# Independent Review of two Democratic Governance Programs in PNG

Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN)

&

**Church Partnership Program (CPP)** 



Final Draft of 12<sup>th</sup> February 2013

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The review team would like to thank all those who supported and contributed to this independent review, namely:

- The AusAID officers from the Democratic Governance Unit (DGU) in Port Moresby who helped organise and manage the review process and logistics, as well as these and all the other officers who contributed their ideas during meetings/interviews in both Papua New Guinea and Australia.
- The representatives of GoPNG government agencies, including from the Departments of National Planning and Monitoring (DNPM), Community Development (DfCD), Provincial and Local Level Government Affairs (DPLLGA) and Provincial Administrations.
- Members of the Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN) team, both in Port Moresby and the regional offices visited.
- Representatives of SPSN non-government partner organisations.
- Representatives of the Church Partnership Program (CPP) PNG churches and their development units, as well as CPP Australian church partner representatives; and
- Representatives of community organisations being supported by SPSN and CPP, including the individual community members who were consulted during field work.

Without their input and support, the review would clearly not have been possible.

Not surprisingly, different people have different views regarding the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and likely sustainability of the two Democratic Governance (DG) programs reviewed, as well as the relevance of AusAID's overall DG strategy.

Nevertheless, the main findings, conclusions and recommendations presented in this report reflect the opinions of the review team. As an independent review, this is as it should be. Consequently, the report authors also take full responsibility for any errors or omissions in this report.

The review team sincerely hopes that this report proves useful in helping AusAID and other key stakeholders to continually improve the effectiveness of AusAID's development cooperation program in PNG.

Cover photos taken by the review team show: top left – Members of Mount Hagen Handicraft Group, W. Highlands Province (CPP); top right – Village Health Post at Dumundiri village, Simbu Province (CPP); bottom centre – Village Birth Attendants trained at Barola village Haus Mama, E. Highlands Province (SPSN grant).

# Abbreviations

ACPNG	Anglican Church PNG
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANCP	AusAID NGO Cooperation Program
ANGO	Australian Non-Government Organisation
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BUPNG	Baptist Union of Papua New Guinea
СВО	Community Based Organisation
CDS	Community Development Scheme
CDW	Community Development Worker
CEC	Church Education Council
CMC	Church Medical Council
CNEC	Catholic National Education Commission
CLC	Church Leaders Council
CPP	Church Partnership Program
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DfCD	Department for Community Development
DG	Democratic Governance
DGTP	Democratic Governance Program – Transition Phase
DGU	Democratic Governance Unit
DID	Disability Inclusive Development
DIRD	Department of Implementation and Rural Development (formerly the Office of
	Rural Development)
DNPM	Department for National Planning and Monitoring
DPLGA	Department of Provincial and Local Government Affairs
DSIP	District Services Improvement Program
FSV	Family and Sexual Violence
GESI	Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
GoA	Government of Australia
GoPNG	Government of PNG
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICDP	Integrated Community Development Program
JDP&BPC	Joint District Planning and Budget Priority Committee
JGC	Joint Governing Council
LG	Local Government
LGC	Local Grants Committee
MC	Managing Contractor
MDI	Media Development Initiative
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MIS	Management Information System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTDP	Medium Term Development Plan
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NBC	National Broadcasting Commission
NEFC	National Economic and Fiscal Commission
NGC	National Grants Committee

NGP	Non-Government Organisation
NGI	New Guinea Islands
PCO	Program Coordination Office
PCMC	Provincial Coordination and Monitoring Committee
PD	Program Director
PDD	Program Design Document
PGC	Provincial Grants Committee
PLGP	Provincial and Local Government Program
PLLSMA	Provincial and Local Level Service Monitoring Authority
PLWHA	People living with HIV/AIDS
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
PMT	Provincial Management Team
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNGCC	Papua New Guinea Council of Churches
PPC	Program Partnership Council
SA	Salvation Army
SDA	Seventh Day Adventist
SGP	Strongim Gavman Program
SNP	Sub-National Program
SNS	Sub-National Strategy
SPSN	Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen
TIPNG	Transparency International PNG
TOR	Terms of Reference
UC	United Church
VCT	Voluntary Counseling and Treatment

# **Executive Summary**

### 1. Purpose and method

### **1.1 Purpose of the review**

The purpose of this independent review is to:

- a) Assess the implementation and achievements of two major Democratic Governance programs currently implemented under the Australian aid program in Papua New Guinea, namely: Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN) and the Church Partnership Program Phase 2 (CPP);
- b) Recommend improvements to strengthen current implementation of both programs and identify lessons to inform the design of future democratic governance programs in PNG; and
- c) Assess the relevance of the existing democratic governance strategy and whether AusAID has effectively implemented the strategy through its programs.

