Support Program for Disaster Response

# Independent Completion Review

# Final Report

February 2021

Government of Australia - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Government of the Philippines - Department of Social Welfare and Development

 

# Program Details

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| --- | --- |
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# Glossary, Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACC Australian Civilian Corps

AIP Aid Investment Plan (of DFAT)

AO Administrative Order

AUD Australian Dollar

CCAM Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation

CCCM Camp Coordination and Camp Management

CFS Child Friendly Space

CO Central Office

DBM Department of Budget and Management

DDR Department for Disaster Resilience

DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

DILG Department of the Interior and Local Government

DPO Disabled Person’s Organizations

DRM Disaster Response Manual

DRM-CO Disaster Response Manual – Central Office

DRMB Disaster Response Management Bureau

DRMG Disaster Response Management Group

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

DRS Disaster Response Strategy

DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development

FAQC Final Aid Quality Check

FCDP Family and Community Disaster Preparedness

FFP Family Food Packs

FGD Focus Group Discussion

FMSD Financial Management Services Division

FO Field Office (meaning DSWD regional office)

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IOM International Organization for Migration

KEQ Key Evaluation Question

KII Key Informant Interview

KPP Key Policy Priorities

LGU Local Government Unit

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MDRRMO Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office(r)

MHPSS Mental Health and Psychosocial Support

MSWDO Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office(r)

MEF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

NCR National Capital Region

NFI Non-Food Item

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NRLMB National Resource and Logistics Management Bureau

NROC National Resource Operations Centre (of DSWD)

OCD Office of Civil Defense

OECD-DAC Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee

PDO Project Development Officer

PDP Philippine Development Plan

PHP Philippine Peso

PMS Procurement Management Services

PMT Program Management Team

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PPP Public-Private Partnership

PWD Person/s with Disability

QRT Quick Response Team

RA Republic Act

RDIP Regional Development and Investment Plan

RDNA Rapid Disaster Analysis and Needs Assessment

RDP Regional Development Plan

RGMO Resource Generation and Management Office

SDG Sustainable Development Goal

SFF Surge Force Framework

SPDR Support Program for Disaster Response

SSW Safety, Security and Welfare

TAU Technical Assistance Unit

ToR Terms of Reference

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNOCHA United Nations – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNWFP United Nations World Food Programme

USD United States Dollar

WFP Work and Financial Plan

WFS Women Friendly Space

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# Executive Summary

## Program Background

The Support Program for Disaster Response (SPDR) commenced on 16 January 2015 with the signing of the partnership agreement between the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The program was designed for three years but was extended until 30 June 2020.

The SPDR had the following strategic objectives:

* To complement the current prepositioning of the DSWD with Australian strategic prepositioning of non-food relief supplies; and
* To improve the capacity of the DSWD in disaster preparedness and response.

The program endeavoured to achieve the objectives through four components:

1. Prepositioning of non-food relief items;
2. Increasing warehousing capacity for relief supplies;
3. Providing capacity development in developing and institutionalizing policies and systems on disaster response and
4. Supporting effective disaster response program management.

## Evaluation design

The evaluation is guided by the OECD-DAC’s criteria for evaluation: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability. In addition, SPDR was assessed against DFAT’s Key Policy Priorities (KPP). The process was guided by key evaluation questions, and consultations were held with DSWD, DFAT, Local Government Units (LGU) and other external agencies. The evaluation was conducted through a mixed methods approach, using surveys, interviews and focus group discussions. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all activities were conducted remotely, with the exception of a visit to one of DSWD’s Field Offices (FOs).

The evaluator adopted DFAT’s six rating levels: Very Good, Good, Adequate, Less than Adequate, Poor and Very Poor. To establish the merit rating for a criterion, a two-step synthesis process was applied using rubrics: 1) different areas of inquiry, defined by the evaluation questions under a criterion, were treated as subdimensions and provided their own merit rating; and 2) ratings of the different subdimensions were consolidated into one judgement for the criterion.

## Findings and conclusions

### Relevance – Was this the right thing to do?

The *Relevance* of the SPDR is rated as **‘Good’**. SPDR aligned very well with national and regional development plans, and the role of DSWD as the national lead in disaster response. Internationally, the program is linked with the Sustainable Development Goal pertaining to resilient and safe communities.

SPDR’s outputs addressed some of the disaster response-related weaknesses of DSWD as identified prior to the program, in particular the need for established standards, better coordination and availability of relief items. For example, disaster response manuals and operational guidelines for mobilizing staff and other support helped address these weaknesses. The prepositioning of non-food items (NFI) was and remained relevant, which addresses issues regarding difficulties in the procurement of specific items during emergencies.

In the absence of environmental or social changes that could influence SPDR’s relevance, the program only had to adapt to internal challenges, in particular frequent leadership changes affecting the program’s focus, and difficulties procuring NFIs for the central office. DFAT was very accommodating, accepting frequent changes in targets and adjustments to the timeline.

### Effectiveness – Has the SPDR achieved the expected outputs and outcomes?

The merit rating for effectiveness, or the performance of the program, is **‘Adequate’**. SPDR changed some outputs since its design and inception but stayed largely within the four core components. The program scores ‘good’ on achieving outputs, procuring the intended NFIs at FOs, and the construction of a new warehouse. The warehouse increased DSWDs storage capacity of family food packs (FFP) by 40%, enabling the agency to deliver a larger response in a shorter timeframe. The Disaster Response Manuals (DRM) of the FOs are broadly used; their most significant purpose is providing clear guidelines and roles for staff, including for the quick mobilization of those in other DSWD divisions. Not all outputs in the capacity building component were utilized to their potential. Some outputs remained in a draft status, such as the Disaster Response Strategy (DRS), which was intended to provide short, medium and long-term direction to the department in regard to disaster response. In addition, a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) was formally adopted, but not integrated in succeeding departmental policies. A number of outputs provided input to new initiatives, such as training materials.

### Efficiency – Did the SPDR make appropriate use of Australia’s and DSWD’s resources?

The Efficiency criterion was divided into nine subdimensions, which are rated from ’very poor’ to ’good, which resulted to an overall rating of **‘Less than Adequate’**. The best scoring subdimension is the value for money, as evidenced by the low cost of goods and activities. This is supported by competitive procurement processes, though some were lengthy or unsuccessful. As with procurement, financial management and trajectory of expenditure also performed ‘less than adequate’. Challenges are attributed to changes in the administration and financial policies. The program’s funds were frozen for more than a year, and as per government regulation, unspent funds were to be returned to the treasury at the year-end. Internally, the program could have benefited from earlier programming of some activities and appropriate sequencing to ensure that outputs build on each other.

SPDR was fortunate to be assigned an Australian Civilian Corps specialist. The specialist’s deployment scores ‘good’ on its importance to the program, however, it is also acknowledged that the specialist nor his outputs were fully utilized. SPDR’s governance modalities, primarily composed of meetings of DFAT and DSWD, and DSWD’s non-monetary contributions are rated ‘adequate’.

### Impact – What difference does the intervention make?

The *Impact* criterion as a whole receives an **‘Adequate’** rating. Majority of DSWD personnel and external agencies agree that DSWD’s disaster response capacity improved, both in response time and the availability of relief goods, informing a ‘good’ rating for this subdimension. There is less evidence that the program had a significant impact on the capacity of LGUs. While FOs cascade trainings down to the LGUs, the LGUs do not necessarily have the capacity to implement learnings, *e.g.*, improving their warehouses. However, awareness raising on DRMs among LGUs has increased their understanding of their responsibilities, which can be attributed to SPDR. Other activities were implemented by DSWD in partnership with the International Organization for Migration, or with the Philippines’ Office for Civil Defense. The subdimension of SPDR’s contribution to the improvements is therefore rated as ‘adequate’.

### Sustainability – Will the benefits of the SPDR last?

The merit rating for *Sustainability* is **‘Adequate’,** with many outputs expected to continue in one form or another. The criterion has three subdimensions, all rated ‘adequate’. The first is the institutionalization of outputs. While many outputs are being used, the approval of the DRM-CO is delayed and the MEF remains unutilized. The DRMs at the FOs are utilized and the regions independently initiated the development of response manuals for various hazards, including for health emergencies driven by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Parts of the developed surge force framework have been adopted in the DRMs as well as in a variety of trainings and products in development, for example, a volunteer management guide. The last subdimension relates to the identification and management of risks to sustainability. The program did not do a sustainability risk assessment, but the institutionalization and roll out of frameworks were the envisioned strategies to ensure sustainability. Institutionalization was not achieved for all outputs, and with the MEF as an example, does not guarantee their implementation.

### Key Policy Priorities (KPPs)

The KPPs do not require an overall judgement. Although inclusion of KPPs in the program was a condition, the program design did not describe actions to address all of them. The most critical KPP is Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) – the program’s lack of information collection and management systems, and the absence of a consistent, cumulative learning strategy resulted in a ‘poor’ merit rating.

While DSWD has a mandate to protect vulnerable groups and champions gender equality, it does not translate to the reporting of gender disaggregated data in the SPDR reports nor in the Department’s disaster status reports. Reports also lack information on persons with disabilities.

The KPPs include the conduct of a risk assessment of the program as a whole, as well as for a number of KPPs separately. Examples are in regard to environmental safeguards and the impact of the program on climate change and disaster risks. With some of DFATs key requirements like child protection policies already institutionalized in DSWD, an ‘adequate’ rating is given for the safeguards. The impact of the program on climate change and disasters, and how this would be managed was not studied. However, SPDR directly reduces disaster risks through the promotion of good practices and providing relief support.

## Key Recommendations

The program’s long-term impact can be enhanced by the following:

* Immediate institutionalization of the *All Hazard DRM* and develop an annex on health emergencies.
* Support peer-to-peer support and exchanges between FOs to learn from each other’s operations and experiences with their DRM.
* Revisit the draft the DRS to inform DSWD’s priorities and strategies in disaster response. The strategy includes detailed activities and short-, medium- and long-term visions.
* Revisit the MEF to assess potential contributions to DSWD’s strategic plan from 2023 onwards.
* Reproduction and distribution of the Safety, Security and Welfare Handbook.

The following are key recommendations for similar future programs:

* Establish a Program Management Team positioned in a relevant bureau with regular DSWD staff, including finance staff and an M&E officer.
* A program needs to be guided by a comprehensive logical framework and an M&E toolkit developed early on in the program. Reporting needs to be consistent, including on the KPPs.

Key recommendations to address general gaps and challenges are provided in the table below:

| **Gaps and challenges** | **Recommendations** |
| --- | --- |
| Lack of capital outlay for investments | Commission economic analyses on warehouse management and information management systems to illustrate the costs and benefits of DSWD making investments in those areas. |
| Majority of staff on service contracts | Standardize a skeleton structure and human resource requirement for the Disaster Response Management Bureau (DRMB) and FOs, and employ full-time staff accordingly. |
| Leadership Changes | Design agreements between partners with clear outputs and timeline.  Donors to release funds based on performance.  Keep program documentation up to date.  DRMB and donor to conduct joint briefings for incoming leaders. |
| Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning | Review and harmonize the different directives and policies on M&E. Establish a common performance assessment for FOs.  Develop and roll-out a standard process for post-disaster evaluation. |
| Time consuming data collection and reporting | Digitalize information management at family level, from registration to monitoring of the distribution of support. |
| Innovation | Work with the private sector and the academe to regularly assess operations and review disaster responses.  Work with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Trade and Industry on the replacement/rotation of items in the FFPs. |
| Environmental and social safeguards | DSWD to work with the LGUs on inclusion of indigenous people and persons with disabilities (PWD) in pre-disaster data collection.  Assess the climate change impact of FFP supply chains and packaging. |
| Disability inclusion | Include PWDs in all consultations and trainings.  Prioritize the use of venues that are accessible to PWDs and provide support for PWDs to fully participate. |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

1. Since 1990, the Philippines has been affected by 565 natural disaster events that claimed the lives of nearly 70,000 Filipinos and caused an estimated USD23 billion in damages, making it one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. In 2013, Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan), the strongest storm ever recorded at landfall, caused over 6,000 reported fatalities and damaged 1.1 million homes in nine regions. The extensive damage also resulted into 2.3 million Filipinos falling below the poverty line, particularly in highly affected areas. [[1]](#footnote-1)
2. The country’s institutional framework regarding disasters is provided in Republic Act (RA) 10121, otherwise known as the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010. RA 10121 sets out the overriding institutional and methodological framework for disaster risk reduction and management in the Philippines.[[2]](#footnote-2)
3. RA 10121 divides disaster management into four pillars, namely 1) Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2) Disaster Preparedness, 3) Disaster Response, and 4) Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation. RA 10121 places the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as Vice Chair for “Disaster Response” *or* the “provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected.”[[3]](#footnote-3)

## 1.2 Program Description

1. After Typhoon Haiyan, it was recognized that DSWD would benefit from assistance to improve disaster response preparedness. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Government of the Philippines, represented by the DSWD, entered into a direct funding agreement of AUD3 million for the Support Program for Disaster Response (SPDR). The program’s intended duration was from January 2015 to December 2017 but was extended five times until 30 June 2020. A brief history of the Disaster Risk Management Bureau (DRMB) and its staffing is provided in Annex A, which includes the details of SPDR extensions.
2. The SPDR had the following strategic objectives:

* To complement the current prepositioning of DSWD with Australian strategic prepositioning of non-food relief supplies; and
* To improve the capacity of the DSWD in disaster preparedness and response.

The program aimed to do this through:

* prepositioning of non-food relief items;
* increasing warehousing capacity for relief supplies;
* providing capacity development in developing and institutionalizing policies and systems on disaster response; and
* supporting effective disaster response program management.

## 1.3 Evaluation objectives

1. The purposes of the evaluation are:

* To assess the contribution of the SPDR to the enhancement of the capacity of DSWD in disaster response.
* Evaluate the actual performance of the program against its targets and expected results from January 2015 to June 2020, including the sustainability of outputs.
* To draw out specific lessons, conclusions, and recommendations for future similar programs.

1. The evaluation would initially assess the program’s performance using the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, with impact during the evaluation itself. In addition, the evaluation will cover to a lesser extent DFAT’s Key Policy Priorities (KPP):

Monitoring and Evaluation, Gender Equality, Disability Inclusion, Risk Management, Environment and Social Safeguards, Innovation; Private Sector Engagement, and Building Resilience to Climate Change and Disasters.

The ToR provided guide questions for the criteria and KPPs. A summary of Key Evaluation Questions (KEQ) for OECD-DAC criteria is provided in Table 1, and all KEQs and detailed questions in Annex J.

Table 1 Evaluation Criteria and KEQs

| Criterion | KEQs |
| --- | --- |
| *Relevance*  *Was the SPDR the right thing to do?* | 1. To what extent were the program’s outcomes aligned with:    1. National and sub-national development priorities and objectives    2. International frameworks    3. Australia’s Aid Investment Plan    4. DSWD’s priorities 2. Was the SPDR responsive to the needs of its target beneficiaries? 3. How appropriate are prepositioning and capacity building in achieving the program outcomes? 4. How flexible was SPDR in adapting to changes? |
| *Effectiveness*  *Has the program achieved the outputs and outcomes that we expected over the lifetime of the investment?* | 1. To what extent did the SPDR achieve its intended outputs? 2. What were the facilitating and constraining factors that affected the achievement of expected outputs? 3. What changes in behaviour and practice among DSWD and Local Government Units (LGU) staff did the SPDR contribute to? 4. How did the SPDR affect the overall disaster response capacity of the DSWD and LGUs? |
| *Efficiency*  *Did the SPDR make appropriate use of Australia’s and DSWD’s time and resources to achieve outcomes?* | Budget management   1. Was the trajectory of spending against budget appropriate? 2. To what extent was financial management supportive? 3. How well did DSWD procurement systems support implementation? 4. Were the outputs achieved at least cost for the expected level of quality (value for money)? 5. Were resources leveraged from other partners?   Management structure   1. To what extent did the modality and governance arrangements support efficient program implementation? 2. How appropriate were the staffing levels within DFAT and DSWD? 3. How important was the allocation of the Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) specialist? 4. What did DSWD contribute to the program to complement SPDR resources? 5. How responsive were management structure and systems of partners in adjusting to learnings and the needs of the program? |
| *Impact*  *What difference does the intervention make?* | 1. What are the improvements in DSWD’s response delivery?  2. What are the improvements in the response delivery by LGUs? |
| *Sustainability*  *Will the benefits of the SPDR last?* | 1. How strong is the ownership of the DSWD and LGUs over the outputs and outcomes of the program? 2. How are the outcomes of SPDR’s capacity building interventions institutionalized within DSWD and LGUs? 3. How well did the program address risks to sustainability? |

# 2. Methodology

## 2.1 Overall design

1. The overall design for the evaluation is mixed methods. Mixed methods research provides “…a way to harness strengths that offset the weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative research” (Cresswell and Plano Clark, 2011, p.12)[[4]](#footnote-4). The purpose of the mixed method design, to use the typology of Greene, Caracelli and Graham (1989)[[5]](#footnote-5), is complementarity, using different data sources to explain the findings of different methods. In addition, the different sources will allow for the triangulation of findings.
2. Data collection for the evaluation took place from 23 November to 23 December 2020, with a few additional interviews conducted in the weeks after. A debriefing on data collection, along with the presentation of initial findings, was conducted on 8 January 2021.

