**Strategic Review of Australia’s Support for Peacebuilding**

**in Conflict-Affected Mindanao**

**Review Mission Findings**

22 May 2020

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# **List of Acronyms**

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines  
APP Australian Partnerships for Peace

AIP DFAT Annual Investment Program

ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao  
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group

Australian DFAT Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

BARMM Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

BBL Bangsamoro Basic Law  
BDAF Bangsamoro Development Assistance Fund  
BG Bangsamoro Government

BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces  
BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

BIWAB Bangsamoro Islamic Women’s Auxiliary Brigade

BMFI Balay Mindanaw Foundation, Inc.

BMFI AS2G-CARE Advancing and Sustaining Good Governance and Community Actions Towards Resilience and Empowerment

BNTF Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund

BOL Bangsamoro Organic Law

BPAT Barangay Peacekeeping Action Teams

BTA Bangsamoro Transition Authority

CAB Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro

CDD Community-driven development  
CHD Center for Humanitarian Dialogue

CSO Civil Society Organization

DILG Department of the Interior and Local Government

FPSF Flexible Peace and Stability Fund

GCERF Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund

GPH Government of the Philippines  
IA International Alert  
IAG Institute for Autonomy and Governance

IATF-EID Inter-agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious Diseases

ICG International Crisis Group

IP Indigenous People  
LGU Local Government Unit  
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front  
MTF-RDP Mindanao Trust Fund – Reconstruction and Development Program   
NAP National Action Plan

OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

Oxfam WELD-PEACE Women’s Empowerment for Leadership and Development and Peace in the Bangsamoro

PBSP Philippine Business for Social Progress

PWD Persons with disability

P/ CVE Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism

RA Republic Act

SALW Small arms and light weapons

SWC MILF Social Welfare Committee

TAF The Asia Foundation

TAF – BMFI Project CIRCLE Communities of Inclusion and Resilience through Collaborative Local Engagements

TAF CARE Cohesion, Advocacy, Resilience and Expansive Engagement for Peace

TFBM Task Force Bangon Marawi

TJRC Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission  
TWG Technical Working Group

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNDP PRIME-Bangsamoro Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives for Empowerment in the Bangsamoro

UNDP START-PEACE Stabilization, Recovery and Transformation for Peace

WB World Bank

# **Executive Summary**

This report summarizes findings from a strategic review of Australia’s support for peace in Muslim Mindanao under the Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Mindanao (INL343) investment, covering three modalities implemented from mid-2017 to mid-2019.

The first modality is the bilateral Australian Partnerships for Peace (APP) program (thereby serving as the APP mid-term review). The second modality covers investments through multilateral mechanisms such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF). Small-value activities delivered through the Flexible Peace and Stability Fund (FPSF) is the third modality.

The program review showed the benefits of an adaptable and flexible approach whilst maintaining the focus on the long-term peace of the region.

Drivers of inequality, both politically and economically, remain of most concern. A sustained effort from all parties is required to ensure the ongoing peaceful development of this region within a unified Philippines.

The medium term political goal is to ensure successful elections in 2022 and this will be best achieved if the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) government can address inadequate delivery of basic services, slow recruitment of new set of civil servants, appointment of staff with inadequate technical skills, and slow progress of decommissioning activities.

The corresponding focus on livelihoods will be required to ensure all parties see the ‘peace dividend’ that flows from the agreement—that is, the assumed ‘payoff’ after the end of armed conflict when investments for development purposes are prioritized rather than the attainment of just the security objective. Failure to focus on livelihoods and only on the politics and military goals will not achieve sustained peace.

Partners (government, WB, UN, NGOs, and other stakeholders) of the peace process need to build on their good work and double down on long-term efforts to coordinate peace and development activities and not fall into the ‘negative peace’ trap of declaring victory too early in the process.[[1]](#footnote-1) The work of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) is only one aspect; sustained efforts to deliver the commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) while addressing communal conflicts across the region must continue beyond May 2022. Mobility restrictions and social distancing requirements put in place in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic will also modify operations in the BARMM and the Philippines more broadly, and will put emphasis on local and online activities that can be done safely with minimal travel.

**Key Findings:**

***On Effectiveness***

***Attaining objectives and adjusting to the changing context*** *-* The implementation partners were generally successful in achieving their expected outputs and outcomes from 2017-2019.A clear manifestation is the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) by the Philippine Congress in mid-2018, and the successful plebiscites in January and February 2019. However, the speed of the passage and ratification of the BOL and the establishment of the new BARMM government brought in a new set of challenges for implementing partners. There was an immediate need to shift efforts and resources to the successful installation of the instrumentalities of the new BARMM government and in ensuring that the new government delivers on the promises made to the Bangsamoro people. The implementing partners responded to the governance challenges of the new BARMM government by offering technical assistance support and limited capacity building programs. Support to normalization activities continued through the extension of the World Bank’s Mindanao Trust Fund – Reconstruction and Development Program 2 (MTF-RDP2) in the six acknowledged MILF camps in Central Mindanao, and the UNDP-managed funding for the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB). A new round of adjustments to operations are envisioned from 2020 onwards pending the long-awaited establishment of the Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF) and new policies to be put in place by the BARMM and Philippine governments to stem the spread of COVID-19.

***Addressing drivers of conflict and violence*** *–* APP partners such as IA, TAF, and CHD continued to deploy conflict monitoring, prevention, and mitigation tools at the local level, particularly on land resource management and clan conflict resolution. However, the assault of VE groups of Marawi City in May 2017 and the growing threat of VE groups elsewhere in the Bangsamoro proved to be another turning point in the peace and conflict situation in Mindanao that had to be adjusted to. The APP partners and multilateral implementing partners such as the World Bank and UNDP were able to systematically respond to this new challenge by providing technical assistance support to the rehabilitation and reconstruction planning for Marawi City. Support for the formulation of the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) was also provided through UNDP. While GCERF and its partnership with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) is still in the early stages and therefore not eligible for full review, the APP and multilateral partners supported analytical and operational interventions focusing on various aspects of P/CVE, many of which attempts to scale up existing local management tools and mechanisms as in the case of Balay Mindanao’s AS2G-CARE in Basilan and TAF and Balay Mindanao’s Project CIRCLE.

***Benefits and costs of flexibility*** *-* The APP and multilateral partners have made efficient use of Australia’s resources despite the rapidly evolving situation in the Bangsamoro region. The flexible funding arrangement enabled DFAT to respond, through its APP and other implementing partners, to new emergent challenges as they arise. Across the board, partners were very appreciative of DFAT’s adaptive programming given the highly fluid situation prevailing on the ground. This flexibility requires additional coordination at the subgrantee level, as multiple APP partners and UNDP tend to work with the same field level subgrantees.

***Impact of research on policies and programs –*** Studies conducted by the APP and multilateral implementing partners were generally able to identify key analytical challenges in the transition, were able to complement each other’s work, and by doing so have informed the understanding and programming of other partners and donors. However, the degree to which the recommendations from the research have been carried out by national and regional actors is mixed. Analytical support to the political and administrative aspects of the transition are generally welcomed and directly used by regional and national partners. DFAT-supported analytics through the ICG and TAF on emerging research on cross boarder threats of VE in Southeast Asia is envisioned to become more relevant in the next phase of operations. Based on feedback from local government partners, however, the next phase of work requires a shift from analysis and coordination to direct implementation of interventions that address identified community drivers of P/CVE.

***Alignment with other Australian assistance in Mindanao -*** There is some overlap among the activities and partners engaged by the Political team, the Education/Pathways team, and the Humanitarian team in the Bangsamoro. Although Pathways and TAF-CARE have been able to coordinate in the drafting of the Education Code, the Pathways Responsive Innovation Fund, multiple APP partners, and UNDP share several subgrantees. Similarly, the support for Task Force Bangon Marawi through the APP partners, the World Bank, and UNDP, operates in the same space as the DFAT-supported Marawi Recovery Project, particularly in the partnerships with UNHCR, UNFPA, and CFSI. Moving forward, UNFPA will be working increasingly with the MILF’s BIWAB as well as the BTA’s Ministry of Social Services (MSS). Although regular meetings are scheduled, these are largely informal and often postponed in the absence of structured coordination guidelines and a shared framework strategy for operations in Mindanao.

***On Efficiency***

The APP and multilateral implementing partners have made efficient use of Australia’s resources despite the rapidly evolving situation in the Bangsamoro region. The flexible funding arrangement enabled DFAT to respond, through its APP and multilateral implementing partners, to new emergent challenges of the peace process such as the need to engage in advocacy work for the passage and ratification of the BOL, the urgent task of successfully installing the new BARMM government and its instrumentalities, the pressing need for BARMM to deliver peace dividends particularly to the combatants, the MILF camps and base commands, and the imperative of tracking and responding to the growing threat of VE groups and the reconstruction work of Marawi City. These events took place within the two-year time frame by which the current program is being implemented. The ability of partners to effectively respond to these variety of tasks and objectives clearly demonstrate that the bilateral flexible funding modality operates well in situations of fragility and conflict, particularly in light of delays in the setup of proposed multidonor mechanisms such as the BNTF and the Marawi Reconstruction Trust Fund. With the creation of the BARMM and a new phase of CAB implementation, DFAT programming should balance flexibility with clear links to national and regional government targets, particularly the BTA’s 12 Point Priority Agenda for the transition.

***On Relevance***

***Adaptation to changing context in BARMM -***The ability to quickly effect changes in objectives, activities, and resource allocation priorities by APP and multilateral implementing partners in response to the changing political economy situation in the Bangsamoro greatly enhanced relevance of the program. It enabled the program to be aligned with the current needs of the BARMM government for technical assistance in formulating key governance codes and ensure the smooth setup of the new parliamentary government. In depth analyses of the causes and growth of VE groups and the conduct of dialogues and consultations among key stakeholders in the Bangsamoro region helped build the coalition to prevent further spread of the influence of VE groups. To remain relevant, efforts should be geared towards the efficient implementation of outstanding commitments. The broad cross-sectoral grassroots networks mobilized for BOL communications and advocacy through the APP partners and groups such as the UNDP-supported Insider Mediators (IM) are resources that have not been fully maximized by the BTA and the peace process mechanisms in the post-plebiscite era. Continuing advocacy for the reconstruction of Marawi City will significantly contribute to reducing tension and dissatisfaction among residents in the area and deprived VE groups of the propaganda value of the still unreconstructed urban core of the only “Islamic City” in the country. Support to normalization activities is key to achieving stability and peace in the Bangsamoro region given that the parties have agreed to decommission around 40,000 MILF combatants and their families and provide socio-economic support to develop identified MILF camps and base commands.

***Integration with the broader range of new initiatives*** *-* Although it must be acknowledged that the volume of new funds now available to BARMM generally outstrips ODA sources, the influx of donor interest in the Bangsamoro transition necessitates strong donor coordination to avoid duplication and ensure complementation. In the absence of a formal donor coordination mechanism, most donors, INGOs and NGOs tend to go straight to specific ministries, while bilateral and multilateral programs are also further coursed through a number of INGOs and NGOs, making the total picture difficult to track. Although DFAT arguably has one of the broadest portfolios supporting the Mindanao peace process, integration will be necessary with JICA, EU, and USAID initiatives in the Bangsamoro region, while helping the BTA execute the Bangsamoro Expenditure Program (BEP) efficiently.

***Support to regional security and economic growth –*** Australian investments provided support to the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) in the decommissioning of the MILF BIAF through UNDP, as well as other key normalization and P/CVE efforts. With the exception of community-driven development in the MILF camps through MTF-RDP, economic-related investments were largely limited to exploratory studies and dialogues. Experiments include PBSP’s Brokering Business Investments in the Bangsamoro to Achieve Inclusive Development and Growth (BRIDGe), as well as exploratory conversations convened by IA on private sector involvement and innovation for internally displaced persons.

***On*** ***Gender Equality***

While Oxfam is the only APP partner whose entire program is explicitly designed for women empowerment in the Bangsamoro area, all APP partners have become more conscious of the need for greater women’s participation in the peace process compared to when they were operating under the previous *BASIC Bangsamoro* program. All APP partners have Conflict Sensitive Gender Action Plans (CSGAPs), with varying levels of interaction with the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1325. This has led to collection of sex-disaggregated data and ensuring that a good proportion of participants and actors for all activities at all levels are women, including the new BTA Ministers of Parliament (MPs). Key APP investments include the formulation of the law creating the new BARMM Bangsamoro Women Commission, and engagement with female IDPs, women affected by ‘black flag’ actors, including spouses of former Maute and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) fighters, as well as members of the MILF’s Social Welfare Committee and the MILF Bangsamoro Islamic Women’s Auxiliary Brigade. As the peace process shifts to implementation, efforts will need to move beyond collecting sex-disaggregated data and ensuring basic participation to aiming for positive development outcomes for women in the Bangsamoro and continue to address power imbalances and inequalities for widows and non-elite, female-headed households.

***On Disability inclusion***

While conscious of the need to promote participation of persons with disability (PWD) particularly in the case of Oxfam’s drafting of a disability inclusion plan and IA’s communications accessibility policies, there has been no deliberate effort yet on the part of the APP and implementing partners to design specific interventions for this cohort. This can be partially rooted in cultural norms, which discourage families or the revolutionary groups in general from admitting that they have members with disabilities (whether physical or related to psycho-social trauma). A second hurdle is the thinking that PWDs are more the concern of humanitarian programs or agencies rather than development workers or agencies. The next phase of investment is an opportunity to engage this issue.

***On inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and other vulnerable sectors***

There was deliberate effort on the part of APP and multilateral implementing partners to reach out to IP communities to ensure their voices are heard in BARMM and the trajectory of the peace process. This includes direct support to key IP regional voices, leading up to the creation of the BARMM Ministry of Indigenous Peoples’ Affairs (MIPA). While there is sensitivity over the issue due to unresolved land claims particularly in Maguindanao, the APP and implementing partners made sure that IP forums are held and IPs are invited in various forums that they sponsored and organized to discuss how the BARMM government can respond to the varying needs of the IP communities within the Bangsamoro region. Effort will be required to ensure that IP inclusion—as well as the inclusion of other vulnerable sectors, including orphans, widows, and internally-displaced persons–goes beyond checklist representation and into substantial and substantive participation.

Although not explicitly included in the Australian DFAT portfolio design for Mindanao, early-stage initiatives that acknowledge the link between climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction and management (CCA/DRRM) and armed conflict were implemented by UNDP, International Alert, and TAF. This will be important given the multiple levels of vulnerabilities exposed by the ongoing pandemic.

**Recommendations:**

**Working better together to sustain peace:**

1. Strengthen coordination among APP, WB, UNDP, and Flexible Peace and Stability Fund partners and across the Australian Mindanao program.
2. Assist in improving coordination amongst donors, national, regional and local governments involved in the peace process to support BARMM operations, the full implementation of the CAB, and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Marawi City.
3. Strengthen gender sensitive plan and install PWD sensitivity plans in the work program of APP and implementing partners, including support to meaningful implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.
4. Develop a framework for P/CVE activities of APP and implementing partners and link it with the larger efforts on this concern, aligned with the National Action Plan on P/CVE. This will support cohesion while retaining flexibility for programming through the FPSF and adjustments with the APP and multilateral portfolio.
5. Assist in strengthening voices of CSOs, IPs, internally-displaced persons, orphans, widows, and other marginalized sectors in policy formulation and decision making within BARMM, including focused efforts to help prevent or manage communal and resource-based conflicts.

**Building Stronger Institutions and the Peace Dividend**

1. Formulate a Mindanao Strategy for DFAT Manila engagement across programs and recruitment of a Local Peace and Development Adviser.
   1. Strengthen coordination between DFAT Manila and DFAT Canberra.
   2. Retain bilateral activities for flexibility.
   3. Ensuring geographic balance and tailoring of interventions to local needs for both archipelagic and mainland BARMM will be important to support inclusivity and legitimacy.
   4. Continue engagement with provincial and city/municipal governments to upscale local conflict management tools, mechanisms, and best practices, and support integration with regular operations of the Bangsamoro Government.
2. BARMM will need to recruit new individuals with a different set of skills and competence that are able to respond to the many governance challenges of the region, foremost of which is the delivery of basic services to the Bangsamoro people.
   1. Support Technical Advisory capacity at BARMM and OPAPP levels (embed Senior Advisor).
   2. Develop training programs and scholarships, particularly among Bangsamoro youth, that prioritize skills needed in reconstructing and developing the Bangsamoro economy.
3. Strengthen coalition for reforms and the peace process among CSOs and other stakeholders, particularly if the high expectations of the BARMM is not met and if deadlock on Marawi reconstruction continues.
   1. Assist in shifting donor support from confidence building measures to socio-economic development. Balancing ‘soft’ policy interventions such as planning workshops and capacity-building trainings with concrete delivery of socio-economic, governance, and security-related packages is crucial particularly for P/CVE and normalization workstreams.
   2. Adjust monitoring and evaluation metrics to more household-level outcomes that can be tangibly felt by constituents (e.g., increase in household income, increase in knowledge about and quality of interaction with the Bangsamoro Government).
   3. Adjust operating procedures to COVID-19 social distancing and mobility restrictions, which will entail more localized investments and partnerships.