The review has been managed by AusAID's Democratic Governance Unit in Port Moresby.

### 1.2 Review method

The review method was participatory, involving active collaboration and consultation with key program stakeholders. Two independent consultants were contracted to undertake the review, with management and administrative support provided by AusAID's Democratic Governance Unit. The review started in mid-October 2012 and the consultants submitted their final report on the 12<sup>th</sup> February 2013.

The review method involved:

- *Preparation of a review methods paper and work plan:* A first draft was submitted to AusAID on the 13<sup>th</sup> October, and following feedback the final version was submitted on the 19<sup>th</sup> October 2012.
- **Document review**: A large number of documents relevant to SPSN, CPP, AusAID's governance strategy, other AusAID programs and GoPNG priorities have been collected and reviewed. A full list is provided at Annex 3.
- *Interviews and consultations with stakeholders*: Almost 200individuals have been directly consulted, representing most of the major stakeholder agencies/groups involved in the SPSN and CPP programs.<sup>1</sup> A mix of in-depth interviews with individuals, focus-group discussions, formal meetings and informal discussions were used.
- *Field / project site visits*: The team visited Port Moresby, Madang, Lae, Goroka, Kundiawa and Mount Hagen, as well as a number of villages/communities where there are CPP and SPSN supported initiatives (either planned or ongoing). The timing of these visits and the specific locations visited are listed in Annex 2.
- *Validation of preliminary findings*: The team's preliminary findings were presented on 9<sup>th</sup> November (in an Aide Memoire) to a group of key stakeholders in Port Moresby. Feedback was received from this group and taken into account in the first draft report, which was submitted to AusAID on the 10<sup>th</sup> December 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This does not include the many community members who attended our project site visits in rural areas

- *Consultation on first draft report:* Following submission of the first draft report, AusAID circulated it to all key stakeholders for their review and comment. The review Team Leader then came back to Port Moresby in late January 2013 to facilitate 3 full days of consultations with all key stakeholders. These meetings were co-facilitated by Mr. Martin Brash from the SPSN team.
- *Finalisation of second draft report:* Subsequent to the Port Moresby consultations, the Team Leader finalized the second draft review report, and submitted this to AusAID on the 12<sup>th</sup> February 2013.

### 2. Main findings / conclusions

### 2.1 SPSN

The Review team concludes that there have been a range of positive developments in relation to SPSN implementation to date, including:

- The majority of staff are now in place, and appear highly committed to the program outcomes.
- Systems are in place to allow grants to flow, and an increasing number of grant agreements are also now in place.
- SPSN management have been flexible in responding to changes in program focus requested / required by AusAID.
- The Local Grants Committees, provincial and local government staff and Civil Society Organisation (CSO) small grant recipients are appreciating the opportunity to engage in the SPSN community planning process.
- CSOs who have been engaged in the Joint Organisational Assessment (JOA) process have considered it very helpful.
- Key partners appreciate the availability of core funding to support their activities, and a number of the key partners (such as the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council and Transparency International PNG) are central to promoting DG principles and practices in PNG.
- A high quality Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI) Action Plan has been developed, and SPSN has effectively mainstreamed issues of gender equality and social inclusion across its systems and operations.
- Innovative initiatives are being developed and supported such as the Panguna Peace Initiative.

There are nevertheless some concerns, including:

- Substantial delays in getting program resources fully and effectively mobilised have impacted on the planned 'roll out' of the 4 year program. However, it is noted that initial expectations were probably unrealistic, given that SPSN was initially designed as a 10 year program, and the DGTP did not provide a firm foundation for a smooth transition between CDS and SPSN.
- The small grants program (as it is designed) is considered to be too broad, geographically dispersed and absorbs a disproportionate amount of SPSN resources to manage its implementation. Small grants are also not necessarily linked to local ward or local government plans (when/where in place), thus limiting their potential contribution to improving CSO / local government partnerships.
- Support for CSO capacity building, linking, learning, and supporting coalitions for learning has not yet been given sufficient priority (on balance) within the overall workplan.

