope for such educational activities would have existed[[25]](#footnote-25).

The fact that GoI has now established the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and put in place a *National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction* (NAP-DRR) means that the future context of delivery of programs such as YCAP should be quite different from the situation faced by YCAP (particularly in phase 1). Future program designs in Indonesia should therefore be cognizant of these contextual changes.

An additional assessment of DRR issues by the AusAID Disaster Management Adviser who accompanied the mission is provided (unedited) as Annex C.

*Lesson 8: The prioritisation and associated timing of various DRR activities to be undertaken by a program must be based on a contextual assessment of ongoing risks. Later evaluative exercises should consider the information upon which such considerations were based and not attempt to retrospectively discount the validity of past risk assessments if these were made with the best information available at the time.*

#### **2.8 Mainstreaming DRR and associated M&E considerations**

Both construction and economic recovery (i.e. livelihoods) activities can have a wide range of benefits, including DRR. Any attempt to segregate DRR activities from other program activities is both artificial and counter-productive. As mentioned above, there was a temporary tendency towards such segregation in the early parts of phase 2 of the program as a misplaced response to the call by the scoping document to make DRR activities more explicit (i.e. give them a ‘higher profile’). Given the integrated nature of many DRR aspects of activities (e.g. improved building standards in construction of community medical facilities or increased personal savings promoted under a livelihoods project), the best approach to making DRR elements of the program more explicit is to apply an M&E framework that specifically records DRR benefits (or failures). This may be as simple as including new indicators (or flagging existing ones) that directly pertain to DRR. This would allow prioritised tradeoffs between DRR and non-DRR benefits to be recognised and monitored within a particular activity, and provide the basis for compilation of overall program contributions to DRR. The M&E frameworks of both phases of the YCAP program missed significant opportunities in this regard.

*Lesson 9: Raising the profile of DRR activities within a transitional program should be achieved using an appropriately designed M&E framework, rather than attempting to artificially segregate DRR ‘activities’ from other emergency or development-related components of the program.*

***2.9 Stakeholder Engagement***

Despite this program title emphasizing ‘community assistance’, engagement of local stakeholders was not a strong point of phase 1 of the program. While this is a common and often unavoidable aspect of emergency responses, the problems with localised engagement faced by YCAP can also be traced to early staffing issues in regard to the position of Community Engagement Manager and a program management model that separated direct implementers from consultations with key stakeholders.

These issues were recognised and corrected in phase 2, to the extent that the stakeholder engagement aspects of the program then became what might be regarded as a good practice model for other community engagement initiatives. Bappeda representatives from all 5 districts involved in the program suggested that the YCAP phase 2 ‘partnership model’[[26]](#footnote-26) should be used as the basis for any similar programs by AusAID or other donors. This suggestion was provided in the context of a direct comparison with the past and existing programs of other donors.

Phase 2 also moved on from the necessarily ‘needs-based’ approach of the emergency phase of the program to a ’strengths-based’ approach[[27]](#footnote-27) to identifying suitable activities within communities. Such strengths-based assessments ensured that relevant resources and other prerequisites for success were available to YCAP’s development-oriented activities. This approach also clearly involved target communities in identifying and selecting feasible options for economic or social advancement. Hence, the strengths-based method met the two critical requirements of a valid participatory approach, in that it:

* Gave communities the opportunity to make heir own choices, and
* Empowered communities with the technical knowledge to make informed decisions.

The ‘partnerships’ created under phase 2 of YCAP also had partially unintended beneficial consequences. The strong foundation of community engagement achieved in relevant locations was often a catalyst for enhanced provision of other community assistance by both GoI agencies and NGOs. Some SKPDs (Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah -Operational Units of the Local Government) used YCAP activities as entry points to local communities to offer services related to their own mandates. For example, the Cooperative Office promoted loan facilities to cooperatives, the Forestry Office offered seeds for DRR-related replanting/reforestation, and the Office of Trade provided special services to assist in licensing of marketable food production (e.g. Brown Sugar Production in Banyucolo).

*Lesson 10: One of the most important determinants of success of community based endeavours is the ability of community themselves to seek, mobilise and optimally use any services offered by external sources, in addition to a community’s own resources mobilization.*

By far, the most important outcome of phase 2 of the program is the increased level of cooperation and understanding it has fostered between NGO and GoI stakeholders (discussed in detail under ‘Impact’ section below).

That all this could have been achieved in what was effectively an 8-month implementation period is truly impressive, and indicative of the commitment and long hours contributed by relevant program staff. That only 8 months has elapsed since the full application of this model also highlights a significant threat to the sustainability of program achievements. By far the most common (and often the only) stakeholder criticism of phase 2 was that it was too short to ensure capacity-building was sufficiently advanced to progress independently, once program support is withdrawn. There were numerous requests from local government representatives, NGOs and community members to at least continue limited support roles of the YCAP program beyond March 2010 (for perhaps another 12 months). Such requests were often very pragmatic, in that they recognised that expansion of the program into new activities was unlikely. Future assistance was sought primarily to consolidate existing achievements. Such limited ongoing support would therefore also appear to be in AusAID’s interest and could be combined with ongoing monitoring of program impacts[[28]](#footnote-28), so such requests should be considered carefully.

# 3.0 ICR Evaluative Criteria

## 3.1 Relevance

(Rating: 5)

The initial need for the assistance provided by the program is cannot be questioned given SATKORLAK estimates of an earthquake death toll of 5,743 people, with an estimated 38,511 injured. Estimates of the number of homeless varied from 200,000 to 650,000.

As discussed above, the relevance of this program was maintained by shifts from emergency to development approaches and in related management structures as suggested by a Mid-Term Review (and subsequent Scoping Study). It was unfortunate that this shift required the intervention of a Mid-Term Review, rather than being ‘built-into’ original design parameters. The need for such a shift was predictable, given that it was clear even at the initial stages of the design that the intervention would bridge emergency and recovery approaches.

**Recommendation 1: Future AusAID programs seeking to span a transition between emergency and development assistance should consider explicitly declaring these two parts of program and defining how and when respective activities and modification of program priorities will occur (see also Recommendations 2 & 3).**

**Recommendation 2: A coordinated, two-team approach to transitional programs (viz. an initial response team and a transitional/development-oriented team) should be used in future, provided the approach has the following characteristics:**

* **A standing offer should be established to allow rapid deployment of an initial, emergency response team**
* **Design of a more detailed transitional approach should take place while the initial response team is operating (deployment of the initial response team should never be held up by more detailed design or contracting processes for transitional/development elements of the program)**
* **The initial response team should have clear responsibilities, including:**
	+ **Identify and deliver necessary emergency assistance as quickly as possible (the use of direct implementation or delivery through local counterparts should be undertaken as contextually justified[[29]](#footnote-29))**
	+ **Gather information to inform the second stage of the design process (and possibly assist with identification and contracting of appropriate organizations to undertake transitional approaches)**
* **The initial response team should always have a clear exit date, with the period of their overlapping activity with the development-oriented team inclusive of a requirement for initial joint consultation approaches, followed by a progressive hand-over of consultative duties to the development-oriented team.**

DRR approaches were satisfactory, but imperfect. In phase 1, DRR primarily focussed on highly earthquake-resistant construction standards, while addressing educational aspects of DRR less well. Phase 1 construction standards also primarily focussed on ‘standard’ steel reinforced concrete structures, with lesser emphasis placed on innovative construction techniques or materials. In phase 2, overreaction to partially misplaced criticism of the high construction standards caused an initial shift in the DRR focus to primarily educational activities, but this balance was soon restored with DRR aspects of construction and economic recovery activities again recognised as necessary parts of a mainstreamed approach. The incorporation of a strong DRR focus into the entire program remains justified given the design document’s assertion that:

*“Early geological advice suggests that this quake may presage a large quake in the near future”*

Until this position is refuted, DRR should remain a focus of any future recovery/development programs implemented in this area.

Initial management arrangements of the program were not suited to the transitional context, particularly in relation to establishment of a permanent Program Management Office separate from the main implementing body (CBAB). The segregation of consultative roles between these two bodies (with the PMO exclusively responsible for engagement with GoI stakeholders), impeded phase 1 community engagement by CBAB because such engagement requires significant coordination with local governments to be fully effective in the longer term. While a ‘two-team’ model for joint management and implementation of transitional is potentially appropriate, the roles, responsibilities and longevity of each team needs to be defined quite differently from those of the PMO-CBAB model (see above).

## 3.2 Effectiveness

(Rating: 5)

In a multi-donor, multi-initiative emergency response context, attribution of broad outcomes will always be difficult. According to government respondents (both at local and National levels), the recovery from the 2006 earthquake is now complete insofar that housing and economic indicators have now returned to at least those of pre-earthquake times. Given that a number of economic shocks have occurred since the earthquake (including a temporary fall-off in tourism and the world financial crisis), this is locally regarded as a highly satisfactory outcome. The exception to this recovery appears to exist in relation to credit provision, however reduced credit availability can also be attributed to tighter Central Bank regulation of commercial bank risk-taking and direction to more quickly resolve bad debts.

YCAPs contribution to this overall recovery is impossible to determine in a brief ICR mission. However, it is possible to state that the YCAP contribution has been both positive and often disproportionate. Many programs, such as the JRF are still in the process of executing a large proportion of their budgets. Local government respondents often noted the timeliness and reliability of YCAP activities compared to other initiatives, and all community-level recipients consulted by the ICR reported significant personal and community benefits currently maintained as a result of program activities. In relation to economic recovery activities, financial records of recipient groups support this assertion.

More specifically, Bappeda provided information suggests that the agriculture sector has increased by 2% annually. Break Event Pont for rice production is at Rp.1.200 - Rp.1.400, while prices at local market have reached Rp.2.000,-/kg. An NGO-provided example (PKPEK) was of a hamlet in Bantul which at the beginning of program-supported activity (April 2009) only had one person producing casava crackers with total sales per day of Rp.58.000. At the end of this activity (November 2009) there are 55 producers with total daily sales at Rp.150.000.000 (or Rp.3.700.000.000 monthly). In another example, the number of Batik producers who are able to penetrate commercial markets has increased from 1 group to 10 groups (hence an increase from about 13 to 600 individual artisans). Some traditional batik makers indicated their renewed concern at competition from cheap, imported (printed) Batik and expressed the need for continued program assistance with marketing issues to ensure sustainability of current benefits.

In relation to construction activities, provision of high quality community facilities was universally welcomed and all such facilities inspected by the ICR team (including markets, schools and health clinics) were being fully utilised, often to levels beyond those of the pre-earthquake structures they replaced. Bappeda specifically praised these high quality community facilities as being more efficient due to their associated lower maintenance and longer life.