# **BACKGROUND**

1. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) appointed a three-person review team[[2]](#footnote-2) to assess the effectiveness of Australia’s support for peace in Muslim Mindanao under the Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Mindanao investment (INL343) and its ongoing appropriateness in the current political context. The review covers three modalities implemented from mid-2017 to mid-2019: a) bilateral investments under the Australian Partnerships for Peace (APP) program (thereby serving as the APP mid-term review); b) investments implemented by multilateral mechanisms such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF); and c) small-value activities delivered through the Flexible Peace and Stability Fund (FPSF). Using a set of criteria drafted by the Australian Embassy Manila, set out in its Terms of Reference (Annex A), the review also aims to provide strategic advice on Australia’s wider support for peace in the region.
2. The assessments herein are based on available documents[[3]](#footnote-3) and interviews with APP, multilateral, and selected Flexible Peace and Stability Fund (FPSF) partners, government officials, development partners, and key stakeholders in the BARMM. These interviews were conducted in in Manila and the cities of Cotabato, Iligan, Zamboanga, and Cagayan de Oro from 3-26 February 2020 (refer to Annex B for the list).
3. The Australian Embassy Manila identified two key changes in context which impacted current activities. The first is the late 2018 passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), or RA No. 11054, and its ratification in early 2019 which triggered the following: (i) establishment of the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM); (ii) the challenge of effective governance on the newly-established BARMM to strengthen its legitimacy; (iii) decommissioning of the remaining MILF combatants and the transformation of MILF camps into prosperous communities; and (iv) transformation of the MILF from a revolutionary non-state armed group to a social and political movement. The second is the 2017 assault and occupation of Marawi City by violent extremist (VE) groups whose defeat resulted in a new set of problems: (a) the destruction and delayed reconstruction of Marawi City’s urban core; (b) addressing the needs of Marawi residents who have been displaced for almost three years and counting; and (c) the continuing challenge of VE groups within and outside the Bangsamoro region.

1. The review team presented its initial findings at a meeting with the Australian Embassy, chaired by Deputy Head of Mission Richard Sisson on 10 March 2020. This Report elaborates on the team’s initial assessments, addressing comments made by Australian Embassy staff during and after the presentation. The findings and recommendations have been enriched by the knowledge and insights of the team members, each of whom has more than a decade of experience working on the Bangsamoro peace process and the region’s major development challenges.

# **II. Mission Findings**

1. The review team notes the importance of having an understanding of the prevailing situation during the project implementation phase (2017-2019) in assessing the performance of the APP and implementing partners based on the evaluation criteria (i.e., effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, gender equality, and disability inclusion) provided in the TOR. Annex C identifies the significant changes that occurred before, during, and after the implementation period, from the initial portfolio design in 2016, to the declaration of Martial Law after the Marawi crisis in 2017, to the passage of the BOL in early 2019. We also discuss how peace efforts transitioned within a relatively short period of time from advocating the passage of the BOL to addressing the governance challenges faced by the newly established BARMM as well as the threat of VE groups across the region.
2. Annex C divides the key peace process milestones into six aspects, broadly corresponding to the Pillar 1: Security and Stability target outcome statements in the current Australian Government’s Annual Investment Program (AIP): a) political; b) administrative; c) planning, budgeting, and fiscal policy; d) security and stability; e) economic development and confidence-building; and f) transitional justice and reconciliation. The table notes which development actors are currently operating in the space, whether funded by DFAT or otherwise. The manner by which partners respond to the fast-changing political economy context in the Bangsamoro region is a major determinant of how they performed during the evaluation period. The table further notes the projected target tasks for 2020 until the first elections of the Bangsamoro parliament in May 2022, as well as likely risks and mitigating measures that should be factored into future programming.
3. These milestones contextualize the Evaluation Matrices that track the performance of APP and multilateral partners against the review criteria (see Annex D). Given the number and varying scope and scale of the projects supported by the Flexible Peace and Stability Fund, the FPSF modality was reviewed as a whole, although notable FPSF-funded projects are discussed throughout this Report.

## ***On Effectiveness***

*A. Attaining* *objectives and adjusting to the changing context*

1. **The APP and implementing partners were generally successful in achieving their expected outputs and outcomes from 2017-2019.** A clear manifestation is the passage of the BOL by the Philippine Congress in mid-2018, and the successful plebiscites in January and February 2019. The APP partner activities such as IAG’s ENPOLD Bangsamoro, OXFAM’s WELD-PEACE, the joint MILF-MNLF dialogues hosted by TAF-CARE and CHD as well as conversations facilitated under PRIME-Bangsamoro ensured broad participation of key stakeholders inside and outside the Bangsamoro region in the deliberation of the various provisions of the BOL. Among the stakeholders engaged by the APP partners were the MILF and national government officials, MNLF, LGU officials, women’s groups, IP communities, youth groups, academe, Christian settlers, media and those residing in the island provinces concerned with their role in the proposed BARMM government. The combined effort of the APP partners, the national government, MILF, and other allies of the peace process led to the ratification of the BOL, the inclusion of additional territories (i.e., Cotabato City and 39 barangays in North Cotabato) under the new BARMM, and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) as the interim regional government for less than three years until the first formal elections of the Bangsamoro Parliament in May 2022.
2. **However, the speed by which the passage and ratification of the BOL and the establishment of new BARMM government took place brought in a new set of challenges for the APP and implementing partners.** As the multitude of activities pursued for the advocacy on the passage and ratification of the BOL were completed, there was an immediate need to shift efforts and resources to the successful installation of the instrumentalities of the new BARMM government and in ensuring that the new government will deliver on promises made to the Bangsamoro people.
3. Selected APP partners, particularly TAF and IAG, responded to the governance challenges of the new BARMM government. Technical assistance support was extended in crafting key legislations (i.e., Civil Service, Education, Administrative, Revenue, and Election Codes) that are needed to ensure that the shift to the parliamentary system from the unitary form of government previously present in ARMM becomes a smooth one. Limited capacity building programs were also offered to provide key BARMM officials and staff knowledge and insights on how to efficiently run their respective ministries. Efforts to establish structures, systems, and rules for the new BARMM as envisioned in the CAB and BOL are expected to continue even beyond 2022.
4. Support to normalization activities continued through the extension of the World Bank’s Mindanao Trust Fund – Reconstruction and Development Program 2 (MTF-RDP2) in the six acknowledged MILF camps in Central Mindanao, and the UNDP-managed funding for the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB), one of the key actors supporting the so-called Phase 2**,** which refers to, among others, the decommissioning of 30% of total combatants (or 12,000 individuals) of the MILF’s Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) and its Bangsamoro Islamic Women’s Auxiliary Brigade (BIWAB). However, effective implementation was hampered by exogenous factors such as the delay in the establishment of the Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF).

### *B. Addressing drivers of conflict and violence*

1. **The APP and implementing partners helped address drivers of conflict and violence by continuing to deploy conflict monitoring, prevention, and mitigation tools at the local level, particularly on land resource management and clan conflict resolution. With the 2017 Marawi Siege, a key adjustment was to provide technical assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Marawi City while helping address the threat of violent extremism (VE) across the region.** A series of high-level consultations and workshops with national government and LGU officials, displaced victims particularly women, NGOs, INGOs and academe on how humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation and reconstruction work should proceed were conducted under sponsorship of APP and implementing partners. Resources provided to the World Bank and UNDP were channeled for support to Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) and the Provincial Government of Lanao del Sur, respectively.
2. This also led to analytical and operational interventions focusing on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), many of which attempted to scale up existing local management tools and mechanisms, including those supported by BASIC Bangsamoro prior to 2017. International Alert built on its conflict monitoring system to support the creation of an Early Response Network and a Critical Events Monitoring System (CEMS) and convened a third-party multi-stakeholder Marawi Reconstruction and Conflict Watch. Local-government focused interventions range from the Provincial Government of Lanao del Sur P/CVE Technical Working Group pilot supported by UNDP START-PEACE, to Project CIRCLE, which is implemented in 14 municipalities and cities across Mindanao by The Asia Foundation and Balay Mindanaw. International Alert has also begun to engage the intersections of resource management and conflict mitigation through local development planning in selected municipalities in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. While the pivot to provincial- and municipal-level mechanisms is positive, it is unclear if these initiatives can be sustainable after project closure and integrated with the newly-created coordination mechanisms at the national and regional levels such as the DILG’s drafting and interagency monitoring of the National Action Plan on P/CVE and the creation of the Ministry of Public Order and Safety, respectively. This is similarly true for CHD’s longstanding clan conflict mediation efforts in Sulu. While GCERF is assumed to strengthen hyperlocal P/CVE initiatives, it is just about to begin implementation for its first round of grantees and therefore cannot be assessed during this review period.
3. **A common observation on P/CVE programs is that they overwhelmingly support ‘soft’ policy interventions such as planning workshops and capacity-building trainings, with limited concrete delivery of socio-economic programs**. Balay Mindanaw’s AS2G-CARE in Basilan, for example, successfully avoids this issue because it complements an existing government program for former Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) fighters that is jointly implemented by the province, the AFP and the defunct ARMM Regional Government, particularly through the latter’s comprehensive housing, livelihood, and social services program, ARMM-BRIDGE.[[4]](#footnote-4) In comparison, there is no fund cover for the reintegration of more than 200 former Maute supporters who have surrendered to the AFP in Lanao del Sur. It is recommended that future P/CVE programming be able to balance between ‘soft’ interventions and more tangible grassroots-level packages, whether as socioeconomic support or through the establishment of security mechanisms such as barangay peacekeeping action teams (BPATs). In the case of reintegration programs for former ‘black flag’ actors, however, caution is recommended in ensuring that restorative justice is upheld, and support is not seen as a negative incentive for perpetrators while providing limited support to affected communities.

### *C. Benefits and costs of flexibility*

1. **The APP and implementing partners have made efficient use of Australia’s resources despite the rapidly evolving situation in the Bangsamoro region.** The flexible funding arrangement enabled DFAT to respond, through its APP and multilateral partners and their subgrantees, to new emergent challenges as they arise. Across the board, partners were very appreciative of DFAT’s adaptive programming given the highly fluid situation prevailing on the ground. Examples include: a) the revision of APP objective 2 to include support for transition activities, b) the earlier pivot of APP to post-Marawi support and P/CVE activities, and c) use of the Strategic Flexible Fund to provide ad-hoc resources for activities such as AS2G and Project CIRCLE. However, unchecked flexibility may sometimes come with efficiency costs, as discussed in greater detail below.

### *D. Impact of research on policies and programs*

1. **Studies conducted by the APP and implementing partners were generally able to identify key analytical challenges in the transition and were able to complement each other’s work**. However, the degree to which the recommendations from the research have been implemented by national and regional actors is mixed. Analytical support to the political and administrative aspects of the transition, such as those conducted by IAG through its ENPOLD Bangsamoro and the abovementioned ongoing support to the drafting of the BTA priority bills, are generally welcomed and directly used by regional and national partners.
2. On the other hand, research related to security and normalization—specifically International Alert and TAF’s work on small arms and light weapons (SALW), analysis from CHD, TAF, and IAG on the triggers of P/CVE, vulnerabilities of Bangsamoro youth and orphans, as well as options for reducing land and resource-based violent conflict in Marawi and other areas supported by IA, the World Bank, and TAF—has opened conversations but has thus far had uneven impact on national programming. This can be partially attributed to the outsize focus on the setup of the BTA after the passage of the BOL in 2018 and other exogenous events. Nevertheless, the research has been shared with other development partners and donors and has informed understanding and programming. It is hoped that as BTA operations settle in, the parties will be able to pivot towards normalization and broader peace and security concerns. With the emerging threat of ISIS fighters moving/returning to Southeast Asia, it is anticipated that the small subset of research on cross-border threats in Southeast Asia, implemented by the International Contact Group and TAF Malaysia will become increasingly relevant. Based on feedback from local government partners, however, the next phase of work requires a shift from analysis and coordination to direct implementation of interventions that reintegrate former fighters/supporters, strengthen community security, and address identified community drivers of P/CVE.

### *E. Alignment with other Australian assistance in Mindanao*

1. **There is some overlap amongst the activities and partners engaged by the DFAT Political team, the Education/Pathways team, and the Humanitarian team in the Bangsamoro.** Although Pathways and TAF-CARE have been able to coordinate in the drafting of the Education Code, the Pathways Responsive Innovation Fund and other APP partners share several subgrantees. Similarly, the support for TFBM through APP, the World Bank, and UNDP operates in the same space as the DFAT-supported Marawi Response Program, particularly in the partnerships with UNHCR, UNFPA, and CFSI. Moving forward, UNFPA will be working increasingly with the MILF’s BIWAB as well as the BTA’s Ministry of Social Services (MSS). Although regular meetings are scheduled, these are largely informal and often postponed in the absence of structured coordination guidelines and a shared framework strategy for operations in Mindanao.

## ***On Efficiency***

1. **The APP and implementing partners have made efficient use of Australia’s resources despite the rapidly evolving situation in the Bangsamoro region.** The flexible funding arrangement enabled DFAT to respond, through its APP and multilateral implementing partners and their subgrantees, to new emergent challenges of the peace process such as the need to engage in advocacy work for the passage and ratification of the BOL, the urgent task of successfully installing the new BARMM government and its various instrumentalities, the pressing need for BARMM to deliver peace dividends particularly to the combatants, the MILF camps and base commands, and the imperative of responding to the growing threat of VE groups and the reconstruction work of Marawi City. These events took place within the two-year time frame by which the current program is being implemented. The ability of the APP and implementing partners to effectively respond to these variety of tasks and objectives clearly demonstrate that the flexible funding modality operates well in situations of fragility and conflict given the highly fluid situation prevailing on the ground, particularly in light of delays in the setup of proposed multi-donor mechanisms such as the BNTF and the Marawi Reconstruction Trust Fund. With the creation of the BARMM and a new phase of CAB implementation, DFAT programming should balance flexibility with clear links to national and regional government targets, particularly the BTA’s 12-Point Priority Agenda for the transition.
2. However, flexibility has also its downside. Flexibility without close coordination among implementing partners and monitoring of their impacts can create confusion among recipients of the assistance both at the Bangsamoro government level and local communities and increase transaction costs. For one, overlaps among APP partners, WB, and UNDP are difficult to prevent because they are working on the same challenges and within the same geographical area, and therefore tend to work with the same field level subgrantees. TAF, with 22 local partners for APP-CARE, unavoidably taps the same partners as that of IA, IAG, CHD and Oxfam. In the case of P/CVE activities in Butig, Lanao del Sur, the two primary NGO subgrantees MARADECA and Balay Mindanaw, are implementing at least three ‘flavors’ of DFAT-funded projects that are coursed through multiple INGOs and multilateral donors, some of whom have limited the implementation period to only three (3) months. Portfolio reviews at the provincial level across all modalities and subgrantees will help address some of these overlaps.
3. There is also a tendency to push and pull Bangsamoro leaders to various directions depending on the strength of the grantee/donor. On the other hand, local communities have been showing fatigue over consultations and forums conducted by different grantees/donors, complaining that concrete results from those activities have not been felt a year after the BTA was established and almost three years after the Marawi siege. Thus, maximizing portfolio flexibility requires additional coordination at the subgrantee level, with a clear focus on delivering tangible outcomes in a complementary manner.