- There is a need to increase attention and program wide focus on the SPSN defined areas of 'democratic governance practice', for example increased multi stakeholder dialogue on policy issues, improved skills in budget analysis, monitoring of service delivery, collective action influencing ways government works, etc.
- There is an ongoing need to improve communication and coordination mechanisms between SPSN national and regional staff (and through them local stakeholders) across all program areas.
- There is a need to increase collaboration / synergies with other AusAID programs working in the area of both governance and service delivery.
- There is a need to further analyse how and in what areas to engage with the private sector on issues of democratic governance, and to develop practical engagement strategies based on this analysis.
- There is a need to review and clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of AusAID and SPSN with respect to some decision making processes.
- The GoPNG's National Department for Community Development (DfCD) has, at least for the past year or so, not been effectively engaged in supporting SPSN oversight and implementation.
- With less than 18months left of the current contract, there is an urgent need to start planning for a subsequent phase of SPSN.

### 2.2 CPP

The following are the review team's main conclusions:

- The CPP remains a relevant and effective element of AusAID's overall development cooperation program in PNG. It is building partner church capacity to support pro-poor development and also directly supports improved service delivery by churches. The flexible structure of the program design, and the iterative way it is being implemented, is helping to ensure that the core partnership and local ownership principles are being effectively supported and promoted.
- Given the churches' established presence in remote rural areas of PNG, they have the ability to reach some of the poorest communities who are currently not adequately covered by basic government services. However, there is no requirement (in the design or implementation strategy) for CPP resources to be targeted at any specific poorest groups or geographic areas.
- CPP is also a relatively efficient way to deliver support, given that it primarily works with and through established (or emerging) PNG church institutional structures (with the exception of the current overall program coordination arrangements). CPP supports the more efficient and effective use of other existing church financial and human resources for pro-poor development work, and is helping partner churches to access additional funding through demonstrating their improved professionalism in program/project planning and management.
- The churches are increasingly active in promoting gender equality and other social inclusion strategies, with CPP support. They are supporting significant HIV/AIDs awareness, counseling and testing support programs, both stand-alone as well as integrated into other activities such as adult literacy programs. The development of a broadly accepted 'Theology of Development' is helping to further establish the churches' development work as a core part of their mission.
- On balance, it is considered that the institutional strengthening support provided through CPP is the most effective element of the support provided to date. This is building church capacity to more effectively plan and manage pro-poor development activities over the long term. Direct

CPP support for specific church service activities is useful, but generally represents a modest contribution to their overall service delivery support finances (e.g. from GoPNG for health and education staff salaries and for school/health infrastructure). Also, AusAID itself invests far more heavily in direct service delivery through its main sectoral programs in health, education, infrastructure and law and justice.

- CPP achievements with respect to supporting 'Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance' are less easily identifiable. Individual churches continue to engage with government agencies (particularly at sub-regional level) on various matters, including service delivery. However, there appears to be little evidence yet of enhanced strategic engagement of the partner churches, as a collective voice, with government. There is talk, but not much in the way of concrete action or results. The Partnership Policy Framework between the GoPNG and the Christian Churches remains moribund, and no specific strategies or actions to improve the functioning of the Church Education and Medical Councils appear to have been advanced directly through CPP supported mechanisms.
- There is as yet little evidence of CPP having established complementary linkages with other AusAID governance or sectoral programs. However, this is not unique to CPP, as most AusAID programs seem to be implemented largely as stand-alone initiatives, without a clear integrating framework (at least in practice rather than just on paper).
- The CPP is effectively supporting ongoing dialogue, information sharing and relationship building between participating churches through the Church Leaders Council (CLC), the Program Partnership Council (PPC), the Forum meetings and Joint Working/Reference Groups. However, the CPP's overall program management mechanisms are not considered particularly efficient or effective in promoting timely decision making on some issues. Clearer division of functions and responsibilities between the CLC, PPC and Management Committee is required.
- The Program Coordination Office (PCO) is not currently able to effectively undertake some of the key functions expected of it (over and above its secretariat functions), due partly to the limited experience and capacities of key technical staff and partly because of inadequate supervision and support mechanisms/arrangements. This is impacting negatively on overall program monitoring, reporting and communication capacities –and thus the quality of related products.
- AusAID has its own institutional and operational weaknesses which reduce its ability to manage, monitor and support programs such as CPP as effectively as it would like to. AusAID Officers with direct program oversight responsibilities seem to be tasked with significant administrative / contract / risk management responsibilities that, at times, limit their ability to engage deeply on more strategic matters, both for their 'own' AusAID programs as well as with respect to promoting strategic linkages / complementarities between programs. There is also relatively high A-based staff turnover, and sometimes inadequate staff transition planning. It was also stated that there are very limited resources available for AusAID officer field monitoring and support visits (at least within the DG Unit), which given the importance of such visits in terms of learning and relationship building (as well as understanding the political economy of PNG), seems to be a false economy.
- Government of Papua New Guinea national agencies directly involved in supporting CPP, namely the DNPM and DfCD, also have institutional weaknesses which limit their ability to effectively support CPP implementation. The frequency and quality of their engagement in key decision making forums, such as the PPC, appears to have been inconsistent. Budget allocation and expenditure details under the State / Church Partnership Policy Framework were requested from DNPM by the review team, but have not been made available to date. More active and consistent support from key GoPNG agencies would clearly be desirable.