The provision of ‘demonstration housing’ by the program faced more complex issues, including instances of social jealousy due to the high quality of the houses given to individuals. Given the comparatively small number of houses involved (73), they can only have ever been intended to serve an educational function. The effectiveness of such housing construction should therefore be primarily assessed from DRR perspective. In this regard, the approach of using and training local skilled tradespersons and labour wherever possible in their (earthquake resistant) construction was highly appropriate. However, the same approach was used for construction of community infrastructure, so the additional experience provided by construction of individual housing may have been only of marginal additional benefit. Given that the earthquake resistant (or disaster mitigating) community structures also provide more direct DRR benefits to a larger number of users, it may have been more effective in future to use available funds solely on community infrastructure[[30]](#footnote-30).

Despite this finding, a number of respondents to this ICR upheld the benefits of modest housing provision by the program. As YCAP housing was provided late in the rebuilding efforts (close to 100 000 homes had already been rebuilt through GoI initiatives by the time YCAP started its demonstration housing activities), it was pointed out that community selection of the recipients of these houses was based on identification of ‘who had not been helped by earlier assistance’. Given that much of the earlier rehousing assistance (particularly from Government programs) required substantial ‘self-help’ to utilise available funds, it was often the most marginalised, such as widows and the disabled who had been passed over by previous assistance. YCAP housing was therefore able to correct this oversight to a small extent.

In regard to measuring the effectiveness of ‘the passing-on’ of earthquake resistant building techniques, particularly to local government bodies, this will only be possible within the timeframes mandated by GoI budget cycles. Given that it takes at least two calendar years for a local government proposal to reach implementation stage, some ‘outlying’ monitoring of such outcomes post-program would be required.

## 3.3 Efficiency

(Rating: 4)

From the most basic design perspective, it is the success of the DRR elements of the program that will primarily determine efficiency. That is, it would be highly inefficient to spend AUD30M on an emergency/recovery program (especially when aware that another, even larger earthquake was a significant risk), if all benefits were then destroyed again when (or if) another earthquake or other disaster occurred.

While difficult to assess in the absence of firm local standards, it was estimated by stakeholders that the construction costs of earthquake resistant, program-built infrastructure (including demonstration houses) were between 3 to 5 times higher than would have been the case had these structures been built to pre-existing local standards. Whether this is additional expenditure is efficient or not depends on the risk assessment made and on the level to which potential future benefits are discounted. For example, if a one month timeframe is utilised, the chance of another major disaster occurring is low, and therefore the opportunity costs of high construction costs associated with the DRR objectives of the program easily outweigh other considerations (i.e. you could provide the same benefits to 3-5 times as many beneficiaries for that month). As the risk assessment timeframe increases, the likelihood of another earthquake (or other disaster) increases and the disbenefits of building to pre-existing local standards become more apparent. In fact, there can be no more persuasive indicator that prevailing local construction standards were inadequate for the location than the widespread destruction caused by the 2006 earthquake. Whether the construction standards (and therefore the costs) of infrastructure provided by the program were too high or too low will unfortunately only be tested in the event of another serious earthquake or other disaster.

The types of community structures targeted by the program (viz. school, markets and clinics) would strongly suggest a longer-term basis be used for risk assessments, as all of these structures are ones which, when built to poor standards, have particular relevance to generating earthquake causalities (or a lack of immediate medical assistance to them). This also raises the issue of program ‘liability’ for causalities caused by failure of program-built structures in the event of future natural disasters, given that these are likely in the delivery area. Hence, any justification for resorting to local standards known to be inadequate, based on short-term opportunity cost alone, may prove highly risky and inefficient, and merely constitute a misplaced application of ‘cultural sensitivity’[[31]](#footnote-31).

To put this in real terms using school construction as an example, the average cost per YCAP classroom (usually with additional toilet facilities included) was AUD15 565. If constructing to local standards costs around AUD4 000-5 000, this means a DRR investment of about AUD10 000 per classroom (housing 20-30 students). While the immediate cost of a local standard equivalent may be substantially less, AUD15 565 cost per classroom does not seem an excessive long-term use of Australian taxpayers’ funds, given that such taxpayers are unlikely to want to rebuild these schools again after the next disaster or contribute to exposure of school children to high risk environments (full schools costing table attached as Annex D).

The only appropriate solution to this issue in future is for AusAID to adopt its own standards of construction in relation to a risk assessment of future natural disasters and apply these regardless of other contextual factors. Note, this does NOT mean adopting standardised building designs, but merely strength standards. Building designs can meet local architectural norms, provided they also meet required strength standards. Given such fixed standards, a program will be able to demonstrate efficiency by meeting them as cost effectively as possible. The maintaining of such fixed standards is not unusual within AusAID procedures, as was illustrated by the AusAID requirement that all YCAP construction activities avoid the use of non-sustainably sourced tropical hardwoods. This requirement also had cost implications, but was clearly justified from an environmental (c.f. DRR) perspective.

The design document also initially required the program to repair partially damaged structures. Given that such structures had already proven their inability to survive a serious earthquake, and the fact that in many cases the original structural integrity of such structures could only be guaranteed by a complete knock-down rebuild approach, patching-up of such structures would have been both an inefficient use of funds and a failure to uphold DRR objectives. The fact that the program successfully avoided such activities during phase 1 is therefore to be commended. However, inefficiencies and DRR failures did creep into the early parts of phase 2 in response to misplaced criticism of perceived high construction costs. The previously noted example of a market place built with unsecured roof tiles, but extensive evacuation signage, illustrates an inefficient application of funds in regard to DRR objectives.

**Recommendation 3: AusAID should set construction strength standards applicable to the natural disaster risks of a particular location and adhere to these strength standards regardless of other contextual factors.**

Despite the high construction costs, the program did attempt to capture greater value for money by designing structures that were as multi-functional as possible. Stakeholders regularly reported that new schools and clinics were more suitable to be used as community meeting venues than the ones they replaced, and that productive ‘after hours use’ of such facilities had significantly increased.

The targeted use of local tradespersons and labourers in YCAP construction activities not only imparted DRR capacity to such participants; it also amounted to an unannounced ‘cash for work’ program. Such programs are one of a number of ‘standard’ approaches adopted as emergency responses to provide an immediate cash injection into communities[[32]](#footnote-32). The multiple-purpose efficiencies so obtained are not tracked well by the program’s M&E framework, so this may amount to a lost opportunity for the program to present some benefits delivered.

An interesting, and potentially controversial measure taken under phase 2 of the program was to provide some modest funding (IDR1.2M/month) directly to local governments to fund coordination activities with the program. This was a clearly successful mechanism for ensuring local government participation, with local government officers suggesting that it both ‘enabled’ them to commit the logistic and other resources required, and imparted a perceived ‘obligation’ to comply with program requests for involvement. While to some extent consistent with Paris Declaration principles, it is easy to imagine programs of other donors being somewhat threatened by such measures, given its potential to allow YCAP to out-compete them in regard to capturing local government involvement. However, in the context of YCAP alone these payments are considered to have been a very worthwhile investment.

Some inefficiencies may have occurred in cases in which program assisted groups or cooperatives had access to multiple funding sources. For example, the program provided economic assistance to the diffabled persons organization, DPO (Lindu Asih, Bantul). In this case, the DPO group (originally 18 but now grown to 24) received many types of financial support from various agencies. Over a three-year period this has amounted to at least Rp.186 Million. Based on information provided by members, while this generous support was welcomed and was able to be used productively, around half of this amount would have been immediately sufficient to support basic group activities. Whether all diffabled persons groups in the area were equally well supported is beyond the scope of this ICR to determine, but if this was not the case, a need for better coordination of donors may be indicated.

## 3.4 Impact

(Not rated in line with ICR template)

As discussed in the effectiveness section, the immediate intended impacts of the program on beneficiaries have generally been strongly positive, both from a DRR and economic recovery perspective. The only real exception to this positive finding occurred in relation to compromising DRR construction standards early in phase 2 in response to misplaced criticism. This lead to potential for negative impacts, if beneficiaries seek shelter in program-built structured that they believed to be built to ‘earthquake proof’ standards when parts of these structures may fail (specific example given in Evaluation Findings section).

In terms of higher-level impacts, it is clear that the program made a positive contribution to both rebuilding and economic recovery efforts and this is supported by financial records of supported cooperatives and SMEs[[33]](#footnote-33). These contributions were regarded by a majority of local government and community respondents as having comparatively higher impacts per direct beneficiary than other recovery initiatives.

The most important and impressive higher-level impact achieved (primarily under phase 2 of the program) is the creation of a strong potential for ongoing, mutually beneficial cooperation between local government and community-oriented NGOs. This represents a clear reversal of the undesirable and unproductive situation that existed prior to phase 2 of YCAP. Both local government and NGOs admitted that they were highly suspicious of each other prior to their close engagement in YCAP phase 2 activities[[34]](#footnote-34). Post-program, 100% of both Local Government and NGO respondents reported an improved trust (based on a better understanding of how their NGO/government counterparts are required to operate), and a greater willingness to work cooperatively again in future.

This new, mutual appreciation was apparently derived from recognition that each had something to contribute to delivering activities. The most commonly reported strengths of NGOs by local government were their flexibility in vertically integrating various aspects of activities[[35]](#footnote-35) and their ability and willingness to operate outside of normal ‘business’ hours. Strengths of local governments as perceived by NGOs included their ability to bring a level of recognised authority or formality to proceedings and agreements undertaken by activities and their greater ability to influence village-level, governance bodies (thereby improving sustainability). At least 3 of the local governments involved in the YCAP program have now established joint committees (primarily relating to Community Engagement, Local Economic Development[[36]](#footnote-36) and DRR activities) with standing members from relevant NGOs, and have allocated funds from their own budgets to support their ongoing operation. No other programs utilised this model, so this improvement in local government and NGO cooperation can be wholly attributed to the YCAP program.

Local government also suggested that the application of this engagement model helped them ensure that program activities were consistent with and contributed to the goals of their mid-term (5-year) district development plans.

## 3.5 Sustainability

(Rating: 4)

Using the standard ‘continuation of program benefits after program completion’ definition of sustainability, it is clear that the high quality of most of the infrastructure provided by the program means that these structures (ranging from schools to flood mitigation channels) will continue to deliver significant, post-program benefits in the medium to long term (10-20 years).