## 2.2 Tools and consultations

Table 2 Geographic distribution of respondents to FO staff survey

| Cluster | Number of Respondents | Percentage |
| --- | --- | --- |
| NCR | 13 | 17% |
| Luzon | 38 | 49% |
| Visayas | 18 | 23% |
| Mindanao | 9 | 12% |
| Total | 78 | 100% |

1. The evaluator conducted a document review, key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD), and launched the following online surveys:
   1. Survey for senior disaster response officials in the FOs, focussing on the status of implementation of disaster response aspects[[6]](#footnote-6). Twelve regions responded to the survey.
   2. Survey for FO staff focussing on changes in capacity of the FOs and their personnel, LGUs and volunteers. Table 2 provides the number and distribution of respondents.
   3. Survey for staff of the DRMB who are known to be familiar with SPDR. This survey focussed on activity implementation and results, strengths and weaknesses, future challenges and priorities. The survey had 12 female and 6 male respondents.
2. The evaluator consulted with representatives from different divisions within DSWD’s Disaster Response Management Group (DRMG). The divisions and/or individuals were suggested in the ToR and confirmed by the SPDR staff. Additional interviews were conducted at the discretion of the evaluator. For example, interviews with external agencies, warehouse managers, the Capacity Building Unit, and staff responsible for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).
3. The consultant selected six Field Offices (FO) in consultation with DFAT and DSWD’s Central Office to take part in the consultation. They were distributed over the three island groups: National Capital Region (NCR) and Regions 2 and 5 in Luzon; Region 8 in the Visayas; and Regions 11 and 12 in Mindanao. The latter was selected randomly, while the others purposively due to their exposure to recent disasters. In all six regions, FGDs were conducted with staff, and in four of them, interviews were conducted with the regional directors. Region 11, Davao, was included as it is the location of the consultant, where an FGD in person could take place, as well as a visit to the region’s warehouse storing relief items.
4. The planned engagement with LGUs was through surveys and FGDs with three cities, one from each island group, and nine municipalities, randomly selected among 4th, 5th and 6th class municipalities. All three cities participated, but only seven out of nine selected municipalities responded, of which some could only be consulted by phone. The box to the right lists the consulted municipalities.

**Box: Consulted LGUs**

NCR: Mandaluyong City

Region 2: Ballesteros and Sabtang

Region 8: Maasin City, Balanggiga and Julita

Region 5: Presentacion and Santo Domingo

Region 11: Tagum City and Saranggani

1. Interviews were conducted with individuals and organizations external to SPDR:
   1. The Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) specialist assigned to DSWD from July 2015 to December 2017.
   2. The head of the Technical Assistance Unit (TAU) from the start of design of SPDR up to December 2019.
   3. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
   4. United Nations – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA)
   5. International Organization for Migration (IOM)
2. An FGD was conducted with DFAT representatives.
3. The consultations were all conducted as confidential – this report does not refer to individuals. Annex E lists all the conducted consultations. The questions for these consultations were guided by the Evaluation Matrix in Annex J.

## 2.3 Limitations

1. The evaluation intended to follow a sequential process with the surveys first, so that data could inform the interviews and FGDs. Unfortunately, most of the regions were not able to comply to this schedule.
2. The participation of LGUs to an online survey was low, attributed to limited internet coverage. LGUs also remained reserved about participation after personal interaction with the consultant. Due to the few numbers, they are not included in the analysis. The FGDs faced similar connectivity issues with internet and phone, and LGU consultations were often done with only one or two individuals.
3. The evaluation covers a lot of ground, with a number of criteria and numerous questions to explore. The consultant cannot, for example, conduct a full assessment of financial management practices, and findings can therefore at times appear superficial. An example is on making a judgement of SPDR’s effectiveness and impact on LGUs.
4. The evaluation would, from its design, have a higher representation from DSWD than any other stakeholder. Bias was mitigated by introducing the review as a learning activity. The survey data and the FGDs demonstrate a high degree of objectiveness and self-critique of the DSWD staff. In addition, external agencies were added to provide an outsider perspective.
5. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the evaluation was conducted remotely, except for a field visit to DSWD’s warehouse in Region 11.

## 2.4 Data analysis and synthesis

1. The evaluation’s KEQs cover a wide range of topics, and the program’s documentation indicate a similar broad variation in performance. The rubrics provided in DFAT’s KEQ were challenging to cover such a variety of topics in one rating for a criterion. To facilitate the assignment of a merit rating, the KEQs are treated as sub-dimensions – each getting an individual rating, followed by a synthesis process to establish an overall rating for the criterion. The synthesis process is included as Annex C. The process includes DFAT’s Final Aid Quality Check (FAQC) ratings matrix as seen in Figure 1.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Ratings Matrix** |  |
| **6** | Very good | Satisfactory |
| **5** | Good |  |
| **4** | Adequate |  |
| **3** | Less than adequate | Unsatisfactory |
| **2** | Poor |  |
| **1** | Very poor |  |

Figure 1 DFAT’s rating matrix for evaluation criteria (Source: FAQC)

1. Quantitative data was analysed with Microsoft Excel and/or IBM SPSS Statistics software and qualitative data analysed using NVivo data analysis software.

# 3. Findings and conclusions

The findings are structured following the OECD-DAC criteria. The criteria re discussed as follows:

* The merit rating for the criterion, accompanied by conclusions.
* A summary table of the merit ratings for the subdimensions.
* A brief description of the findings for each subdimension.

In addition, the findings for the KPPs are presented in this section, with the exception of Innovation, and given a merit rating each.

## 3.1 Relevance

This section aims to answer the question: Was this the right thing to do?

1. The *Relevance* of SPDR is rated as **‘Good’**. SPDR aligned very well with national and regional development plans, and the role of DSWD as the national lead in disaster response. Internationally, the program is linked with the Sustainable Development Goal pertaining to resilient and safe communities. SPDR’s outputs addressed some of the disaster response-related weaknesses of DSWD as identified prior to the program, in particular the need for established standards, better coordination and availability of relief items. For example, disaster response manuals and operational guidelines for mobilizing staff and other support help address these weaknesses. The prepositioning of NFIs remained relevant since identified items are those that are difficult to procure in emergencies.

In the absence of environmental or social changes that could affect SPDR’s relevance, the program only had to adopt to internal challenges like frequent leadership changes affecting the program’s focus, and difficulties in the procurement of NFIs at the national level. DFAT was very accommodating in accepting changes in outputs and adjustments to the timeline as a result of delayed accomplishments.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Alignment of SPDR with government priorities | Very good |
| Alignment of SPDR internationally | Good |
| SPDR responding to the needs of target beneficiaries | Good |
| Appropriateness of prepositioning and capacity building in achieving program outcomes. | Very good |
| Flexibility in adapting to changes | Good |

*Alignment of SPDR with government priorities (Rating: Very good)*

1. DSWD’s Administrative Order (AO) 2015-003, includes a problem tree analysis. The SPDR was designed to respond to a number of the presented challenges, which were confirmed by the ACC specialist in his inception report.
2. The SPDR activities are aligned with the previous and current Philippine Development Plan (PDP)*.* The current PDP of 2017 – 2022 has the following indicator the SPDR contributes to: *By 2020, 100% of families affected by natural and human-induced calamities are provided with relief assistance.*
3. The program’s components remain relevant, with a revived debate, in the proposed establishment of a Department of Disaster Resilience (DDR) prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The proposed DDR is expected to absorb DRMG or portions thereof. DSWD staff welcomed the initiative without expressing any risks. A number saw the merger as an increased chance to get permanent staff positions. In the meantime, DSWD remains responsible for disaster response, expressed in the Department’s strategic plan as Outcome 3*: Immediate relief and early recovery of disaster victims/survivors ensured.*
4. Disaster preparedness within the Regional Development Plans (RDP) of 2017 – 2022 varies. For example, the Regional Development and Investment Plan (RDIP) of Region 8 includes a strategy on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation and mitigation (CCAM). The RDP and RDIP of Region 11 do not describe such interventions, nor an emergency response strategy.

*Alignment of SPDR internationally (Rating: Good)*

1. The SPDR links directly with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in particular SDG 11: *Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.* The program links in many ways to the Sendai Framework, in particular Priority 4: *Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.*
2. SPDR supporting an increased resilience of community to disasters directly contributes to DFAT’s focus areas in the country: 1) Economic Growth, 2) Stronger Institutions; and 3) Peace and Stability. DFAT’s Aid Investment Plan (AIP) for the Philippines is expected to continue humanitarian support to disasters. DFAT’s international support continues to include for 2020-21 the investment priority *Building resilience, humanitarian assistance, disaster risk reduction and social protection.[[7]](#footnote-7)*
3. DSWD aims to follow the Sphere guidelines after significant criticism following Typhoon Haiyan. The prepositioned NFIs cover most, but not all of Sphere’s shelter items.

*SPDR responding to the needs of target beneficiaries (Rating: Good)*

1. The SPDR design identifies DSWD as its beneficiary. DSWD’s needs are rooted in the increased frequency and intensity of hydrometeorological hazards, for which they are required to: 1) build the resilience of the poor and vulnerable; and 2) develop and scale up disaster response capacity. The program is biased towards the second.
2. The LGUs were identified as beneficiaries during the design of the evaluation – they are not implicitly mentioned as a beneficiary in the program design. Capacity building cascades to the FOs, who prioritize what needs to be further passed on to LGUs.
3. The program design does not formally identify disaster victims as direct beneficiaries. Nevertheless, SPDR’s support to prepositioning of NFIs helped address some of those needs. The support to shelter rehabilitation was identified as a significant need of disaster victims. SPDR was not designed to address this nor capacitate DSWD to improve its support in this area.

*Appropriateness of prepositioning and capacity building in achieving program outcomes (Rating: Very good)*

1. The prepositioning of relief items enabled DSWD to rapidly provide support to victims, in particular items that DSWD cannot procure in large quantities or are difficult to purchase in times of emergencies. The FOs reportedly used most of the items they procured from the SDPR funds, and the stockpile at DSWD’s National Resource Operation Center (NROC) in Pasay City augmented responses nationwide.
2. The capacity building component of the program is considered crucial to the outcome. The weaknesses identified in the program design were mostly rooted in capacity challenges, both knowledge and skills, as well as the lack of guidance documents. The development of manuals was an important part of SPDR, but the products were not fully utilized by DSWD during and after the project.

*Flexibility in adapting to changes (Good)*

1. The evaluation did not identify any social or environmental changes that would or should have triggered changes in the program design.
2. The program, however, had to adapt to the following organizational challenges:
   1. Change in the national administration triggering the review of the program, which resulted in funds being frozen and implementation on hold for more than a year.
   2. Changes in leadership at DSWD and DRMG, and consequently different priorities.
   3. Procurement rules do not allow SPDR to procure items above PHP15,000, which was the case for tents. Funds were diverted to other activities and NFIs.
3. DFAT has demonstrated remarkable flexibility in allowing extensions and the re-alignment of budgets.

## 3.2 Effectiveness

Effectiveness is assessed through the question: Has SPDR achieved the outputs and outcomes that we expected over the lifetime of the investment?

1. The merit rating for *Effectiveness* is **‘Adequate’**. SPDR changed some outputs since its design and inception but stayed largely within the four core components. The program scores ‘good’ on achieving outputs, procuring the intended NFIs at FOs, and the construction of a new warehouse. The warehouse increased DSWD’s storage capacity of family food packs (FFP) by 40%, enabling the agency to deliver a larger response in a shorter timeframe. The disaster response manuals (DRM) are broadly used in most of the regions, with their most significant purpose being the provision of clear guidelines and roles for staff, including for quick mobilization of those in other DSWD divisions. Not all outputs in the capacity building component were utilized to their potential. Some outputs remained in a draft status, for example a Disaster Response Strategy (DRS) which was intended to provide short, medium and long-term direction to the department in regard to disaster response. In addition, a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) was formally adopted, but not integrated in succeeding departmental policies. A number of outputs provided input to new initiatives, such as training materials.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| The extent of achieving outputs | Good |
| The extent of output utilization | Adequate |
| Changes in behaviour and practices at DSWD | Good |
| Changes in behaviour and practices at LGUs | Adequate |
| Extent of satisfaction with achievements and meeting expectations | Good |

*The extent of achieving outputs (Rating: Good)*

1. SPDR’s logical framework provides general outputs, and a single outcome: enhancing the Department’s capacity. The activities changed over time, and the consultant structured them in a logic map, presented in Annex B. The extent to which outputs were achieved is considered good, with some outputs being partially achieved.
2. Summarized, SPDR’s activities for each of the program components are:
   1. Component 1: 14 FOs completed the procurement of NFIs within a year of budget release. The items procured for NROC commenced later and the budget for tents was reallocated to solar lamps, an additional order of laminated sacks and personal protective equipment (PPE).
   2. Component 2: One warehouse was constructed at NROC, and other facilities renovated. This substitutes the original plan of two satellite warehouses.
   3. Component 3: DRMs were drafted for the CO and FOs. The CO version is awaiting formal institutionalization, while 13 FOs reportedly have been finalized. An external consultant developed a Surge Force Framework (SFF), and the ACC specialist made a Safety, Security and Welfare (SSW) Handbook.
   4. Component 4: The progress reports state that the MEF was completed and adopted in 2016. No sustainability plan was developed during the program’s implementation.

More detail is provided in Annex D.

1. The program provided training in family and community disaster preparedness (FCDP) for volunteers. The trainings intended to have 75% of the trainees coming from communities and 25% from FO staff. According to the attendance sheets, only 40.5% were community volunteers.

*Unintended outputs and outcomes (No Rating)*

1. The challenges in the procurement of tents for child-friendly Spaces (CFS) and women-friendly spaces (WFS) and consultancy services for this independent completion review freed up funds to procure PPEs in response to the COVID-19 outbreak.
2. No unintended negative outcomes were identified.

*The extent of output utilisation (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The application and utilization of outputs vary. A detailed description of the adoption and utilisation of the outputs is provided in Annex D. The following are positive highlights:
   1. The NFIs have been distributed, with the exception of children’s toys in some of the regions. A confusion over the release protocol remained in some FOs until 2019. In Mindanao, many items were used after the 2017 Marawi siege.
   2. Warehouse H is, at any given time, used for FFP production and/or storage. The facility was already in use during Typhoon Lawin (October 2016) before its inauguration in November.
   3. The majority of the consulted FOs use the DRMs, some on a daily basis – making revisions and developing new manuals for additional hazards, such as earthquakes and the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. The following outputs were not fully adopted but their content informed other activities:
   1. The SFF content on quick response teams (QRT) was included in the DRMs, and also informed the development of a manual for volunteers and the FCDP trainings.
   2. The Warehouse Management Manual remained a draft in 2017 but contributed to the 2018 Operations Manual for NROC, which has been ISO-2015 certified since 2018.
3. There is no evidence that the SSW handbook was utilized for its purpose. The MEF was adopted and included in the DRM-CO. However, succeeding policies do not reflect the MEF indicators.
4. DRMB staff ranked four SPDR activities that contributed most to improve DSWD’s response capacity. The DRM-CO was found most relevant, with an average score of 3.6, followed by the DRMs in the FOs (2.1). Third and fourth the Logistics and Warehouse Manual (1.4) and the procurement of NFIs (1.2). Details can be found in Annex F.