### 2.3 Democratic Governance Strategy

In theory at least, AusAID's Democratic Governance (DG) strategy and principles look to be (and remain) relevant to PNG, and indeed to most other countries. Working with both civil society and state agencies to promote partnerships, and the concept of shared-governance, makes sense.

However, it is unclear to some (including the review team) what this really means in practice, and how it is to be effectively implemented. The DG strategy is very general, and does not clearly help define the scope and focus of program design and management arrangements.

The DG strategy is also only one of many similar/related AusAID policies, strategies and frameworks, including the Civil Society Engagement Framework (June 2012), the Effective Governance paper (Nov 2011), GoA Aid Effectiveness commitments, the GoA-GOPNG Development Cooperation Treaty, AusAID's Governance Performance Assessment Framework, etc. Each of these gives slightly different emphasis to different things, and it is not always clear how they align with each other, or which one takes precedence.

One diagram, from the PLGP design document, helps to profile the current structure / configuration of AusAID programs in PNG:



Service Focused Programs

This makes the distinction between 'Governance and Service Enabling Programs' and 'Service Focused Programs'. The DG element clearly fits under 'Governance and Enabling Programs'. To the review team, this seems clear and pragmatic. While it makes a distinction between the two main types of programs, it is also clear that there are important and necessary links between them. They need to complement and support each other. Also, Service Focused Programs also clearly need to contain some

governance strengthening element themselves, while the Governance Programs must also keep their eye on the service delivery end-point, while focusing on practical ways to improve governance.

However, each type of program also needs to maintain focus, understand the limits of its scope, and know when (where and how) it should work closely with other programs and/or let other programs take the lead.

A problem with the DG strategy is that it doesn't really seem to add much value to helping understand how this will work - from a program design and management perspective. It highlights the need to 'Support state and civil society to work in **partnership** in order to strengthen their complementary roles and responsibilities' and to 'Work at as **local** a level as possible in supporting civil society and the sub-national levels of the PNG state....'. This then also raises the question as to what makes a DG program different from any other sub-national program, as all such programs should (or at least could) be working in concert with such principles?

The review of the Development Cooperation Treaty, which resulted in added emphasis being placed on all AusAID programs to demonstrate service delivery outcomes, appears to have further complicated the picture. The service delivery 'push' has led to some levels of uncertainty, particularly within programs such as SPSN, about how much emphasis should be placed on supporting the facilitating/enabling environment for service delivery, and how much emphasis (and thus resource for implementation and monitoring) should be placed on demonstrating service delivery outcomes. The review team feels that the balance has shifted, certainly too much for core DG 'enabling' programs, in favour of demonstrating service delivery at the expense of enabling governance outputs and outcomes.

There also appears to be very limited evidence as yet, of significant engagement by DG programs with the private sector, in particular the big resource development companies and their respective foundations. This is not easily done through an organization such as AusAID (with its relatively complex processes, accountability and monitoring requirements), however given the scope, scale and impact of such resource development projects in PNG (particularly in remote / poor communities), there remain obvious advantages to developing complementary programs of development work.

### 3. Recommendations

It is important to note that a number of these recommendations are already being acted on by key stakeholders, given that the MTR process was participatory and to a significant extent reflects a general consensus as to what needs to be done to further improve program implementation.

The main report provides further clarification as to what the implementation of each of these recommendations might entail in practice.

### 3.1 Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen recommendations

Given that SPSN now has less than 18 months to run, under the current contract, implementation of many of the recommendations provided below is somewhat dependent on whether or not there is going to be a Phase 2. Recommendation 1 is therefore critical to helping prioritise some of the specific actions required to implement the recommendations, as well as the level of resources that should be applied to implementing them.

*Recommendation 1*: Immediately initiate plans to undertake scoping and design work for a possible Phase 2 of SPSN

*Recommendation 2*: Prioritise the development of improved coordination and cohesion across program components for the remaining program period.

*Recommendation 3*: Increased attention be given to promoting the understanding and implementation of SPSN 'Democratic Governance Practices' across all program areas.