## ***On Relevance***

### *A. Adaptation to changing context in BARMM*

1. **The ability to quickly effect changes in objectives, activities and resource allocation priorities by APP and multilateral implementing partners in response to the changing political economy situation in the Bangsamoro greatly enhanced relevance of the program**. It enabled the program to be aligned with the current needs of the BARMM government for technical assistance in formulating key governance codes to ensure a smooth working of the new parliamentary government. Support to normalization activities is key to achieving stability and peace in the Bangsamoro region given that the process will decommission around 40,000 MILF combatants and provide socio-economic support to MILF camps and base command. In depth analyses of the causes and growth of VE groups and the conduct of dialogues and consultations among key stakeholders in the Bangsamoro region helped build the coalition to prevent further spread of the influence of VE groups. Continuing advocacy for the reconstruction of Marawi City will significantly contribute to reducing tension and dissatisfaction among residents in the area and deprived VE groups of the propaganda value of the still desolated “only Islamic City” in the country.
2. Further adaptation will be required in the coming cycles, particularly in assisting the newly-established BTA in fulfilling its mandates. Early efforts have focused on the drafting of the priority codes. Moving forward, the BTA will be judged on how well it has delivered priority basic services including those publicly identified as part of the BARMM’s 12-Point Agenda, while operationalizing the Interim Chief Minister Ahod Ebrahim’s call for ‘moral governance’. This also entails assisting the BTA in efficiently utilizing the various sources of financing, which will require new processes for planning, budgeting, disbursement, and monitoring and evaluation. Under the 2020 National Expenditure Plan (NEP), a total of PHP 70.6 billion will be allocated for BARMM, covering the following components: i) the annual Block Grant of PHP 63.6 billion; ii)  a Special Development Fund of PHP 5.0 billion; and iii) PHP 2.0 billion as the BARMM’s share in the taxes, fees and charges collected in the region. This is almost twice higher than the PHP 31.117 billion allotted to the now-defunct ARMM’s final annual budget in 2018.[[5]](#footnote-5)

### *B. Integration with the broader range of new initiatives*

1. Although it must be acknowledged that the volume of new funds now available to BARMM outstrips ODA sources, the influx of donor interest in the Bangsamoro transition necessitates strong donor coordination to avoid duplication and ensure complementation. In the absence of a formal donor coordination mechanism (which ideally should be lodged with the ICM’s office), most donors, INGOs and NGOs tend to go straight to specific ministries, while bilateral and multilateral programs are also further coursed through a number of INGOs and NGOs, making the total picture difficult to track.
2. Although DFAT arguably has one of the broadest portfolios supporting the Mindanao peace process, integration will be necessary with Japan’s Capacity Development Project for the Bangsamoro (CDPB), the EU/AECID Technical Assistance for Support to Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA), the UK’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), and USAID’s PeaceConnect, Marawi Response Project, and FORWARD Bangsamoro. Operationally, much of the coordination presently occurs at the level of the APP and multilateral implementing partners, as in the cases of TAF, IAG, and UNDP, who manage multiple funding streams for similar activities. Similar programming complementation is conducted at the subgrantee level, as in the case of MARADECA and Balay Mindanaw.

### *C. Support to regional security and economic growth*

1. With the exception of community-driven development in the MILF camps through MTF-RDP, economic-related investments were largely limited to exploratory studies and dialogues. Experiments include PBSP’s Brokering Business Investments in the Bangsamoro to Achieve Inclusive Development and Growth (BRIDGe), as well as exploratory conversations convened by IA on private sector involvement and innovation for internally displaced persons. In contrast, it must be noted that eight out of the BTA’s 12 priorities for the transition (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12) have to do with sustainable livelihood activities and economic development.
2. As illustrated in Annex C, programming adjustments will also need to be made to catch up on normalization-related investments to manage horizontal conflict leading up to the May 2022 elections. This includes disbandment of private armed groups, deactivation of SCAAs, community policing efforts, firearms control and management, amnesties and pardons, all of which should be supported by the broader transitional justice and reconciliation agenda.

## ***On*** ***Gender Equality***

1. **While Oxfam is the only APP partner whose entire program is explicitly designed for women empowerment in the Bangsamoro area, the other APP partners have become more conscious of the need for greater women’s participation in the peace process** compared to when they were operating under the previous *BASIC Bangsamoro* program. All APP partners have Conflict Sensitive Gender Action Plans (CSGAPs), with varying levels of interaction with the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. This has led to collection of sex-disaggregated data and ensuring that a good proportion of participants and actors for all activities at all levels are women, including key Ministers of Parliament. Key APP investments include the formulation of the law creating the new BARMM Bangsamoro Women Commission, and engagement with female IDPs, women affected by ‘black flag’ actors, including spouses of former Maute and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) fighters, regional CSO coalitions of women such as WOMB, as well as members of the MILF’s Social Welfare Committee and the MILF Bangsamoro Islamic Women’s Auxiliary Brigade. As the peace process shifts to implementation, efforts will need to move beyond collecting sex-disaggregated data and ensuring basic participation to aiming for positive development outcomes for women in the Bangsamoro, particularly widows and female-headed households, and other vulnerable sectors.

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## ***On Disability inclusion***

1. While conscious of the need to promote participation of persons with disability (PWD) particularly in the case of Oxfam’s drafting of an disability inclusion plan and IA’s communications accessibility policies, there has been no deliberate effort yet on the part of the APP and multilateral implementing partners to design specific interventions for this cohort.. Part of the problem is the difficulty in identifying them in the community as cultural norms discourage families or the revolutionary groups in general from admitting that they have members with disabilities (whether physical or related to psycho-social trauma). A second hurdle is the thinking that PWDs are more the concern of humanitarian programs or agencies rather than development workers or agencies. Nevertheless, a WB partner, CFSI, made the effort of identifying how many PWDs are in the community using PSA data and cross-validated it with WHO data. It is to be noted though that the CFSI might be an exceptional case because it is involved in both humanitarian and development work. The next phase of Australian investments in Mindanao is an opportunity to engage this issue.

## ***Other criteria***

1. ***Indigenous People inclusion –*** There was also deliberate effort on the part of APP and multilateral implementing partners and their subgrantees, particularly TAF, IAG and IA to reach out to IP communities to ensure their voices are heard in BARMM and the trajectory of the peace process, leading up to the creation of the BARMM Ministry of Indigenous Peoples’ Affairs (MIPA). While there is sensitivity over the issue with some BARMM officials on the matter particularly due to the outstanding land claims in Maguindanao, the APP and other implementing partners made sure that Ips forums are held and Ips are invited in various forums that they sponsored and organized to discuss how the BARMM government can respond to the varying needs of the IP communities within the Bangsamoro region to ensure inclusivity in the peace process. However, effort will be required to ensure that IP inclusion—as well as the inclusion of other vulnerable sectors, including orphans, widows, and internally-displaced persons–goes beyond checklist representation and into substantial and substantive participation.
2. Although not explicitly included in the Australian DFAT portfolio design for Mindanao, early-stage initiatives that acknowledge the link between climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction and management (CCA/DRRM) and armed conflict were implemented by UNDP, International Alert, and TAF.

# **III. Exogenous Factors Impacting Program Effectiveness**

1. The effectiveness or success of donor’s assistance in attaining peace and stability is to a large extent determined by the policy and institutional environment within which the peace process evolved.[[6]](#footnote-6) This is not surprising as donors are not the main actors in the conflict; in the case of the Mindanao conflict, they are the GPH and the MILF. The policy and institutional arrangements agreed and set up by both parties delineate the parameters within which donors can engage. A number of these policy and institutional bottlenecks constrained greater effectiveness of APP and multilateral implementing partners and their subgrantees, among which are:
2. ***Coordination issues***

***(i) Donor coordination –*** Early in the administration of the Duterte administration, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) formulated the “Mindanao Peace and Development Framework”, a government blueprint in attaining peace and development in the island and identified areas where development partners could help. OPAPP called for a series of meetings with the development partners with the objective of sharing the framework and improving donor coordination. However, the change of leadership in OPAPP in 2018 did not see a follow up on this effort. The gap could have been addressed if the newly-established BARMM government had taken over the leadership role on this initiative. Unfortunately, it did not.

Donors attempted to fill the vacuum by convening donors to a regular meeting to discuss the peace process and other Mindanao concerns. The effort was not sustained though because of conflicting schedules and views from key donors. The end result was donors went on their own way in helping the new BARMM government. It is not surprising then that they are addressing the same governance concerns of the BTA and BARMM. For instance, given the relative inexperience of BARMM officials in governance, major donors are launching technical assistance and capacity building projects. Substantial overlaps in their efforts is expected, resulting in waste of scarce resources and further confusion among the recipients.

***(ii) Government coordination –***  While OPAPP is the national government agency leading the peace process with the MILF, it is not an implementing entity in the delivery of socio-economic services as part of the package of the normalization agenda. OPAPP has to link with various and larger government agencies such as the DepEd when educational services are needed, DA for agricultural livelihood programs, TESDA for skills upgrading programs, DoH for health services, DILG for local government concerns, etc. Moreover, there is also confusion regarding who is the official point person of the government on BARMM matters because the DND Secretary is the Cabinet Official assigned to BARMM and the President designated the head of MinDA as the person in-charge of BARMM. On the other hand, the Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR) body, the entity created under the BOL to thresh out policy differences between national government agencies and BARMM ministries, is headed by the Finance Secretary and his counterpart in BARMM is the Minister of Basic, Higher and Technical Education. Moreover, the relationship between BARMM and LGUs in the autonomous region is still unclear with the DILG attempting to mediate their differences, as was in the recent case of the turnover of Cotabato City to BARMM.

***(iii) Coordination on P/CVE efforts –*** There has been a proliferation of dialogues, consultations, forums, and studies along the line of P/CVE as a result of the Marawi assault and the threat of VE groups. While Australian DFAT and USAID attempted to coordinate these various P/CVE efforts, their efforts have not been quite successful as there is no agreed framework on how donors should address the threat of VE groups and the areas which should be given priority by each donors, given their comparative strengths, in meeting the challenge of VE. Also, most of the analytics on VE are anecdotal in nature rather than a systematic and empirically based analysis of the threat. The Conflict Monitoring system and Early Response Networks of IA is a good start. Efforts are being exerted by DFAT to further enrich IA’s findings with more data/information obtained from the ground through scientific surveys to determine the main triggers/causes of the emergence and growth of VE in various provinces of the Bangsamoro region.

1. ***The Marawi challenge***

Despite significant assistance (both financial and technical) provided by donors (DFAT included) to the Marawi reconstruction, the work has hardly started almost two a half years after the defeat of the VE groups. Marawi City holds a high propaganda value to VE groups because it is the only “Islamic City” in the Philippines. Its rehabilitation and reconstruction should have been a top priority both by the national government and the BARMM leaderships. The inability to address policy and institutional bottlenecks to the reconstruction of Marawi City is severely hampering donor’s effectiveness in strengthening peace and stability and preventing VE groups from regaining strength because of the legitimate grievance over the neglect of the Marawi IDPs and the continuing sight of a destroyed and desolated City.

1. ***Trust deficit***

Multiple roles are held by key officials of BARMM and within the peace process architecture. No matter how qualified and competent they are, it is extremely difficult to effectively and efficiently discharge one’s function if spread to numerous tasks waiting for quick resolution because of the short transition time frame. Such practice also generates dissatisfaction among qualified Bangsamoro, particularly the youth, because they are denied the opportunity to serve and to learn the art and science of good governance. It also results to a much-delayed response on key issues facing the autonomous government given the heavy workload of officials occupying multiple positions.

1. ***Absence of active participation by CSOs, women, youth, IP, and IDP groups***

CSOs, women, youth, and IP groups in the Bangsamoro region were highly visible and active during the campaign for the passage and ratification of BOL. Once these were achieved and the BARMM government was established, there was no deliberate attempt to ensure that the voices of marginalized groups are continually and substantially heard in BTA operations and decision-making, although there are clear gender, IP, and ethnolinguistic ‘quotas’ for representation at the BTA ministry and parliament level.

The feeling of being left out gradually leads to discontentment and restlessness among the ranks of these proven allies of the peace process. Combined with the slow delivery of basic services and the inability to enjoy the benefits of the peace dividends, it is highly possible that CSOs, women, youth, IP, and IDP groups may turn out to become critics of the MILF dominated BARMM government should their concerns not be met.

Appointments to key government positions are mired by political considerations, an arena which the donors are discouraged to engage. However, support to passage of the Civil Service Code or similar laws/regulations that attempt to professionalize the bureaucracy will serve as a mitigating measure against appointment of individuals with inadequate technical skills. The application of such Codes or laws is particularly critical at this juncture because the BARMM government, after declaring redundant around 6,000 personnel from the previous ARMM government last December 2019, is now in the process of recruiting a new set of civil servants.

1. ***Absence of social protection assistance***

The years immediately after the signing of the GPH-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA) in September 1996 witnessed the unveiling of a number of social protection measures such as the WB’s SZOPAD Social Fund, UNDP’s multi-year Multi-Donor Programme, and the creation of a transition mechanism called the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD).[[7]](#footnote-7) These programs were aimed at delivering the benefits of the peace dividends immediately to MNLF and conflict-affected communities. Thus, there was heavy support on livelihood and employment generation activities and provision of basic infrastructure to support livelihood activities and improve social services (i.e., education and health). They were intended as short-term measures meant to gain the trust and confidence of local communities and enable the newly-formed MNLF dominated government in ARMM to work out the details of their medium-term development plan and implement it.

No such transition arrangements happened under the GPH-MILF peace process although it was expected that the previous ARMM would have already delivered on this socio-economic assistance. But that was ARMM and expectations are high on the MILF to quickly respond to the socio-economic needs of the ordinary Bangsamoro given that a huge amount under the “block grant” arrangement to be allotted to the BARMM government has been repeatedly announced. Nonetheless, expectations cannot be immediately met because (i) much of the attention of the MILF leadership is focused on the political transition process; (ii) relative inexperience of BARMM officials on governance; (iii) the complicated government procedures in accessing “block grant” allocation to ensure that government procurement, accounting and auditing rules are followed; and (iv) the absence of social protection programs that will immediately address the demand of the ordinary Bangsamoro to uplift their socio-economic conditions. The result is the current vacuum on support to economic and livelihood programs to the Bangsamoro communities, the need for which they repeatedly articulate in various forums.

# **IV. RECOMMENDATIONS**

## **Part A: APP, Multilateral, and Flexible Peace and Stability Fund Partners**

1. **Strengthen coordination among APP partners, WB, UNDP and their subgrantees, and across the Australian Mindanao program –** Overlaps in the activities among APP partners, the WB and UNDP have been noted as a result of them addressing the same challenges of the peace process and operating within a limited geographical area. While this can be partially attributed to the fact that a number of projects are jointly implemented or informed by shared studies, coordination can be further enhanced by regular quarterly meetings with APP and FPSF partners, WB, and UNDP. Continuing support to APP and FPSF partners based on their relative comparative strength in the peace process (e.g., IA on conflict monitoring, IAG on constructive and critical analysis of regional issues, CHD in Sulu, TAF on engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, Oxfam on gender equality, Balay Mindanaw on P/CVE activities, and PBSP on private sector engagement). The WB and UNDP can complement the efforts of the APP and FPSF partners by being able to match international insights and experiences of similarly situated countries in other parts of the world with local expertise.
2. **Better coordination across the Australian Mindanao program is also needed to avoid overlaps in their activities and gain maximum return on Australia’s investment in the Mindanao peace process--** Humanitarian assistance will eventually transition to delivery of traditional socio-economic services once situation normalizes. Peace and governance activities will have to be aligned with sectoral concerns such as education because the latter is the foundation by which good governance can only be sustained in the medium and long-run. It is recommended that a quarterly or bi-annual meeting among the heads and key staff of the various Australian projects should be conducted to improve coordination and information sharing activities.
3. **Assist in improving coordination amongst donors, national, regional and local governments involved in the peace process -** There are significant overlaps on the ground because of absence an effective coordinating mechanisms on donor assistance. Currently, all major donors are offering technical assistance and capacity-building programs to the BARMM government to build its capacity to effectively govern. Also, there is a vacuum on coordination among national, regional and local governments in the delivery of promised assistance to MILF combatants who will be decommissioned and the socio-economic services to be provided to MILF camps and communities. Poor coordination has resulted, at both levels, in confusion among recipients of the assistance and frustration over the slow delivery of promised benefits of the peace process. Being the second biggest donor in the peace process (in terms of grants), Australia can play an important role in improving donor and government coordination by sponsoring a series of forums that address this critical issue. It can partner with the WB[[8]](#footnote-8) and JICA (Japan being the biggest donor) in the conduct of these forums.
4. **Strengthen implementation of gender sensitive plans and install PWD sensitivity plan in the work program of APP partners –**  While significant progress on gender sensitivity has been noted in APP partners work, compared to when they were operating under the *Basic Bangsamoro*program, there is still room for improvement in implementing their Conflict Sensitive Gender Action Plans (CSGAPs), and how these activities contribute to the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. As the peace process shifts to implementation, there are opportunities to intensify engagement with non-elite and vulnerable women in the Bangsamoro, including widows, female-headed households, former combatants, and internally-displaced women. On the other hand, there is a notable gap in PWD sensitivity in the works of the APP, multilateral, and other implementing partners, despite initial plans by Oxfam and accessibility guidelines established by IA. Culturally-appropriate parameters on this concern should be built in the work program of APP and multilateral implementing partners to ensure the extent of engagement with PWDs.
5. **Develop a framework and metrics for P/CVE activities of APP and multilateral implementing partners and link it with larger efforts on this concern -** The Marawi siege and the emergence of VE groups in various parts of Mindanao have triggered serious concern among donors and the government in preventing/countering violent extremist groups. While the concern is warranted, the downside is that significant resources are being poured to address the issue without a framework by which a more effective way of addressing it should be conducted. The recent completion of the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, which was supported by DFAT through UNDP, should help inform this framing. Recently, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) issued a Memorandum Circular providing the guidelines for CSOs and international development organizations on how to engage in P/CVE work. The situation is not being assisted by the fact that most of the existing work on P/CVE, analyzing its causes and triggers, are anecdotal in nature. Australia is in a position to continue to assist in addressing this gap, in coordination with other donors, by co-developing a framework and evidence-based metrics for P/CVE engagement within the varying context of the local communities (i.e., island provinces vis-à-vis mainland Mindanao) where the VE groups operate.
6. **Assist in restoring and strengthening voices of CSOs, Ips and other marginalized sectors in policy formulation and decision making within BARMM –** APP partners, UNDP, and their local subgrantees were heavily involved in the advocacy for the passage and ratification of the BOL as part of the coalition of peace builders. Local partners are now complaining that after the BARMM government’s installation, their participation in the policy formulation and decision making in BARMM has been limited. The APP and multilateral partners should continue their support to CSOs, IPs, women, youth, IDPs, and other local stakeholders, to ensure that their views are articulated and able to meaningfully influence decision-making in the region. Strengthening the ranks of this coalition of peace builders will particularly be critical if the BARMM experiment disappoints.