*Changes in behaviour and practices at DSWD as a result of SPDR (Good)*

1. DRMB demonstrates significant improvements in their operations, for example the assignment of M&E staff recently, and the development of new training manuals.
2. In addition, the FO-level survey records good changes, but they are difficult to attribute directly to SPDR. The results are presented in Annex G. Examples of positive changes are:
   1. The identification of NFI suppliers, and monitoring dispatched goods up to delivery.
   2. The designation of (mental) health personnel, and status checks of evacuation centres.
   3. The mapping of storage locations and recording of stockpiles of LGUs, and quality control.
   4. Coordination/cluster system – coordination with other support agencies for the clusters.
   5. The provision of feminine hygiene and childcare needs, as well as the monitoring of Gender Based Violence.
   6. Physical and psychosocial support to persons with disabilities (PWD) in evacuation centres.
3. The DRMs were referred to as the guiding document, providing a systematic approach during the onset and aftermath of a disaster to designated staff as well as for the immediate engagement of staff from other divisions.
4. The allocation of NFIs to FOs set a good example, catalysing an increased NFI prepositioning for many. For example, FO2 started purchasing tents in 2019, while other FOs mainly procured laminated sacks.

However, some doubt is cast on SPDR’s role in these improvements due to the following observations:

* 1. In October 2015 FOs had PHP81 million worth of NFIs in storage, triple SPDR’s support.
  2. A DSWD officer reported that 15-20% of DSWD’s annual budget of PHP2-3 billion for disaster response, or PHP300 million, is for NFIs, much more than SPDR’s budget of PHP56 million.

1. The construction of Warehouse H increased NROC capacity to store up to 40,000 FFPs, contrary to earlier progress reports stating 70,000. The National Resource and Logistics Management Bureau (NLRMB) shows the warehouse to its trainees in warehouse management as a model of a modern, worker-friendly space. The FOs have not been able to increase their storage capacity, and many are not able to store the required 30,000 FFPs, despite training. The moratorium on using LGU facilities for prepositioning makes it increasingly difficult. A number of FOs said they seek spaces in other government agencies or armed forces, but still unable to maintain the minimum stock.
2. External agencies noted that in the 2019 earthquake response and the Taal eruption in January 2020, the evacuation centres were managed more orderly than in the past. The Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) trainings were provided in partnership with IOM, and CCCM components are included in DRMs.
3. SPDR supported initiatives encouraging volunteer engagement, and there are indications that after the first round of FCDP, DSWD will further pursue this. Figure 2 presents the survey data on FO preparedness to work with volunteers.

Chart

Status of volunteer management within DSWD regions.

Figure 2 Status of volunteer management within DSWD regions (N=12)

*Changes in behaviour and practices at LGUs as a result of SPDR (Rating: Adequate)*

The inclusion of this subdimension is somewhat contentious since the program was designed to increase the response capacity of DSWD. LGUs are included in the evaluation, since SPDR was implemented two years beyond the original timeline, and changes among LGUs could have taken place.

1. The results of knowledge sharing vary:
   1. Figure 3 shows that of the FOs that received training, most are cascading it to LGUs. An exception is on the DRM. However, FOs observed that sharing the DRM increased clarity on roles and made LGUs more responsible.

Chart

Type of training received and cascaded to LGUs by the FOs in the previous 3 years.

Figure 3 Type of training received and cascaded to LGUs by the FOs in the previous 3 years (N = 12)

* 1. CCCM training was passed on to LGUs, but they were not always able to change their practices due to the lack of resources.
  2. The learnings from warehouse management training was also not widely practiced. LGUs prefer a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with local businesses for preferential treatment in the event of a disaster. The LGUs usually do not store NFIs. Figure 4 provides the view of FOs on the prepositioning by LGUs, with around half of the respondents agreeing, while about a third neither agrees nor disagrees.

Chart

Views of FO Staff on stockpiles among LGUs.

Figure 4 Views of FO Staff on stockpiles among LGUs (N = 78)

1. Cities like Mandaluyong and Tagum have a larger response capacity. In the event of flooding, the contribution of food relief is about 50% from the LGU and the other half from DSWD. The Municipal Social Welfare Development Office (MSWDO) of Tagum conducts rapid disaster analysis and needs assessments (RDNA) to identify the potential needs and relief items. Tagum noted that NFIs are usually augmented by the provincial government.
2. LGUs report that community preparedness activities are now conducted annually, prior to the typhoon season. This is a partnership between the MSWDs and the Department of Interior and Local Governance (DILG). Some of the LGUs report that they participated in FCDP trainings, with one repeating the training for each of its barangays.

*Extent of satisfaction with achievements and meeting expectations (Rating: Good)*

1. Majority of DRMB and FO staff familiar with SPDR before the review were satisfied with their participation and the program’s results (see Figure 5). Changes in capacity and improvements at the FO level score 71%. The average score for the statements on achievements is 4.0, sufficient for a ‘Good’ merit rating.

Chart

Satisfaction of DSWD survey respondents with their participation in, and the results of SPDR.

Figure 5 Satisfaction of DSWD survey respondents with their participation in, and the results of SPDR (N = 35)

## 3.3 Efficiency

Assessing Efficiency is guided by the question: Did the SPDR make appropriate use of Australia’s and DSWD’s time and resources to achieve outcomes?

1. The numerous questions for the Efficiency criterion informed nine subdimensions, which are rated from very poor to good, and an overall rating of **‘Less than adequate’**. The best scoring subdimension is value for money, as evidenced by low cost of goods and activities. This is supported by competitive procurement processes, though these could be lengthy and now and again unsuccessful. As with procurement, financial management and the trajectory of expenditure also performed ‘less than adequate’. Challenges are attributed to changes in the administration and financial policies. The program’s funds were frozen for more than a year, and unspent funds returned to the treasury at year-end. Internally, the program could have benefited from earlier programming of some activities in order for outputs to sequentially contribute to each other in a shorter timeframe.

SPDR was fortunate to be assigned an Australian Civilian Corps specialist. The specialist’s deployment scores ‘good’ on its importance to the program, however, it is also acknowledged that the specialist nor his outputs were fully utilized. SPDR’s governance modalities, primarily composed of meetings of DFAT and DSWD, and DSWD’s non-monetary contributions are rated ‘adequate’.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Appropriateness of expenditure trajectory | Less than adequate |
| Supportiveness of financial management | Less than adequate |
| Timely support of procurement systems | Poor |
| Cost of outputs – value for money | Good |
| The extent of governance arrangements and modalities support reaching outputs and outcomes | Adequate |
| Adequacy of human resource allocation | Less than adequate |
| Importance of the ACC specialist to the program | Good |
| Leverage from DSWD and partners | Adequate |
| Responsiveness of DSWD/program management to learnings | Very poor |

*Appropriateness of expenditure trajectory to achieve project outputs and outcomes (Rating: Less than adequate)*

1. DSWD received all of the funds at the beginning of the program, which is unusual for DFAT. An exception was made for SPDR since funds remained from Super Typhoon Haiyan response.
2. In 2015 and 2016, the work and financial plans (WFP) were largely implemented as planned. The CO downloaded funds to the FOs by the end of August in 2015, in time for the procurement of NFIs before the typhoon season. However, the DRM for the CO and other policies that were expected to be institutionalized by 2016 were delayed.
3. For all parts to work well together, the allocation and timing of DRM workshops and the SFF and MEF consultancies should have been conducted earlier to inform the DRM-CO. Beyond 2017, the budgets were realigned numerous times due to procurement challenges.

*Supportiveness of financial management (Rating: Less than adequate)*

1. The funds of SPDR were overseen by the Financial Management Services Division (FMSD). The detailed financial records for the period of 2015 – 2017 suggest that most of the expense claims and reimbursements are processed in less than 5 days. The quick transaction time would allow for updated financial records, but was hindered by the practice of advancing funds to the FOs, for which liquidations or returns took up to 18 months. An example is the return of P1.1 million for the purchase of NFIs. By 2018, carrying over advances to the next calendar year were disallowed.
2. SPDR’s burn rate up to the end of 2016 was low at 57%. The figure is mainly due to the delays in procurement of NFIs and the warehouse construction. Components 3 and 4 were underspending at burn rates of 47% and 22% respectively.
3. The program suffered from a number of practices out of the program’s control:
   1. In 2016, the administration required a review of all programs. SPDR’s remaining funds, PHP45.6 million, were retained by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) in early 2017 until April 2018, forcing the program into a no-cost extension. According to SPDR, the returned funds was around PHP500,000 short. FMSD was not able to explain whether the amount was eventually returned, but suspects the difference was caused by the changes in policies regarding advances and refunds as mentioned in paragraph 65
   2. At year-end, unspent funds are returned to the treasury, after which a Special Allotment Request Order needs to be made again. This is normal practice, but delays program implementation and contributed to the need for program extensions.
4. In response to the challenges and delays, the budget allocations across the components changed slightly. Table 3 presents the budget allocation as per initial WFP and expenditures reported during an inception meeting for the ICR on 11 November 2020. The allocation for capacity building was cut by 26.0%, to the benefit of the program management component and prepositioning of NFIs. DSWD’s documentation of disbursements indicates a difference of PHP113,643, close to PHP130,000 in Table 3. FMSD could not explain the discrepancies, and at the time of finalizing this report indicated that it was trying to reconciliate a larger amount of PHP1.6 Million.

Table 3 Original and actual budget allocation per program component

| Component | Allocation in 2015 (Million) | Report in 2020 (Million) | Change (Million) | Change (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Prepositioning of NFIs | 52.12 | 53.94 | +1.82 | 3.50 |
| Warehousing | 34.75 | 34.72 | -0.03 | -0.09 |
| Capacity Development | 10.08 | 7.46 | -2.62 | -26.0 |
| Program Management | 7.30 | 8.00 | +0.70 | 9.59 |
| *Total* | *104.25* | *104.12* | *-0.13* | -*0.12* |

*Timely support of procurement systems (Rating: Poor)*

1. The procurement of NFIs by the FOs proceeded well, as per progress reports. Most had procured their allocation by 2016. FO1 stated that they faced difficulties getting the required items for the allocated budget and succeeded only in 2020. The SPDR team only had distribution records of three FOs.
2. The support from Procurement Management Services (PMS) is considered poor. PMS conducts market assessments to see whether products are available at the right price and quality, but processes are frequently cancelled or delayed because of non-compliant suppliers or changing specifications. PMS told the consultant that they can provide any item within 30 days, but this was often not met. The following steps in the purchase of solar lamps illustrate SPDR’s challenges:
   * Papers were submitted to PMS in October 2018, but returned in November of the same year noting there was not enough time in 2018. This contradicts their 30 days turn around.
   * The treasury returned the funds in February 2019. A new procurement process started in March 2019 after approval of the new WFP.
   * The potential suppliers requested 60 days of manufacturing time, after which the 6th bidder qualified for the contract, more than a year after the initial process in 2018.

*Cost of outputs - value for money (Rating: Good)*

1. The procurement processes are considered lengthy, but are competitive and designed to get goods at the best price. For larger purchase orders, bidding conferences are organized, where according to PMS, both quality and price are considered. Several participants in the evaluation stated that no money gets wasted in DSWD. The allocated budgets for procurement of NFIs for the FOs appeared to be low, but all were reportedly able to purchase the items within the allocated PHP1.5 million. At least two FOs have not had an opportunity to distribute their allocated 2,000 children’s toys to date.
2. Trainings and workshops are conducted at a reasonable cost, at around PHP2,000 per person for board and lodging. To provide an indication on cost-effectiveness - the total expenditure for the development of the regional DRMs is below PHP2 million, or just over PHP130,000 per FO. This is a small amount for the changes in capacity and preparedness, and by extension the support to affected populations. It needs to be noted that personnel costs and those for the ACC specialist are not included.

*The extent of governance arrangements and modalities supporting reaching outputs and outcomes*

*(Rating: Adequate)*

1. The overall experience with governance arrangements is positive, but not ideal. Until 2017, SPDR was placed under DSWD’s TAU, a unit that handled several foreign-assisted projects and programs. The dominant view is that with the changes in leadership and DRMB often occupied with disaster responses, it was fortunate that SPDR was under TAU. Sources suggested that the program would have benefited from a full program management team (PMT).
2. Oversight of the program was done by DSWD and DFAT, conducting meetings at quarterly or bi-annual intervals, and at a higher frequency towards the end. The program parties were satisfied with the partnership arrangements, and no conflicts were recorded. In the latter part of the project, however, the meetings were experienced as an inefficient use of time. Action points and deadlines were established for the final deliverables but never met. Some sources felt that DFAT’s monitoring frequency varied, and that personnel could have participated in the conduct of field visits.
3. The original design included a Steering Committee with, for example, the United Nations World Food Programme and World Bank as members. While this group did not materialize, there was not a feeling that it affected the effectiveness of the program.
4. The initial requirement for FOs to request the release of NFIs was poorly understood in some FOs until 2019, with the items unused. Others treated the items as part of their overall stocks.

*Adequacy of human resource allocation (Less than adequate)*

1. The staff allocation to SPDR was inconsistent and at times inadequate.
   1. From 2015 to the freezing of funds at the DBM, one technical person at Project Development Officer (PDO) IV level was assigned to SPDR. The budget for an administrative officer appears unused. The PDO worked as a counterpart of the ACC specialist, but was also spending a lot of time on procurement. The ACC was also supported by other DRMB and Resource Generation and Management Office (RGMO) staff during workshops.
   2. In 2018, the management of the SPDR was transferred to the Office of the Undersecretary of the DRMG, and a team of ten people was dedicated to SPDR from October to December 2018. The allocation was not questioned, but seems inefficient since there were only four identical activities, and no procurement completed.
   3. From January 2019 to June 2020 three SPDR staff remained, who had the responsibility to finalize the DRM-CO, conduct FCDP trainings for volunteers and procure NFIs. The remaining SPDR team was assisted by staff from other departments who were providing ad hoc support when needed, for example in reporting. It was noted that people with experience in procurement processes could have helped reaching the deliverables quicker.

*Importance of the ACC specialist to the program (Rating: Good)*

1. The ACC specialist commenced his assignment in July 2015, and extended from July 2016 until December 2017. It was reported that DSWD was slow in realizing the ACC’s potential as a resource.

The ACC specialist applied consultative processes to identify gaps and challenges and suggest solutions accordingly through the DRS and DRM development. The DRS was drafted as an overarching guidance for capacity development of DSWD for the period up to 2030. The specialist also provided feedback to the work on the SFF and MEF.

1. The ACC played a very important role in shaping DSWD’s disaster response. However, a number of initiatives stalled after his departure. The changes in priorities were given as reasons, as well as non-inclusion of printing of the SSW handbook in the 2018 WFP. Given that the program was on hold after the ACC specialist left, DFAT could have played a proactive role in ensuring the specialist’s outputs were followed through and included in the WFP.

*Leverage from DSWD and partners (Rating: Adequate)*

1. DSWD had no obligation to provide financial support to SPDR, and did not do so. The cascading of some of the direct and indirect outputs of SPDR was supported by the FO budgets.
2. SPDR was placed within DSWD and as such, utilized common office resources, including those of other divisions and offices according to their function. The RGMO and other offices also provided staff to join field activities, in particular to the DRM workshops. The FOs also provided logistical support in organizing trainings and workshops within their area of responsibility and according to the CO, it is at the FO’s discretion to invite other partners to support capacity building activities. A number stated that they do liaise with agencies like the Office of the Civil Defence (OCD) for a number of trainings. This was not for the implementation of SPDR.