Even longer-term benefits could be claimed if it were possible to show that the higher standards of construction demonstrated by the program were being replicated by local stakeholders. Given the majority of infrastructure provided was community infrastructure; this would initially mean looking for such standards stipulated under new local government construction contracts. Given the two year lead time required by GoI forward planning and budgeting systems, identifying such outcomes would require the establishment of an outlying (post-program) monitoring period. The potential for corruption to erode contractually stipulated standards would also devalue such initial indicators, with the only true test of effective ‘standards transfer’ being technical inspection of new structures while under construction.

As an interim indication of local governments’ desire to replicate YCAP standards, local government respondents reported having already taken their construction contractors to inspect YCAP-built infrastructure to illustrate the standards they wish to see met in future[[37]](#footnote-37). While this is a positive interim indicator, it must be tempered by recognition that such desires will need to be backed up with increased funding allocations for construction.

One opportunity for improving sustainability of construction activities that was largely missed by the program relates to the need or local governments to complete asset transfer formalities before they are officially able to expend funds on maintenance of such physical assets. While handovers of program-built infrastructure to GoI were undertaken, such handover is required to be to central GoI agencies. Local governments are then expected to go through the formalities of requesting asset transfer from these central agencies to their own authority. Only once this is achieved, can these local governments allocate funds for maintenance of these assets. While not within its original mandate, the program could have prompted and assisted local governments to apply for such asset transfer.

**Recommendation 4: Future programs providing physical assets at local government level in Indonesia should be cognizant of this asset transfer issue, and prompt and assist targeted local governments to apply for these transfers in order to enable the local allocation of maintenance budgets.**

Some aspects of DRR and economic recovery activities supported by the program that have already demonstrated sustainable local uptake through the establishment of participatory Village Regulations (Peraturan Desa or Perdes). Two instances of the creation of such village regulations were provided to the ICR team from the Klaten District. These related to regulations supporting disaster preparedness and BUMDES (Village Owned Business Enterprises) approaches promoted by the program. Bantul District has also been preparing the establishment of Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (District Disaster Response Body), which according to relevant legislation, has to be anticipated with the establishment of a Perda (District Regulation) on disaster preparedness. There were also a number of villages provided with YCAP funds to strengthening village services to the poorest and most isolated villagers. This has led at least two non-targeted villages implementing a similar ‘endowment’ concept and other villages considering this option. Some villages have also started to develop Village Owned Business Enterprises (VOBE) as a way to further develop such endowment funds.

Perhaps the most impressive area in which sustainability has been fostered is in relation to the establishment of increased levels of mutual understanding and willingness to cooperate between local government and NGO stakeholders. As stated earlier, there was unanimous reporting of this outcome by both NGO and local government sources, and some local governments have taken the step of funding ongoing cooperative forums with NGOs. Given the existing capacity of NGOs to significantly extend the limited capacity of local government, especially in relation to community engagement and implementation of small-scale economic development activities, the fostering of this increased cooperation by YCAP has the potential to provide significant ongoing benefits across all districts involved in phase 2. Outlying monitoring would again be required to confirm these benefits.

Despite the apparent success of phase 2 of the program, the single most common criticism provided by stakeholders was that the duration of this phase (and thereby the application of phase 2 engagement models) was too short to fully stabilize the social and economic benefits delivered. There remained a common fear that gains made in only 8 months, could easily be lost again once the program ceases. On the positive side, a significant number of NGOs stated that they would try to continue the work started by YCAP using their own resources. The opinion expressed by a number of these NGOs was that it would be ‘foolish to waste’ the community engagement foundation they have established during the YCAP program[[38]](#footnote-38).

**Recommendation 5: It is strongly recommended that AusAID consider allocating 12 months of modest additional funding to provide limited ongoing support to existing YCAP activities, specifically to:**

* **continue efforts to empower working cooperation between GoI-NGO-community**
* **continue efforts to empower working cooperation between SME-NGO- bigger business entities, especially in regard to increasing market access of cooperative groups**
* **continue efforts to strengthen women as income earners as a way to encourage ongoing cultural change**

This funding provision should have the multiple aims of consolidating the sustainability of phase 2 achievements, monitoring future independent uptake of program approaches and researching the best means of replicating YCAP successes related to stakeholder engagement and participation. (A number of options for achieving this recommendation, based on preliminary discussions with relevant AusAID staff, are provided as Annex E.)

## 3.6 Gender Equality

(Rating: 5)

If a criticism were to be made of the YCAP program in relation to gender equality, it would be that there appeared to be an over-emphasis on targeting women beneficiaries. This was particularly true of phase 2 (with the more extensive construction activities of phase 1 adding a level of balance to gender participation). Virtually, all economic development activities conduced under phase 2 targeted women-dominated groups or cooperatives.

During field visit, the ICR team found a number of examples of how empowerment of women in the economic sector as income earners has also contributed to strengthening their roles in decision making process at both household and community levels[[39]](#footnote-39).

Interestingly, in almost all cases visited, women have now been given significant ‘book-keeping’ roles in village enterprises (particularly ‘savings and loan’ cooperatives). This role generally extends well beyond documenting finances to imposing a controlling influence over their use. In many villages men frankly admitted that it is better their collective money be managed by women, as such duties tend to create conflict (and misuse) when assigned to men. Hence, giving women financial responsibilities is becoming a recognised ‘risk reduction’ and ‘conflict avoidance’ strategy within villages.

Due to the (program-supported) increasing financial inputs of women at household level, they have also often been given improved authority to manage household economy, and this enhanced role of women is becoming more widely recognised a district levels[[40]](#footnote-40). With these increased financial responsibilities, women have also gained greater political influence at both family and village levels. A significant proportion of the women interviewed by the ICR attributed such changes directly to YCAP activities, particularly those in which contracted NGOs delivered not only financial management training, but also associated training in self-confidence and promoting the rights of women in communities.

## 3.7 Monitoring and Evaluation

(Rating: 4)

The monitoring of phase 1 of the program was initially poor, with no clear framework defined for doing so[[41]](#footnote-41). It has been suggested by some respondents that it is simply too difficult and time consuming to monitor emergency response activities. This is not considered a valid position by the ICR team, as this would amount to proposing that it is not important to know whether a response was successful or not. Clearly both accountability and continuous improvement requirements imply the need or accurate monitoring of any activity.

However, it is recognised that the success of an emergency response should not be assessed against the same indicators that might be used for a development program, and that for transitional programs target performance requirements against certain indicators should change over time (see Evaluation Findings section).

**Recommendation 6: M&E frameworks of programs wishing to transition from emergency to development assistance should define indicators relevant to both forms of assistance and recognise that optimal performance levels against the various indicators is something that should change over time.**

A detailed monitoring framework was introduced in the latter half of phase 1 and this was revised for application to phase 2. This monitoring framework satisfactorily recorded indicators at output level (with the exception of being weak in regard to separately identifying DRR outputs), but appeared to struggle in regard to defining specific indicators at outcome level. While it included some valid ‘effect’ measures, such as income change data, to measure most outcomes it resorted to either output indicators (e.g. ‘*number of community planning processes completed*’) or incomplete definitions of effect indicators (e.g. ‘*contribution of program in assisting affected households to return to pre-earthquake economic and social conditions*’). Hence, while strong in documenting program outputs, it was not always able to provide clear evidence of the positive (or negative) effects of delivering those outputs. One reason for this may have been that the framework strongly favoured quantitative indicators, and did not define a structured approach to the collection of relevant qualitative data (such as stakeholder feedback or verifiable ‘lists’ of qualitative achievements) that might have also been used to defensively illustrate outcomes.

## 3.8 Analysis and Learning

(Rating: 5)

As stated at the outset of this report, one of the greatest strengths of this program was its ability to successfully transition from an emergency response to a development-oriented program. The need for this change was identified by Mid-Term Review findings, and the basic structure of phase 2 was defined by the subsequent scoping study. In response to this need for change the program implementers produced both a Self Evaluation Study and a Transition Plan. Both documents were highly pragmatic and clearly informed the implementation of the approaches that proved so successful in phase 2.

Failures did occur in regard to analysis and learning, most notably the initial misinterpretation of DRR as a new (largely educational) requirement at the beginning of phase 2, and the over-relaxation of construction standards and the compromising of DRR objectives in response to misplaced criticism. However, such failures were either short-lived or limited in their application to a small number of activities. A DRR strategy was also produced that proved valuable in eventually imparting a fuller understanding of DRR issues to implementing partners.

 Also of note in relation to analysis and learning was the recognition during phase 1 that the design’s direction in regard to repairing ‘lightly damaged’ structures was problematic, given DRR considerations.

## 3.9 Other Cross-cutting Issues

(Not rated)

Various values were successfully promoted by YCAP, including anti-corruption stances and concern for the environment. YCAP exercised very transparent processes especially in relation to construction and economic recovery activities. Contractors were often required to open their bookkeeping to beneficiaries, even though not all beneficiaries utilised these opportunities. A number of instances of fraud were detected in relation to the Quick Impact Livelihood (QIL) component of the program, but appropriate action was quickly instituted and all monies retrieved, with the exception of one case for which criminal proceedings have now been started. The program also amended financial management procedures to reduce the possibility of recurrence and this appears to have been successful during phase 2.

In regard to environmental issues, program activities paid specific attention to waste management aspects of economic recovery projects, and also included some environment-focussed activities such as mangrove replanting.

One of the best examples of an integrated investment activity by YCAP is KWS (Karya Wahana Sentosa) located in Bantul. In this case, YCAP combined efforts towards supporting SMEs, earthquake resistant construction techniques and environmentally sound operational approaches. KWS is a furniture production company that won a competition process to receive YCAP support in the construction of their bamboo-based factory. Construction cost was about Rp. 3 Billion. The bamboo-based design was created by a Team from the University of Gajah Mada. KWS is an affiliate of the World Wildlife Fund and has received various certifications in relation to the use of sustainably sourced timber and other inputs. They also practice social accountability by employing both local men and promoting local utilization of the factory’s off-cuts and other safe wastes for home production activities. Many visitors visit the factory to learn from their bamboo construction techniques and their environmental and social accountability approaches. Consequently, KWS was selected as the 2009 New Ventures Indonesia Best Finalist at the Third Annual Investor Forum supporting the growth of Indonesia’s sustainable small and medium sized enterprises (held on October 22, 2009 at Semarang). KWS already exports the majority of its production to prestigious international markets, and in May this year will join an international exposition in Jakarta to promote eco-labelling and associated marketing/export opportunities.