## **Part B: Future programming**

1. **Formulate a Mindanao Strategy for DFAT engagement across programs** **and recruitment of a Local Peace and Development Adviser** – The increasing investments and attention on Mindanao by the Australian government will necessitate the formulation of Mindanao strategy to guide current and future assistance. Formulating the strategy will also be in line with the OECD Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding nexus. Mindanao is one of the best places globally to test case the successful linkage of humanitarian, development and peace building work given that all three streams of assistance will be needed, in varying degrees, in Mindanao’s conflict affected areas and adjoining communities given widespread poverty and vulnerability in the island.
2. The expanded coverage of Australian engagement in Mindanao will necessitate the engagement of a Local Peace and Development Adviser in DFAT to assist in the formulation of the Mindanao Strategy for DFAT and in linking with critical stakeholders in the peace process at OPAPP, concerned national government agencies and BARMM.
3. **Improve coordination between DFAT Manila and DFAT Canberra -** The formulation of a Mindanao strategy will require greater inputs from DFAT Canberra to DFAT Manila to assist the latter in addressing additional issues that will result in better coordination of the humanitarian, development and peace building nexus. DFAT Manila will benefit from knowledge of other countries similarly situated like Mindanao which DFAT Canberra has access to. In turn, knowledge of the Mindanao situation and the work of the APP, multilateral, and FPSF implementing partners can be shared by DFAT Manila to DFAT Canberra to improve the latter’s selection procedures on studies and activities that should be funded by DFAT.
4. **Technical Advisory support at BARMM and OPAPP levels (embed Senior Advisor) -** Senior officials of BARMM acknowledged their technical deficiency in running a government given that for almost four decades they were engaged in a revolutionary struggle. Most donors are offering one-shot technical assistance and capacity-building programs to address the problem but this is ostensibly not sufficient. The problem is aggravated by the redundancies of nearly 6,000 workers of the previous ARMM government, and whose replacements are currently being vetted. The experience of technical assistance support in other countries (e.g., Indonesia) shows that embedding a senior international adviser (supported by local consultants and staff) in the transitional government will be most effective because of the immersion of the senior adviser to the day-to-day operations of the bureaucracy. It will also be an opportunity to perform “on-the-job” training for middle level managers and support staff in various ministries of BARMM instead of sending them away for training for a period of time.
5. **Training programs and scholarships, particularly among the Bangsamoro youth, should prioritize skills needed in reconstructing and developing the Bangsamoro economy -** Training programs and Australian scholarships are heavily skewed towards conflict resolution, peace building, justice, and identity issues. While such expertise and skills are still relevant to this day, their relative importance has declined given that the primordial task now is to reconstruct and develop the Bangsamoro economy. A clear manifestation of this mismatch between skills and jobs is the lack of a Chief Economist in the BARMM government who could help formulate a systematic and data-driven economic blueprint for the Bangsamoro economy. Islamic banking and finance have been a long-held advocacy of the Bangsamoro but there are few financial experts engaged by the BARMM to operate the system in a viable manner. Also, there are only a few graduate degree holders in business administration and management or science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) among the Bangsamoro and yet the BARMM leadership calls for an economic development strategy based on private cooperative and corporate models. It is high time that the selection criteria for fields of specialization for the Bangsamoro youth be changed to prioritize expertise that will be needed for the reconstruction and development of the Bangsamoro economy, and to ensure that these young specialists are able to serve in the region.
6. **Assist in shifting support from confidence building measures to socio-economic development -** There was heavy emphasis on confidence-building measures during the protracted peace negotiations between the government and the MILF. Now that this phase is over, DFAT support to the Mindanao Trust Fund or eventually, to the BNTF, should prioritize the provision of sustainable place-based socio-economic services particularly livelihood programs because these ranked highest in their priority needs. Specific gaps identified include sustainable livelihood, bridging opportunities with private sector investment, and ultimately ensuring access to jobs and fixed/increased incomes at household level. Also, the peace process is now at the stage of reconstruction and development of the Bangsamoro economy through effective governance by the BARMM ministries. Balancing ‘soft’ policy interventions such as planning workshops and capacity-building trainings with concrete delivery of socio-economic, governance, and security-related packages is equally crucial for the P/CVE and normalization workstreams, as highlighted by the needs of the reintegration of former ‘black-flag’ actors in Basilan and Lanao del Sur. Although the JICA-supported HARVEST facility for agribusiness loans through Landbank has yet to gain the envisioned traction in BARMM, similar innovative facilities to harness private sector investment and innovation should be considered. (At smaller scale, the British Council provided support to selected social enterprises in collaboration with the old DTI-ARMM, although this was discontinued after the transition to the BARMM.) DFAT Manila should be able to closely monitor whether targets for socio-economic services are met, once funding is fully operational, and whether they are producing the results they are meant to achieve.
7. **Ensuring geographic balance will be important to support inclusivity and legitimacy.** This entails more place-sensitive programming across mainland and archipelagic BARMM, supporting the integration of new entrants Cotabato City and the 63 barangays in North Cotabato, and fulfilling the CAB provision on development programs for Bangsamoro communities outside the BARMM.This has implications on both security and socioeconomic activities, such as initial discussions for a BASULTA-wide P/CVE ‘BRAVE’ program as a successor to PAVE.
8. **Retain bilateral activities for flexibility -**  It is expected that once the BNTF is established, a significant portion of Australia’s assistance will go to this Trust Fund. However, it is recommended that funds for bilateral activities should be maintained so that DFAT can exercise flexibility in supporting activities on peace building and governance that will complement delivery of socio-economic services. Too often in the past, the provision of socio-economic assistance is blinded by the imperatives of development ignoring in the process that these projects are just one though an important component of achieving sustainable peace and stability in these conflict-affected communities.
9. **Adjust operating procedures to COVID-19 social distancing and mobility restrictions, which will entail more localized investments and partnership.** With limited mobility globally and between regions, local expertise, assets, and relationship/supply chains must be strengthened. Service deployment for all ministries will necessarily be area-based. Social distancing requires limiting large public gatherings such as workshops and distribution. Given that internet coverage in the BARMM is spotty, creative means for two-way communication loops such as traditional radio and two-way radio work will be required.
10. The review team notes that most of the options above could be pursued by adjusting the balance of activities within existing allocations, though additional funding would be needed for future programming activities and could widen their impact. With the COVID-19 crisis and continued lack of clarity regarding the future of the BNTF and other multilateral modalities, building a balanced and flexible portfolio that can complement local resources and expertise, including the substantial resources held by the BARMM government and the private sector is recommended for the next phase of Australian investments in Mindanao.

# **V. Epilogue: Operations Post-COVID-19**

1. The Review was conducted prior to the declaration by the World Health Organization (WHO) of SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19 as a global pandemic. While mention of the virus threat was included in the closing recommendations of this report, the manner by which COVID-19 is profoundly changing how government operates, financial and material resources are allocated, and human beings interact, necessitates the addition of this **Epilogue** to enhance the report’s relevance.
2. The first case of COVID-19 community transmission in the Philippines was recorded in the second week of March 2020. By the third week of March, President Duterte placed the entire island of Luzon under “Enhanced Community Quarantine” (ECQ), or what is globally referred to as a “lockdown”. The lockdown was meant to prevent further spread of the virus by preventing human carriers from transmitting the virus from one place to another. The lockdown was originally scheduled to be lifted on April 14 but the continuing rise in the number of cases convinced the government to further extend until mid-May.
3. In the case of the BARMM, the intensity of travel to and from the region, required a swift response from the Bangsamoro Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on Emerging Infectious Diseases, which links to the national IATF-EID. The first COVID-19 case in Mindanao and the first death outside Metro Manila involved a resident of Lanao del Sur who had left after the Marawi siege and was visiting from Luzon. Intensified contact tracing was required due to the presence of BARMM participants in a religious gathering of *tabligh* in Malaysia between February 27 and March 1, 2020, which became a hotspot for the spread of the virus. Three cases were confirmed in Cotabato City linked to a cockfighting derby in Matina, Davao City. As a result, the Regional Darul Ifta’ has suspended all congregational prayers throughout the Ramadan period, an injunction that continues even after the BARMM transitioned to general community quarantine on 1 May.[[9]](#footnote-9)
4. COVID-19 magnifies all the health and governance challenges that existed in the Bangsamoro prior to the pandemic, and will impact negatively on the poor in BARMM, where poverty incidence is already among the highest in the country. The region only has three existing ventilators (housed in the Maguindanao Provincial Hospital) and does not have enough doctors, nurses, medical facilities and personal protective equipment (PPE). As of 17 May 2020, there are only 11 confirmed cases in the BARMM, with an additional 8 probable cases and 291 suspect cases. Tracking is hampered by the fact that as of this writing, the region only has one accredited testing facility, the Cotabato Regional Medical Center (CRMC).[[10]](#footnote-10) Although the BTA has allotted at least PHP 1.9 billion from the 2020 BEP for COVID-19 response, it will take some time before Amai Pakpak Regional Medical Center in Marawi City and the island provinces will be able to have a functional laboratory. The target laboratory in Zamboanga City to serve Region IX (Zamboanga Peninsula) and the BARMM island provinces is still at Stage 3 of the DOH 5-stage accreditation process. The construction of a 100-bed isolation facility near the Cotabato Sanitarium in Sultan Kudarat is still underway. In the meantime, existing provincial facilities across the region are being repurposed as COVID-19 centers.
5. These challenges are further compounded by waves of returning OFWs who lost their jobs abroad due to the contraction of the global economy and “halaws” or illegal immigrants being deported by Malaysia from Sabah who may be carriers of the virus. Once the rainy season begins, infections may also rise should communities be displaced by flooding and be forced to stay in congested evacuation sites. It must be noted that the districts in Sabah with highest number of confirmed Covid-19 cases are those with strong familial, cultural and trading ties with the island provinces, such as Tawau, Kota Kinabalu, Lahad Datu and Sandakan. There is also the added challenge of Zamboanga City, which serves as a transportation hub, for travelers from Basilan, Sulu and Tawi Tawi (BaSulTa) but not part of the BARMM territory, and where a substantial Moro population reside. Zamboanga City has reported incidences of COVID 19 patient travelers from Metro Manila and those coming from abroad. Placing BaSulTa or Zamboanga City on a lockdown mode will seriously impact economic activities and supply of essential commodities (e.g., chicken, eggs, soap, toothpaste, paper, etc.) to BaSulTa because they depend on Zamboanga City for their supply of these commodities. The BARMM government is cooperating with the City government on how best to protect the welfare of the Moro communities in the city and the island provinces. However, there is lingering feeling among Moros that the same attention on preventing spread of COVID in the Maguindanao province is not accorded by the BARMM government to outside provinces, particularly those in the island provinces of BARMM.
6. **The situation provides a clear opportunity for BARMM to exercise to the fullest real autonomy it so aspired for many decades.** How the current BARMM leadership seizes this opportunity will be the acid test of whether aspirations for meaningful self-determination can be translated into reality. COVID 19, like any other crisis, is not only an occasion for the demise of the old order; it is also an occasion for renewal. Given that the ministries of the BARMM are still undergoing design and organizational development, the COVID-19 crisis is an opportunity for the Bangsamoro Parliament to build pandemic-proof systems, structures and protocols. As the new members of the bureaucracy are still being hired, capacity building plans should be retooled for the skills required for the new normal. Unlike a normal crisis, where recovery follows after the crisis strikes**, what we will experience is an “adaptive recovery” process where learnings from previous experiences**, back by data gathered and analyzed from those experiences, will guide decision making and policy implementation. It is expected that this “adaptive recovery” process will linger until a vaccine is successfully formulated and mass-produced.
7. In the short term, quarantine and self-isolation facilities must be constructed now while boosting the capability of hospitals in the region in terms of establishing more laboratory testing facilities, contact tracing, and hiring of additional medical personnel. This will require additional funding which can be realized if the budgetary line items for this year is re-allocated to meet the challenge of this public health crisis**. The BTA should immediately propose budgetary re-alignments due to the emergency situation, similar to the “Bayanihan to Heal as One” bill passed by Congress at the national level**. This way, the BARMM government will be assured of the necessary funds and flexibility to better respond to the emergency situation. It will also help the BARMM government to improve its absorptive capacity of the budgetary resources allocated this year for the region.
8. Besides the obvious priority expenditures on health and social amelioration programs to cushion the lack of employment and income among the poor due to the lockdown, **the other top priority is reviving the economy to return to normality.** The region is in a better position in achieving this task for two reasons: First, the number of COVID-19 infected patients is seemingly low, and a second wave should be prevented from happening by instituting measures focused on stricter screening of returning OFWs and “halaws”, by mandating use of face masks in areas where there are public gatherings, and by intensifying information, education and communication activities dealing on how the threat of the virus can be foiled. Hence, economic/business activities can be re-started with less mobility restrictions compared to other regions.
9. Second**, the BARMM economy is predominantly an agricultural economy, wherein the agriculture, fishery and forestry sector constitutes around 60% of the regional GDP.**  COVID-19 has affected the food supply chain, bringing food shortages (real or artificial) in various parts of the country particularly Metro Manila where the biggest concentration of urban consumers are residing. BARMM can seize this opportunity by increasing agricultural productivity through farm consolidation using modern farm technologies and equipment and thus, capturing a large percentage of this huge consumer market. Market access and logistical bottlenecks can be surmounted if BARMM’s Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agrarian Reform (MAFAR) is able to forge contracts with huge wholesalers/institutional buyers (e.g., San Miguel Corporation, SM HyperMart, Jollibee, etc.) for the latter to buy all the produce of the Moro farmers and fishers who will be organized by MAFAR to ensure steady supply of produce for the buyers. By increasing agricultural productivity and having an assured market for their produce, this will result in higher incomes for the BARMM farmers and fisherfolks and eventually result in higher economic welfare for the region given that its major source of employment is in agriculture.
10. For the long-term, the BTA needs to adopt a policy framework and investment program to manage the effects of increasingly frequent natural and man-made disasters. This year alone, Mindanao was hit by a series of devastating earthquakes and the effects of climate change are beginning to be felt. All of which will have devastating economic consequences just coming out of a protracted conflict and in post-conflict rehabilitation and development. At the very least, based on this review, the DFAT investment in Muslim Mindanao is in the position to ensure that the workforce of the new Bangsamoro government is equipped with the necessary skills to address current and emerging risks and vulnerabilities.

# **Annex A. Terms of Reference**

**Strategic Review of  
Australia’s Support for Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Mindanao**

**Terms of Reference**

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This review will assess the effectiveness of Australia’s support for peace in Muslim Mindanao under the Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Mindanao investment (INL343) and its ongoing appropriateness in the current political context.

The review will also serve as the mandated mid-term review of the bilateral Australian Partnerships for Peace (APP) Program. It will also inform the future direction of the current *Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Mindanao* program and Australia’s broader support for peace and stability. The review is to be consistent with DFAT’s Conflict Analysis for Conflict Sensitive Programming Guidance.

**Scope**

The review will consider the implementation of the above support to the peace process, including project outcomes from 1 July 2017 to October 2019, and assess the extent to which these activities and implementation modalities remain appropriate in the new political context. The primary recipient for the report is DFAT management. Implementing partners will also be provided with the report and constitute a secondary audience. The report will also be made available in the DFAT website.

This review will also include a Conflict Analyses for the Philippines through a separate peer review process to be conducted by an external consultant. The output of the Conflict Analyses will contribute to this review.