*Responsiveness of DSWD/program management to learnings (Rating: Very poor)*

1. There is no evidence that SPDR had a system to learn from its implementation. DSWD notes that there is limited manpower to conduct reflection and learning activities.

## 3.4 Impact

Both DFAT and DSWD added Impact as one of the areas to assess during the evaluation. The Impact criterion is not included in DFAT’s FAQC. The question used here is from the OECD: What difference does the intervention make?

1. The *Impact* criterion as a whole receives an **‘Adequate’** rating. Majority of DSWD personnel and external agencies agree that DSWD’s disaster response capacity improved, both in response time and the availability of relief goods, informing a ‘good’ rating for this subdimension. There is less evidence that the program impacted the capacity of LGUs. While FOs cascade trainings down to the LGUs, they do not necessarily have the capacity to implement, e.g., improving their warehouses. However, awareness raising on DRMs among LGUs has increased their understanding of their responsibilities, and can be attributed to SPDR. Other activities were implemented by DSWD in partnership with the IOM, or the Philippines’ OCD. The subdimension for the extent of the SPDR’s contribution to the improvements is therefore rated as ‘adequate’.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Improvements in DSWD response delivery | Good |
| Improvements in LGU response delivery | Adequate |
| The extent that impact can be attributed to SPDR | Adequate |

*Improvements in DSWD response delivery (Rating: Good)*

1. The surveys among DSWD staff explored their degree of agreement to observing changes in FO disaster responses. Figure 6 presents the responses. FO respondents are overall more positive about their office’s performance than the view of DRMB staff. About three-quarters of the respondents started in their current position since 2015, after the start of SPDR.

Chart

Degree of agreement of FO staff (N = 78) and DRMB staff (N = 18) with changes in FO disaster response.

Figure 6 Degree of agreement of FO staff (N = 78) and DRMB staff (N = 18) with changes in FO disaster response

1. Table 4 shows that responses vary across clusters. Respondents from Luzon are overall more positive, and the Visayas more reserved. During the FGDs, participants from Regions 2 and 5 expressed a high level of confidence, as did representatives from other Luzon regions during phone interviews.

Table 4 Differences in degree of agreement in changes in FO disaster response across clusters of regions (N = 78)

| Statement | Degree of agreement | NCR  (N = 13) | Luzon  (38) | Visayas  (18) | Mindanao  (N = 9) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| I observed Field Offices are quicker identifying victims and their needs | Strongly agree | 23.1 | 44.7 | 27.8 | 44.4 |
|  | Agree | 69.2 | 47.4 | 61.1 | 55.6 |
| I observed Field Offices are quicker in providing support to victims | Strongly agree | 46.2 | 50.0 | 27.8 | 33.3 |
|  | Agree | 53.8 | 47.4 | 61.1 | 66.7 |

1. DRMB staff stated that they are deployed quickly, at times before a typhoon makes landfall. External agencies shared that they have seen major improvements in the response time of DSWD, in particular their presence and the speed at which FFPs and NFIs are available. FO8 reported that they are able to meet their self-imposed goal of serving 80% of disaster affected families within 3 days.

*Improvements in LGU response delivery (Rating: Adequate)*

1. A consensus exists that LGUs significantly increased their capacity to deliver responses. The reduction in fatalities and injuries from typhoons is attributed to the capacity of LGUs to pre-emptively evacuate people.
2. In the survey among FO staff, they recognized that improvements in FO capacity is partially due to the increased capacity of LGUs. Just over half, or 55.8%, said that LGU capacity made a big contribution. On a scale of 0 – 4, the contribution averaged a rating 2.5, just in the ‘Adequate’ range.
3. The consulted municipalities were 4th, 5th or 6th class, with few resources. Their calamity funds (5% of their budget) are often less than PHP1million,70% of which is allocated for preparedness activities. According to the LGUs, they store little food and usually no NFIs.
4. FO staff corroborates this through the survey. The agreement scores for prepositioning are only 3.3 and 3.4 on average, falling within the ‘Less than Adequate’ rating. The lowest score, 3.2, across all statements is regarding LGUs having DRMs. Despite these lower figures, the agreement exists that LGUs increased their knowledge, with a score of 4.0, and improved response capacity (3.6), both in the ‘Adequate’ rating.

*The extent that impact can be attributed to SPDR (Rating: Adequate)*

1. Improved disaster response delivery of DSWD is attributed to the following SPDR activities:
   1. The deliberation and elaboration of the DRMs resulted in a systematized approach for response.
   2. The logistics and warehouse management activities initiated standardized processes in the production and management of relief items.
   3. The redesign of the CCAM Training Manual partially comes from previous learning, although the work with IOM would have equally played a central role.
2. The survey among FO staff inquired about which factors and to what extent the factors contributed to improvements in their response, individual capacity development, volunteer management and improvements in disaster response of LGUs. The average scores from a four-point Likert scale are presented in Annex G. The following can be observed:
   1. Trainings by the CO are important to improve FO staff in general, and individually.
   2. The DRM development was important to increase FO capacity, but less so for individual staff.
   3. The SSF was not used to improve the number and skills of volunteers, confirming the limited roll-out. The QRT guidelines was considered a more important factor to improve a response.
3. The trainings provided by DSWD and their assistance in developing disaster response plans were found important factors of the improved capacity of LGUs. Equally, other national agencies (e.g. OCD and DILG) and international agencies (e.g. IOM) were acknowledged. In addition, the experience of communities to disasters, increasing participation and responsiveness were important factors, as well as the growing disaster response staff. For example, staff size in Davao Region’s FO grew from seven in 2015 to the current 60. DRMB staff doubled to 60 since 2016.
4. The consulted LGUs had no knowledge of SPDR, and thus could not attribute any changes to SPDR. A number of FOs in Luzon stated that they did cascade logistics and warehouse management trainings, and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) orientations to municipalities, but the former is not relevant to all LGUs.

## 3.5 Sustainability

The criterion on Sustainability is guided by the question: Will the benefits last?

1. The merit rating for *Sustainability* is **‘Adequate’,** with many outputs expected to continue to be used. The criterion has three subdimensions, all rating adequate. The first is the institutionalization of outputs. While many outputs are being used, the approval of the DRM-CO is delayed and the MEF remains unutilized. The DRMs at the FOs are utilized and the regions independently initiated the development of response manuals for various hazards, including for health emergencies driven by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Parts of the SFF have been adopted in the DRMs as well as in a variety of trainings and products in development, for example, a volunteer management guide. The last subdimension relates to the identification and management of risks to sustainability. The program did not do a sustainability risk assessment, but the institutionalization and roll out of frameworks were the envisioned strategies to ensure sustainability. While some of the outputs wer institutionalized, some were not utilised at all, such the MEF.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Institutionalization of outputs and outcomes | Adequate |
| Ownership of DSWD and LGUs over outputs and outcomes | Adequate |
| Addressing risks to sustainability | Adequate |

*Institutionalization of outputs and outcomes (Rating: Adequate)*

The term institutionalization can be formal in governments through resolutions and ordinances, or in the form of norms and practices without formal recognition.

1. Majority of SPDR’s crucial outputs have not been fully institutionalized. The logic map in Annex B presents the outputs attributed to SPDR and are color-coded according to the extent they are being institutionalized or applied.
   1. The well-utilized outputs are Warehouse H and the refurbished facilities at NROC. In addition, the SFF has found multiple applications, and the trainings in logistics and management is a regular NRLMB activity. SPDR contributed to an ISO-certified warehouse operation manual.
   2. The partially accomplished and/or institutionalized outputs are the DRM’s at the FOs. In addition, the levels of NFI stockpiling are not formalized, but FOs have regular budget allocations and continue to purchase what is relevant. Some of the FOs have incorporated their desired level of stocks in their DRM.
   3. The biggest shortcoming is the institutionalization of the All Hazard DRM for the CO. The draft in its current form is from March 2019, and the anticipated approval by the Management Committee in December 2020 did not take place. SPDR supported evaluation workshops of DSWD’s disaster response operations and the DRS drafted by the ACC specialist. Each of them can inform the DRMG’s operations for the long term, but it is unclear whether their outputs were accepted.
2. The establishment of the DDR could be a threat to SPDRs outputs. The absorption of the DRMG could mean reorganization of staff and loss of institutional knowledge. The threat could be mitigated by the institutionalization of documents and processes.

*Ownership of DSWD and LGUs over outputs and outcomes (Adequate)*

1. Figure 5 shows the participation of survey respondents in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the SPDR. With the scores of 3.8 and 3.9, they fall in the Adequate rating.
2. Good ownership of outputs is further demonstrated by the following:
   1. A number of FOs consider DRMs as living documents and have made revisions as needed or incorporated knowledge gained from the Incident Command System, a disaster response and management mechanism rolled-out by the OCD.
   2. Several FOs have started the development of DRMs for other hazards like earthquakes and realized the need for a document guidance on health emergencies. The need for the latter prompted some individuals to call for a revision of the draft DRM-CO.
   3. The NRLMB is working on a method for FOs to assess their logistics, and an accreditation system for the warehouses.
   4. Several ACC outputs adopted, such as the SFF in training development.
3. The ownership over warehousing facilities seems limited. Warehouse H is reportedly already in need for flooring repairs as a result of the heavy use of the facility. There were no funds allocated for this yet, thus threatening sustained use of the facility. The flooring of warehouses is reportedly bad in some regions as well. It must be noted that no issues could be observed in the 6 year-old warehouse in Davao.

Image

DSWD warehouse Davao Region

Figure 7 DSWD warehouse Davao Region

1. The number of outputs and outcomes at the LGU level are limited, with none included in the program design. The participation and utilization of the MHPSS training provided to MSWDOs and Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (MDRRMO) is a positive example, with the skills reportedly applied during calamities and smaller incidents.

*Addressing risks to sustainability (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The risk management plan was primarily formulated to safeguard the implementation of the program itself, not the risks to sustainability of outputs or outcomes. The closest risk is that outputs are not utilized, with institutionalization as the identified remedy. It must be noted that institutionalization is not a guarantee that content or guidelines are used and considered in succeeding policies, as evidenced by the MEF.
2. In regard to DSWD’s budget, NFIs are a regular item, but the lack of budget for the maintenance of assets like warehouses is a serious concern. The consultant was asked to pass on the request to donors whether funds could be provided for the repairs of warehouse flooring.
3. The engagement of volunteers from other DSWD programs, e.g., the Sustainable Livelihoods Program and 4Ps[[8]](#footnote-8) in the FCDP trainings is a good example of spreading knowledge and practices to communities. The cascading to LGUs is also a useful strategy to spread knowledge and skills beyond DSWD.

## 3.6 Key Policy Priorities (KPP)

This section follows a similar structure to the sections on the main criteria. First, a brief conclusion will be provided, followed by a summary table with a merit rating for each KPP and lastly, a short description of findings for each of the KPPs.

1. If the KPPs would be summarized with one overall merit rating, it will be assigned **‘Less than adequate’.** The program did not address many of the KPPs in the proposal or inception report, but at the time this was not a requirement. The most critical KPP is M&E – the program’s lack of information collection and management systems and absence of consistent, cumulative learning strategies resulted in a ‘poor’ merit rating. The DSWD has as its mandate to protect vulnerable groups, and champions gender equality, but basic principles of gender disaggregating data is not practiced in disaster status reports, nor is information on Persons with Disabilities presented in reports.

The KPPs include the conduct of a risk assessment of the program as a whole, as well as for a number of KPPs specifically. Examples are with regards to environmental safeguards and the impact of the program on climate change and disaster risks. With some of DFATs key requirements like child protection policies already institutionalized in DSWD, an ‘adequate’ rating is given for the safeguards. The impact of the program on climate change and disasters, and how this would be managed was not studied. However, SPDR directly reduces disaster risks through the promotion of good practices and providing relief support.

| **KPPs** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Monitoring and Evaluation | Poor |
| Gender Equality | Less than adequate |
| Disability inclusion | Less than adequate |
| Risk management | Poor |
| Environmental and Social safeguards | Adequate |
| Innovation | No rating required |
| Private sector engagement | Very poor |
| Building resilience to climate change and disasters | Adequate |

*Monitoring and Evaluation (Rating: Poor)*

The FAQC question for M&E is: Did the M&E system generate credible information that was used for management decision-making, learning and accountability purposes?

1. The SPDR inception report highlights that DSWD will ‘monitor, record and report’ on the program’s contribution to the number of vulnerable people that are assisted through the program. There is no evidence in the progress reports, and the lack of data collection is confirmed by DRMB.
2. SPDR as a program did not have an M&E system. As a result:
   1. The progress reports do not monitor achievements against the program’s targets.
   2. The progress followed different templates, all focussing on outputs only.
   3. There are no records of the procurement and use of NFIs by the FOs.
   4. The SPDR team from 2019 onwards relied on individuals with the institutional knowledge rather than relying on project documentation.
   5. The baseline study and midterm review of the program were not conducted.
   6. The national level does not know the effect of cascading trainings from the FOs to LGUs.
   7. SPDR staff are unfamiliar with the reasons why funds have reduced.
3. The disbursement monitoring of 2015-2017 contains a budget line titled *Semestral assessments and other M&E activities.* The budget item had an allocation of P927,200, but remained unused and was realigned for expenditures unrelated to M&E systems.
4. The MEF developed with support from SPDR was accepted, and would have provided the framework, but was not adopted in DSWDs strategic plan. Current DSWD staff expressed that the MEF was more relevant and appropriate. Data collection for the current indicators is difficult and only started in 2019. Required data is difficult to consolidate, with much input required from LGUs.
5. In the absence of a monitoring system, the only data that informs decision-making is tracking of progress in procurement processes. Changes in items were made as some could not be purchased and the COVID-19 pandemic prompted the procurement of PPEs.
6. The program conducted a nationwide review of the disaster response operations in 2018. One of the regions mentioned that for them, this was SPDR’s most important activity, helping them to reflect and improve their operations. The documentation of these workshops could not be located for sharing with the consultant.
7. DFAT’s monitoring could have benefited from more resources to allow. for example, field visits. The ACC specialist was seen as an important link between DSWD and DFAT.

*Gender Equality (Rating: Less than adequate)*

The AQC describes the following question for Gender Equality: Did the investment make a difference to gender equality and empowering women and girls?

The AQC prescribes two different rubrics. Gender equality, as highlighted in the inception report, was identified in SPDR as a cross-cutting issue, and thus the rubric for investments without a gender equality objective is used.

1. DFAT’s Aid Quality Check of 2017 reports that DSWD takes a mainstreaming approach towards gender equality. The report states that gender “…are asserted in the formulation and implementation of the Department’s Disaster Response Manual”.
2. SPDR has been acknowledged by sources for promoting gender equality and the protection of female Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). WFS have been promoted since 2015, through Memorandum Circular 006. however, prepositioning of these facilities reportedly only started in 2019. The WFS is more prominent in some of the regional DRMs, and the DRM-CO provides clear guidance when the deployment of WFS should take place. DROMIC does not report separately on the stockpile of WFS or CFS. Some LGUs indicated that they have evacuation centers, but these are not standardized yet and have no space for WFS or CFS.
3. Gender disaggregated data – While the M&E framework developed by SPDR indicates a need to collect gender disaggregated data, DSWD’s strategic plan does not bring up the different needs of men and women. From 2016 to the present, DROMIC reports only include the number of affected families and individuals without disaggregated data. Reportedly, LGUs do collect gender-segregated data.
4. The SPDR teams shared workshop registration sheets for different activities, showing inconsistencies in the collection of gender-disaggregated data. In 2019, the FCDP trainings have attendance sheets indicating the gender of participants -- female participation was at 64.1%, while among the community representatives 64.2% were female, not an equal distribution.
5. The surveys among DSWD staff inquired about their perception of gender equality internally. Table 5 shows a higher percentage of male respondents ‘Strongly agree’ with equality in the office environment. There was no opportunity to explore these differences during FGDs.