## 3.10 Evaluation Criteria Ratings -Summary

| Evaluation Criteria | Rating (1-6) | Comments |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Relevance | 5 | Program was necessary and approaches were amended to maintain relevance, albeit not as part of a planned design approach |
| Effectiveness | 5 | Significant and appropriate contributions were made to all the objectives (of both phases) |
| Efficiency | 4 | When implementation was underway, delivery was both timely and reasonably cost effective (particularly in Phase 2, but there were unplanned breaks in implementation due to program governance issues. |
| Sustainability | 4 | High standards of program construction will ensure mid-term sustainability of basic outputs. The actual period of implementation of Phase 2 was insufficient to ensure sustainability of socio-economic outcomes. |
| Gender Equality | 5 | Gender targets met and women have been a key focus of most program activities. |
| Monitoring & Evaluation | 4 | Monitoring initially poor, but much improved in late stages of Phase 1 and throughout Phase 2. Still lacked clear measurement of some longer-term DRR outcomes. |
| Analysis & Learning | 5 | Mid-term Review, Scoping Study and Self Evaluation Study all resulted in marked adaptation and improvement of program. |

**Rating scale:**

| Satisfactory | Less that satisfactory |
| --- | --- |
| **6** | Very high quality | **3** | Less than adequate quality |
| **5** | Good quality | **2** | Poor quality |
| **4** | Adequate quality | **1** | Very poor quality |

#

# 4.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

##### Conclusion

This program is considered to have achieved above average outcomes, particularly in the second phase of its operation. A key strength of the program has been its ability to successfully undertake a transition from ‘emergency’ to ‘development’ approaches between phase 1 and phase 2 of the program, despite initial management and other design parameters that were not conducive to such a transition. Many of these problematic initial approaches to design and management resulted from incorrect assumptions regarding transitional approaches.

In short, the emergency response aspect of YCAP is considered satisfactory, as is its incorporation of DRR into relevant activities. More notably, the success of development-oriented approaches adopted under phase 2 has been outstanding, particularly in regard to establishment of highly productive implementation ‘partnerships’ between the program, local government, NGOs and communities. Hence, the exemplar model that might be drawn from this program is one that pertains to stakeholder engagement.

The level of success of the development approaches adopted under phase 2 has been particularly impressive given the limited (8 month) implementation period available. This success is far beyond the norm, even when compared with longer-term development programs that have not had to negotiate the shift between emergency and development priorities.

There is a need to learn from the design shortcomings of this 2006 disaster response approach, especially given more recent events and current interventions in Padang. It would also be a waste of the resources invested in phase 2 of the program not to follow-up this success in a way that consolidates the sustainability of benefits and identifies appropriate approaches to transferring this good practice example to other contexts.

*Lessons/Recommendations:*

*Lesson 1. Clarity in communication of program intent (particularly in relation to levels of funding directly available) to stakeholders on program governance bodies is vital, if a cascade of related implementation disputes and issues are to be avoided.*

*Lesson 2: Transition between emergency and development assistance does not happen automatically, it must be managed. The need to manage the transition should be explicitly recognised in the initial design (see Recommendations 1 & 2).*

*Lesson 3: While a single coordinated program of emergency and transitional assistance is an appropriate model and ‘two team’ approach to such transitional programs may be appropriate, the model adopted for phase 1 of YCAP in which key consultative roles were segregated and thereby distanced from direct implementers should not be repeated (see Recommendation 2).*

*Lesson 4: M&E frameworks of transitional programs need to be designed to recognise (and record the success of) the transition between emergency and development priorities (see Recommendation 6)*

*Lesson 5: Application of Paris Declaration principles should not be pursued blindly, but tailored to implementation contexts.*

*Lesson 6: In developing a DRR strategy for a transitional program such as YCAP, DRR will be most effective when defined broadly, and explicit decisions should be made regarding the priority to be given to each aspect of DRR (particularly preventative and educational aspects). This prioritisation should be reflected in budget allocations and appropriate performance indicators for construction activities which have the primary purpose of mitigating impacts of future disasters and/or providing long-term examples of the benefits of improved or modified construction standards (see Recommendation 3 below).*

*Lesson 7: Care should be taken to prevent perceptions of DRR outputs/outcomes of transitional programs from exceeding actual standards maintained. If this is not done DRR activities may become self-defeating. In cases where perceptions are difficult to control, the DRR-related responsibility of DRR program implementers is to err on the side of maintaining as high standards as indicated necessary by risk assessments, even if this carries financial implications and associated opportunity costs.*

*Lesson 8: The prioritisation and associated timing of various DRR activities to be undertaken by a program must be based on a contextual assessment of ongoing risks. Later evaluative exercises should consider the information upon which such considerations were based and not attempt to retrospectively discount the validity of past risk assessments if these were made with the best information available at the time.*

*Lesson 9: Raising the profile of DRR activities within a transitional program should be achieved using an appropriately designed M&E framework, rather than attempting to artificially segregate DRR ‘activities’ from other emergency or development-related components of the program.*

*Lesson 10: One of the most important determinants of success of community based endeavours is the ability of community themselves to seek, mobilise and optimally use any services offered by external sources, in addition to a community’s own resources mobilization.*

**Recommendation 1: Future AusAID programs seeking to span a transition between emergency and development assistance should consider explicitly declaring these two parts of program and defining how and when respective activities and modification of program priorities will occur (see also Recommendations 2 & 3).**

**Recommendation 2: A coordinated, two-team approach to transitional programs (viz. an initial response team and a transitional/development-oriented team) should be used in future, provided the approach has the following characteristics:**

* **A standing offer should be established to allow rapid deployment of an initial, emergency response team**
* **Design of a more detailed transitional approach should take place while the initial response team is operating (deployment of the initial response team should never be held up by more detailed design or contracting processes for transitional/development elements of the program)**
* **The initial response team should have clear responsibilities, including:**
	+ **Identify and deliver necessary emergency assistance as quickly as possible (the use of direct implementation or delivery through local counterparts should be undertaken as contextually justified[[42]](#footnote-42))**
	+ **Gather information to inform the second stage of the design process (and possibly assist with identification and contracting of appropriate organizations to undertake transitional approaches)**
* **The initial response team should always have a clear exit date, with the period of their overlapping activity with the development-oriented team inclusive of a requirement for initial joint consultation approaches, followed by a progressive hand-over of consultative duties to the development-oriented team.**

**Recommendation 3: AusAID should set construction strength standards applicable to the natural disaster risks of a particular location and adhere to these strength standards regardless of other contextual factors.**

**Recommendation 4: Future programs providing physical assets at local government level in Indonesia should be cognizant of this asset transfer issue, and prompt and assist targeted local governments to apply for these transfers in order to enable the local allocation of maintenance budgets.**

**Recommendation 5: It is strongly recommended that AusAID consider allocating 12 months of modest additional funding to provide limited ongoing support to existing YCAP activities, specifically to:**

* **continue efforts to empower working cooperation between GoI-NGO-community**
* **continue efforts to empower working cooperation between SME-NGO- bigger business entities, especially in regard to increasing market access of cooperative groups**
* **continue efforts to strengthen women as income earners as a way to encourage ongoing cultural change**

This funding provision should have the multiple aims of consolidating the sustainability of phase 2 achievements, monitoring future independent uptake of program approaches and researching the best means of replicating YCAP successes related to stakeholder engagement and participation. (A number of options for achieving this recommendation, based on preliminary discussions with relevant AusAID staff, are provided as Annex E.)

**Recommendation 6: M&E frameworks of programs wishing to transition from emergency to development assistance should define indicators relevant to both forms of assistance and recognise that optimal performance levels against the various indicators is something that should change over time.**

# ANNEX A. TORs and Key Dates

**Terms of Reference**

**Independent Completion Report for:**

**Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD)**

**Yogya-Central Java Community Assistance Program (YCAP)**

1. **Introduction**

These Terms of Reference are prepared for an Independent Completion Report (ICR) for Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD) funded project, Yogya-Central Java Community Assistance Program (YCAP).

Independent Completion Report (ICR) of an aid activity is required for all monitored activities greater than AUD3 million with strategic or political importance.

1. **Background**
	1. **Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development**

The inaugural Joint Commission Ministers meeting of the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD) on 17 March 2005 agreed a number of programs and activities to be funded from Australia’s AUD1 billion dollar post tsunami aid package. Endorsed by the AIPRD Joint Commission, the Partnership Framework outlines a program structure for the AIPRD based on two main themes: 1. Emergency Preparedness and Response; and 2. Promoting broad-based economic growth.

* 1. **Yogya-Central Java Community Assistance Program**

On 27 May 2006, an earthquake measuring 6.2 on the Richter scale occurred off the coast of South Java. The earthquake affected the provinces of Yogyakarta (Bantul, Sleman, Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo districts) and Central Java (Klaten, Magelang, Boyolali and Purwerejo). Bantul and Klaten Districts were the most affected.

Officials’ reports indicate a death toll of 5,722 people, with an estimated 37,927 injured and varying reports between 200,000 and 650,000 left homeless. As a result, on 2 June the AIPRD Joint Commission approved $A30 million in AIPRD grant funding for immediate demolition, repair and construction works and longer-term reconstruction for the Yogya (and Central Java) Reconstruction Program.

A managing contractor was selected, through a tender process to implement the
Yogya-Central Java Community Assistance Program (YCAP) over two years (2006 – 2008).

The purpose of the Program is to provide short and medium term assistance to affected communities and to assist the roll-out of rehabilitation programs. The program goal is to assist affected families and communities in the project areas to return as quickly as possible to normality.

YCAP is divided under two phases. Phase 1 operated from 2006 to 2008 and Phase 2 commenced in 2008 and will conclude in early 2010.

Under phase 1, program components were:

1. sustaining household life;
2. restoring local incomes; and
3. school readiness.

Under phase 2, program components are:

1. disaster risk reduction;
2. improving community infrastructure, particularly water and sanitation, irrigation, restoration of markets and (where resources allow) small scale roads and bridges rehabilitation;
* improving livelihoods, giving priority to those made vulnerable by the earthquake.

First phase activities concentrated on the two most affected districts, Bantul and Klaten. In the second phase, YCAP expanded the program to also cover Gunung Kidul, Sleman and Kulon Progo districts, as suggested by Yogyakarta province, making a total of five districts receiving assistance. The expansion was requested by the Yogyakarta province to assist other earthquake affected districts.

A mid-term review was undertaken for YCAP in August 2007. Key recommendations were the need to: develop a coherent strategy for all activities based on community engagement and include practical strategies to promote gender equity and broader social inclusion (cross-cutting issues); develop processes for improved communication and sharing lessons learned amongst stakeholders; undertake a scoping mission to determine best options to use the unallocated earthquake response funds.