**Background**

The road to peace has been a long one for the Philippines. After several years of negotiations, significant gains were achieved in the peace process between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – the biggest milestone of which was the signing of Republic Act 11054 or the Bangsamoro Organic Law by President Rodrigo Duterte on 26 July 2018. Two successful plebiscites seeking public agreement to establish an expanded Bangsamoro Autonomous Region took place and led to the beginning of the transition period from the former administrative region to the new one. Until regional elections in 2022, an 81- member Bangsamoro Transition Authority will govern the new Bangsamoro region. The launch of the second phase of MILF decommissioning on 7 September 2019 also signalled the start of the normalization process involving the transformation of MILF combatants into civilians and camps into productive communities. Other bilateral donors and the development banks have scaled-up their programs to support transition and development in the BARMM.

The establishment of the Bangsamoro is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for the eradication of conflict in Mindanao. The broader conflict includes significant terrorist activity and involves groups including those affiliated with ISIS. In addition, clan feuding (rido) frequently breaks out into armed violence, and also feeds wider political violence, in which private armed groups are used to cement territory and allegiances.

Notwithstanding the progress and gains of the BARMM, new and old interrelated political and development challenges still face the region:

* *Political and Bureaucratic Transition* from ARMM administration to the Bangsamoro and including the high expectations of the people to the MILF leadership to govern changes;
* *Normalization*; involving the decommissioning of the remaining MILF combatants and transformation of MILF camps into communities, delivery of socio-economic packages, transitional justice and confidence-building (amnesty);
* *Transformation of the MILF* from a revolutionary to a social and political movement;
* *‘Horizontal’ conflict (e.g. clan, local political, criminal);*
* *Preventing Violent Extremism* which presents a significant threat to durable peace*; and more dangers of radicalisation; and*
* *Delays in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Marawi* which represents a long term humanitarian and development challenge and a key narrative for recruitment by extremist groups.

The GPH’s peacebuilding work is guided by the following documents: the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB, 2013), the *Bangsamoro Peace and Development Roadmap* (2016), the *Philippine Development Plan* (PDP, 2017-2022),the *National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism* (NAP P/CVE, 2019) and the proposed *Transition Plan 2019-2022* for the BTA.

The results of the GPH’s peacebuilding work since the start of the Duterte Administration in July 2016 apart from the enactment of the BOL and appointment of the BTA members are: the support for normalization[[11]](#footnote-11) of MILF camps/communities, establishment of Task Force Bangon Marawi to support the rehabilitation of the city following the siege, the development of a whole-of-nation approach to P/CVE (through a National Action Plan), capacity development of Bangsamoro officials and staff, and addressing Women, Peace and Security concerns in response to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820.

**Australia’s Support for Peace in Muslim Mindanao**

Australia has supported peace and stability in Muslim Mindanao since 1996. Our current program, *Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Mindanao* ($91.2 million over 2014-2023) supports the ongoing peace process between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This includes supporting the establishment of the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and working towards long-term stability, security and development in the region’s conflict-affected areas.

Our support for the peace process contributes to preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Grievances against the GPH as well as regional (Jemaah Islamiyah) and global terrorist organisations (ISIS) adopted ideologies are key recruitment narratives for the violent extremist group. Australia also increased funding for P/CVE following the Marawi siege in 2017.

The program is contributing to the following outcomes from Australia’s Aid Investment Plan:

1. The Government of the Philippines improves access to basic services in fragile and/or conflict affected communities;
2. Fragile and/or conflict-affected communities are better able to promote peace, security, prosperity and resilience;
3. Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces members are demobilised and supported to return to civilian life; and
4. Governance in the Bangsamoro is inclusive and responsive.

These have been aligned with some elements of the BOL as well as the documents mentioned above on providing autonomy to the Bangsamoro people.

The program *Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Mindanao* was not designed with a specific program outcome in mind. Instead, it is an aggregation of discrete but mutually supporting activities, all flexible in design, covering support for a political peace process, preventing/countering violent extremism, and development in conflict-affected areas.

Australia’s support for peace in Muslim Mindanao is currently delivered through the following partners and activities:

*Australian Partnerships for Peace Program (APP) ($13.7 million, 2017-2020)*

APP is Australia’s main bilateral peace and stability program. The program funds the five NGO partners listed below, who work with local grassroots organisations on the following objectives:

1. Inclusive participation in political dialogue and transition, including women’s engagement in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1325;
2. Stronger mechanisms for averting the escalation of violence and resolving conflict;
3. Community cohesion and resilience, including through religious leaders, women, youth (preventing/countering violent extremism-P/CVE).

*International Alert:*

* preventing the capture of youth and women by violent extremism, by establishing an early response network on radicalisation and recruitment, creating supportive networks for women, and supporting youth leadership and the delivery of community change projects
* reducing land and resource-based violent conflict, by supporting land management planning and clan conflict resolution
* encouraging the entry of conflict-sensitive business and investments to increase livelihood opportunities
* strengthening support for the Bangsamoro enabling law and anti-discrimination legislation

*The Asia Foundation*:

* promoting an inclusive peace process and political dialogue, by supporting the

participation of women and indigenous peoples

* strengthening mechanisms for resolving conflicts and averting escalation of violence, by helping to resolve land disputes and clan conflict
* strengthening community cohesion and resilience against IS-affiliated groups, by

undertaking research on the local drivers of violent extremism and helping religious and community leaders to promote messages of tolerance and moderation

*The Institute for Autonomy and Governance:*

* promote inclusive participation in the peace process and political dialogue, including engagement by local and provincial governments, traditional leaders and women
* research partnership with religious leaders on Islamic schools and teaching in the BARMM

*Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue:*

* promoting convergence within Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) factions and between the MNLF and MILF
* supporting inclusion of marginalised groups in the peace process and political dialogue
* reducing land and resource-based violent conflict, by supporting land management planning and clan conflict resolution
* preventing recruitment by and enabling disengagement from extremist groups in the Sulu archipelago

*Oxfam:*

* women’s empowerment for leadership in development and peace in the Bangsamoro

*Multilateral activities*

*Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) – World Bank ($10.5 million, June 2005 – June 2019)*

* delivering community-led development and reconstruction projects and support for livelihoods in conflicted-affected communities, including in MILF camps
* development in camp communities will create economic opportunities, mitigating the risk of combatants leaving for economic reasons to join IS-affiliated groups

*Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives for Empowerment in the Bangsamoro (PRIME- Bangsamoro) – UNDP* ($3 million, May 2016 – June 2018)

* supporting the transformation of the MILF and MNLF from armed groups to political actors
* supporting political aspects of the peace process, including mediating the passage of a law through congress to establish the Bangsamoro
* working with local NGOs to address radicalisation and violent extremism

*Stabilization, Recovery and Transformation for Peace (START-PEACE)—UNDP ($5.5 million, April 2019 – April 2022)*

* preparing the MILF and other Bangsamoro stakeholders for the political transition and on P/CVE
* establishing a School for Peace and Democracy, an institution that will deliver governance and public administration capacity building to the MILF and other Moro groups participating in the Bangsamoro government
* supporting the *Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB)* in the decommissioning of combatant forces and putting weapons beyond use

*Support to Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM):*

* *World Bank ($2.3 million, 2017 -2019)* – providing the Philippine Government with technical assistance and advisory services on the recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation of Marawi City, including on resolving contested land titles

*Support Preventing Violent Extremism in Asia--* Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF) *($2 million, April 2019—June 2020)*

* in partnership with the Philippines Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) it is supporting a grants program for activities that will address local drivers of VE (social cohesion, community agency, equal access opportunities, and sense of purpose)

*Small value activities delivered through the Flexible Peace and Stability Fund*

* *International Crisis Group*: research project on new militancy in South East Asia to investigate links between extremist groups
* *The Asia Foundation (Malaysia)*: build the capacity of youth leaders in the border regions of Sabah, Malaysia, to counter violent extremist influences, build peace and participate in community law enforcement
* *The Asia Foundation and Balay Mindanaw Foundation--Communities of Inclusion and Resilience through Collaborative Local Engagements (Project CIRCLE):* supporting local government units to reduce threats in VE and increase resilience of communities
* *Ayala Foundation*: Bangsamoro Young Leaders Program-Leadership Communities: a youth leadership program in the BARMM that aims to empower and develop youth leaders to provide sustainable solutions addressing the pressing needs of their communities.
* *Balay Mindanaw Foundation*: reintegration program for Abu Sayyaf returnees in Basilan Bridging leadership for the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity

**Methodology**

While the specific methodologies will be determined by the review team in consultation with Manila Post, it is expected that the review will cover the following approaches:

* Document review (as per reference list)
* Key informant interviews (suggested list below)
* Program field visits to project locations (suggestions below)

Manila Post will provide a briefing to the team on the political context prior to the review mission.

The review will address the following criteria and (indicative) questions:

Effectiveness: *Are we achieving the outputs and outcomes that we expected at this point in time?*

1. Is each activity on-track to meet its outcomes and objectives?
2. What are the benefits and costs of DFAT’s flexible programming strategy, for both implementing partners and for DFAT?
3. Is the program as a whole addressing the drivers of conflict and violence? Does it meet the ‘do no harm’ standard?
4. What is the impact of the research activities being supported? Have these been used to inform policies and programs?
5. Are activities well-aligned with other Australian aid interventions in Muslim Mindanao?

Efficiency: *Are we making appropriate use of Australia’s and our partners’ time and resources to achieve outcomes?*

1. Is each activity able to monitor both the delivery of outputs and remain within the budget allocated?
2. Are there other modalities that would be more appropriate to deliver the activities?
3. The current implementation modalities are directly engaging partners and through multilateral organisations. What are benefits and costs of DFAT with these modalities rather than working through other modalities, such as a managing contractor?

Relevance: *Is this still the right thing to do?*

1. How well have current programs adapted in response to the change in context? Are there programs/partners that are no longer relevant?
2. b)  How well aligned or integrated is the program with the broader range of new initiatives being implemented and planned in the BARMM?
3. c)  What new initiatives/objectives/partners are needed to support the transition of the BARMM government and ongoing governance in the BARMM?
4. d)  To what extent do the programs support regional security and economic growth?
5. e)  What future activities should be considered post the political transition?
6. How well are the current programs responding to the different kinds of conflict in the region – violent extremism, community/clan-based, and political? Are we targeting the correct drivers of these conflicts?

Gender Equality: *Are we contributing towards gender equality and empowering women and girls?*

a)  Is the program as a whole making progress as expected in effectively promoting gender equality and women's empowerment?

b)  Are the individual gender action plans being effectively utilised by partners?

c)  To what extent did the program contribute to the Women, Peace and Security agenda?

Disability Inclusion: *Is the investment actively involving people with disabilities?*

a)  How well does the investment actively involve people with disabilities and/or disabled peoples’ organisations in planning, implementation, monitoring & evaluation?

b)  How well does the investment identify and addresses barriers to inclusion and opportunities for participation for people with disabilities to enable them to benefit equally from the aid investment?

The review should use responses to these criteria to make recommendations on the utility of individual activities in the future. The review should also make recommendations for improvements that could be made over the remaining implementation period as well as how the program can best adapt to the changing context now and in the future.

**Outputs/ Deliverables**

The review team will produce:

1. A debriefing presentation for Embassy staff on the mission’s findings;
2. A final report outlining the assessment and recommendations, submitted no more than 10 working days after completing the mission. The report should be no more than 15 pages long excluding annexes and include an executive summary of no more than two pages.

An annexe to this report will be the results of a peer review. The peer review will

bring all partners together to provide their own analysis of conflict, context and political economy. It will take place during the broader strategic review mission and then inform the final conclusions of the review.

**Indicative Timeframe**

| Review Phase & Actions | Location | Indicative Days (input days, maximum | Indicative Dates |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Inception   * Review Documents * Briefing with DFAT (via teleconference) * Draft Evaluation Plan | Desk- based | 3 working days | 13-17 January 2020 |
| 2. Consultation/ Program Field visit | Manila, Cotabato | 9 working days | 10-17 February 2020 |
| 3. Peer Review including conflict analysis (by an external consultant) | Manila | 1 day (+5 days prep & 1 day f/u) = 7 Days | 12 Feb 2020 |
| 4. Presentation of Aide Memoire | Manila | 1 day | 15 Feb 2020 |
| 5. Drafting | Desk- based | Up to 10 working days | Late Feb - March 2020 |
| 6. Submission of First Draft Report  7. DFAT and NGO partner comments on draft report | Desk- based | 3 days | Mid-March 2020 |
| 8. Revise Report and Submission of Final Report | Desk- based | 2 days | April 30 |
| Optional additional work related if required |  | Up to 2 days |  |
| TOTAL |  | Up to 30 days |  |

**Suggested list of organisations/people to be consulted**

* Implementing partners: including organisations with which DFAT has funding agreements, relevant subsidiary partners and other relevant organisations
* Other donors/UN agencies: EU, Norway, Japan, UK, USA, Spain
* Philippines representatives: GPH representatives, representatives of the parties to peace agreements, IP organisations, sub-national government stakeholders
* Australian Government: Relevant staff and management in Manila

**Review Team Composition/Roles**

1. Team Leader (Independent Consultant - local)

* Plan, guide and develop the overall approach and methodology for the full scope of the Review in consultation with team members
* Be responsible for managing and directing the review activities; representing the Review Team and leading the consultations with the stakeholders;
* Draft and present an Aide Memoire, providing preliminary key findings to DFAT at the conclusion of the in-country mission, with input and assistance from team members as required;
* Produce a draft and final report in accordance with the agreed Evaluation Plan; and ensure overall quality of reporting.

Professional requirements:

1. Expertise in the peace process, peacebuilding and extensive experience working in the Bangsamoro and conflict-affected Mindanao;
2. Strong knowledge of political transition, and conflict transformation (i.e. normalization) issues
3. Experience in preventing/countering violent extremism and security programs/projects
4. High familiarity of the GPH (National Government and Bangsamoro Regional Government and BARMM LGUs) dynamics and priorities;
5. Experience as an independent evaluator of peacebuilding/conflict sensitive programs/projects
6. Knowledge of DFAT’s systems and policies or experience in applying donor policies to review processes;
7. Ability to lead a small, multicultural evaluation team and empower team members.
8. Governance and conflict sensitivity specialist – (independent consultant – local)

Professional requirements:

1. Requirements similar to a) to d) above
2. Experience in crosscutting themes of gender equality and social inclusion, child protection
3. Bangsamoro Peace and Development Specialist (independent consultant-local from the Bangsamoro)

Professional requirements:

1. Requirements similar to a) to d) above
2. Strong knowledge and extensive experience of cultural sensitivities (dynamics-Moro and non-Moro, indigenous peoples, and clans) in the Bangsamoro
3. DFAT Representative from the Fragility and Conflict Section, or with suitable relevant knowledge and expertise.
4. Peer Review Facilitator (external consultant to DFAT)

**Reference Documents**

* DFAT design documents
* Partner design documents
* Partner reporting
* DFAT quality reporting
* GPH documents, action plans and policies