Recommendation 4: Increase focus on CSO capacity building for Democratic Governance.

*Recommendation 5:* Review and (as appropriate) revise current ways of working to improve program efficiencies and effectiveness.

*Recommendation 6*: Look for opportunities to improve links / synergies with other AusAID programs, including DG, Governance and sectoral programs.

*Recommendation* 7: Promote systems and mechanisms to improve collaboration between SPSN partners across the 5 component areas.

*Recommendation 8*: Ensure sufficient resources are available to ensure the timely implementation of the Gender and Social Inclusion Action Plan.

**Recommendation 9:** AusAID should review its own resource allocation and management practices with respect to how effectively it supports its DG program managers to carry out the work expected of them.

### 3.2 Church Partnership Program recommendations

**Recommendation 1**: The Program Partnership Council should bring forward their own planned review of CPP governance and management arrangements to the earliest opportunity.

*Recommendation 2*: Consolidated CPP program monitoring, reporting and communication should be given more priority / attention.

**Recommendation 3**: The CLC and PPC members should give increased focus, both during their meetings and in-between meetings, to developing and advancing strategies to more effectively progress work under Outcome Area 1, namely 'Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance'.

*Recommendation 4*: Opportunities to establish greater linkages / synergies with other AusAID governance and sectoral programs should be identified and more vigorously pursued.

*Recommendation 5*: Continue to strengthen the focus on gender and women's empowerment within CPP funded church work programs.

**Recommendation 6:** CPP partner contract / financing agreements should be reviewed, and as appropriate amended, to ensure that these are not unnecessarily complex or restrictive with respect to making timely required amendments and ensuring funds are released in a timely manner.

*Recommendation 7*: AusAID should review its own resource allocation and management practices with respect to how effectively it supports its DG program managers to carry out the work expected of them.

*Recommendation 8*: Key GoPNG strategic partners in the CPP, namely the DNPM and the DfCD, make additional efforts to participate more regularly and actively in the PCC, as well as to strategically support achievement of CPP outcomes more generally.

### 3.3 Democratic Governance Strategy recommendations

*Recommendation 1*: The current AusAID Governance review process (for PNG) should also assess whether or not a separate DG strategy is actually required.

**Recommendation 2**: Future sub-national support programs (new phases or new programs) should ideally be designed at the same time, including with common implementation periods, areas of geographic focus and specific mechanisms to promote their integration / synergies.

*Recommendation 3*: AusAID's expectations for core governance and DG programs to demonstrate service delivery outcomes should be clarified.

# **1 INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1** Background to the review

### **Partnership for Development**<sup>2</sup>

The 2010 Review of the PNG-Australia Development Cooperation Treaty (the DCT Review) recommended that the Australian aid program in PNG narrow its focus and target resources towards priority sectors, with governance programs supporting the enabling environment for service delivery. At the 2011 Australia-PNG Ministerial Forum, ministers agreed to four schedules to the PNG-Australia Partnership for Development (the Partnership) to reflect the priority sectors of: education; health and HIV/AIDS; transport infrastructure; and law and justice. The choice of sectors is based on an analysis of where Australian aid can make the biggest difference and achieve the greatest gains in reducing poverty and improving development outcomes.

### Australian Support for Improving Governance

The Australian aid program has a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening governance in Papua New Guinea. Significant among these are the Economic and Public Sector Program assisting the effectiveness of national government departments and agencies, the Provincial and Local Government Support Program focusing on provincial and local level governments, and the Democratic Governance program which aims to support greater engagement of civil society and the private sector in public sector governance and service delivery. AusAID is presently developing an overarching strategy to strengthen governance for improved development outcomes in its four priority sectors.

### AusAID support to Democratic Governance

The term democratic governance embodies the notion of shared governance, in which civil society, democratically elected local government and the private sector, together with the national government (the state) participate in public matters including policy making and implementation, resolution of public problems and the allocation of public resources. It involves working directly with communities as citizens, engaging with the ways in which they can both influence development and call for accountability.

AusAID's assistance in support of democratic governance has been guided by the Democratic Governance Strategy in Papua New Guinea since 2009. The Democratic Governance Strategy goal is: "Men and women, civil society, and the state working together on issues of public interest, shaping policy, allocating resources, and enabling the exercise of rights". By strengthening the institutions of civil society and the state to work in partnership, the strategy aims to contribute to social and political stability, and to efficient resource allocation by working at as local level as possible. These are essential conditions for the effective delivery of services and sustainable economic development.