Following the mid term review recommendation, a scoping mission was conducted in February 2008 to determine the use of unallocated Australian funding. Based on that, it was recommended to continue the assistance until 2010 through YCAP as the primary mechanism for delivery of the unallocated Australian funding, with the reformation of YCAP into a capacity building/advisory facility no longer directly implementing activities. The facility is responsible to ensure effective consultation with local authorities and other stakeholders. AusAID and BAPPENAS agreed with the recommendation. It was also determined that a continuation of YCAP (as opposed to terminating YCAP and designing and tendering a completely new activity) would be the most effective way to proceed. The total of imprest fund managed through YCAP in both phases are
AUD20 million.

In the second phase, with a facility type of arrangement, the scoping mission found there was no longer a need to have a Program Management Office (PMO) and the office was phased out by September 2008.

The ICR’s target audience is the community of professionals implementing Australian aid, who need credible, independent advice on the results of past efforts. This community includes AusAID staff and management, government counterparts, implementing partners, and other donors. Australia is committed to supporting Indonesia prepare for and respond to future disasters. As such, reviewing current assistance to help inform future assistance is a priority.

* 1. **Key Issues**

At this stage, AusAID sees the following issues as key areas for the evaluation team to focus their efforts on as they conduct the review. These are the specific issues AusAID wishes to have information on to inform future decision making:

* 1. Effectiveness of mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction into each objective component;
	2. Effectiveness of arrangements for coordination and engagement with local government and community in both phases;
	3. How well the program addressed other AusAID cross-cutting issues in addition to DRR in particularly Gender Equality; Anti Corruption; Disability; Environment;
	4. Sustainability upon completion of the program.
1. **Objectives of the ICR Mission**

The objectives of the ICR mission is to:

* 1. Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of YCAP, in order to provide information on accountability and lessons learnt that could be applied and /or shared across the aid program;
	2. Identify factors facilitating or constraining success and lessons learnt from the program and recommend mechanisms in order to enhance overall effectiveness of post disaster assistance;
	3. Validate and follow-up the information and relevant assessments made by the Activity Completion Report.
1. **Scope of ICR**

The ICR will independently assess and rate the project’s performance against the evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact (or potential impact), sustainability, gender equality, monitoring and evaluation, in addition to analysis and learning. The ratings will be based on the standard AusAID six-point scale, as outlined in the ICR template. The following are standard evaluation questions to guide the evaluation team in forming these rating of the evaluation criteria above and will respond the following questions:

* 1. What lessons from the program can be applied in particular in relation to future DRR activities?
	2. Are the activities undertaken consistent with the objectives outlined in the YCAP project proposal for both phases?
	3. To what extent have program components contributed to achievement of objectives?
	4. What were the risks to the achievement of objectives? Were the risks managed appropriately?
	5. How well did the program address mainstreaming of DRR into each component (intentionally or unintentionally)?
	6. Has the activity produced intended or unintended changes in the lives of beneficiaries, directly or indirectly?
	7. Do beneficiaries and local government have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the activity outcomes after the completion of the program?
	8. To what extent did each YCAP approach support more active engagement of local government in program oversight and monitoring (Phase 1 and Phase 2)?
	9. Is the activity promoting equal participation and benefits for women, men, boys and girls?
	10. Does evidence exist to show that objectives were achieved?
	11. How well have YCAP and the Program Management Group (PMG) responded to the recommendations from the MTR and scoping mission?
	12. How well the approaches adopted by YCAP recognized and supported the varying roles of the different humanitarian organizations involved in the response effort?

These are standard questions and will be used as starting point for ICR team to prepare the methodology. Should primary data employed to verify claims of achievements in this activity not available, the ICR team should use their professional judgment to assess the impact of the program activities. The team should provide an evaluation plan (including methodology) and information required prior to in-country visit.

1. **Evaluation Process**

The ICR will take up to 27 days over an 8 weeks period (up to 10 days for in-country visit). It is proposed to commence in the second half of January 2010. It may also take additional weeks for AusAID and BAPPENAS to review and approve the final report as it will need to go to series of review with a range of stakeholders. The exact date of the ICR is yet to be confirmed.

The program is preparing an Activity Completion Report (ACR) which will be available by early January 2010. The report will provide the Program’s perspective on achievements.

In undertaking the ICR, the evaluation team will:

* 1. Conduct a desk study to assess relevant program documentation provided by AusAID and advise AusAID of any additional documents or information required prior to the in-country visit (up to 3 days);
	2. Appraise the M&E framework, disaster risk reduction strategy, gender strategy and sustainability strategy documents (up to 2 days);
	3. Develop an evaluation plan (including the methodology), issue paper, field research guide and instruments and identification of key issues. The plan will indicate the roles and responsibilities of each team member for data collection, analysis and reporting (up to 2 days);
	4. In-country mission (up to 10 days), including pre-mission briefing in Jakarta at the start of the in-country field visit (1 day), field visit be team member including travel time to/from project sites (up to 7 days), preparation and presentation of aide memoire (up to 2 days);
	5. Submit a draft ICR (7 days of writing for the team leader, which includes the consolidation of reports from other members); and
	6. Submit the final ICR (3 days of writing for the team leader, which includes the revision of input from other team members).
1. **Reporting Requirements**

The ICR team shall provide AusAID with the following:

* 1. **An Evaluation Plan (including methodology)**

to be submitted at least one week prior to the in-country visit for AusAID in principle approval prior to the in country visit. The final Evaluation Plan will be agreed at the pre-mission briefing in Jakarta;

* 1. **An Issue paper** based on review of the documents (2 pages maximum)

to be presented at the same time as the Evaluation Plan at the pre-mission briefing;

* 1. **An Aide Memoire** (5 pages maximum)

summarizing initial findings of the ICR and recommendations to be presented to AusAID staff and relevant stakeholders at the completion of the in-country mission;

* 1. **A draft ICR** (25 pages maximum plus annexes)

to be submitted within 2 weeks of completing field visit; and

* 1. **Final ICR** (25 pages maximum plus annexes)

to be submitted within 5 working days of receipt of AusAID’s comments on the draft ICR.

1. **Team Composition**

The ICR team will comprise two members, an international evaluation expert with particular expertise in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as a Team Leader and a local community development expert with substantial knowledge of DRR.

The team will be supported by an AusAID Disaster Management Adviser, Mr. Jeong Park, to provide direction on the AIP Disaster Risk Management Work Plan, Sector Plan and Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), in addition to DRR. AusAID Activity Managers will also assist the team to provide background information on the projects, oversee the review through regular feedback during the review process, facilitation of stakeholders’ meetings and logistics requirements.

The team Leader will be responsible for:

* 1. Leading the review mission
	2. Responsible for overall management of the team inputs in achieving missions objectives outlined above;
	3. Providing an evaluation plan, including methodology and instruments to be used;
	4. Production of an Aide Memoire and;
	5. Submission of a review report to AusAID.

The Community Development Specialist will be responsible for:

* 1. Providing advice and written inputs to the Team Leader, as instructed by the Team Leader, in order for the objectives and reporting requirements of the review to be met;
	2. Providing inputs to the Team Leader on the evaluation plan;
	3. Providing inputs to the Team Leader on the program’s community engagement, particularly on local perspective including gender strategies.
1. **List of key documents**
	1. Project Design Document
	2. Six-Monthly & Annual Plan
	3. Quarterly & Six-Monthly Report
	4. Quality at Implementation Reports
	5. Mid Term Review Report
	6. Scoping Mission Report
	7. Self Evaluation Study of Phase 1 and Transition Plan of Phase 1 to Phase 2
	8. Activity Completion Report
	9. Relevant AusAID policies (disaster risk reduction, gender, anti corruption, partnerships, performance management and evaluation)
	10. AusGuidelines on preparing completion report
	11. AusAID’s template on the Independent Completion Report and Aide Memoire
	12. AusAID Standard Evaluation Questions to guide in forming the ratings.

**Key Dates (drawn from Activity Completion Report)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| May 2006 | Yogyakarta and central Java province hit by earth quake. Death toll is 5,743 and injured 38,511. Estimates of homeless vary from 200,000 to 650,000. |
| June/July 2006 | AIPRD Secretaries Committee approved AUD30 million for immediate demolition, repair and construction works and longer term construction. |
| 4 September 2006  | AusAID engaged the services of RHK Project Management in association with IDSS to manage YCAP.PMO also established. |
| October 2006 | Initial action plan presented and initial phase 1 activities approved. |
| May 2007 | First PMG Meeting – then 6 monthly. |
| August 2007 | Mid Term Review (MTR) to review program implementation. |
| February 2008 | AusAID Scoping Mission to recommend strategy for unallocated AUD7 million. |
| July – August 2008  | YCAP Self Evaluation Study – internal review and evaluation for period 2006 – 2008. PMO closes. |
| September 2008 | Commencement of YCAP Phase 2 – First meeting of SG. |
| November/December 2008  | SG and PMG agree allocation of funds across new districts. Design and selection of geographical areas, implementing partners and budget allocation. |
| December 2008 | Submission of YCAP Phase 2 Annual Work Plan based on SG and PMG outcomes. |
| February 2009 | YCAP Phase 2 program implemented by partners at field level. |
| June 2009 | Joint Monitoring & Evaluation. |
| November 2009 | Joint Monitoring & Evaluation. |
| December 2009 | Final Program Management Group and Steering Group meeting held in Yogyakarta. |
| January 2010 | Submission of Activity Completion Report.Independent Completion Report. |
| March 2010 | YCAP completed. |