Table 5 Male and female respondents and their degree of agreement with gender equality statements

| Statement | Degree of agreement | FO + DRMB |  | FO staff |  | DRMB staff |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Male  (N = 40) | Female  (N = 56) | Male  (N = 34) | Female  (N = 44) | Male  (N = 6) | Female  (N = 12) |
| In our office men and women are treated with equal respect | Strongly agree | 65.2% | 44.1% | 70.6% | 50.0% | 50.0% | 33.3% |
|  | Agree | 17.4% | 45.6% | 23.5% | 43.2% | 0.0% | 50.0% |
|  | Neither agree or disagree | 13.0% | 5.9% | 5.9% | 4.5% | 33.3% | 8.3% |
| In our office men and women receive the same training | Strongly agree | 67.4% | 59.6% | 73.5% | 52.3% | 50.0% | 58.3% |
|  | Agree | 10.9% | 25.4% | 14.7% | 36.4% | 0.0% | 33.3% |
|  | Neither agree or disagree | 21.7% | 14.0% | 11.8% | 9.1% | 50.0% | 8.3% |

*Disability Inclusion (Less than adequate)*

DFAT’s FACQ does not provided one overarching question, but instructs to explore the following:

1. PWDs engagement in program planning, implementation and M&E
2. The program identifies and address barriers to inclusion and opportunities for participation
3. There is no evidence that PWDs participated in program planning and M&E, but reportedly, disabled persons organizations (DPO) were part of the DRM development workshops. SPDR did not have interventions specifically for PWDs or promoting their inclusion. The DRM-CO includes PWDs among the vulnerable groups, but there was no mention of their specific needs or how inclusion can be ensured.

*“The PWDs are often left behind. Some LGUs are prepared but inclusiveness should be further improved. The SDGs say that no one should be left behind”*

Participant in an FGD

1. Sources mentioned that in some trainings, PWDs were among the trainees but is not reflected in attendance sheets. In addition, it was expressed that PWDs in general are not participating in capacity building activities, not just in SPDR but in general. While DPOs are often represented in DRRMC’s, they are not included in capacity building interventions.
2. The LGUs claim to know the location of PWDs and reportedly, they get priority during evacuation. This was contradicted by external organizations, stating that PWDs were frequently not considered during evacuations. The data collected from IDPs reportedly includes gender and disability, but is not necessarily passed on to other levels or agencies.

*Risk management (Rating: Poor)*

The FAQC provides the following question for risk management: Was risk management effective, did any risks eventuate, are there any risks that will continue after the investment?

1. SPDR’s inception report provides in its Annex 5 a risk assessment. However, the progress reports do not provide updates on the risk assessment. The evaluation identified two risks that eventuated:
   1. The risk of inefficient purchase of supplies. The assessment did not foresee the unavailability of certain products at certain prices and how to deal with it.
   2. The risk of weak compliance to the M&E systems eventuated, or more appropriately, the absence of a system to be able to comply.
2. The risk of FOs not participating in the program was largely unfounded, although compliance with reporting systems could have been enforced stronger by the CO, for example, the distribution records of NFIs. The risk treatment, a top-down instruction that FOs should work with the program, was not used, and may be ineffective where FOs are expected to have reasonable independence.
3. The risk assessment does not include changes in administration and leadership as risks – two factors that left a big mark on the program – concluding that the risk assessment was incomplete.

*Environmental and Social safeguards (Rating: Adequate)*

1. In general, the program itself does not pose any environmental risks. To the contrary, the program and DSWD promote awareness of the environment and the links to disaster prevention.
2. The program invited stakeholders where appropriate, in particular during the development of the DRM and the evaluation of the program. During the activities, LGUs, non-government organizations and people’s organizations participated. The consultant has no evidence that indigenous communities participated or were represented. The protection of IPs during disasters primarily lies with the LGUs and the MSWDOs, which are in charge of identifying vulnerable individuals and households.
3. DSWD has guidelines on the protection of women and children’s rights, and the former is included as a cross-cutting issue in SPDR and is reinforced in the DRMs. In addition, the program promoted WFS and CFS. Other than this, there was no allocation of funds or other resources to safeguarding. There is no evidence that beyond WFS, specific initiatives were conducted for the prevention of sexual exploitation and harassment.

*Innovation (No rating)*

Innovations are defined by DFAT’s FAQC as development innovations, new approaches to an aid investment. This priority policy does not have a rating rubric.

1. The identified innovations are primarily in regard to NFIs:
   1. SPDR has opened the eyes of FOs to procure a wider variety of NFIs. One of the FOs noted that due to the program, they now purchase pre-cut laminated sacks rather than buying rolls in the past, reducing labour requirements.
   2. SPDR promoted the establishment of WFS and prepositioning of sleeping kits for the vulnerable, which was not common practice before the Program.
2. In regard to new processes, the surge force model was highlighted as a specific output that was very helpful to DRMB. A source mentioned that SPDR changed the focus to FOs, positioning them at the centre of implementation.
3. External agencies are of the opinion that there is little innovation in DSWD, possibly due to staff capacity. SPDR did not lead to new partnerships.

*Private sector engagement (Rating: Very poor)*

Private sector engagement for DFAT means the direct contribution of the private sector to reaching SPDR’s investment outcome.

1. The evaluation did not identify partnerships between DSWD and the private sector that contributed to SPDR. The development of guidelines and mechanisms for increased private-public partnerships could have contributed to partnerships supporting DSWD’s mandate, but the activity was abandoned.
2. Both the CO and the FOs reported that they have arrangements with private transporters to be mobilized as necessary. However, the transporters are pre-selected service providers and do not provide services for free. DSWD receives donations but again, not for SPDR implementation.

*Building resilience to climate change and disasters (Rating: Adequate)*

This KPP is primarily looking at the assessment and mitigation of the program’s impact on the climate and disaster risks of the program itself. In addition, the extent of responding to disasters is part of this KPP.

1. The program was not subjected to a climate change and disaster risk assessment. Consequently, no actions were undertaken by the program. It can be argued that the nature of the project, mainly capacity building, carries by itself a low risk of contributing to climate change and disasters. The program directly contributes to reducing the risk of impacts of disaster, for example the loss of life.
2. DSWD activities, but not as part of SPDR, include:
   1. Supporting CCAM interventions under cash for work initiatives in the aftermath of disasters; and
   2. Participation of DSWD staff in tree planting activities.
3. The majority of FO staff, strongly agree (60.3%) or agree (32.1%) with the statement that in their daily operations, they consider the impact of their actions on the environment and climate change. In regard to the statement of their office taking action against greenhouse gases, 38.5% strongly agree and 39.7% agree.

## 3.7 Supporting and hindering factors

1. A number of internal and external factors positively contributed to SPDR reaching its outputs:
   1. Placement of the program within DSWD – The program was embedded in the TAU, where the program was also developed initially.
   2. The ACC specialist was also located in the TAU and was an important link to the FOs and DFAT.
   3. The number of staff at FOs have grown over time. The LGUs, although less relevant for the program, also noted that MDRRMO and/or MSWDO positions became full-time positions in recent years.
   4. The flexibility of DFAT with regards to the activities and program duration.
2. The program experienced a number of challenges that hindered program implementation. Many have been described in previous sections: 1) frozen funds by the new national administration; 2) changes in leadership, bringing new interests and new priorities for activities; 3) long procurement processes; and 4) high staff turnover due to MOAs or other short contracts. In addition, the absence of feedback from the CO to the FOs was mentioned. Most DRMB staff are very concerned that these issues will continue and threaten the delivery of quality services.

*“The possibility of suddenly being transferred or replaced makes leaders risk-averse - appointed leaders hesitant to make decisions with long-term implications”.*

## 3.8 Gaps and challenges

The evaluation identified a number of gaps and challenges within DRMB or its environment, hindering further improvement of the Bureau’s disaster response capacity.

1. Overall Disaster Response Strategy – The framework was drafted by the ACC specialist but not finalized. The following challenges and key gaps remain important to strengthen:
   1. Engagement with the private sector, including their participation in the cluster system.
   2. Volunteer engagement, which is already underway following the development of a manual.
   3. Lack of policies and processes, for example, an M&E and learning system.
   4. National and regional governance, in particular on roles, complementarity, communication and sharing of information on disaster response and recovery.
   5. Human-induced disasters and DSWD’s preparedness to respond to these.
2. Lack of capital outlay – Reportedly, DRMB annually proposes budgets for investments in equipment and infrastructure but they do not get prioritized during national budget deliberations. This especially impacts warehousing capacity, including:
   * Deterioration of facilities due to insufficient maintenance.
   * Expenditures for rental facilities where the quality of storage can be compromised.
   * Underutilization of facilities, in particularly vertical storage due to the absence of racking systems.
   * Upgrading of electrical load capacity to facilitate the mechanization of repacking.

DSWD personnel expressed the need for capital-heavy investments, namely communication tools, real-time information management technology and digital registration of vulnerable households as currently piloted in the Disaster Vulnerability Assessment and Profiling Project, a DSWD partnership with IOM. The latter will facilitate the quick delivery of support to victims thanks to established databases at LGU level. A nationwide roll-out will be costly.

1. Contractual staff – A very large percentage of DRMG, and DSWD as a whole, are on a service contract or MOA. The agreements do not come with benefits, and reportedly leads to high staff turnover. The replacements often have to start without the benefits of a handover.
2. Mandanas ruling – The Mandanas ruling results in a larger allocation of national revenues to local governments by 2022. The provincial governments are expected to benefit. This can mean a shift of resources to LGUs, but lower allocation for national agencies.
3. Coverage of remote areas – Concerns were expressed on RDNAs being conducted immediately, as required, but at the risk of remote areas being excluded. These areas are often the home of vulnerable households, including indigenous communities.

# 4. Lessons learned

The following definition for lessons learned is used: *Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact.*[[9]](#footnote-9)

1. Program objectives – SPDR has shown that capacity building activities or products are often linked with each other, and their benefits discovered along the way. A future program will benefit from a better design with clear capacity building objectives and logical connection and sequence of activities.
2. Program host – SPDR was fortunate during the early stages of implementation by being based in the TAU and having continuous leadership for several years. Ideally, programs should be placed in units or bureaus that are not subjected to political appointments and regular change. Where possible, agreements and fund releases should be made with this bureau directly to reduce the risk of unspent budgets annually returning to the treasury.
3. Program duration and policy change – SPDR allocated two years to have policy changes institutionalized. This required strong dedication from the beginning. The program duration needs to be sufficient to achieve policy changes. With continued availability of program funds, the All Hazard DRM may have been approved within three years, yet a longer timeline may be necessary to ensure the use, adoption and roll-out of the policy or approach. At the FO level, interest in the DRMs also only started during the third year of the program.

# 5. Recommendations

This section presents three sets of recommendations:

1. Recommendations to maximize the current SPDR outputs
2. Recommendations for similar programs
3. Recommendations to address identified gaps and challenges

## 5.1 Maximizing the use of SPDR outputs – sustainability plan

The actions below are recommended to ensure the sustained use of SPDR’s outputs.

1. The following are recommended for the SPDR outputs:
   1. DRM-FO – release directives for an annual review of the DRMs; facilitate peer sessions between different FOs, in particular between successfully-adopting FOs and those that have yet to finalize theirs. The CO should facilitate sessions to share and discuss DRMs for different disasters, including hydrometeorological, geological and health emergencies. Institutionalize sessions to communicate the content of DRMs to LGUs
   2. DRM-CO – Approve and disseminate the manual to partner organizations and FOs. An Annex should be developed on health emergencies as soon as possible. Lessons can be drawn from the current COVID-19 response of DSWD and other agencies.
   3. M&E Framework – The framework needs to be revisited as soon as possible to see what can be adopted during the development of DSWD’s new strategic plan. The current strategy ends in 2022.
   4. Draft DRS – The document is a product of the ACC specialist. While it is still in draft form, it needs to be revisited regularly. As with the MEF, it can inform DSWD’s new strategic plan, and can also be used to develop a long-term vision for DRMB. The document provides detailed activities for development phases and outcomes until 2030.
   5. Safety, Security and Welfare Handbook – As with the DRS, this document was developed by the ACC specialist. It was due for printing and distribution in early 2018 but was not included in the WFP. The document is still very much valid, and reproduction should be strongly considered. While it is a reference material, smaller sections could be taken out, reformatted and translated as appropriate. The draft handbook has matching training materials.
   6. Surge Force Framework (SFF) – DSWD has adopted a number of the ten strategies prescribed in the SFF. The framework needs to be reviewed, particularly strategies on knowledge management and performance management systems, and align them with overall monitoring and evaluation strategies. The SFF should remain an input for volunteer engagement and management.

## 5.2 Recommendations for similar programs

1. The table below (Table 6) provides recommendations for similar programs in the future. Unless specifically indicating one agency, they should be considered by both agencies. DRMB can use the recommendations beyond partnerships with DFAT.

Table 6 Recommendations for similar programs in the future

| Area | Recommendations for similar programs |
| --- | --- |
| Program management | General:   * Establish a PMT for each partnership to ensure that sufficient human and other resources are allocated to a program. Contributions from both parties should be specified in the partnership agreement. * The PMT should be allocated in the relevant bureau to ensure effectiveness and continuity of capacity building initiatives. * The PMT staff should have permanent positions to increase the probability of skills and learnings applied elsewhere in the DSWD. * The program needs to have a comprehensive, complete logical framework. Deviations need to be well justified and documented.   DFAT-specific:   * Include the KPPs in proposal and progress report templates. * Release funds in tranches based on performance * Pro-actively engage with the program to ensure continuity and inclusion of the required activities in WFPs |
| Monitoring and Evaluation | Each program should:   * Develop a complete logical framework with SMART indicators at all levels. Align the program highest outcome level or impact with the outcomes of DRMB as a whole. * Allocate dedicated M&E staff within the PMT. * Design during the inception stage an M&E toolkit to be used throughout the implementation. Include baseline studies for any project longer than 2 years, and a midterm review if 3 years or more. * Elaborate a standard progress report template for the duration of the intervention, including the documentation of cumulative results. |
| Procurement | * Finalize the list of NFIs with clear specifications of the products – conduct participatory research, if necessary, to inform such specifications. * DSWD to consider international procurement of specialized items, and advocate for changes in policies if required to realize this. |
| KPPs | * DFAT to provide an orientation on the priority policies and standards to potential fund recipients. * Include the KPPs in proposal and reporting templates |

## 5.3 Addressing gaps and challenges

1. Table 7 lists the gaps and challenges identified in section 3.8.

Table 7 Recommendations to address gaps and challenges

| Gaps and challenges | Recommendations |
| --- | --- |
| Lack of capital outlay for investments | Commission an economic analysis on warehouse management and digital information management systems to illustrate the costs and benefits of DSWD making investments in those areas. The identified maintenance costs should be reflected in DSWD’s annual budgets and long-term investment plans. |
| Majority of staff on service contracts – high staff turnover and motivational and accountability challenges | Standardize a skeleton structure and human resource requirement for DRMB and FOs – employ full time staff accordingly.  Roll-out the Surge Force Framework and pre-register and train volunteers.  Study the trends in LGU staffing for Disaster Response and their QRTs or equivalent groups.  Ensure the availability of information of QRT membership of LGUs at the FOs. |
| Leadership Changes | Agreement with clear outputs and timeline accompanied with performance-based fund releases.  Clear, up-to-date documentation of program progress to ease the understanding of new leadership.  Joint introduction by DSWD and DRMB of the program to the new leadership.  Establishment of a PMT within a relevant Office or Bureau. |
| Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning | Review and harmonize the different directives and policies on M&E, for example strategic plan and the performance management framework.  Establish a common assessment matrix for the performance of FOs. Develop action plans with them to address gaps.  Development and roll-out of a standard process for post-disaster evaluation; create uniformity across the FOs.  Study trends across different regions. |
| Time consuming data collection and reporting | Digitalization of information management at family level, from registration to the monitoring of the distribution of support.  Advocate for budget allocations. |
| Mandanas ruling | The FOs should provide extended support to the provincial governments and lobby for an increased allocation to disaster response preparedness. Include the provinces in regular capacity building activities like logistics and warehousing management. |
| Innovation | Work with private sector and academe to assess operations and review disaster responses on a regular basis.  Work with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Trade and Industry on the augmentation/replacement/rotation of different items in the FFPs. |
| Environmental and social safeguards | DSWD to work with the LGUs on effective inclusion of IPs and PWDs in pre-disaster data collection.  Include the recording of details in data collection and analysis instrument.  Assess production processes, e.g., supply chains and food packaging at CO and FOs on their environmental impact, and consider the purchase of locally produced products for FFPs. |
| Disability inclusion | Mandatory inclusion of PWDs in all consultations and trainings  Provide assistance to PWDs to facilitate their participation. |