# **Annex B. List of Respondents**

| No. | Role | Institution | Name | Location | Date of Interview |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | GPH-NG | OPAPP | Dpapp Sid Purisima | Manila | Thursday, 27 February 2020 |
| 2 | GPH-NG | OPAPP | Pam Padilla Salvan | Manila | Thursday, 27 February 2020 |
| 3 | GPH-NG | OPAPP | Vanessa Pallarco | Manila | Thursday, 27 February 2020 |
| 4 | GPH-NG | OPAPP (former) | Arvin Chua | Manila | Tuesday, 4 February 2020 |
| 5 | GPH-NG | DILG PCVE PMO | Joan Tolibas | Manila | Thursday, 6 February 2020 |
| 6 | GPH-NG | DOF | Usec Beltran | Manila | Thursday, 6 February 2020 |
| 7 | APP | CHD | Iona Jalijali | Manila | Monday, 10 February 2020 |
| 8 | APP | CHD | Ibrahim Badiee | Manila | Monday, 10 February 2020 |
| 9 | APP | International Alert | Pancho Lara | Manila | Monday, 10 February 2020 |
| 10 | APP | International Alert | Nikki de la Rosa | Manila | Monday, 10 February 2020 |
| 11 | APP | International Alert | Liezl Bugtay | Manila | Monday, 10 February 2020 |
| 12 | APP | International Alert | Ruel Punongbayan | Manila | Monday, 10 February 2020 |
| 13 | APP | Oxfam | Lot Felizco | Manila | Tuesday, 11 February 2020 |
| 14 | APP | Oxfam | Nina Abogado | Manila | Tuesday, 11 February 2020 |
| 15 | APP | IAG | Benny Bacani | Manila | Tuesday, 11 February 2020 |
| 16 | APP | TAF | Sam Chittick | Manila | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 15 | APP | TAF | Noraida Chio | Cotabato | Friday, 31 January 2020 |
| 16 | APP | TAF | Aisha Midtimbang | Cotabato | Friday, 31 January 2020 |
| 17 | APP | TAF | Kathline Tolosa | Manila | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 18 | Multilateral | WB | Marcelo Fabre | Manila | Wednesday, 5 February 2020 |
| 19 | Multilateral | WB | Ditte Fallesen | Manila | Wednesday, 5 February 2020 |
| 20 | Multilateral | UNDP | Titon Mitra | Manila | Friday, 14 February 2020 |
| 21 | Multilateral | UNDP | Chetan Kumar | Manila | Friday, 14 February 2020 |
| 22 | Multilateral | UNDP | Faith Evangelista | Marawi | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 23 | Multilateral | GCERF | Jennifer Buan | Manila | Monday, 10 February 2020 |
| 24 | FPP | Balay Mindanaw | Ayi Hernandez | CDO/Manila | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 25 | FPP | Balay Mindanaw | Kaloy Manlupig | CDO | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 26 |  | Balay Mindanaw | Richard Rejas | CDO | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 27 | FPP | ICG | Georgi Engelbrecht | Cotabato | Wednesday, 26 February 2020 |
| 28 | FPP | PBSP | Rey Laguda | Manila | Friday, 7 February 2020 |
| 29 | Marawi | TFBM | Asec Felix Castro | Cagayan de Oro | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 30 | Donors | EU | Emily Mercado | Manila | Monday, 3 February 2020 |
| 31 | Donors | JICA | Yo Ebisawa | Manila | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 32 | Donors | JICA | Cristina Santiago | Manila | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 33 | Donors | Japanese Embassy | Yosuke Tamabayashi | Manila | Monday, 3 February 2020 |
| 34 | Donors | UK Embassy | Martin Norman | Manila | Wednesday, 29 January 2020 |
| 35 | Donors | US Embassy | Christopher Farlow | Manila | Monday, 3 February 2020 |
| 36 | Donors | US Embassy | Precious Bernardo | Manila | Monday, 3 February 2020 |
| 37 | Donors | USAID | Jeffrey Lehrer | Manila | Monday, 3 February 2020 |
| 38 | Donors | Norway | Counsellor Larissa Falkenberg Kosanovic | Manila | Tuesday, 4 February 2020 |
| 39 | Donors | Norway | Stian Arvid Hegland | Manila | Tuesday, 4 February 2020 |
| 40 | Donors | Norway | Nikki Delfin | Manila | Tuesday, 4 February 2020 |
| 41 | TJRC |  | Mo Bleeker | Manila | Saturday, 15 February 2020 |
| 42 | TJRC |  | Macis Araga | Manila | Saturday, 15 February 2020 |
| 43 | Individuals | ANU / former DFAT advisor | Paul Hutchcroft | Manila | Friday, 24 January 2020 |
| 44 | DFAT | DFAT Australia | Clare Duffield | Manila | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 45 | DFAT | DFAT Australia | Jen Bennett | Manila | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 46 | DFAT | DFAT Australia | Shannen Enriquez | Manila | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 47 | DFAT | DFAT Australia | EJ Solis | Manila | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 48 | DFAT | DFAT Australia | Tim Smith | Telecon | Thursday, 13 February 2020 |
| 49 | DFAT-Pathways | DFAT Australia | Frankie Lawe-Davies | Manila | Thursday, 6 February 2020 |
| 50 | DFAT-Pathways | DFAT Australia | Sharon Lumpias | Manila | Thursday, 6 February 2020 |
| 51 | DFAT- Humanitarian and DRM | DFAT Australia | Inge Stokkel | Manila | Thursday, 6 February 2020 |
| 52 | DFAT- Humanitarian and DRM | DFAT Australia | Ana Mariquina | Manila | Thursday, 6 February 2020 |
| 53 | Academe | MSU Marawi - IPDM | Acram Latiph | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 54 | Academe | MSU IIT - IPDM | Bebot Rodil | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 55 | APP Subgrantee - International Alert | Marawi Reconstruction and Conflict Watch | Dr. Fedelina Tawagon | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 56 | APP Subgrantee - International Alert | Marawi Reconstruction and Conflict Watch | Dir. Macmillan Lucman | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 57 | APP Subgrantee - International Alert | Marawi Reconstruction and Conflict Watch | Jalila Sapiin | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 58 | APP Subgrantee - International Alert | Marawi Reconstruction and Conflict Watch | Rolanisah Dipatuan Dimaporo | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 59 | Mindanao Humanitarian Team | UNFPA | Maria Aimee Santos | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 60 | Mindanao Humanitarian Team | UNFPA | Gillian Salvador | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 61 | Mindanao Humanitarian Team | CFSI | Farida Mangcaan | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 62 | Mindanao Humanitarian Team | UNHCR | Alpha Carole Pontanal | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 63 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Ali Samporna | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 64 | UNDP PCVE TWG | PLGU Lanao del Sur | Salma Jane Tamano | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 65 | UNDP PCVE TWG | PLGU Lanao del Sur | Popeye Alonto | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 66 | UNDP PCVE TWG | PLGU Lanao del Sur | Pipalawan Naga | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 67 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Ana Jamera Rakim | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 68 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Anshary Maongco | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 69 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Ali Sumandar | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 70 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Cosain Datumaas | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 71 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Sultan Sulahudin Samporna | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 72 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Conrado Ilagan | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 73 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Aquila Kathar | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 74 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Esmail Magaray | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 75 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Amer Samona | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 76 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Anna Rakim | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 77 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Mayda Minalang | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 78 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Hannan Macadato | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 79 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Nathera Dangcal | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 80 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Sasin Ayunan | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 81 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Alinori Tuan | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 82 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Joel Gamboa | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 83 | UNDP PCVE TWG |  | Renato Datulayta | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 84 | UNDP PCVE TWG | UNDP | Pari Hyriah Candao | Iligan | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 85 | APP Subgrantee - Oxfam | Al Mujadillah Development Foundation | Zahria Muti-Mapandi | Iligan | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 86 | APP Subgrantee - International Alert | Tabang Ako Siyap ko Bangsa Iranun saya ko Kalilintad ago Kapamagayon Inc (TASBIKKA); | Mohammad Abas | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 87 | APP Subgrantee - International Alert | Iranun Corridor Youth Network | Almairah Mangza | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 88 | APP Subgrantee - CARE | Institute for Bangsamoro Studies | Abhoud Lingga | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 89 | APP Subgrantee - IAG | Bangsamoro Women Services Center (BWSC) | Tarhata Maglangit | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 90 | APP Subgrantee - IAG | Organization of Teduray Lambangian Conference (OTLAC), | Deonato Mookudef | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 91 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | UNYPAD | Morsidin Husain | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 92 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | AFADMin | Datu Ali Ibrahim | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 93 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | WOMB | Anabelle Esmael | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 94 | APP Subgrantee - Oxfam | UnYPhil-Women | Mobina Kasim | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 95 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women MPC | Bait Sittie Rabia Abdullah | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 96 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women MPC | Datuking Tua | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 97 | APP Subgrantee | BLMI | Wahab Guidal | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 98 | APP Subgrantee | MOSEP | Mariam K. Ali | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 99 | APP Subgrantee | MAPAD | Mahdie Amellia | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 100 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | Mothers for Peace | Nida Dans | Zamboanga | Friday, 31 January 2020 |
| 101 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | BASULTA Contact Group | Benhur Usman | Zamboanga | Friday, 31 January 2020 |
| 102 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | BASULTA Contact Group | Jocelyn Sumail | Zamboanga | Thursday, 20 February 2020 |
| 103 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | BASULTA Contact Group | Abdulla Sumail | Zamboanga | Thursday, 20 February 2020 |
| 104 | APP Subgrantee - TAF CARE | LupahSug Advocators for Peace and Develoment (LSADPI) | Alhajar Abdulgafor | Zamboanga | Friday, 31 January 2020 |
| 105 | APP Subgrantee - Oxfam | Tarbilang Foundation | Jurma Tikmasan | Zamboanga | Thursday, 20 February 2020 |
| 106 | APP Subgrantee - CHD | TSS | Rosemain Abuduraji | Zamboanga | Thursday, 20 February 2020 |
| 107 | APP Subgrantee - CHD | TSS | Khamar Allama | Zamboanga | Thursday, 20 February 2020 |
| 108 | APP Subgrantee - IAG | ZABIDA | Vandrazel Birowa | Zamboanga | Thursday, 20 February 2020 |
| 109 | APP Subgrantee - International Alert | Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women Association (LSBWA); | Fatmawati Salapuddin | Zamboanga | Thursday, 20 February 2020 |
| 110 | APP Subgrantee - International Alert | WMSU Research Center | Dr. Chona Sarmiento | Zamboanga | Thursday, 20 February 2020 |
| 111 | BARMM | ICM/MENRE | ES Sami Gambar | Cotabato | Wednesday, 19 February 2020 |
| 112 | BARMM | MNLF/MOLE | Romeo Sema | Cotabato | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 113 | BARMM | JNC ++MPWH | Ed Guerra | Cotabato | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |
| 114 | BARMM | BTA Deputy Speaker | Hatimil Hassan | Cotabato | Wednesday, 19 February 2020 |
| 115 | BARMM | Majority Floor Leader | Lanang Ali, Jr. | Cotabato | Wednesday, 19 February 2020 |
| 116 | BARMM | Minority Floor Leader | Laisa Alamia | Cotabato |  |
| 117 | BARMM | DMFL | Suharto Ambolodto | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 118 | LGU | Zamboanga City | EA Abdusalam | Zamboanga | Thursday 20 February 2020 |
| 119 | LGU | Zamboanga City | Engr Sicat | Zamboanga | Thursday 20 February 2020 |
| 120 | Other | BDA | Windel Diangcalan | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 121 | Other | IBS | Abhoud Syed Lingga | Cotabato | Wednesday, 19 February 2020 |
| 122 | Other | IDB | Anna Pacete | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 123 | Other | IDB |  | Cotabato | Monday, 17 February 2020 |
| 124 | Other | CFSI | Steve Muncy | Cotabato | Tuesday, 18 February 2020 |