# ANNEX B. Persons Consulted

|  |
| --- |
| Persons Consulted - YCAP Independent Completion Review -Jakarta |
|  Pak Suprayoga Hadi: Director for Regional Development, National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) |
| Persons Consulted - YCAP Independent Completion Review -Field |
| **Kulon Progo, 26 January 2010** |
| Syamsu Hidayat | YCAP Program Manager for Kulon Progo | 0811 282 287 syamsu.hidayat@yogjacap.com |
| **Community Meeting** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Detail** |
| Mahmud | LPPSP Field Coordinator for four villages in Kulon Progo (Jangkaran, Glagah, Banaran, Karangsewu) | LPPSP (Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Pembangunan) Semarang Bumi Winamukti A4/31 Semarang 50276 Jawa Tengah Telp: 024 6705577 Faks: 024 6701321 |
| Jangkaran Community representing mangrove group, farmer group, and women micro finance (M:4 F:3) |   | Dukuh Pasir Mendit, Desa Jangkaran, Kecamatan Temon, Kulon Progo |
| **Meeting during lunch** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Detail** |
| Saptono Tanjung | Damar Project Manager for four villages in Kulon Progo (Hargotirto, Hargowilis, Hargomulyo, Kalirejo) | DAMAR Rt 13 Rw VI Dusun Tambak Desa Triharjo Kec Wates Kulon Progo Telp/Faks: 0274 867737 |
| **Meeting with Bappeda Kulon Progo** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Detail** |
| Eko Wisnu Wardhana, SE | Head of Social and Culture Section | BAPPEDA KULON PROGO Jl Perwakilan no 1 Wates Yogyakarta Telp: 0274 773247 Faks: 0274 774126 |
| Taufik Amrullah, ST, MM | Head of Economic Section |
| Hesti Suryandari, SP, M.Si | Head of Planning Sub-section/Steering Group member |
| Eratra Muktiana | Staff of Economic Section |
| **Klaten 27 January 2010** |
| Agni Pratama | YCAP Program Manager for Klaten | 0274 - 787 7678/ 0818 272 737 agni.pratama@yogjacap.com |
| **Meeting At Bappeda Office** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Details:**  |
| Drs. Agus Yanuari, Msi | Secretary of Klaten House of Representative formerly Secretary of BAPEDA and Member of Steering Group YCAP  | Mobile Phone : 08164271693 |
| Ir. Bambang Eko | Secretary of Department of Public Works Formerly Head of Infrastructure Section - BAPPEDA KLATEN - member of Steering Group YCAP | Mobile Phone : 08122775001email : ekobam65@yahoo.com |
| Ir. Sugeng Santosa, MM | Sub-Head of Infrastructure Section Member of Steering Group | Mobile Phone : 081328251555email: sugengsts@gmail.com |
| Sumino | Director of Research and Development Of LPTP Solo Implementing Partner for Rainwaterharvesting Tank ( Replicating UNICEF Project )  | Mobile Phone : 081329039885email: Minox911@yahoo.com |
| Ag. Gatot Bintoro | Project Manager - LPPM Atmajaya Implementing Partner for Livelihood Project  | Mobile Phone :081578142202email : agustinus.bintoro@gmail.com |
| Rossana Dewi | Executive Director - Gita Pertiwi Implementing Partner for Livelihood Project | Mobile Phone : 08122977169email: dewiross@yahoo.com |
| Titik Eka Sasanti | Project Manager - Gita Pertiwi Implementing Partner for Livelihood Project  | Mobile Phone : 081329989384email: titikeksa@yahoo.com |
| Panji Kusuma | Team Leader - EPM CDA Implementing Partner for Traditional Market and Community Meeting Buildings | Mobile Phone: 081328700581email : panji@epmprojectmanagement.or.id |
| Artin Suryani | Assistant of Director - EPM CDA Implementing Partner for Traditional Market and Community Meeting Buildings | Mobile Phone : 08122964206email:artinwuriyani@yahoo.com |
| **Community Meeting** |
| Bapak Nurhadi  | Tlingsing Village Head | Mobile Phone : 085867195758 |
| Gita Pertiwi Staff |   | Jl. Griyan Lama No. 20, Baturan, Solo 57171, Jawa Tengah Ph. 0271 - 718956 www.gita.or.id |
| Community  | Approximate number : 20 people Lurik Producers Lurik and Modification of Lurik Product Trader Food Processing Producers Local Disaster Respon Team Local Monitoring of Infrastructure Project Team | Tlingsing |
| **Bantul, 28 Januari 2010** |
| Soetatwo Hadiwigeno | Steering Group Co Facilitator | 0811 252410 |
| Damayanti Sari Rohmaningtyas | YCAP Program Manager for Bantul |  0817 547 8827/ 383 956 damayanti.rohmaningtyas@yogjacap.com |
| **Meeting with KWAS** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Details** |
| Robert Agung  | CV KWAS , Owner/Director | CV Kwas, Dusun Bungas, Desa Sumberagung, Kecamatan Jetis, Bantul phone 087839151317, email:indesign@indosat.net.id |
| Laili | CV KWAS , Vice Director | CV Kwas, Dusun Bungas, Desa Sumberagung, Kecamatan Jetis, Bantul |
| **Meeting with Community (Housing)** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Details** |
| Triyono | Community member, beneficiaries | Pundong Subvillage, Srihardono Village, Pundong District, Bantul |
| Head of Sub Village |   | Pundong Subvillage, Srihardono Village, Pundong District, Bantul |
| Head of Village |   | Pundong Subvillage, Srihardono Village, Pundong District, Bantul |
| **Meeting with Bappeda** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Details** |
| Ir Pulung Haryadi | Secretary of Bappeda Bantul | Bappeda Bantul, Kompleks Parasamya Bantul. Phone: 08179423849/email: pulung\_haryadi@yahoo.com |
| **Meeting with Implementing Partners** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Details** |
| Sutrisna  | PKPEK, Program Manager | Perkumpulan untuk Kajian dan Pengembangan Ekonomi Kerakyatan (PKPEK),Jl Mangkuyudan no.7, telp 0274 380 549, email:fairbiz@indo.net.id, bytrys@yahoo.co.id |
| Rohmanu | PKPEK, Program Staff | Perkumpulan untuk Kajian dan Pengembangan Ekonomi Kerakyatan (PKPEK),Jl Mangkuyudan no.7, telp 0274 380 549,  |
| Heniwati | Daya Annisa, Director | Daya Annisa, Jl Parangtritis km 4,5 Saman II No. 28. Yogyakarta. 55187, +62 274 373274 email: dayaannisa@yahoo.com |
| Mark Deasy | Muslim Aid, Program Director | Muslim Aid Yogyakarta, Jl Lowano MG III/1361, Yogyakarta 55153, Phone 0274 381876 |
| Joko Yuliantoro | Muslim Aid, Program Manager | Muslim Aid Yogyakarta, Jl Lowano MG III/1361, Yogyakarta 55153, Phone 0274 381876 phone     (0274) 381876, 081 392 710071 , email: fieldcoordinatormuslimaidyogya@gmail.com, yuliant\_jk@yahoo.com |
| Lukman Hakim | Muslim Aid, DRR Program Coordinator | Muslim Aid Yogyakarta, Jl Lowano MG III/1361, Yogyakarta 55153, Phone 0274 381876 phone     (0274) 381876, 081 392 710071 , email: fieldcoordinatormuslimaidyogya@gmail.com, yuliant\_jk@yahoo.com |
| Yusra Tebe | KYPA, Program Director | Yayasan KYPA, Jalan Banteng Raya no 8 Ngaglik Sleman Yogyakarta, phone 0274 886322, email: kypa\_recovery@yahoo.co.id, yusra.tebe@gmail.com  |
| Ananto Harimawan | KYPA, Program Manager | Yayasan KYPA, Jalan Banteng Raya no 8 Ngaglik Sleman Yogyakarta, phone 0274 886322, email: a\_hananto@yahoo.com  |
| Elly Wisanti Utama | Kerabat Desa Kota, Director | Yayasan Kerabat Desa Kota Indonesia (KDK), Jl Jurugsari IV/1B, Jl Kaliurang Km 7 Yogyakarta55283, Phone 0274 - 7008934 / Hp : 0816 4228171 /0274 3038305, email : kerabatdesakota@gmail.com atau utamaelly@yahoo.co.id |
| Irma | Kerabat Desa Kota, staff | Yayasan Kerabat Desa Kota Indonesia (KDK), Jl Jurugsari IV/1B, Jl Kaliurang Km 7 Yogyakarta 55283, Phone 0274 - 7008934 atau Hp : 0816 4228171 /0274 3038305, email : kerabatdesakota@gmail.com |
| **Meeting with Community** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Details** |
| Beneficiaries of PR Yakkum  |
| Bp Ngatijan | DPO (Difable People Organisation) Alliance District Bantul, President | Imogiri, Bantul |
| Ibu Suginem | DPO Alliance District Bantul, Board of Member | Imogiri, Bantul |
| Ibu Suwartiningsh | DPO Lindu Asih, member | Imogiri, Bantul |
| Jaimun | PR Yakkum staff/Program Coordinator | PR Yakkum, Jl Kaliurang km 13,5, Besi. Po Box 6310/YKGD Gondolayu Yogyakarta 55233A, Phone: 0274-895386/895181, email: support@rehabilitasi-yakkum.or.id, websitw : www.rehabilitasi-yakkum.or.id |
| Trisna | PR Yakkum staff/Community Organizer | PR Yakkum, Jl Kaliurang km 13,5, Besi. Po Box 6310/YKGD Gondolayu Yogyakarta 55233A, Phone: 0274-895386/895181, email: support@rehabilitasi-yakkum.or.id, websitw : [www.rehabilitasi-yakkum.or.id](http://www.rehabilitasi-yakkum.or.id) |
| Beneficiaries of Jogja Heritage Society |
| 16 Community member in Girilaya, Wukirsari (F 13, M 3) | Batik Groups representative (Paguyuban Batik Girilaya, Wukirsari | Girilaya Subvillage, Wukirsari Village, Imogiri Subdistrict, Bantul |
| Reni Yuliastanti | JHS staff/Assistant to Program Coordinator | Jogja Heritage Society, Jln. Surokarsan 24, Yogyakarta, Phone (0274) 375758/0856 432 69 774, email : saya\_reni@yahoo.co.id |
| Harumanto Sapardi  | JHS staff/Field Coordinator | Jogja Heritage Society, Jln. Surokarsan 24, Yogyakarta, Phone (0274) 375758/0856 432 69 774, email : haroom\_anto@yahoo.com |
| Beneficiaries of IRD |
| 5 Community members in Girilaya, Wukirsari (4 M, 1 F) | Girilaya, Wukirsari | Girilaya Subvillage, Wukirsari Village, Imogiri Subdistrict, Bantul |
| Aries Hernawati | IRD, Hygiene Promotion Officer | International Relief and Development (IRD), Menara Intiland Lt 9, Jl Jendral Sudirman Kav 32, Jakarta, www.ird.org, phone 021-57854063, mobile 081328041093, email ahernawati@ird.org |
| Dayat | IRD, Field Engineer | International Relief and Development (IRD), Menara Intiland Lt 9, Jl Jendral Sudirman Kav 32, Jakarta, www.ird.org, phone 021-57854063,  |
| **Sleman, 29 January 2010** |
| Ruhaini | YCAP National Gender Adviser | 0811254670 ruhainidz@yahoo.co.id |
| Ni Putu Yunita Kurniawati | YCAP Program Manager for Sleman | 0274 - 798 296/ 081 227 845 57 yunita.kurniawati@yogjacap.com |
| **Discussion with Bappeda Sleman representatives, Location: Balai Desa Kalitirto** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Details** |
| Drs. Muhamad Aji Wibowo, MSc. | Head of Economics Section YCAP-Steering Group | Bappeda Sleman Jl. Parasamya No. 1, Beran, Sleman YOGYAKARTA - INDONESIA 55511 Phone. (0274) 86800 |
| **Discussion with Implementing Partner** |
| Sutrisno | Program Coordinator - PKPEK | PKPEK Jl Mangkuyudan No. 7 Yogyakarta Indonesia 55143 Phone. (0274) 380549 |
| Al. Agung S | Program Coordinator - YSBD | YSBD Perum Taman Indah B1 Ngaglik Sleman Yogyakarta Indonesia 55581 Phone. (0274) 9186004 |
| Ady Widodo Sinandang ST | Field Coordinator - YSBD |
| **Discussion with community, Location: Pasar Tanjung Indah** |
| Tanjung Indah Cooperative members F: 7 M: 1 |   | KSU Tanjung Indah Teguhan, Kalitirto, Berbah, Sleman (0274) 3321227 |
| **Discussion with community, Location: Fish Pond Irrigation channel** |
| Kelompok Tanjung Mandiri F: 1 M: 4 |   | Kelompok Tanjung Mandiri Dusun Tanjung, Desa Kalitirto, Berbah Sleman Pak Slamet: 081 5790 5868 |
| **Klaten, 30 January 2010** |
| Syamsu Hidayat | YCAP Program Manager for Kulon Progo | 0811 282 287 poday\_1232@yahoo.com.au |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact** |
| **Meeting at SD Basin** |
| Suparmi Spd | Kepala Sekolah SD Basin |   |
| Siti Karomah | Kepala Sekolah MIM Basin | 085642266515 |
| Komite beserta Guru SD dan MIM Basin | Sekitar 8 orang |   |
| **Community Meeting At Srowot** |
| Panji Kusumah | Team Leader - EPM CDA Implementing Partner for Traditional Market and Community Meeting Buildings | Mobile Phone: 081328700581email : panji@epmprojectmanagement.or.id |
| Artin Suryani | Assistant of Director - EPM CDA | Mobile Phone : 08122964206 email:artinwuriyani@yahoo.com |
| Lala | EPM |   |
| Intan | EPM |   |
| Anjas | EPM |   |
| Desi | EPM |   |
| Community  | Approximate number : 10 people | Srowot Market, Klaten |
| **Community Meeting At Sukorejo** |
| Tri Haryani | Bidan Polindes Sukorejo | 081393895877 |
| Suryono ST | Kades Sukorejo |   |
| Community  | Approximate number : 15 people |   |
| **Meeting with Bapeda DIY** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Detail** |
| Ir Eddy Siswanto | Head of Bapeda DIY | Bapeda DIY (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta) Kompleks Kepatihan Danurejan Jl Malioboro 14 Yogyakarta Telp: 0274 586712 |
| Drs Sultoni Nurifa'I, M.Si | Head of Trade, Industry, and Service Sub-section Bappeda DIY/SG member |
| Ir Drajad Suwandono | Secretary of Bapeda DIY |
| Ir Woro Sulistianingsih | Head of Economic Section Bapeda DIY |
| **Gunungkidul, 01 February 2010** |
| Syamsu Hidayat | YCAP Program Manager for Gunungkidul | 0811 282 287 syamsu.hidayat@yogjacap.com |
| **Community Meeting** |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Contact Detail** |
| Brown sugar producers (F:22, M:2) |   | Dusun Gedad, Sawah Lor, and Klepu Desa Banyusoco, Kec Playen, Gunungkidul |
| Wiyatno | Project Manager | FIDES Perumahan Baturan Indah Blok A8 Jl Melati XXII No 17 Baturan, Colomadu Karanganyar Surakarta Telp/Fax: 0271 726041 |
| Sixansius | Finance Officer |
| Dimas | Field Officer |
| Dyah | Field Officer |
| Eko Budi | Project Manager | LESMAN Jl Regulo 78B Sidomulyo Rt 04 Rw VII Pulisen Boyolali 57136 Telp/Fax : 0276 325770 |
| Satyo | Field Officer |
| Agus Sugiarto, SIP | Staff of Economic Section Bappeda Gunungkidul/SG member | Bappeda Gunungkidul Jl Satria 3 Wonosari Telp: 0274 391761 |
| Ir Hj Anik Indarwati, MP | Head of Forestry and Plantation Office Gunungkidul/ex SG member | 081 2276 5765 |
|  |  |  |
| **YCAP Team** |
| Catherine Yates | YCAP Team Leader | 0811 250 8763 catherine.yates@yogjacap.com |
| Maria Epik Pranasari | YCAP National Livelihood Adviser | 0812 2692 945 maria.epik@yogjacap.com |
| Antonius Maria Indrianto | YCAP Partnership Strengthening Adviser | 081 125 06016 anton@yogjacap.com |
| Triady S Diredja | YCAP Senior Construction Manager | 0811 962 3248 triady.diredja@yogjacap.com |
| **YCAP Staffs** |
| Nikivida Buda Damayanti | Office Manager | 0813 2811 0246 nikivida.damayanti@yogjacap.com |
| Felix Satrio | IT Officer | 0858 6806 0633 felix.satrio@yogjacap.com |
| Supriyani Wulandari | Admin Assistant | 0818 0401 0147 supriyani.wulandari@yogjacap.com  |
| Cepy Fuad Syahda | Senior Finance Manager | 0815 1346 2211 cepy.fuad@yogjacap.com |
| Lilian Rosita | Accountant | 0815 6808 808 lilian@yogjacap.com |
| Deborah Octavia Tobing | Grants/Contract Manager | 0812 2799 298 deborah.josephine@yogjacap.com |
| Rachma Safitri Yogasari | Grants/Contract Manager | 0818 465 717 rachma.safitri@yogjacap.com |
| Mumpuni Ardiyani | Grants/Contract Manager | 0811 268 691 mumpuni.ardiyani@yogjacap.com |
| Irawan Kristianto | Compliance/Partners Manager | 0858 6817 4349 irawan.kristianto@yogjacap.com |
| Astri Indirawati | M&E Support | 0813 9246 2875 astri.indirawati@yogjacap.com |
| Ngadiman | Construction Technical Adviser | 0819 1553 3772 ngadiman@yogjacap.com |
| Hendri Puryanto | Watsan Technical Adviser | 0858 7892 9495 hendri.puryanto@yogjacap.com |
| Nur Widi Atmaka | CE Field Officer | 0815 8618 6593 nur.widi@yogjacap.com |
| Wawan Probo Sulistyo | CE Field Officer | 0813 2968 1975 wawan.probo@yogjacap.com |
| Nasocha | Road and Bridge Adviser | 0816 686 073 nasocha@yogjacap.com |
| Eddy Sasongko | Irrigation Adviser | 0818 278 153 eddy.sasongko@yogjacap.com |
| Suyanto | Watsan Technical Adviser | 0812 155 2205 suyanto@yogjacap.com |