# Annex A: History of DRMB, staffing and agreements

***History of DRMB***

| **Year** | **Name of Office** | **Human Resource**  **(max staffing)** | **Remarks or**  **Reference** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2013-2016 | DRRROO (Disaster Risk Reduction and Response Operations Office) | 29 | DRRROO is a division under the management of the Program Management Bureau (PMB) |
| 2017-2018 | DREAMB (Disaster Response Assistance and Management Bureau) | 60 | Evolved from one of the divisions of the Protective Management Bureau |
| 2019 | DRMB (Disaster Response Management Bureau) | 2019 - 60  2020 - 70 | AO 1 - 2019 |

***History of the SPDR Staff***

| Year | Office | Project Management Team Members | Remarks |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2015 | Technical Assistance Unit (now Resource Generation and Management Office) | Gil Tuparan, Head  Darwin Espinosa, PDO IV  Michael Castillo, ADAS VI | The SPDR was lodged initially under the management of Policy and Plans Cluster under the Technical Assistance Unit. |
| 2018  Oct 2018-Jan 2019 | TAU  Office of the Undersecretary of the Disaster Response Management Group (OUS-DRMG) | Gil Tuparan, Head Reggy Sollegue, PDO III  USec. Hope Hervilla (until Oct 2018) Aldren Lacandazo, PDO IV  Mayliza DV. Ocampo, ADAS VI  Perlita DV. Panganiban, ABD, DRMB Eduard A. Colod Kyu Jr., PDO V Ryan Kim L. Pescadera, PDO IV  Ian Fidel C. Valdez, PDO IV Marjorie Ethel L. Geraldoy, PDO IV Kristine Ann Robles, PDO III  Sheenah Grace N. Ferolino, PDO III  Graciel DV. Panganiban, PDO III Ricardo R. Ferrer, PDO III  Roberto R. Hollon, Jr., ADAS VI  Mayliza DV. Ocampo, ADAS VI  OIC - Usec. Fernando De Villa  Marjorie Ethel L. Geraldoy, PDO IV Kristine Ann Robles, PDO III  Sheenah Grace N. Ferolino, PDO III  Jorge C. Pampuan, ADAS VI | Efforts were primarily for the re-accessing of funds. |
| 2019-2020 | Disaster Response Management Bureau | Usec. Felicisimo C. Budiongan  Director Rodolfo M. Encabo  Marjorie Ethel L. Geraldoy, PDO IV Kristine Ann Robles, PDO III  Sheenah Grace N. Ferolino, PDO III  Jorge C. Pampuan, ADAS VI  OIC Jam Karess Banzon  Director Clifford Cyril Y. Riveral | The supervision of the SPDR staff was delegated to Ms. Imee Rose S. Castillo and eventually to Mr. Krystian Harold J. Javier. |

***Project stages***

three years (Jan 2015- Dec 2017) but was extended five times (Jan-June 2018, July- Dec. 2018, Jan-Sept. 2019, Oct-Dec. 2019, and Jan-June 2020).

| Agreement | Period |
| --- | --- |
| Original | January 2015 – December 2017 |
| 1st Amendment | January – June 2018 |
| 2nd Amendment | July – December 2018 |
| 3rd Amendment | January – September 2019 |
| 4th Amendment | October – December 2019 |
| 5th Amendment | January – June 2020 |

***Transitions of Leadership in DSWD during SPDR***

| **Term** | **Secretary** | **Term** | **Undersecretary** | **Term** | **Director** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| June 2010 – June 2016 | Corazón Victoria N. Soliman | 2012 - 2015 | Usec. Parisya H. Taradji | 2013 – 2014 | Dir. Restituto Macuto |
|  |  |  |  | 2014 – 2015 | Dir. Thelsa Biolena |
|  |  |  |  | 2015 - 2016 | Dir. Thelsa Biolena |
| July 2016 – August 2017 | Judy M. Taguiwalo | 2015 – 2017 | Usec Vilma Cabrera | 2016 – 2018 | Dir. Felino Castro IV |
| August 2017 – May 2018 | Emmanuel C. Leyco (OIC) | February 2017 – October 2018 | Usec Hope Hervilla | 2018 | Dir. Perlita Panganiban (OIC) |
| May 2018 – October 2018 | Virginia N. Orogo | October 2018 – January 2019 | OIC – Usec Fernando De Villa | June 2018 – December 2019 | Dir. Rodolfo Encabo |
| October 2018 – to date | Lt. Gen. Rolando Joselito D. Bautista, AFP (Ret.) | January 2019 - present | Usec. Felicisimo C. Budiongan | December 2019 – March 2020 | Dir. Jam Karess Banzon (OIC) |
|  |  |  |  | March 2020 – to date | Dir. Clifford Cyril Riveral |

# Annex B: Intervention logic

The program logical framework, as part of the SPDR’s Inception Report includes a result chain with as program outcome: *Enhanced capacity of the DSWD to lead disaster response and delivery of prompt humanitarian assistance in times of disaster.* The described impact of SPDR is *Increased disaster resilience of poor families assisted by the DSWD in times of Disaster.* The logical framework provides a clearer overview of the program than presented in the original agreement, nevertheless has a number of weaknesses hampering measurement of program results:

* The logical framework does not provide indicators for the outcome and impact.
* The logical framework does not use specify outputs, but the indicators for activities are descriptions of outputs instead.

The evaluation will benefit from a clear consistent use of terms, and will apply those as described in DFAT’s glossary[[10]](#footnote-10) and reprinted in the text box. The terms are also used in the logic model, which provides a visual presentation how the consultant perceives the program’s implementation. The logic map was revised as a result of the meetings with partners and document review.

**Box: DFAT definitions of Outcome and Output**

End-of-Investment Outcome  
The desired development change that can be achieved within the timeframe of the investment.

Intermediate Outcome  
The short and medium-term effects of an investment’s outputs. Short term outcomes include changes in knowledge, attitudes, skills, while medium term outcomes often reflect changes in behavior, practice and decisions.

Outputs

The products, goods and services that result from a development investment. These are delivered to parties external to the department

Source: DFAT’s Aid Programming Guide, November 2020.

Lastly, the logic model makes a number of assumptions on what may have been achieved. The SPDR Inception Report presents the program as contributing to the outcomes of DSWD’s Disaster Response Strategic Policy Framework (DRSPF), as in place in 2015.

The DSWD has since 2015 revised and further developed their policies on Disaster Response. The context of the evaluation is however defined by policies at the start of the program, as agreed by DSWD and DFAT.

The consultant believes that the SPDR contributes directly to three of the outcomes in the DRSPF, and are in modified form included as medium-term outcomes in the logic model. The three outcomes are:

1. Sufficient stockpiles of relief items are strategically located in disaster response warehouses, ready to augment stockpiles of local governments without delay.
2. Well-trained staff are deployed the minute a disaster occurs.
3. Trained volunteers can be immediately deployed as support in agency disaster operations.

The three medium-term outcomes are in the logic model indicated with ‘DRSPF’.

The logic model highlights the outputs in 3 different colours: 1) Green for full accomplished/institutionalized outputs; 2) Yellow for outputs that are partially being utilized, primarily as sources for other products; and 3)

Chart

SPDR logic model with immediate, secondary, short-term, medium-term and end-of-investment outcomes

# Annex C: Synthesis process

**Introduction**

The analysis and synthesis of findings is often considered a weakness of evaluations. In particular the merger of data from mixed methods, qualitative and quantitative, is often subjective, rather than done systematically.

This document provides the outline for the synthesis of the review findings. The presented standards are established before the analysis of the collected data.

A number of the key questions for the criteria Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability, can be considered subdimensions, which can be rated individually on performance. The synthesis process presented in this process will help to determine the merit (quality) ratings for these subdimensions, and consequently for each OECD criteria.

The following are presented:

* The subdimensions under each of the OECD criteria. Additional subdimensions are provides in response to priorities like measuring results beyond outcomes.
* Rubrics and procedures for determining merit ratings for each of the subdimensions. These are aligned with the six performance levels in DFAT’s Final Aid Quality Check (FAQC).
* The process to determine merit ratings for the performance for each of the criteria.

The matrix consists of the following 6 performance levels:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Ratings Matrix** |  |
| **6** | Very good | Satisfactory |
| **5** | Good |  |
| **4** | Adequate |  |
| **3** | Less than adequate | Unsatisfactory |
| **2** | Poor |  |
| **1** | Very poor |  |

**Subdimensions under the evaluation criteria**

The overall evaluation questions associated with the OECD criteria, and their subdimensions, are provided below:

**Relevance:** *Was this the right thing to do?*

* Alignment of SPDR with:
  + National and sub-national development priorities
  + DSWD’s priorities
* Alignment of SPDR with
  + International frameworks
  + Australia Aid Investment Plan
* Responsiveness to the needs of target beneficiaries
* Appropriateness of prepositioning and capacity building in achieving program outcomes
* Flexibility in adapting to changes

**Effectiveness:** *Did SPDR achieve the outputs and outcomes that we expected over the lifetime of the investment?*

* The extent of achieving outputs
* The extent of output utilization
* Changes in behaviour and practices at DSWD
* Changes in behaviour and practices at LGUs
* Extent of satisfaction with achievements and meeting expectations

**Efficiency:** *Did the SPDR make appropriate sue of Australia’s and DSWD’s time and resources to achieve outcomes?*

* Appropriateness of expenditure trajectory
* Supportiveness of financial management
* Timely support of procurement systems
* Cost of outputs – value for money
* The extent of governance arrangements and modalities support reaching outputs and outcomes
* Adequacy of human resource allocation
* Importance of the ACC specialist to the program
* Leverage from DSWD and partners
* Responsiveness of DSWD/program management to learnings

**Impact:** *What difference does the intervention make?*

* Improvements in DSWD response delivery
* Improvements in LGU response delivery
* The extent that impact can be attributed to SPDR

**Sustainability:** *Will the benefits of the SPDR last?*

* Ownership of DSWD and LGUs over outputs and outcomes
* Institutionalization of outputs and outcomes
* Addressing risks to sustainability

**Merit rating for subdimensions**

The logical framework of SPDR is basic and does not provide other indicators than for outputs. The assignment of the different subdimensions will help assessing the program’s performance at different levels.

The table below provides the merit rating for qualitative data. The table merges the 6 ratings of the FAQC with a rubric of Davidson (2005).

| **Score** | **Merit Rating** | **Description** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **1** | Very good | Evidence of very strong performance; positive feedback from all consulted sources. No weaknesses were identified. |
| **2** | Good | Evidence of a strong performance; predominantly positive comments. No weaknesses, or a few weaknesses without real consequences. |
| **3** | Adequate | Evidence of noticeable positive performance; more than half of sources suggest a positive performance. Only a few weaknesses identified with serious impact on performance. |
| **4** | Less than adequate | A mix of positive and negative comments. Inconsistent comments across the sources of information, and the different locations. Sources highlight a number of weaknesses with a serious impact on performance |
| **5** | Poor | Clear evidence of unsatisfactory performance. Findings are predominantly negative, or partial weak evidence. Many weaknesses are identified. |
| **6** | Very poor | No positive evidence found, or predominantly weak evidence |

The quantitative data collected through surveys and interviews are predominantly through the use of Likert scales of four or five points. Some include a ‘I do not know’ response option, and are excluded from analysis. The other choice options will be converted in numerical values, for example with a five-point scale: Strongly agree = 5, Agree – 4, Neutral = 3, Disagree =2, and Strongly Disagree = 1.

The average value of the responses will be calculated, and merit ratings assigned as per table below.

| **Score** | **Merit Rating** | **Average of 5-point Likert scale** | **Average of 4-point Likert scale** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1** | Very good |  |  |
| **2** | Good |  |  |
| **3** | Adequate |  |  |
| **4** | Less than adequate |  |  |
| **5** | Poor |  |  |
| **6** | Very poor |  |  |

**Procedure of setting merit ratings for subdimensions**

*For qualitative data only*

* Review the data/evidence collected and assign the appropriate merit rating

*For quantitative data only*

* Compare the analysed data with the merit ratings and identify the associated merit rating

*For quantitative and qualitative data*

* Assign the merit ratings for quantitative data
* Assign the merit rating for qualitative data
* If they are the same, then that is the final merit rating
* If the qualitative merit rating is higher than that of the quantitative, then the overall merit rating will go up, but a maximum of 1 level.
* If the qualitative merit rating is lower than that of the quantitative, then the overall merit rating will go down, but a maximum of 1 level.

In an equal number of subdimensions the lower rating will be applied.

**Merit rating matrix for dimensions**

The merit rating matrix below is valid for all dimensions. The table is adapted from Davidson (2005).

| **Dimensional rating** | ***Median subdimension rating*** | ***Subdimensions below “Good”*** | ***Subdimensions below “Adequate”*** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Very good | Very good | 0 | 0 |
| Good | Good or higher | >0 and < 1/3 | 0 |
| Adequate | Adequate or higher | (no restrictions) | >0 and < 1/3 |
| Less than adequate | Less than adequate or higher | (no restrictions) | (no restrictions) |
| Poor | Poor or higher | (no restrictions) | (no restrictions) |
| Very poor | Very poor | (no restrictions) | (no restrictions) |

Note: Conditions in all three columns must be met to receive the corresponding rating.

**Additional considerations**

In the case of unreconcilable or severely conflicting data sources this will be in the narrative. This will include the justification if any of the data is used in the synthesis.

In the event that all data for a subdimension is considered unreliable or insufficient, then the subdimension will be excluded from establishing the overall merit rating.

The review explored a number of other areas, which will be assessed as one general dimension. They are:

* Monitoring and Evaluation
* Gender Equality
* Disability inclusion
* Risk management
* Environmental and social safeguards
* Innovation
* Private sector engagement
* Building resilience to climate change and disasters

The review included a number of questions that will not be given a merit rating, but a narrative of the findings will be included in the evaluation report. Examples are:

* Facilitating and constraining factors that affected the achievement of intended outputs
* Positive and negative unintended outcomes (positive and negative)

References

Davidson, E.J. (2005). *Evaluation Methodology Basics: The Nuts and Bolts of Sound Evaluation*. Los Angeles, California: SAGE.