AusAID support to Democratic Governance in PNG is currently through the following initiatives: Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN), the Church Partnership Program (CPP), CARE International Integrated Community Development Program (ICDP), and the Electoral Support Program. AusAID has recently reviewed the CARE ICDP and the completed a review of the Media for Development Initiative (MDI). A rapid review of Australian electoral support was recently completed and a more comprehensive review of 12 years of Australian electoral support was conducted in October 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> This text on the background to the review is sourced from the review team's Terms of Reference

### 1.2 Purpose and scope of the review

The purpose of this independent review is to:

- Assess the implementation and achievements of two major Democratic Governance programs currently implemented under the Australian aid program in Papua New Guinea, namely: Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN) and the Church Partnership Program Phase 2 (CPP);
- e) Recommend improvements to strengthen current implementation of both programs and identify lessons to inform the design of future democratic governance programs in PNG; and
- f) Assess the relevance of the existing democratic governance strategy and whether AusAID has effectively implemented the strategy through its programs.

As these two initiatives (SPSN and CPP) have adopted different modalities and are operating in quite different circumstances, the review was also asked to identify opportunities for cross-learning.

The independent review has been primarily formative (or forward looking) in nature.

The full scope of the review is outlined in the Terms of Reference, provided at Annex 1.

The review team consisted of two independent consultants, namely Jonathan Hampshire (Team Leader) and Julie Klugman (Democratic Governance Specialist).<sup>3</sup> The team was accompanied during field visits by Margaret Sete (Manager of the CPP Program Coordination Office) and (at different times) by Sophia Close, Jennifer Clancy and Junita Goma from AusAID's Democratic Governance Unit in Port Moresby.

### 1.3 Review method

### Method and tools

The review method involved:

- *Preparation of a review methods paper and work plan:* A first draft was submitted to AusAID on the 13<sup>th</sup> October, and following feedback the final version was submitted on the 19<sup>th</sup> October.
- **Document review**: A large number of documents relevant to SPSN, CPP, AusAID's governance strategy, other AusAID programs and GoPNG priorities have been collected and reviewed. A full list is provided at Annex 3.
- Interviews and consultations with stakeholders: Almost 200individuals have been directly consulted, representing most of the major stakeholder agencies/groups involved in the SPSN and CPP programs.<sup>4</sup> Questions asked and issues explored during these consultations have been guided primarily by the key questions included in the team's TOR (under the headings of relevance, effectiveness and sustainability). A mix of in-depth interviews with individuals, focus-group discussions, formal meetings and informal discussions were used.
- *Field / project site visits*: The team visited Port Moresby, Madang, Lae, Goroka, Kundiawa and Mount Hagen, as well as a number of villages/communities where there are CPP and SPSN supported initiatives (either planned or ongoing). The timing of these visits and the specific locations visited are listed in Annex 2.
- *Validation of preliminary findings*: The team's preliminary findings were presented on 9<sup>th</sup> November (in an Aide Memoire) to a group of key stakeholders in Port Moresby. Feedback was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Terms of Reference originally envisaged a team of four independent consultants. However, difficulties in securing the services of two proposed members resulted in the work being undertaken by a two-person team <sup>4</sup> This does not include the many community members who attended our project site visits in rural areas

received from this group and taken into account in the first draft report, which was submitted to AusAID on the  $10^{th}$  December 2012.

- *Consultation on first draft report:* Following submission of the first draft report, AusAID circulated it to all key stakeholders for their review and comment. The review Team Leader then came back to Port Moresby in late January 2013 to facilitate 3 full days of consultations with all key stakeholders. These meetings were co-facilitated by Mr. Martin Brash from the SPSN team.
- *Finalisation of second draft report:* Subsequent to the Port Moresby consultations, the Team Leader finalized the second draft review report, and submitted this to AusAID on the 12<sup>th</sup> February 2013.

The review method has been highly participatory, based primarily on an 'appreciative enquiry' approach.<sup>5</sup> This has helped to ensure that key issues and concerns of stakeholders have been openly tabled and discussed. The aim has been to make the review <u>process</u> useful in itself, not just the final report <u>product</u>.

The review team's field work program and a list of those consulted are provided at Annex 2.