# ANNEX C. Comments from AusAID Disaster Management Adviser

**Reflection on Disaster Risk Reduction Component**

**of**

**Yogyakarta Central Java Community Assistance Program**

**Independent Completion Report**

**1 February 2010**

**Introduction**

1. This reflection paper is largely based on the observations through a three-day field visit during the Yogyakarta Central Java Community Assistance Program (YCAP) independent completion report (ICR).

**Findings & Reflection**

1. The UNISDR’s terminology on DRR, published in 2009, clearly explains that disaster risk management aims to avoid, lessen or transfer the adverse effects of hazards through activities and measures for mitigation and preparedness. YCAP 2 activities were definitely designed and implemented to mitigate and/or be prepared for future events.
2. Overall, DRR principles such as “building back better” and “safer and resilient communities” are well incorporated into YCAP 2, although it was unclear whether a scientific risk assessment was undertaken prior to project implementation (evidence based DRR).
3. Although insignificant, it seemed that the concept of “resilience” was used to imply the definition of “disaster risk”. The AusAID DRR Policy[[43]](#footnote-43) considers disaster risk as a product of the relationship between hazards, vulnerability and resilience[[44]](#footnote-44).
4. It was understood that YCAP 2 struggled to define the scope/definition of DRR in the beginning partially due to other program components, e.g. small infrastructure and livelihoods, which could have become integral elements of DRR. According to the design document, DRR is one of three separate components of YCAP 2.
5. While struggling, however, program structure/design was not revised (to make it more holistic). Instead, there were a lot of integration attempts made between DRR, livelihood and/or small infrastructure projects, mostly through the DRR mainstream matrix.
6. Some activities were carried out in isolation, e.g. hazard mapping vs. skill development for weavers and food production in one target community. Although largely justified by the DRR mainstream matrix, there was no close correlation between these two activities. It would have been better if further attentions were given to program design to focus on specific hazards, vulnerabilities and/or resilience.
7. Again, although justified, there were too many initiatives/activities ranging from community infrastructure, WASH promotion, hazard mapping, etc. to micro credit, skills development, bio-gas production, the handicapped welfare, etc. to sensibly conclude an overall outcome that is holistic and focused. (It probably made YCAP 2 difficult to define clear indicators and assess performance against them). However, a lot of outputs are fully recognized as evidences of success.
8. There was a fair balance of gender representation in DRM projects, mainly through the integration between community-focused DRM e.g. building community infrastructure, community mapping and simulations, etc., and household-oriented livelihoods activities e.g. weaving, food production, etc., allowing all members of family to participate in the YCAP activities.
9. Relationship with governments, especially with Bappedas, was strengthened through joint planning as well as joint monitoring, which was one of key success factors in YCAP 2. However there were a few activities specifically focusing on the capacity development of local governments.
10. It was presented that every activity in the DRR mainstream matrix contributes to the overall program objectives. However, it was not clear whether these activities attributed to the government (sub-district or district)’s development plans. It was also not clear whether community engagement helped government’s annual planning process (Musrenbang).
11. It was said that YCAP 2 program officers learned DRR concepts from technical advisers as well as by working with community NGOs. However, it should also be noted that their personal desire to study DRR was extraordinary, which made YCAP 2 successful.
12. In general, local partners (CSOs/NGOs) were technically competent and sound in local wisdom, community engagement as well as DRM project management. For those NGOs visited, they all demonstrated their solid grassroots foundation.