# Annex D: SPDR Components and Outputs

**Component 1: Prepositioning of NFIs**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Prepositioning NFIs at FOs | End of 2016: Purchased products and volumes as planned by 14 FOs | Largely used. Unclear release protocols until 2019.  Children toys still complete in 2 out of 12 regions.  FO 1 - PITC |
| Prepositioning NROC | 7,000 Each of Mats and mosquito nets. No blankets or Malongs. Less toys.  Discrepancy in number of items with the 2018 progress report. | No tents purchased due to challenges to procure with right specifications. Solar lamp purchase not pursued.  Instead a higher volume of laminated sacks, as was identified as most useful.  Towards the end PPEs procured.  All changes in coordination with DFAT. |

**Component 2: Warehouse construction**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Planned or new output** | **Reported** | **Status and Uptake** |
| Original design: Construction two regional warehouses | Changed to one warehouse at NROC | Model warehouse; used for exposure  Capacity increase with 40,000 FPPs storage space  Worker friendly production space |

**Component 3: Capacity Building**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Psycho Social Support training | Completed in 2016. |  |
| Disaster Risk Manual (DRM) Central Office | By 2016 draft almost finished. Considered too long. Final draft by April 2019. | Anticipated institutionalization by first quarter 2021. |
| DRM field offices | In 2020 SPDR reporting 13 institutionalized DRMs | Origin 13 unknown, CO shared a number of drafts and FOs are awaiting feedback from CO and have not proceeded (R11 and R12) developing it further. Others have fully embraced, finalized, approved by RD and utilizing. |
| Logistics and warehouse management manual | Training conducted in 2016. SPDR reports institutionalized by 2017. | In 2018 considered a draft by NLRMB. Finalized with additional input in to ISO certified operations manual. |
| Public Private Partnerships | No evidence this was pursued after inception report. |  |
| Safety, Security and Welfare handbook | Drafted by ACC specialist. Not institutionalized or reproduced. Plan was to train 200 staff by March 2018. | No roll out. Fund allocation removed by 2018. |
| Surge Force Framework | Completed in 2016. | Reportedly provides input to the QRT  Input to the volunteer |
| Training on Family and Community Preparedness | Conducted in 2019 in 4 clusters across the country. Participants (134) from FOs, and SLP, KALAHI-CIDDS and 4P programs. | Proposal uses the term ‘surge’, but not the surge force framework.  Activity referred to as a ‘pilot’ for further development of Family and Community Volunteer Program  No process documentation |

**Component 4**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Evaluation workshops of disaster response operations | Was tied to regional workshops on FO DRMs in 2018. | No documentation available. Results input to revised DRM manuals. |
| Monitoring and Evaluation Framework | Completed in 2016. | Indicators are adopted in the Final Draft of the DRM as indicators for OO3 of DSWD. However, not aligned with OO3 indicators of AO10-2018. |
| Sustainability Plan | Not made. |  |

# Annex E: Conducted consultations

| **Date** | **Agency/Respondents** | **Male participants** | **Female participants** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| November 28 | Australian Civilian Corps | 1 |  |
| December 1 | DSWD - SPDR | 1 | 4 |
| December 2 | DSWD Procurement Division | 1 |  |
| December 2 | DSWD Finance Division | 1 | 1 |
| December 3 | DSWD - DROMIC | 1 |  |
| December 3 | RGMO | 1 |  |
| December 4 | BDRM Director Riveral | 1 |  |
| December 7 | Gil Tuparan, Former head TAU | 1 |  |
| December 7 | FGD FO-NCR | 4 | 4 |
| December 8 | DFAT |  | 3 |
| December 9 | FGD FO-FO-12 | 2 | 5 |
| December 9 | KII RD FO12 |  | 1 |
| December 10 | FGD FO-FO-5 | 2 | 1 |
| December 10 | KII RD FO5 | 1 |  |
| December 10 | LGU – Santo Domingo | 1 | 1 |
| December 10 | LGU - Presentacion |  | 2 |
| December 10 | UN-OCHA | 1 | 2 |
| December 11 | FGD FO-FO-2 | 2 | 5 |
| December 11 | KII RD FO 2 | 1 |  |
| December 11 | LGU Ballesteros | 1 |  |
| December 14 | Secretary Budiongan | 1 |  |
| December 14 | LGU Balangiga | 2 | 3 |
| December 14 | LGU Tagum City | 3 | 2 |
| December 15 | FO11 – Warehouse visit | 2 |  |
| December 15 | FGD FO 11 | 3 | 3 |
| December 16 | FGD FO8 | 4 | 2 |
| December 16 | FGD LGU Maasin City | 3 | 1 |
| December 16 | FGD LGU Julita | 3 | 3 |
| December 17 | NLRMB - NROC | 2 |  |
| December 17 | LGU Saranggani (FO11) |  | 2 |
| December 17 | FO8 Former Director | 1 |  |
| December 17 and 18 | LGU Saranggani (FO11) | 1 | 2 |
| December 18 | LGU Mandaluyong | 1 | 3 |
| December 18 | LGU Sabtang | 1 |  |
| January 4 | Sir Gabatin, NLRMB | 1 |  |
| January 4 | Warehouse manager R5 | 1 |  |
| January 4 | FO11 – warehouse manager | 1 |  |
| January 5 | FO1 – OIC |  | 1 |
| January 5 | FO4b – OIC |  | 1 |
| January 5 | FO – CAR OIC |  | 1 |
| January 12 | IOM | 1 |  |
| January 12 | Assistant Undersecretary | 1 |  |

# Annex F: DRMB staff and program outputs

The evaluation conducted a survey among DRMB staff which allegedly had an awareness of the SPDR program. The table below includes:

* Column B: The percentage of respondents that said they are familiar with the activity.
* Column C: The percentage of respondents that puts the activity in their top four of activities/outputs that contribute most to enhancing DSWD’s disaster response capacity.
* Column D: The average score of the activity/output if their rankings are converted in to numbers. For example, if the output is ranked number 1 it get 4 points, second 3 points, etc. Then the total of points was divided by the 18 respondents.

| **A: Output/Activity** | **B:**  **Percentage with familiarity (N = 18)** | **C:**  **Percentage with inclusion in Top 4 (N = 18)** | **D:**  **Average score** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Warehouse construction and rehabilitations at NROC | 28% | 22% | 0.6 |
| Procurement of Non Food Items | 50% | 44% | 1.2 |
| Disaster Response Manual at the Central Office | 78% | 78% | 3.6 |
| Disaster Response Manuals at the Field Offices | 28% | 61% | 2.1 |
| Logistics and warehouse management manual | 17% | 50% | 1.4 |
| Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Disaster Response | 11% | 33% | 0.9 |
| Nationwide workshops to Evaluate Disaster Response Operations | 6% | 28% | 0.7 |
| Surge Force Framework for quick mobilization of staff, volunteers and stakeholders | 28% | 17% | 0.5 |
| Safety, Security and Welfare handbook | 11% | 6% | 0.2 |
| Psychosocial Support training | 22% | 28% | 0.4 |
| Family and Community Disaster Preparedness Training | 44% | 33% | 1.1 |

# Annex G: Adoption of new disaster preparedness activities by Field Offices

Chart

Adoption of new disaster preparedness activities by field offices for procurement and transport.

Chart

Adoption of new disaster preparedness activities by field offices for evacuation centres.

Chart

Adoption of new disaster preparedness activities by field offices for inventory management/storage.

Chart

Adoption of new disaster preparedness activities by field offices for cluster coordination system.

Chart

Adoption of new disaster preparedness activities by field offices for data collection and dissemination.

Chart

Adoption of new disaster preparedness activities by field offices for protection of women.

Chart

Adoption of new disaster preparedness activities by field offices for protection of people with disabilities.

# Annex H: Contributing factors to improving disaster response

The survey asked for the underlying factors of improvements in FO disaster response performance, individual capacity of the respondent, volunteer management and LGU disaster response performance.

The questions were only asked for respondents who ‘Strongly agreed’ or ‘Agreed’ that improvements had taken place, for which N is provided. The colouring is applied for each of the groups, not across all the factors.

The table below provides a numerical representation of the response options: Big contribution, Moderate contribution, Small contribution, or Not contributing at all. They are respectively scored as 2, 2, 1, and 0. Also I the respondent did not know a ‘0’ value was given. The color s

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Contributing factors to improved FO disaster response (N = 77)** | **Average score** |
| Trainings from the Central Office | 2.7 |
| Workshops to design a Disaster Response Manual | 2.8 |
| Orientation of staff on the final Disaster Response Manual | 2.6 |
| Better procurement processes for food and non-food items | 2.6 |
| Identification of regular suppliers of food and non-food items | 2.4 |
| Increased availability of NFIs from the Central office/NROC | 2.6 |
| The LGUs have grown stronger in Disaster Response | 2.5 |
| **Contributing factors to improving personal capacity (N = 73)** |  |
| Trainings from the Central Office | 2.6 |
| Participation in the design of the Disaster Response Manual | 2.3 |
| Orientation/training in the Disaster Response Manual | 2.4 |
| Training/degree relevant to Disaster Response before joining DSWD | 1.9 |
| The review and evaluation of previous disaster responses to improve practice | 2.5 |
| **Contributing factors to increased number and skills of disaster response volunteers (N= 57)** |  |
| Use of Surge Force Framework | 2.0 |
| Guidelines for Quick Response teams | 2.6 |
| Safety, Security and Welfare Trainings by DSWD | 2.6 |
| Trainings by other national agencies (for example DILG) | 2.3 |
| Other training by DSWD | 2.8 |
| **Contributing factors to improved LGU disaster response capacity (N=53)** |  |
| Trainings by DSWD | 2.9 |
| Trainings by other national agencies (for example DILG) | 2.8 |
| Trainings by non-government organizations or private sector | 2.7 |
| DSWD helped LGUs with making Disaster Response Plans | 2.7 |
| The support of other government agencies to the development of local disaster risk reduction and management plans (for example by the DILG) | 2.7 |
| The support of non-government organizations or to the development of local disaster risk reduction and management plans | 2.6 |
| Better allocation of the 5% Calamity Fund | 2.6 |

# Annex I: Degree of agreement of DSWD staff with Effectiveness and Impact statements

The Table below provides the statements and responses from the survey for Field Office staff. The table includes the numerical average if ‘ Strongly Agree’ is scored as 5, ‘Agree’ as 4, and onwards. ‘I do not know was not given a value, and excluded from the calculation. The survey had 78 respondents. The second column identifies to which evaluation criteria the statement relates.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Category** | **Criteria** | **Statement** | **Average numerical** | **Strongly Agree** | **Agree** | **Neutral (Neither Agree nor disagree)** | **Disagree** | **Strongly Disagree** | **I do not know** |
| **Field Offices** | Effectiveness | FO staff know their roles and responsibilities pre and post disaster | 4.0 | 30.8% | 50.0% | 11.5% | 5.1% | 1.3% | 1.3% |
|  | Impact | I Observed FOs are quicker identifying victims and their needs | 4.3 | 37.2% | 55.1% | 6.4% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
|  | Impact | I Observed FOs are quicker in providing support to victims | 4.4 | 41.0% | 55.1% | 2.6% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
|  | Effectiveness | Observed that FOs have increased the number of prepositioned NFIs | 3.7 | 26.9% | 43.6% | 15.4% | 9.0% | 0.0% | 5.1% |
|  | Effectiveness | FOs effectively coordinate with the agencies (government and private) in preparations and response | 4.4 | 51.3% | 39.7% | 7.7% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| **Personal** | Effectiveness | I have the skills to assess the impact of disasters | 3.9 | 24.4% | 50.0% | 23.1% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 0.0% |
|  | Effectiveness | I have the skills to support the FO in the distribution of relief goods | 4.4 | 51.3% | 39.7% | 7.7% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
|  | Effectiveness | My knowledge and skills in disaster response improved since I joined the FO | 4.5 | 56.4% | 34.6% | 7.7% | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
|  | Effectiveness | I am satisfied with capacity building provided by the FO | 4.2 | 38.5% | 43.6% | 15.4% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 0.0% |
|  | Effectiveness | I am satisfied with capacity building provided by the CO | 4.0 | 34.6% | 38.5% | 23.1% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.3% |
| **Volunteers** | Effectiveness | Since I joined the FO the number of volunteers to mobilize during disasters increased | 3.8 | 17.9% | 46.2% | 30.8% | 3.8% | 1.3% | 0.0% |
|  | Effectiveness | I observed an increase in knowledge and skills of volunteers | 3.7 | 15.4% | 51.3% | 29.5% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.3% |
|  | Effectiveness | DSWD has a clear procedure to quickly mobilize volunteers when needed | 3.8 | 20.5% | 46.2% | 28.2% | 3.8% | 1.3% | 0.0% |
|  | Effectiveness | Volunteers know their roles and responsibilities | 3.6 | 11.5% | 44.9% | 35.9% | 5.1% | 1.3% | 1.3% |
|  | Effectiveness | All volunteers know how to work safely during a disaster response | 3.5 | 11.5% | 39.7% | 39.7% | 6.4% | 0.0% | 2.6% |
| **LGUs** | Impact | The majority of cities and municipalities have a DRM | 3.2 | 21.8% | 33.3% | 21.8% | 7.7% | 1.3% | 14.1% |
|  | Impact | The majority of cities and municipalities have the knowledge to immediately respond to disasters | 4.0 | 30.8% | 41.0% | 23.1% | 3.8% | 1.3% | 0.0% |
|  | Impact | The majority of cities and municipalities in the region have sufficient stockpiles of food packs to support constituents at times of a small disaster | 3.4 | 20.5% | 26.9% | 35.9% | 11.5% | 1.3% | 3.8% |
|  | Impact | The majority of cities and municipalities in the region have sufficient stockpiles of NFIs to support constituents at times of a small disaster | 3.3 | 15.4% | 29.5% | 33.3% | 15.4% | 1.3% | 5.1% |
|  | Impact | Since I joined DSWD I have seen most LGUs increase their disaster response capacity | 3.6 | 14.1% | 50.0% | 28.2% | 2.6% | 1.3% | 3.8% |

# Annex J: Evaluation Matrix

In the matrix several terms are used. The following is meant with them:

* Progress reports – Period and other reports providing updates on program implementation. They include DSWD reports, but also documents like the AQCs of DFAT.
* DSWD project staff – The staff that are currently assigned to wrapping up the program, despite having a different position. This may also include individuals that have no active role anymore with the program, but with DSWD in a different capacity
* LGUs – This is primarily at the municipal level, and including the relevant offices like the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO), and the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office or council
* NFI distribution records – These are primarily the distribution records for the goods that were purchased through SPDR.

The Matrix can be updated any time as necessary.