### Limitations of method

The primary limitations of the review method are as follows:

- *Locations visited*. The team visited a limited number of locations (given that SPSN and CPP activities are spread across the whole country), which were purposively selected based on practical considerations of the time available and the difficulties / expense of travelling around PNG. There was no random selection.
- **People / organisations consulted.** While the team met with a large number of individuals from most of the key partner agencies, there were inevitably some people and organisations involved with SPSN and CPP (given their broad scope and coverage) that we were not able to consult with directly.
- *Statistical validity*. Because there was no random selection of respondents or sites to visit, and the main information collection method was appreciative enquiry, there is no statistical validity to any of the review team's findings.
- *The review team*. The core review team consisted of two independent consultants. The review findings, conclusions and recommendations are therefore limited by any limitations they may have in terms of knowledge and skills.
- *Time available*. As ever, the scope of work and analysis undertaken by the review team has been limited, to some extent, by the time available. We have had just over 7 weeks (from the start of work in PNG) to prepare and submit the first full draft of this review report.

Nevertheless, it is felt that the review method has been generally appropriate to need, given the time and resources available.

Because the review team was looking at two large programs, it was decided that one consultant (Julie Klugman, Governance Specialist) would focus on reviewing the SPSN program and that the other (Jonathan Hampshire, Team Leader) would focus on the review of CPP.<sup>6</sup> The two main sections of this report on SPSN and CPP have therefore been written by the corresponding consultant. The Team Leader has nevertheless taken responsibility for overall editing and presentation of the report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In the context of this review, using an appreciative enquiry approach simply means that we have sought to listen, learn and appreciate the complex context within which the two programs are being implemented. It also means that we have looked for strengths to build on, not simply weaknesses to be addressed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Both consultants nevertheless jointly attended some meetings and most field visits for both programs.

# 2 SPSN review findings and main conclusions

# 2.1 Overview of planned program scope

Strongim Pipol, Strongim Nesen						
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/democratic-governance-init1.aspx						
http://www.sps	http://www.spsnpng.com/					
Timeframe:	1 July 2010-30 June 2014					
	Note: SPSN was designed as a five year program but was contracted for four years due to AusAID's financial management and procurement arrangements. It is expected that a one year extension will be granted to the current contract.					
Funding:	A\$100,000,000					
Objectives:	To enable civil society, together with the state and others, to better meet the needs and priorities of men, women and children in communities across PNG.					
	SPSN works through five components:					
	<i>Component 1 – Strengthened Key Partners.</i> Supports the strengthened practice and promotion of democratic governance by Key Partners.					
	<ul> <li>Key partnerships exist or are being negotiated with Transparency International- PNG, the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council, the Department for Community Development, the National Broadcasting Corporation, Buk Bilong Pikinini, Callan Services, Eastern Highlands Family Voice and Port Moresby City Mission.</li> <li>Component 2 – Communities Working to Meet Identified Needs. Includes the allocation of small, medium and large grant funds as follows:</li> </ul>					
	<ul> <li>Small Grants: for the support of village level projects of 1-12 month's duration. Approximately 1,000 grants of K5,000 – K80,000 per grant.</li> <li>Medium Grants: support longer duration projects (1-2 years) involving either single communities or networks of communities. Approximately 30 grants of K81,000 – K160,000 per grant.</li> <li>Large Grants: support larger scale projects of 1-2 years' duration. Approximately 30 grants of K161,000 – K500,000 (AU\$70,000 - 225,000) per grant.</li> <li>Component 3 – Improved Local Governance. Supports community, government, development partners and the private sector to work together to identify and model how particular development needs (service delivery) can be addressed through improving local governance.</li> </ul>					
	<i>Component 4 – Strengthened Collaboration</i> . Builds or strengthens SPSN's national collaboration between stakeholders (governments, the private sector, and civil society) for the promotion of democratic governance for development and service delivery.					
	<i>Component 5 – Strengthened Human Capital</i> . Develops the capacity of men and women for democratic governance. A capacity development framework guides the allocation of resources under the component, linked to human capital needs identified through the implementation of other components.					
Geographic focus:	All provinces in Papua New Guinea as well as the National Capital District and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. SPSN has field offices in Port Moresby, Lae, Mt					

	Hagen, Kokopo and a sub-office in Buka.			
Management arrangement:	A Managing Contractor (MC), URS, manages services for implementation. The managing contractor operates mostly as a facilitator and enabler of other parties for the delivery and implementation of the program rather than being the main direct implementer of outputs and activities.			
	A Joint Governing Council (JGC) is responsible for the policy and strategic direction of SPSN, as well as overseeing its implementation. The JGC will also participate in (and be the forum for) broader policy discussion between AusAID, GoPNG, civil society and the private sector. A National Grant Committee (NGC) is also operational and is responsible for the review and approval of large and medium grants. Provincial Grants Committees (PGCs) to assess and approve small grants have started to be put into operation in each of the 22 provinces of PNG.			