# **Annex C. Evaluation Matrix – Performance of Partners against Criteria**

## **Annex C.1 APP Partners**

| **Evaluation Criteria based on TOR** | **International Alert**  **-Building Conflict Resilient Communities and Development Initiatives in Muslim Mindanao (CORE-CODE)**  **-Preventing Urban Violence and Emerging Threats (PREVENT)**  **-Sustainable Peace and Development for Post-War Marawi (STAND for Marawi)** | **Institute of Autonomy and Governance**  **- Enhancing Political Dialogue for Inclusive Peace in the Bangsamoro (EnPolD Bangsamoro)** | **The Asia Foundation CARE (Cohesion, Advocacy, Resilience, and Expansive Engagement) for Peace in the Philippines** | **Center for Humanitarian Dialogue – Building Inclusive Institutions for Peaceful Governance in the Bangsamoro** | **OXFAM – Women’s Empowerment for Leadership in Development and Peace (WELD Peace)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. **Effectiveness** |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1. **Are we achieving the outputs and outcomes that we expected at this point in time?**   **a.1 Is each activity on track to meet its outcomes and objectives?**  **a.2 What are the benefits and costs of DFAT’s flexible programming strategy, for both implementing partners and DFAT?**  **a.3 Is the program as a whole addressing the drivers of conflict and violence? Does it meet the “do no harm” standard?**  **a.4 What is the impact of the research activities being supported? Have these been used to inform policies and programs?**  **a.5 Are activities well-aligned with other Australian aid interventions in Muslim Mindanao?** | Conflict tracking tools, dialogues with stakeholders and information dissemination on conflict (including land) and conflict prevention have been successfully implemented.  The CORE-CODE, PREVENT and Stand for Marawi were able to meet their objectives as scheduled.  Benefits far outweigh cost which are mainly in the supervision of activities because of additional activities that were pursued given changing context and needs. Project proponent was able to address emerging issues on VE both in the mainland and island provinces through better tracking of conflict incidences and conducting dialogues to key stakeholders on the issue of VE.  The project addressed various drivers of conflict (e.g., land, discrimination against Muslim, greater participation of LGUs, etc.) and was systematic in its approach as it was informed by the results of its conflict monitoring project. While project proponent observes the “do no harm” standard, it is quite difficult to assess the extent of its full compliance given dynamic situation on the ground.  Results, particularly of the project proponent’s Conflict Monitoring System, have gained recognition among donors of their importance in the programming of their assistance. It also gained traction among selected LGUs in the Bangsamoro. But its adoption by the national government agency mandated to address the Bangsamoro peace process is still in the works.  The research and research cum action activities under the three projects complement the activities of the other Australian partners which are mostly engaged in advocacy, consultations, dialogues and to some extent, capacity building. | Yes, the project has provided technical assistance platform for horizontal and vertical dialogues between Moros and non-Moros and among Moros.  Both activities for the first phase (pre-signing of BOL) and second phase (post-BOL ratification) are on track in achieving outcomes and objectives.  Relevance of dialogues, consultations, technical assistance on institutional matters, etc. largely depend on the obtaining situation/context. The flexibility afforded to the project proponent by DFAT enabled it to address issues which not have been in the original list of proposed activities.  Having consensus on BOL, its ratification, addressing concerns/objections on BOL, conducting dialogues with residents of communities, particularly mothers, to discourage their sons from joining VE groups, etc. undoubtedly address some of the known drivers of conflict in the Bangsamor region. However, it is difficult to determine whether activities met the criteria of “do no harm” considering the built-in reservations of some of the elements in the Bangsamoro who are against an MILF-dominated BARMM government.  Recommendations of the studies on structures of BTA and BARMM, and position on the federalism debate. Monographs and papers to build consensus produced by the project proponent are also being used by Bangsamoro stakeholders.  Activities were well-aligned with Australian aid interventions during the stage of the peace process then between the government and the MILF. | CARE was able to engage critical government offices, implementing partners, consultants, and close to 3,000 participants through its 49 activities.  Under Objective 1 on inclusive participation on political dialogue, to date, CARE was involved in drafting priority legislation, such as the education, civil service and administrative codes. The TAF involvement in the camp transformation commenced with pilot work for Camp Bilal through Balay Mindanao. TAF provided technical support to the Joint Normalization Committee (JNC) in developing the framework for the reduction and management of small arms and light weapons (SMLWs). Since then, this framework had been through consultations, validation activities and after a final edit, The SALW framework was presented by TAF and MILF and GPH jointly agreed on the paper’s recommendations. TAF has been requested to assist a technical working group in establishing SALWs database in the region. Women engagement were done through the Mothers for Peace Enterprise in Basilan, Federation of the United Mindanawon Bangsamoro Women MPC, Kadtabanga Foundation for Peace and Development and Women’s Organizations Movement of the Bangsamoro (WOMB).  The objectives and deliverables of the CARE clearly aligns with critical components of the BARMM transition, such as priority legislations, camp transformation, addressing loose firearms and internal security issues, and the importance of women’s engagement despite of the prevailing traditional expectations on Moro women. | HD was able to deliver on its key outputs under its 4 outcomes. Output 1 is strongly focused on reviving the MNLF’s women’s committee and facilitated interaction with its MILF counterpart. Key woman-leaders involved here were Hadja Bainon Karon and Aida Silongan. Both are members of the BTA and Karon heads the regional women’s agency.  The MNLF-MILF convergence efforts led to the formation of a joint development planning team that came up with a 10-year Unified Bangsamoro Development Plan (UBDP), and in turn, presented to the ICM and the regional cabinet as important inputs in their respective agency programming.  HD’s engagement through Sulu-based Tumikang Sama-Sama (TSS) allows it to have a good presence on the ground without necessarily constraints by security protocols normally associated with international agencies.  TSS familiarity with Sulu’s political, security and cultural terrains, allows HD to support local efforts, such as local conflict mediation, the establishment of the One Network for Elections – Sulu (ONE Sulu) as an election monitoring network, work on a local coordination mechanism among PNP, AFP and MNLF Jikiri branch, now referred as JMSCC. HD and TSS have facilitating confidence building meetings among JMSCC members.  HD and TSS are also in the current P/CVE focus of DFAT and the Philippine Government, more targeting high-risk young people in the province. Towards this end, they are working with the influential Sulu Ulama Council for Peace and Development (SUCPD) in developing counter-narrative modules that will address misconceptions about the Islamic faith, often misused by VE recruiters. | The project strength lies in mobilizing women to promote their agenda in peace process and in the crafting of the Bangsamoro basic law, influencing national media and civil society in understanding and sharing the experiences in conflict areas in Year 1; and in Year 2, highlighting women’s voices in crafting the Bangsamoro organic law, plebiscite and now in the transition.  DFAT benefits significantly on the project’s explicit focus on women engagement and empowerment consistent with the country’s and UN’s Women, Peace and Security agenda.  Women are not just victims of conflict, hey are also privy to the conflict as well participants to its resolution. The WELD Peace project provides platforms for articulations of women voices and supports women’s efforts and plans in promoting their causes and concerns at the BARMM and local government levels.  WELD Peace project focus is strongly aligned with the Philippine, DFAT and UN Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Although, there is an opportunity for DFAT in future programming to be more explicit with indicators that mirrors the global WPS Index and the national action plan. |
| 1. **2. Efficiency** |  |  |  |  |  |
| **b. Are we making appropriate use of Australia’s and our partners’ time and resources to achieve outcomes?**  **b.1 Is each activity able to monitor both the delivery of outputs and remain within the budget allocated?**  **b.2 Are there other modalities that would be more appropriate to deliver the activities?**  **b.3 The current implementation modalities are directly engaging partners and through multilateral organizations. What are the benefits and costs of DFAT with these modalities rather than working through other modalities, such as managing contractor?** | The attention given by project proponent on PVE, assisting in Marawi reconstruction (a possible trigger of future conflict), and addressing land conflict is a highly judicious of resources, both time and money.  Project proponent is able to diligently monitor delivery of outputs and budget expenditures.  IA’s comparative strength is its research capacity mainly through its Conflict Monitoring Project and its ability to share its analytical insights to key stakeholders in the peace process.  It enables DFAT to access various experts from different organizations which cannot be easily done if there is a single contractor. It affords DFAT greater flexibility in addressing problems, some of which were not anticipated in the original project proposals submitted to it by project proponent. | Given the stage of the peace process then when project activities were in full swing, it was among the best use of Australia and partner’s time resources. There was critical need for consensus building, dialogues and massive information dissemination about the BOL and its implications on the peace process and the Bangsamoro governance.  There was conscious effort on the part of project proponent to monitor progress made, whether they deliver outputs expected from the project and kept their expenditures within the bounds of their allotment.  Conducting and sponsoring dialogues among key players in the peace process is a comparative advantage of IAG given that it is a homegrown institution with solid academic track record.  It affords flexibility to DFAT in addressing a wide-range of issues which were not originally recognized from the start and make the best use of institutions fitted for the task of undertaking the particular activity. In the case of IAG, its “convening” power among the local key stakeholders in the peace process enables it to engage various actors of different perspectives/persuasions to discuss a most important issue in the peace process and hopefully, to arrive at a consensus. | Worth noting is the quality of CARE engagement reflects both the goodwill built and the competence of TAF in assisting the BARMM in transition. They work from engaging the concerned ministry, facilitating the consultation process, engaging local institutions like the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies (IBS) and consultants to bring together a draft, helping the ministry navigate through the BARMM executive branch.  TAF through this CARE project demonstrated its appreciation of the critical actors in the region. Its engagement is not limited to national and regional government, MILF and MNLF leadership, but also woman-leaders, religious and youth leaders under its objective 3 | DFAT Manila and HD were able to outline partnership proposal sometime in 2018 that increases utilization of Australian expertise, inclusion of DFAT staff in the HD’s performance processes, provides analysis relevant to Australia’s role as UNHRC membership, and on on-going political and conflict analysis and conflict-affected areas useful for DFAT programming.  HD’s strength lies in its early beginning in Sulu and decades-old rapport with the MNLF, dialogic interventions with these rebel leaders and experiences in local feud mediation. | Local women organizations, such as the Tarbilang Foundation for the island provinces, and Philippine Usrah Foundation and AMDF in Lanao del Sur, UnyPhil-Women, and Ummahat in North Cotabato and Maguindanao, were mobilized by Oxfam and connected them with national government and civil society entities, particularly in support of the peace process, creating awareness about it and the proposed Bangsamoro basic and organic laws. Oxfam and WELD Peace local partners leverages resources though the conduct of back-to-back activities, harmonization of its capacity building support to partners and institutional benefits emphasized during interactions with local partners and participants.  While Oxfam has partnership with DFAT on the WELD Peace Project, Oxfam presence in Mindanao is wider and long-term, operating in areas outside BARMM and with other cultural groups aside from the Moro communities, and with interventions beyond the current project engagement, such as health and sexual rights for girls and women and humanitarian responses. |
| **3. Relevance** |  |  |  |  |  |
| **c. Is this still the right thing to do?**  **c.1 How well have current programs adapted in response to the change in the context? Are there programs/partners that are no longer relevant?**  **c.2 How well aligned or integrated is the program with the broader range of new initiatives being implemented and planned in BARMM?**  **c.3 What new initiatives/objectives/**  **partners are needed to support the transition of the BARMM govt and ongoing governance in the BARMM?**  **c.4 To what extent do the programs support regional security and economic growth?**  **c.5 What future activities should be considered post the political transition?**  **c.6 How well are the current programs responding to the different kinds of conflict in the region - violent extremism, community/**  **clan based, and political? Are we targeting the correct drivers of these conflicts?** | Due to continuing threat of VE groups, activities on C/PVE must form part of the priority agenda in attaining peace and stability in the Bangsamoro region.  Current projects responded in the changing political economy context in the Bangsamoro region such as the rise and challenge of VE groups, the push for a more inclusive Marawi reconstruction effort, and the critical need for the Marawi reconstruction work to push through. IA’s shift to engaging local governments in using community monitoring and resource management tools is appropriate at this juncture.  Marawi reconstruction and addressing the challenge of VE groups are among the priority agendas that the new BARMM government is and will be addressing.  There is a need for technical assistance support to the senior officers and middle level managers of BTA on how to successfully navigate the bureaucratic rules and regulations of the government in securing and releasing funds, utilizing them for development projects, monitoring progress of their development projects, properly accounting and auditing of the use of public funds, preparing feasibility studies, prioritizing activities to be funded, etc.  Quite strong in supporting regional security but limited effort in promoting economic growth (i.e., mainly thru MBC, BIMP-EAGA, organizing women’s coop, etc.).  Ensuring the BTA ministries effectively exercise good governance. There is a proliferation of complaints on the lack of accomplishment in implementing development projects that will immediately benefit ordinary Bangsamoro.  Projects under IA directly address VE, land-based conflict, conflict based on competition for economic opportunities, discrimination, etc. Project proponent possesses a sophisticated analytical tool in identifying drivers of conflict. | The current socio-political context has significantly changed. It is no longer building consensus and support to the ratification of BOL. It is now ensuring that institutions created/established by virtue of BOL are now functioning effectively.  There was an attempt to install PVE measures through dialogues in Lanao del Sur and Zamboanga (with Sulu and Basilan participants). It has downloaded Technical Working Group on Preventing and Transforming VE to UNDP.  There is a need to build competence of project proponent on capacity building on actual governance and day to day operations of the BARMM. This might require different skill set.  There is need for technical experts to provide TA to run specific socio-development ministries (agencies) like the one for agriculture, health, education, social welfare and development, and trade and industry. Governance experience of former MILF officers and key leaders are seriously inadequate for the development challenges of the Bangsamoro region.  To a certain extent, the project supports regional security (i.e., PVE tool). However, it is far-fetched if it supports economic growth given the project was not intended for it.  Building capacity of senior and middle level managers of the Bangsamoro ministries and other instrumentalities to govern effectively.  It responded to the previous possible source of conflict (i.e., non-support and ratification of BOL) and attempting to address VE, which now had been downloaded to UNDP. | The transition will take a number of years to be fully-completed, way beyond the current term and can beyond the 2022 elections. Given this situation, the multisectoral strategy of working simultaneously with the national, regional and local governments as well as with civil society organizations continues to be a viable option.  VE didn’t start with Marawi Siege, it started with the ASG in the 1990s frustrated and antagonistic to the peace agreement between the government and the MNLF. It is now 3 decades long, and VE had transformed from kidnapped for ransom and bombing activities into laying siege of a city and recently built the capacity for suicide bombings. Addressing the VE’s push, pull and contextual factors need to be further contextualized. While Basilan, with strong local ownership and leadership demonstrated capacity to diminish the ASG threats, the same can’t be said of VE groups operating other BARMM provinces and neighboring areas.  Aside from direct and immediate support to the BARMM transition, camp transformation and support mechanisms to avert local feuds and violent extremism, CARE’s researches are critical to formulation of policies and programming on sectors that are both vulnerable and victim of the protracted conflict. The rapid assessment of at-risk orphans is ready for formal launch. The second study on the enabling environment for violent extremism is in the final phase.  The SALW framework and the ensuing baseline data on the nature and quantity of small arms in the region is important first step than can potentially impact on the long-term resolution of politics-based clan feuds, VE and illegal arms trade in the region. | There are two “BARMM” – mainland and islands. The mainland is where the MILF has a strong presence, and the MNLF continues to exert influence in the islands. HD’s engagement with MNLF and in Sulu helps mitigate the perceived divide between these two geo-political areas within the region.  HD utilizes its so-called adaptive monitoring and evaluation model that allows it to adapt to changing context regionally.  HD talks about technical assistance to BTA members and technical staff to undertake their individual advocacy and collective deliverables as stated in the BOL, such as the passage of specific codes. It also points to the need to continue supporting its local partner like TSS to financially-stable and developmentally-capable.  HD’s engagement with MNLF Jikiri camp is crucial in ensuring this rebel organization continues to engage peacefully and proactively in regional governance. MNLF members are also expected to benefit socio-economic support package from the BARMM transition, which if nothing is felt can make them vulnerable to VE recruitment or join the league of poverty households, the rate of which is among the highest in the country.  HD’s presence started support to the peace process and has since evolved to competence in local conflict mediation, dialogue facilitation between government and MNLF forces, and to understanding Sulu-based VE. TSS also raised the Sabah issue as a political claim, the case of halaws (deportees), barter trading, porous border’s role in the movement of illegal drugs, guns and VE groups. | The focus of WELD Peace was to build women leadership within the peace process. This continues to be relevant as the BARMM transitions into a parliamentary and ministerial systems, and the MILF transitions to become a social movement and its combatants going through the normalization process and its camps to be transformed into functioning and peaceful communities.  Recently, the BTA passed Bangsamoro Autonomy Act 8 (January 2020) creating the Bangsamoro Women Commission (BWC) and replacing the ARMM Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women (RCBW). Oxfam local partners and women were involved in different capacities in pushing for its passage.  In the process of mobilizing women leaders, the need for economic development became apparent. Local women groups in Datu Saudi Ampatuan municipality benefited from initial linkeage with the Municipal Agriculturist’s Office and TESDA.  In the national conference on the revisit of the women’s agenda, women leaders and advocates defined their agenda following the thematic outline on the WPS national action plan. While participation and empowerment, prevention of VAW in conflict situationgender mainstreaming and security remain important, the participants also highlighted livelihood and economic opportunities as critical to poverty alleviation, empowering women to be independent of their spouses in financial terms and provide additional support to their children, in the case of married women. |
| **4. Gender Equality** |  |  |  |  |  |
| **d. Are we contributing towards gender equality and empowering women and girls?**  **d.1 Is the program as a whole making progress as expected in effectively promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment?**  **d.2 Are the individual gender action plans being effectively utilized by partners?**  **d.3 To what extent did the program contribute to the Women, Peace and Security agenda?** | Project proponent deliberately ensured women’s participation in their various activities and emphasize their critical role in peace building.  Previous assessment of IA noted its project’s inadequate attention on gender issues. Current projects now have made sure that women empowerment and gender equality are embedded in the project activities. The current Conflict Sensitive Gender Action Plan (CSGAP) is well structured but should be reviewed particularly on how changes are measured over time.  Difficult to determine because of limited documentation on this parameter, apart from sex-disaggregated figures and anecdotal reports. | The project sponsored forum devoted solely for women to increase their understanding of BOL and encourage their participation in the electoral process. It also engaged mothers residing in areas where VE groups are operating/influencing.  Project made a conscious effort in ensuring women’s participation in dialogues, consultations and various public gatherings it conducted. Project reported that almost half of their participants in said public gatherings are women. Partners noted that current engagement has started to create space and opportunities for the next generation of female peace and development workers.  CSGAP should be reviewed. Level of transformation of gender disparities achieved or contribution to WPS is difficult to measure because there is no detailed matrix provided to measure this objective, apart from sex-disaggregated figures and anecdotal reports. | CARE has an explicit and strong focus on women engagement under Objective 1 on women empowerment, Objective 3 on increasing community cohesion and resilience on engaging young women and women leaders, and psychosocial support for affected mothers.  Gender action plan as reflected in the project design and reports is specified in terms of engagement of young women and woman-leaders and support to affected mothers. Women-led and focused organizations are engaged as subgrantees and community partners.  In order for DFAT investment to have an explicit connection with the global Women, Peace and Security ((WPS) Index, future engagement and programming to Muslim Mindanao should foreshadow the WPS indicators on inclusion, justice and security, even on an exploratory basis given the nature of traditional and cultural contexts prevailing in the region. | HD strives to improve women participation in its activities. The continuing engagement of the MNLF women’s committee and the MILF social affairs committee are strategies get more women engaged in the development process. MNLF woman-leader Hadja Bainon Karon and MILF woman leader Aida Silongan are considered champions of women’s causes in the region. However, the real challenge is beyond personality-based engaged to get more ordinary Moro women engaged. TSS also promoted spaces and developed local women involvement in conflict mediation. | WELD Peace project have explicit gender focus, and therefore contribute to empowering women and developing women leaders in Moro communities, and actively engaging them in the peace process and in voicing their development agenda.  Very explicit progress in terms of promoting the gender agenda.  The development agenda developed through a national conference is being utilized by local civil society partners and women leaders as they work and advocate with their local and regional governments, calling for women’s presence and voices in LGU consultations and dialogues, provision of economic opportunities and wider dissemination and education on the women’s rights. |
| **5. Disability Inclusion** |  |  |  |  |  |
| **e. Is the investment actively involve people with disabilities?** | No data available. Accessibility policy for captioning of video reports in place. | Data/response not available in the report. | No data available on this. The suggestion from the review team is to explore and integrate this theme in future programming either as a rapid assessment or research activity into disabled combatants, disability due to conflict or disability in a conflict situation.  No deliberate plan for this purpose. Partners merely saying that participants with physical disability are welcomed and consideration in accommodation and transportation are provided, e.g. room at ground floor or near an elevator. Allowed a relative to assist in their movement from home to venue. | HD had undertaken a workshop for persons with disabilities. | Data/response not available in the report. |
| **e.1 How well does the investment actively involved people with disabilities and/or disabled peoples’ organizations in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation?** | No data available on this | Data/response not available in the report. | No data available on this | However, no follow-up activities have been undertaken after the workshop for PWDs. | No data available on this |
| **e.2 How well does the investment identify and address barriers to inclusion and opportunities for participation for people with disabilities to enable them to benefit equally from aid investment?** | All AVP materials produced have subtitles to benefit persons suffering from deafness. Orientation briefings with IA partners include disability awareness practices. | Data/response not available in the report. | No data available on this | No data available on this |