**Relevance -** Was this the right thing to do?

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| To what extent were the program’s outcomes aligned with: | National and sub-national development priorities and objectives (e.g. Philippine Development Plan and Regional Development Plans)  International frameworks (e.g. Sustainable Development Goals, and Sendai framework), and Australia’s Aid Investment Plan  DSWD’s priorities | Program design  Progress reports  Policy documents  DFAT Senior Policy officer  OUSDRM/OADRM | Document review  Interview |
| Was the SPDR responsive to the needs of its target beneficiaries? | How were the needs of DSWD and LGUs identified? | Program design | Document review |
|  | How well do the program components align with the needs? | Program design  Work and Financial Plan (WFP) | Document review |
|  | How were the needs of vulnerable families exposed to a disaster identified? | DSWD FOs | Interview |
|  | To what extent were the distributed NFIs the items needed by vulnerable families? | DSWD FOs  LGUs | Interview |
| How appropriate are prepositioning and capacity building in achieving the program outcomes? |  | OUSDRM/OADRM  DSWD FOs  LGUs (MDDRMO/MDSWO) | Interview |
| How flexible was SPDR in adapting to changes? | What, if any, where changes in the development context or priorities of the Philippine Government? | Progress reports  OUSDRM/OADRM | Document review  Interview |
|  | What, if any, changes did the program made to align itself with those priorities? | DRMB  DFAT |  |
|  | Why were changes not made? | ACC Specialist |  |

**Effectiveness –** Have we achieved the outputs and outcomes that we expected over the lifetime of the investment?

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| To what extent did the SPDR achieve its intended outputs? | How do the outputs compare with the original agreement and subsequent work and financial plans? | WFP  Progress reports | Document review |
|  | Why were changes made if any? | Progress reports  DSWD SPDR staff  ACC Specialist | Document review  Interview |
|  | To what extent were the original and modified outputs achieved? | WFP  Progress reports | Document review |
| What were the facilitating and constraining factors that affected the achievement of expected outputs? | What policies and mechanisms, existing or introduced by SPDR, were supportive to achieving the outputs? | DSWD SPDR staff  Progress reports | Interview/FGD  Document review |
|  | What policies and mechanisms, existing or introduced by SPDR, were constraining achieving the outputs? |  |  |
|  | What external factors supported or constrained achieving outputs? |  |  |
|  | What have been challenges to fully adopt program outputs, for example the implementation of manuals and guidelines? | DSWD SPDR staff  DSWD FOs | Interview/FGD |
| What changes in behaviour and practice among DSWD and LGU staff did the SPDR contribute to? | What changes in behaviour and practices (outcomes) can be attributed (partially) to the outputs of the program? | DSWD DRMB  DSWD FOs  LGUs | Interviews  FGDs  Survey |
|  | How were those changes achieved? | DSWD DRMB  DSWD FOs  LGUs | Interviews/FGD |
|  | How satisfied are DSWD and LGUs with their achievements? Do they meet the expectations they had of the program? | DSWD DRMB  DSWD FOs  LGUs | Survey  Interviews/FGD |
| How did the SPDR affect the overall disaster response capacity of the DSWD and LGUs? | How has the response capacity of DRMB changed as a result of SPDR? For example, the volume and timely delivery of relief items? | DRMB  NROC  DFAT | Interviews |
|  | Has the response by FOs and LGUs changed as a result of SPDR, for example in time, quality and/or quality? | DSWD FOs  LGUs | Survey |
|  | What have been the key contributing factors? | DRMB  NROC  DSWD FOs  LGUs | Interviews  FGD |
|  | In what areas did the SPDR have the greatest and least achievements? |  |  |

**Efficiency -** Did the SPDR make appropriate use of Australia’s and DSWD’s time and resources to achieve outcomes?

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Was the trajectory of spending against budget over the lifetime of the SPDR appropriate to achieve the intended outcomes? | To what extent were expenditures made as planned? | WFP  Progress reports | Document reviews |
|  | Are variances between planned and actual expenditures justified? |  |  |
|  | What effects, whether positive or negative, did these variances have towards the delivery of outputs? | DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT | Interview  FGD |
| To what extent was financial management supportive to the program implementation? | Were financial resources made available timely? | DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT  RGMO  NRLMB | Interview  FGD |
|  | What were/are bottlenecks in financial management and procurement? |  |  |
|  | What was done to resolve bottlenecks, if any? How successful were these resolutions? |  |  |
| How well did DSWD procurement systems support timely and quality program implementation? | What policies were in place to ensure efficiency procurement? | RGMO  NRLMB  Procurement guidelines | Interview  FGD  Document review |
|  | How were they implemented in practice, and did this have any impact on the timeliness and quality of implementation? | Progress reports  DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT  RGMO  NRLMB | Document review  Interview  FGD |
|  | What, was done to resolve bottlenecks, if any? How successful were these resolutions? |  |  |
|  | What should be done different in the future to smoothen procurement? |  |  |
| Were the outputs achieved at least cost for the expected level of quality (value for money)? |  | Procurement guidelines  NLRMB  DFAT | Document reviews  Interview |
| Were there resources leveraged from other partners? (includes NGOs, philanthropic organisations and state-owned enterprises |  | Progress Reports | Document review |
| To what extent did the modality and governance arrangements support efficient program implementation throughout the lifetime of the program? | What were the established coordination and management mechanisms? | OUSDRM/OADRM  DRMB  DSWD SPDR staff | Interviews |
|  | To what extent were they being followed? |  |  |
|  | Were these modalities regularly reviewed? What were the outcomes of these reviews? |  |  |
|  | How, if any, were disagreements resolved? |  |  |
|  | What could have been done better (learnings)? |  |  |
| How appropriate were the staffing levels within DFAT and DSWD? | What staff, position, responsibilities and numbers were deployed by the partner? | DRMB  DFAT  DSWD SPDR staff | Interviews |
|  | Did the staffing level change throughout the program? |  |  |
|  | Was technical support provided timely and at the relevant quality? | Progress reports  BDRM  ACC specialist | Document review  interviews |
|  | How could human resources be managed better? | BDRM  DFAT  DSWD SPDR staff | Interviews |
| How important was the allocation of the ACC specialist to the program? | What were the key responsibilities of the ACC specialist? | ACC ToR  Progress documents | Document review |
|  | Were the ACC specialist’s achievements in line with the original plan and expectations? | DFAT  ACC specialist | Interview |
|  | How satisfied are the partners with the support provided by the ACC Specialist? | DFAT  BDRM | Interview |
|  | How, if at all, could the presence of the ACC specialist have been maximized better? | DFAT  BDRM  ACC Specialist | Interview |
| What did DSWD contribute to the program to complement SPDR resources? To what extent did this support efficient implementation of the program? |  | Progress reports  WFP  DSWD SPDR staff | Document review  Interview |
| How responsive were the management structure and systems of partners in adjusting to learnings and needs of the program? |  | Progress reports  DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT | Document review  Interview |

**Sustainability -** Will the benefits of the SPDR last?

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| How strong is the ownership of the DSWD and LGUs over the outputs and outcomes of the program? | To what extent did SPDR built on existing policies and systems? | Program design  DFAT | Document review  Interview |
|  | How satisfied are DSWD and LGUs with their participation in planning, implementation and monitoring of the program? | DSWD SPDR staff  DRMB  DSWD FOs  LGUs | Survey  Interview/FGD |
|  | To what extent are DSWD and LGU implementing the manuals and policies developed by the program? |  |  |
|  | What challenges, if any, existing in implementing the policies? |  |  |
| How are the outcomes of SPDR’s capacity building interventions institutionalized within DSWD and LGUs? | How significant was the pre-positioning of NFIs supported by DFAT? | NROC  DSWD FOs  LGUS | Interview |
|  | What resources has DSWD CO allocated for the stockpiling of NFIs? How is this reflected in policies and budgets? | OUSDRM/OADRM  DSWD-CO/NROC | Interview |
|  | What adjustments have FOs and LGUs made in the prepositioning of food items and NFIs? | DSWD FOs  LGUs | Interview |
|  | What mechanisms are in place to support disaster response volunteers? Has this changed since the start of SPDR? | DSWD FOs  LGUs | Interview |
|  | What challenges, if any, exist in resourcing Disaster Response plans? | OUSDRM/OADRM  DRMB  DSWD FOs | Interview |
| How well did the program address risks to sustainability? | Who was involved in risk identification? | Risk Assessment and management plan  DFAT  DRMB  ACC Specialist | Document review  Interview |
|  | What potential risks were identified? | Risk Assessment and management plan | Document review |
|  | What mitigation plans/mechanisms were established? | Risk Assessment and management plan  ACC specialist | Document review  Interview |
|  | If needed, how successful was the program in addressing the risks? | ACC specialist  DSWD SPDR staff | Interview |
|  | What is the perception of stakeholders on the risks and continuation of achievements? | DSWD-FOs  LGUs  Private sector | Interview |
|  | Who is designated and with what authority to manage the risks to sustainability? | DRMB  DSWD-FOs | Interview |

**Gender Equality -** To what extent did the SPDR make a difference to gender equality and empowering women and girls?

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| What, if any, are the mechanisms in SPDR to address gender equality? | What resources were available to promote gender equality? | Program design | Document review |
|  | What activities were conducted? | WFP  Progress reports | Document review |
|  | How was the participation of women and girls promoted during the program? | DSWD SPDR staff  Progress reports | Document review |
|  | What indicators and tools were used or developed to measure the effects of the program on women and girls? | Progress reports  M&E framework | Document review |
|  | How frequently were indicators measured and data analysed? | M&E framework  Progress reports | Document review |
| How does DSWD prioritize gender equality in its policies and practices? | How does gender equality reflect in DSWD practices? | DRMB  Progress reports | Interview  Document review |
|  | How does the inclusion of gender equality in policy and practices of DSWD and LGUs compare to before the SPDR program? | OUSDRM/OADRM  DRMB | Interview |
|  | What resources does DSWD put aside to promote gender equality? In particular in Disaster Response? | OUSDRM/OADRM  DRMB  DSWD-FOs  LGUs | Interview  FGD |
|  | What measures are in place to prevent negative impact of the program/DSWD practices on women and girls? |  |  |

**Monitoring and Evaluation –**

Did the M&E system generate credible information that was used for management decision-making, learning and accountability purposes?

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| What mechanisms were in place to measure progress against outputs and outcomes? | What guidance documents were in place or developed to ensure quality M&E? | M&E framework  Progress reports  ACC specialist  DSWD SPDR staff | Document review  Interview |
|  | At what stages in the program are M&E activities conducted? | Progress reports | Document review |
|  | How were outputs from activities recorded and processed to reflect cumulative progress against the baseline? | Progress reports | Document review |
|  | How were the program outcomes measured and reported? | M&E framework  Progress reports  ACC specialist  DSWD SPDR staff | Document review  Interview |
|  | What M&E was conducted during training activities? | Progress reports  DSWD SPDR staff | Document review  Interview |
| To what extent did the M&E activities strengthen existing DSWD M&E systems or capacity |  | OUSDRM/OADRM  DRMB  DSWD-FOs | Interview |
| How did information coming from M&E tools and system inform the program implementation (management, targets etc). |  | Progress reports  OUSDRM/OADRM  DRMB  DFAT | Document review  Interview |
| Were the resources budgeted for M&E optimal? | What resources did the SPDR allocate for M&E (staff, time, budget)? | WFP | Document review |
|  | What resources did DSWD allocate from its own resources? | DRMB | Interview |
|  | How were the resources used? | Progress reports  DSWD SPDR staff | Interview |
|  | Were resources sufficient to timely provide information to the program management and TWG? | DRMB  DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT | Interview |
| How accessible is information required to evaluate progress and end results? |  | Progress reports  Training reports  Monitoring forms  Evaluator | Document review |

**Disability/Social Inclusion**

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| How did PWDs participate in the different stages of SPDR? | What evidence exists that SPDR actively involved persons with disabilities (PWDs) with different impairments and/or disabled person’s organizations (DPOs) in planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation? | Progress reports  DPOs  PWDs | Document review |
|  | What resources were included in SPDR to ensure the participation of PWDs in all stages of the program? | WFP | Document review |
|  | What adopted/tried mechanisms were effective in ensuring meaningful participation of PWDs and DPOs? | DRMB  DSWD-FOs  DPOs  PWDs | Interview |
|  | How is the participation of PWDs and DPOs measured and recorded in SPDR’s M&E system? | M&E framework  Progress and training documentation | Document review |
| How are the needs of PWDs reflected in program outputs and outcomes? | How are the needs of PWDs identified and reflected in the manuals and guidelines developed under SPDR? | DRMB  DSWD-FOs |  |
|  | What resources are made available in response plans for PWDs? | Disaster Reduction manuals  DSWD-FOs  LGU preparedness plans | Document review  Interview |
|  | How have DSWD and LGUs been able to include PWDs in their Disaster Response? Is this different than before the program? | DSWD-FOs  LGUs | Interview |
| How effective did the M&E system record the effects of the program on vulnerable and special interest groups? | Did the M&E system collected PWD-disaggregated data? In regards to indigenous communities and other special interest groups? | M&E framework  Progress reports  NFI distribution records  Training attendance records | Document review |
|  | To what extent did the M&E framework collect and analyse data to track the quality and extent of involvement of PWDs and DPOs in all stages of the program cycle? | Progress reports  DFAT  DSWD SPDR staff | Document review  Interview |
|  | How did the data inform the decision-making in targeting and program participation? | Progress reports  DFAT  DSWD SPDR staff |  |

**Environmental and Social Safeguards**

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| What risks (e.g., environmental protection, children, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, displacement and resettlement, indigenous peoples, and health and safety safeguards) where identified at the onset of the program? | What risks were identified in regards to the environment? | Risk assessment and management plan | Document review |
|  | What risks were identified in regards to children? |  |  |
|  | What risks were identified in regards to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups? |  |  |
|  | What risks were identified in regards to displacement and resettlement? |  |  |
|  | What risks were identified in regards to indigenous people? |  |  |
|  | What risks were identified in regards to health and safety safeguards?? |  |  |
| How well did the program identify risks during implementation? | What mechanisms were in place to identify and respond to emerging risks? | Risk assessment and management plan | Document review |
|  | What resources were allocated to respond to risks? | WFP  DRMB  DFAT | Document review  Interview |
|  | How frequent was the risk management plan reviewed and updated if needed? | Risk assessment and management plan  Progress reports | Document review |
| How well did DSWD and DFAT manage identified risks? | What risks arose during implementation? | Progress reports  DRMB  DFAT  DSWD SPDR staff | Document review  Interview |
|  | How did the partners respond to the risks? |  |  |
|  | How satisfied were the involved parties/stakeholders with how the risks were addressed? | DRMB  DFAT  DSWD SPDR staff | Interview |

**Private sector engagement**

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| To what extent did directly engage with the private sector during the implementation of the program? | What were the private sector stakeholders in SPDR? | Progress reports  DSWD SPDR staff | Document review  Interview |
|  | What private sector stakeholders provided support to the implementation of SPDR? |  |  |
|  | If any, what monetary or other resources did these stakeholders bring to the program? | DSWD SPDR staff  Private sector stakeholders | Interview |
|  | To what extent are private sector partnerships formalized? |  |  |
|  | Where NFI suppliers considering CSR in their pricing? |  |  |
|  | What private sector support to the program outcomes was mobilized at regional level as a result of SPDR activities? | DSWD - FOs | Interview |
| To what extent do the partnerships continue after SPDR completion? |  | DSWD SPDR staff  Private sector stakeholders  DSWD - FOs | Interview |

**Innovation**

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| What new methods in planning and targeting were used during the program implementation? | Progress reports  DRMB  DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT | Document review  Interview |
| Have the partners engaged with non-traditional partners during SPDR? |  |  |
| What innovative processes did SPDR deploy or test? What new systems for the delivery of goods were tried? |  |  |
| What were the outcomes of adopting new approaches? |  |  |

**Building resilience to climate change and disasters**

| **Key evaluation questions** | **Detailed questions** | **Sources of information** | **Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| How did the program manage climate and disaster risks? | Did the partners assess the economic, socio-political and sustainability risks of SPDR? | Risk management plan | Document review |
|  | What risk management measures were put in place? |  |  |
|  | How effective were the measures in managing the risks? | Progress report  DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT | Document review  Interview |
| What results indicate that the investment is delivering on climate change action? | What outputs or activities does SPDR deliver in relation to DRR, adaptation and mitigation? | Program design  Progress reports | Interview |
|  | To what extent are greenhouse gas emissions considered in program implementation? | DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT  DSWD - FOs | Interview  Survey |
|  | How do the activities impact stakeholders’ resilience to climate change risks and other hazards? |  |  |
| How adequate was the M&E system (M&E frameworks, progress reports and evaluations) in collecting data on climate change risks and disaster risk reduction activities? | How are climate change and DRR activities and risk mitigation measured monitored and evaluated? | M&E Framework  Progress reports | Document review |
|  | To what extent is this data used to inform management? | DSWD SPDR staff  DFAT  DSWD - FOs | Interview |
|  | What are gaps in the M&E system regarding climate change risks and disaster risk reduction? | M&E Framework  Progress reports  DFAT | Document review  Interview |

1. Country Profile: The Philippines <https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/PHILIPPINES2016.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Republic Act 10121 <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2010/05/27/republic-act-no-10121/> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Draft Disaster Response Manual for DSWD Central Office, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Creswell, J. & Plano Clark, V. (2011). *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Greene, J. C., Caracelli, V. J., & Graham, W. F. (1989). Toward a Conceptual Framework Mixed-Method Evaluation Designs. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 11(3), 255–274. Retrieved from <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/unimelb.edu.au?url=http%3A%2F%2Fepa.sagepub.com%2Fcontent%2F11%2F3%2F255.full.pdf%2Bhtml> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The template was inspired by a checklist made by the specialist from the Australia Civilian Corps [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/building-resilience/Pages/building-resilience> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program – a conditional cash grant program supporting the poorest of the poor to improve health, nutrition and education of children aged 0- 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. OECD (2002). *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management.* OECD. Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aid-programming-guide-glossary.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)