# ANNEX D. YCAP Schools Costings


#

# ANNEX E. Draft Costings of Recommended Ongoing Support Options.

***Authors’ note: It needs to be transparently stated that both options presented below potentially favour the same managing contractor (IDSS). It is not the intent of the authors to suggest any favoured treatment of this managing contractor. The two options presented were jointly identified during discussions with AusAID staff, post field mission.***

There would appear to be two main options for provision of continuing modest support to consolidate and learn from the stakeholder engagement gains made by phase 2 of YCAP:

* 1. Extend the current program in a heavily cut down form; or
	2. Link continuance of the support and monitoring aspects of this intervention to AusAID’s other major community engagement oriented program, namely ACCESS (Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme). This option can also be broken into B1 & B2, based on the level of supervisory commitment by ACCESS (see below).

In either case the level of operational expenditure would be similar, and would amount to continuing district program manager positions for another 12 months. These program managers would not be required to establish or oversee new activities, rather they would only:

* continue efforts to empower working cooperation between GoI-NGO-community
* continue efforts to empower working cooperation between SME-NGO- bigger business entities, especially in regard to increasing market access of cooperative groups
* continue efforts to strengthen women as income earners as a way to encourage ongoing cultural change
* Apply and report against an ongoing (partially redesigned) M&E framework.

Rough budget estimates for each option are:

*(Note: these estimates were provided with the necessary assistance of IDSS. Due to the tentative and sensitive nature of this suggestion, these costings exclude examination of any program management fees).*

**Option A** (12 months):

4 Program Managers [salaries/on-costs]

Logistic support (2 leased vehicles + 2 drivers [salaries/on-costs])

Program Supervisor/Administrator (national position) [salary/on-costs]

Office and equipment (three rooms plus garage space for vehicles)

Communications Costs and Consumables (phone bills, paper, etc.)

Stakeholder support costs (travel, venue rental, etc.)

Evaluative (Research) exercise (Stand Alone)

**Approximate total (12 months): IDR 2 489 572 009 [AUD$** **299 948]**

**Option B1** (12 months):

4 Program Managers [salaries/on-costs]

Logistic support (2 leased vehicles + 2 drivers [salaries/on-costs])

Supervisory visits and administrative support (from existing ACCESS staff -based on 5 days per month)

Office and equipment (two rooms plus garage space for vehicles)

Communications Costs and Consumables (phone bills, paper, etc.)

Stakeholder support costs (travel, venue rental, etc.)

Extension of ACCESS evaluative exercises to cover YCAP

**Approximate total (12 months): IDR 2 311 379 200 [AUD$ 278 479]**

**Option B2** (12 months)

4 Program Managers [salaries/on-costs]

Logistic support (2 leased vehicles + 2 drivers [salaries/on-costs])

ACCESS Yogya Sub-Program Supervisor/Administrator (new ACCESS national position) [salary/on-costs]

Office and equipment (three rooms plus garage space for vehicles)

Communications Costs and Consumables (phone bills, paper, etc.)

Stakeholder support costs (travel, venue rental, etc.)

Extension of ACCESS evaluative exercises to cover YCAP

**Approximate total (12 months): IDR 2 323 572 000 [AUD$** **279 948]**

While Option B1 would likely prove marginally less expensive, the cost differences between it and B2 appear negligible, and the benefits of maintenance of a local, full-time supervisory/administrative support position in Yogyakarta would clearly outweigh this extra cost. Hence, if a modest continuation of the program is deemed desirable, the ICR recommends that either option A or B2 be selected, depending on the perceived appropriateness of tying the continuation to ACCESS.

Expanded bases of costings are provided below (original data provided by IDSS).

1. In some emergency situations no appropriate local counterparts may be available. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. No matter how forcibly presented, any information provided that does not easily fall into one or more of the SWOT categories is likely to be irrelevant. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. To maintain harmony with others, politeness is emphasized with a consequent tendency to try to please others by only raising good points. (Etiquette Jawa: Buku Pelajaran Sekolah Rakyat Untuk Klas 3-6, Balai Pustaka, 1959), [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The ToR’s of this ICR imposed four primary requirements on the evaluation (see above). The reporting format used to respond to these requirements is as follows:

Items (i) and (iv) will be addressed under relevant later headings of stipulated the ICR format (Item (i) using their own explicit headings and item (iv) covered under ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ headings).

Item (ii) will be addressed under the current ‘evaluation findings’ heading, with Item (iii) contextually integrated into these discussions of findings as recommendations for comparable future initiatives. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Note that the program was not involved in housing wholly displaced persons or persons who did not have access to other community resources; hence it did not need to utilise or comply with SPHERE standards. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. There appears to be a common misconception among program designers that such transition between emergency and development approaches can happen ‘automatically’. Like all complex tasks, such transition needs to be carefully managed. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/code-of-conduct-290296 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Perhaps a blunt, but accurate, interpretation is that of sustaining affected populations so that they remain both alive and capable of becoming involved in future longer-term recovery or development processes. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. For example, a common indicator of effectiveness for an emergency response is the level of mortality within most vulnerable groups, whereas in a development setting key indicators more often relate to measures of the establishment of ongoing, inclusive systems for broad stakeholder ownership of appropriate outputs/outcomes. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For a brief, but illustrative account of issues related to transitional programs see: Moore, J. (1999) “The humanitarian-development gap”, International Review of the Red Cross Nr 833, p. 103-107  (<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPT2>)  [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. This is sometimes termed the mythical, ‘magic bullet’ approach. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Periods are speculative for the Yogyakarta 2006 earthquake context only, and should not be interpreted more broadly. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. It is important that the processes under this component should not begin until fundamental psychosocial or physical trauma of communities is addressed to the point that they can meaningfully participate in long-term planning, or while resources of government agencies remain fully committed to relief efforts. In both cases, any attempts at initiating processes supporting longer-term development planning will either obstruct relief efforts or be inappropriately informed by the immediate emergency priorities of communities or government. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. While this ‘cut-off point’ approach is clearly imperfect in relation to the progressive change experienced by transitional programs, it provides for feasible management and assessment frameworks. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. It also needs to be recognised that initial emergency responses will always require an element of ‘top down’ application, given the need to act quickly, the lack of time available and the reduced capacity of local stakeholders to engage in ‘standard’ development-oriented participatory activities. In this context, the (often-maligned) approach of donors to emphasize the need to expend funds quickly is quite appropriate, provided that it is also recognised that such rapid expenditure cannot reasonably be held to the efficiency and sustainability criteria that might be applied in a purely development-oriented context. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Including ‘bottom-up’ community engagement processes. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. In some emergency situations no appropriate local counterparts may be available. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Standing contracts, or period offers may therefore be useful. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The worst outcome in a transitional context is for the implementation of an emergency response to be delayed while details of development components are worked out. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Based on Bappeda advice. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. It appears that the community resisted the tying of tiles as traditional approaches to this make future maintenance more difficult, this would therefore have been a perfect opportunity for the program to introduce innovative approaches to securing tiles which overcame such future maintenance issues and thereby addressed ‘dangerous’ community preconceptions. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Many of which continue to focus almost solely on the educative aspects of DRR. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See background to design document [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Note that in the context of a disaster that has little likelihood of recurrence in a particular location (e.g. an airliner crash in an urban area distant from an airport), the priority of immediate (or any) DRR may be greatly reduced, so it is important that DRR requirements be assessed on a case-by-case basis and not standardised in future design requirements. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. In which key stakeholders (i.e. communities, local government and implementing NGOs) were involved in all stages of activity development (from planning to evaluation), overseen and assisted by a YCAP program manager responsible for a specific geographical area. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. YCAP produced a manual on this approach which has been utilsed by NGOs partners and has been disseminated to other NGOs beyond YCAP’s partners. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. A lack of longer-term monitoring of phase 2 achievements is another shortcoming related to the brief implementation period available. The use of the stakeholder engagement model of phase 2 as a good practice example, should be supported by such ongoing monitoring. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. In some emergency situations no appropriate local counterparts may be available. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Unless rehousing is a specific aim of a program. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. It is interesting to note that the preferences of virtually all community and local government respondents to the ICR were now that they did not want the program to show such sensitivity, and would rather have the stronger structures. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Cash-for work has the added benefit of also repairing community infrastructure, but is usually augmented by cash grants to ensure that those most vulnerable persons, potentially unable or unavailable to work, are not overlooked. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. The ICR team routinely requested to see these records, but did not ask to retain copies (mainly because records were hand written and facilities to make copies were not readily available). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Put bluntly, local government generally suspected NGOs of having quasi-political agendas and NGOs generally regarded local government as either corrupt and/or apathetic. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. E.g. in economic recovery activities they can easily provide advice regarding and directly facilitate linkages between production and marketing aspects of initiatives (e.g. study-motivation-production-pricing-packaging-marketing-banking), whereas this would involve a prohibitive, multi-department coordination effort if attempted through government channels. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. The ICR Team attended one-day seminar of the Forum PEL (Forum Pengembangan Ekonomi Lokal) introduced by Phase 2 of YCAP, covering all 5-program districts, but operationally established in Bantul and Klaten. The forum has the role of facilitating cooperation between SME-NGOs-Big Business-GOI. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. District head of Kulonprogo instructed all contractors in his region to look at YCAP market construction as the example of desired quality. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Some NGO’s have also already produced proposals seeking AusAID assistance to continue the work they started under YCAP. The proposals provided to the ICR team have been passed on to AusAID separately from this ICR report. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. E.g. women’s role in saving and credit at Pasir Mendit, Kulonprogo, women weavers at Tlingsing, Klaten; women Batik makers at Wukirsari, Bantul; women coconut sugar makers at Banyucolo, Gunungkidul. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Many areas outside Java, many communities have traditionally prevented women from being an equal partner in household governance (despite the fact they may be responsible for most household duties and income generation). In many parts of eastern Indonesia (NTB, NTT, Molukas), women have not been allowed to own a land certificate with land transactions also requiring a husband’s signature. In Java women are generally allow to obtain bank loans, but some Banks still require applications to be signed by both husband and wife. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. The design document suggested some basic indicators, but this did not amount to a fully operational M&E framework. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. In some emergency situations no appropriate local counterparts may be available. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. AusAID 2009 Investing in a Safer Future: A disaster risk reduction policy for the Australian aid program. Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Resilience is the ability to resist, absorb, accommodate and recover or ‘spring back’ from the effects of a hazard. Mechanisms that increase resilience include livelihood diversification, warning systems, access to health and education, improved buildings, effective legislation and governance. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)