## **Annex C.2 Multilateral Partners**

| **Evaluation Criteria based on TOR** | **World Bank**  **Mindanao Trust Fund 2 (MTF-2) --2017-2019** | **World Bank**  **Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM)** | **UNDP Peace, Reconciliation, and Empowerment Initiatives in the Bangsamoro (PRIME Bangsamoro)** | **UNDP Stabilization, Recovery, and Transformation for PEACE (START-PEACE)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. **Effectiveness** |  |  |  |  |
| 1. **Are we achieving the outputs and outcomes that we expected at this point in time?**   **a.1 Is each activity on track to meet its outcomes and objectives?**  **a.2 What are the benefits and costs of DFAT’s flexible programming strategy, for both implementing partners and DFAT?**  **a.3 Is the program as a whole addressing the drivers of conflict and violence? Does it meet the “do no harm” standard?**  **a.4 What is the impact of the research activities being supported? Have these been used to inform policies and programs?**  **a.5 Are activities well-aligned with other Australian aid interventions in Muslim Mindanao?** | The project is on track in achieving outputs and outcomes given that it has sufficient knowledge and experience in project implementation given that they were built on previous activities and experiences of the project.  Socio-economic Infrastructure under Component 1 (Community Development Assistance) encountered delay due to security problems. The other two components (i.e., Capacity and Institution-Building, and Project Administration, Monitoring and Evaluation) are on track of meeting outcomes and objectives.  Given the fluid situation in conflict-affected areas, the flexibility afforded by DFAT’s flexible programming strategy enables partners to better respond to the needs of the community. On the downside, it requires greater supervision work on the part of DFAT given the need to ensure that any shift in strategic direction is aligned with the genuine needs of the community.  It is addressing basic socio-economic needs of communities and thus, help ease tension and brings hope to the communities. The consultative manner by which projects/activities are identified with MILF and local leaders and community members conform to the “do no harm” principle.  Little engagement in research activities but more in project implementation. However, mode of implementation (i.e., community driven development) is being used as a model by the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) in implementing projects funded by other development partners.  They are well-aligned because they took into consideration recent developments in the peace process (i.e., signing of BOL, focus on Camp Transformation, assistance to combatants and their family) | The technical assistance support provided to the TFBM accomplished the tasks that it aimed to undertake. There were 12 activities to be completed within a short-time fame and mostly technical work in nature  Most of them except for the continuing activities, which is expected, such as the MIS, technical and advisory support to the TFBM, Citizens Engagement, IDPs and returnees profiling, and support to Compensation Law  It allowed accommodation of activities which were not anticipated at the start of the project but which are currently deemed important in achieving stability and peace within the community.  It does because it promotes inclusion of affected parties in decision making of TFBM that will affect them and inputting feedback from displaced residents as to their needs to the TFBM. The problem are the expectations built by the project among conflict victims, which unfortunately are beyond the project to deliver because its work is recommendatory in nature.  Most of the recommendations of research studies and surveys have been submitted for consideration by TFBM and those within the competence of TFBM to deliver were implemented.  The project is aligned with the various assistance of DFAT on the peace process given that it addresses a specific emergency situation which has very high importance among the Bangsamoro, both residents and non-residents of Marawi City. | PRIME Bangsamoro is one of the multilateral activities implemented from 2016 to 2018, a period when the peace process suffered major setbacks with the Mamasapano incident and the non-passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) by the Philippine Congress. 2017 is when the Marawi Siege happened. Despite of these events, the project was able to provide support to the MILF and MNLF leadership. Among its support was facilitating the group desires to participate in the political process through the organization of their respective political parties, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) for the MILF and the Bangsamoro Party (BaPa) for the MNLF Jikiri wing.  PRIME Bangsamoro was able to access the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands to deliver customized dialogue, negotiation, mediation and political skills training program for MILF, MNLF, traditional, religious and professional leaders in Bangsamoro.  By engaging both the MILF and MNLF, and training and mobilizing Moro leaders across broad spectrum of political persuasion, the project was able to demonstrate how conflicting narratives can be heard in the safe spaces of dialogue and mediation.  Prior to the assumption of the government of the day in the BARMM, PRIME Bangsamoro was able to provide timely technical and operational assistance leading to the strategic review and reorganization of such ministries as local government, agriculture and fisheries, science and technology, trade and tourism and the women’s commission. | START PEACE started on April 2019 and will run up to 2022. It appears from early report and interview with implementing partner that this project is off to a good start with quality inputs that can significant influence good outputs.  The project was able to connect BARMM group with Aceh, Indonesia, for hands-on experience in assessing transition and autonomy exercise, learning from past experiences and exploring opportunities for replication.  UNDP brings into the partnership with DFAT its overseas exposure, related experience and network of development resources from documents and models to consultants.  The establishment of a functional BARMM and the support being extended by the START PEACE Project are crucial in addressing the protracted conflict and its drivers.  While learning and lessons are curled from overseas exposure, the ensuing replication is more akin to the BARMM context than to the overseas model it was taken from. For example, while the concept of the School of Peace and Democracy is taken from the Aceh model in Indonesia, the BARMM model is reflective of the local intricacies and need. The school will be developed through a consortium that includes AIM, DAP, LGA, Galing Pook, Clindengael Institute and SPD-Aceh. The work is divided into two tracks, one to support the BARMM bureaucracy and the other one to support MILF combatants transition to civilian life.  START PEACE focus is well-aligned with DFAT AIP Pillar 1 on Security and Stability particularly on demobilization of combatants and return to normal life, and the BARMM transition resulting to a more inclusive and responsive autonomous government and improvement in government services to the communities. |
| 1. **2. Efficiency** |  |  |  |  |
| **b. Are we making appropriate use of Australia’s and our partners’ time and resources to achieve outcomes?**  **b.1 Is each activity able to monitor both the delivery of outputs and remain within the budget allocated?**  **b.2 Are there other modalities that would be more appropriate to deliver the activities?**  **b.3 The current implementation modalities are directly engaging partners and through multilateral organizations. What are the benefits and costs of DFAT with these modalities rather than working through other modalities, such as managing contractor?** | DFAT’s investment is sound because project responds to the current needs of conflict-affected communities for socio-economic projects.  The project has installed a robust monitoring and evaluation system and thus, been able to track progress made and budget expenditures  None has the ability and experience of the project implementor given their almost 15 years work in the Bangsamoro region.  It provides greater flexibility in operations and the arrangement is more responsive to changing needs because DFAT engages different service providers instead of engaging the service of a single managing contractor. | Yes, as the successful reconstruction of Marawi will have a confidence-building effect not only on the residents of Marawi but with the Bangsamoro in general because of the symbolic importance of the city to them. Unsuccessful reconstruction of the City is being used as a propaganda material by VE groups against the government.  Clear outputs from each of the 12 components of the project have been identified and submitted.  The spread and scope of the project implementor in working in conflict areas around the world makes it the ideal agent for this type of technical assistance project.  Flexibility is enjoyed by DFAT in addressing new and emerging issues which have not been anticipated at the start of the project. It also allows to be more responsive to needs/demands of the client stakeholders. | PRIME Bangsamoro is one of the more prominent and relevant donor-funded interventions that made significant in-roads in terms of supporting an enabling environment, mobilizing key stakeholders and facilitating platforms for inclusive political dialogues and mediations.  It is arguably one of few donor-funded projects well-positioned to provide substantial support to influence the stakeholders to stay the course of the peace process, and promote intra-Moro dialogues in view of the BOL and federalism tracks.  There was a strong sense of ownership and engagement from dialogue partners such as the MILF and MNLF; local foreign, national and local civil society organizations; and national, regional and local governments.  PRIME Bangsamoro was very explicit in terms of building local capacities and context-sensitive inputs. While dominated by Moros and the MILF as contractual partner in the peace process, PRIME Bangsamoro was also able to mobilize and provide opportunities for minority sectors, such as the descendants of Christian settlers and non-Moro indigenous peoples to articulate their issues and concerns. | UNDP’s engagement provides a unique global perspective to political transition and violent extremism. The START PEACE project can learn and benefits from UNDP’s post conflict reconstruction and development experiences.  Consequently, the critical two factors to post-conflict reconstruction – nature of transition by armed groups and their ability to practice, participate and lead a different type of politics – have been integrated into the START PEACE project design.  There is a healthy mix of varied implementing partners – international, national and local – in this project, each bringing its own expertise and experience and allows the BARMM to benefits in terms of wider input choices to its governance transition, normalization and camp transformation. This hopefully would mean more qualitative outputs for the project that support value for money for the DFAT investment in Muslim Mindanao. |
| **3. Relevance** |  |  |  |  |
| **c. Is this still the right thing to do?**  **c.1 How well have current programs adapted in response to the change in the context? Are there programs/partners that are no longer relevant?**  **c.2 How well aligned or integrated is the program with the broader range of new initiatives being implemented and planned in BARMM?**  **c.3 What new initiatives/objectives/**  **partners are needed to support the transition of the BARMM govt and ongoing governance in the BARMM?**  **c.4 To what extent do the programs support regional security and economic growth?**  **c.5 What future activities should be considered post the political transition?**  **c.6 How well are the current programs responding to the different kinds of conflict in the region - violent extremism, community/**  **clan based, and political? Are we targeting the correct drivers of these conflicts?** | Focusing assistance to combatants, their camps, and family is both timely and relevant given the stage within which the peace process is at right now.  Quite well given that “normalization” has now occupied a front stage in the peace process. In fact, activities helping the transformation process of the camps and combatants and their family should be intensified for them to immediately realize the benefit of peace and build their confidence and support to the peace process.  Well aligned given the priority accorded by the BARMM government to “normalization” support activities, including camp transformation and assisting combatants and their family.  There is need to find partners who can help BARMM officials in formulating and quickly implementing socio-economic projects which are meant to improve the well-being of ordinary Bangsamoro in the region.  The project fits well with the current thrust of BARMM to develop the regional economy and by doing this, build confidence of the people to the newly constituted BARMM government and wean them away from supporting violent extremist groups.  \  Activities that will help Bangsamoro voters to elect in the 2022 scheduled election MILF endorsed candidates.  The current project responds well to counter influence of VE groups and clan related conflicts by showing concrete results on the grounds (benefits of the peace dividend) and being consultative in the process of identifying and implementing projects. Unfortunately, the scale of project implementation is relatively small due to budgetary constraints. | Rehabilitation and reconstruction of Marawi is long overdue. It is way past preparatory technical support for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the City. There is urgent need for implementation, which is beyond control of project implementor.  Project proponent has responded well to needs of TFBM and stakeholders and the changing situation in Marawi. But without actual implementation by the government of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program, people’s expectation will not be satisfied.  The leadership of BTA has made the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Marawi City a priority activity. Hence, the outputs coming from the various activities of the project can serve as important inputs to the BTA’s work.  Good project managers to implement the rehabilitation and reconstruction work and provided with the corresponding budget to do their work properly.  Marawi City has a huge symbolic meaning to the Bangsamoro as it is the only “Islamic City” in the country. Its successful rehabilitation and reconstruction will weaken the VE groups’ propaganda that the Christian-dominated central government in Manila is not interested in reconstructing an Islamic area because of its bias against Islam.  Continuing effort to restore and improve Marawi City to enhance its reputation as the center of Islamic faith and culture.  It does respond to a major propaganda line of the VE groups that the Christian government based in Manila is on war path against Islam and hence, targeted the destruction of the only “Islamic City” in the Philippines. Its rehabilitation and reconstruction is not taking place as it prioritizes the development of other cities in the country populated by Christians. | The PRIME Bangsamoro programmatic approach with built in flexibility and nuanced implementation based on changing and emerging political and security contexts is relevant to this day. In fact, in all the focus groups and interviews, these flexibility and nuanced implementation appear to be the strongest points of DFAT programming in Muslim Mindanao.  Many of those engaged under PRIME Bangsamoro are now the shakers and movers in the BARMM, from being members of the BTA, to occupying senior and technical positions across the ministries and leading in the normalization of combatants and the provision of socio-economic support package as well as in the camp transformation.  Because of the unique nature of transition towards parliamentary and ministerial system and given that no such realities is present in the current Philippine system, capacity building support, technical and institutional, continues to be expressed by political appointees and civil society leaders in the region.  There is a need to ensure that the normative functions of parliament and ministerial cabinet are fully understood by the next batch of regional leadership and that they have the capacity to live up to the expectations of good governance, rule of law and public service.  PRIME Bangsamoro was flexible enough to be implemented in a 3-year period of so much uncertainty in the political and security fronts. It was also able to accommodate early initiatives on P/CVE especially after the Marawi Siege.  The current political and security frame in addressing VE drivers is very limiting. There is a need for DFAT to consider a larger “human security” frame in its programming so that other dimensions of insecurity such as economic, food, health, environment, personal and culture, which feed into the drivers and complexity of violent extremism. | The contexts upon which START PEACE operates is very much relevant to the BARMM situation – the need to support the MILF (and MNLF) to transition from a secessionist to a social movement, the need for proactive and customized approaches to violent extremism (while the BARMM provinces are beset by the same problem the situations in each area is also unique and different from the rest), the transition of their combatants into productive citizens and of their camps into productive and resilient communities.  While transition takes time, obviously beyond 2022, the START PEACE project is in the best position to help jumpstart and built the foundations for succeeding and continuing interventions.  START PEACE project have already captured some of the interventions needed to jumpstart the transition at various levels.  The success of the transition is integral to regional peace and development. The success of the government transition will also it to focus on the lingering challenges of poverty. Early successes in the normalization would alleviate combatants from ails of poverty and other forms on insecurity. The early successes in camp transformation would build productive and resilient communities away from the lure and pull of violent extremism.  Post transition and project end in 2022, future activities should pursue the unfinished businesses of combatant normalization, camp transformation and governance transition to the parliamentary and ministerial system.  Conditional on the demobilization of combatants is the parallel reduction and management of small arms and light weapons (SALWs)which are often associated with political clans, local warlords and armed groups. While the project has clear intervention support for demobilization, it should also influence the government and the security sectors to be serious about arresting the proliferation of loose firearms. |
| **4. Gender Equality** |  |  |  |  |
| **d. Are we contributing towards gender equality and empowering women and girls?**  **d.1 Is the program as a whole making progress as expected in effectively promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment?**  **d.2 Are the individual gender action plans being effectively utilized by partners?**  **d.3 To what extent did the program contribute to the Women, Peace and Security agenda?** | Project makes conscious effort in ensuring participation of women in training programs it conducted, during the community consultation process, and the kind of socio-economic sub-projects it implements.  There is no specific activity along the line of promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment but their active participation in the community consultation sessions, serving as community volunteers, being recipients of the Alternative Learning System are activities that contribute toward this goal.  No specific gender action plan has been provided for the review..  Difficult to measure but the fact that the project ensured participation of women, particularly members of the BWAF, in all components/activities of the project must have positive contribution to emphasizing the role of women in peace and security agenda. | Consultations and citizens engagement conducted deliberately engaged women in the process and encouraged their active participation.  Not the main objective of the project though women are encouraged to participate in discussions and women’s groups were specifically invited to various consultations.  No specific gender action plan has been provided for the review.  This is not included in the original objective of the project and hence, difficult to measure. However, leaders and representatives of various women’s groups were invited to the consultations and planning activities of the project with TFBM. | There was deliberate identification and inclusion of women leaders across cultural groups – Moros, Christians and IPs. Women groups such as the RCBW, MILF Social Welfare Committee, UNYPhil-Women, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Women Auxiliary Brigade were also engaged throughout the project implementation.  The project contribution is more on presence and participation. No explicit gender action plans were developed. | There is no clear gender lens in its statement of key outputs and activities. This implies the normative approach to include women as participants can be expected. How far the women agenda can be integrated is not explicit. |
| **5. Disability Inclusion** |  |  |  |  |
| **e. Is the investment actively involving people with disabilities?** | It involved former MILF combatants with disabilities, as victims of previous armed conflicts | No specific plan for this purpose | No specific plan for this purpose | No specific plan for this purpose |
| **e.1 How well does the investment actively involved people with disabilities and/or disabled peoples’ organizations in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation?** | Representatives from the BWAF and officers of MILF combatants were present in the identification and the decision on what projects to be implemented. Psychosocial services were extended to selected previous combatants. | No deliberate plan for this purpose. | No specific plan for this purpose | No specific plan for this purpose |
| **e.2 How well does the investment identify and address barriers to inclusion and opportunities for participation for people with disabilities to enable them to benefit equally from aid investment?** | Not an integral component of the project and hence no deliberate plan to ensure that people with disabilities will equally benefit from the aid investment, although some of them were selected as recipients of the assistance. | No specific plan for this purpose. | No specific plan for this purpose | No specific plan for this purpose |

1. Negative peace refers to the mere absence of war or direct violence, while positive peace refers to broader challenges of structural integration and addressing root causes of conflict. Sustainable peacebulding requires both. See Galtung, J. (1996*). Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilisation*. Oslo: PRIO. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The team was composed of Fermin D. Adriano (Team Leader), Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez (Governance and conflict sensitivity specialist), and Noor Saada (Bangsamoro Peace and Development specialist). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Documents provided to the review team were largely qualitative in nature, with the exception of sex-disaggregated data. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Support for PAVE was previously provided by the US Embassy in the early stages of the program but had been discontinued. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. .  In late 2019, BTA-Cabinet Bill No. 31 entitled "An Act appropriating funds for the operation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) from January 1 to December 31, 2020, and other purposes" covering a total of PHP65.3-billion was approved by the BTA with 48 “yes” votes, one “no” vote, and five abstentions. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Refer to Rood, Steven (2016). “The Role of International Actors in Search for Peace in Mindanao”. In: Hutchcroft, Paul (ed.) Mindanao: The Long Journey to Peace and Prosperity. Manila: Anvil Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. However, the peace agreement did not include the decommissioning of MNLF combatants. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. WB was designated by OPAPP as the Administrator of the Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Although there was a request to extend ECQ imposition in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, this was rejected by the national IATF-EID. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. CRMC received just over PHP 14 million from the BARMM government for upgrading of laboratory capacity for COVID-19 testing. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “*Normalization is the process whereby communities can achieve their desired quality of life, which includes the pursuit of sustainable livelihood and political participation within a deliberative society”* (Annex on Normalization, 2014)*.* Executive Order No. 79 was issued on 24 April 2019 to implement the Annex on Normalization. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)