## 2.2 Relevance and quality of design

The consultant's TOR required that the following 3 questions regarding program relevance be explored:<sup>7</sup>

# Q1. Are the planned objectives of SPSN clear, realistic and appropriate given the social, economic and geographic context of PNG?

The main reference documents to guide the delivery of Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN) are the Program Design Document (PDD, September 2009) and AusAID's PNG Democratic Governance Strategy (October 2009). These main documents have been supplemented by the SPSN Theory of Change developed in association with the program's Monitoring and Evaluation framework.

SPSN is designed to contribute to the objective of AusAID's PNG Democratic Governance Strategy, namely: "Men and women, civil society and state working together on issues of public interest, shaping policy, allocating resources, and enabling the exercise of rights".

The PDD SPSN program goal is: "To enable civil society, together with the State and others, to better meet the needs and priorities of men, women and children in communities across PNG".

The PDD also includes 5 component outcomes that aim to contribute to this goal, namely:

- Component 1 Strengthened practice and promotion of democratic governance by key partners
- Component 2 Communities working together to address identified problems
- Component 3 Improved local governance in selected geographic areas
- Component 4 Strengthened collaboration of women and men stakeholders for the promotion of democratic governance
- Component 5 Strengthened human capital of men and women for the practice of democratic governance

The PDD does not have any goal related impact indicators, nor is there an intermediary "purpose" linking the 5 outcome areas to the goal.

The Review team is of the opinion that the goal is not clearly enough specified to be able to assess whether is it 'realistic' or not. The goal is very broad and too ambiguous to evaluate against.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Most questions have been modified slightly from the original Terms of Reference in the interests of greater clarity and focus.

A concern with the goal statement is also that it does not recognize the different roles of the State, civil society and private sector in relation to "better meet the needs and priorities" of people across PNG.

CSOs (and the private sector) clearly play an important role in engaging with governments, facilitating improved communication between communities and government, and helping to identify and prioritise service delivery needs. In some cases, particularly in more marginalized or isolated communities, civil society organisations (particularly churches) do play a lead role in relation to the actual delivery of services. However, it is generally acknowledged that it is ultimately the role and responsibility of the State to ensure its citizens have access to basic services.

The AusAID Governance Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) also clearly makes this distinction. Pillar 1 of the Governance PAF is "Delivering better services through improved government effectiveness and efficiency and more accountable, open, responsive governments", with the outcome area relating to CSOs being "Local civil society actors playing an active role in ensuring transparency and accountability of service delivery". The SPSN goal blurs any such distinction.

SPSN's component objectives / outcomes are somewhat more clearly stated, but are certainly not very specific, easily measurable, time-bound or easily assessed. Their clarity also depends greatly on whether or not the concept and practice of democratic governance (DG) is itself clearly understood by all key stakeholders /partners. The review team found this <u>not</u> to be the case. The realism of these objectives / outcomes is therefore also difficult to assess. It can be said, however, that the 4 year time line for SPSN implementation is not realistic, particularly given that the design does not appear to have had a clearly articulated phasing strategy for these first 4 years.

Overall, the review team found the quality of design to be marginally satisfactory. It is strong on theory and rhetoric, but has provided limited in the way of practical guidance as to how the program should best be implemented on the ground, particularly with respect to the phasing of implementation. For example, it should have been recognized that establishing and implementing the small grants program under Component 2 would be extremely resource intensive and time consuming. Indeed, the review team feels that inclusion of the small grants program, with such ambitious initial delivery targets and national coverage, was a flaw in the design.

Nevertheless, the general intent of SPSN's objectives are considered **appropriate** to the PNG context in as much as:

- They are broadly consistent with and supportive of Government of Papua New Guinea (GoPNG) development policies and priorities, as well as the current GOPNG / Government of Australia (GOA) development cooperation treaty.
- There is very limited community / civil society engagement in decisions relating to the development, delivery or monitoring of key public services in PNG.
- There is a clear need to support efforts for more responsive, effective, inclusive, transparent and accountable service delivery improved democratic governance; and
- Many communities in PNG do not yet have access to basic services of adequate quality, and there is widespread dissatisfaction with the service delivery performance of the State.

These issues are further discussed in the effectiveness section further below.

# Q2. Is the SPSN program still relevant to the promotion of democratic governance, improved service delivery outcomes and strengthened institutional capacity of civil society, government and the private sector?

Whilst AusAID is supporting a number of programs aimed at improving government service delivery, SPSN (and CPP) are the primary AusAID programs providing resources to build the capacity of *civil society* for improved democratic governance. In providing this support for strengthening of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the Australian and Papua New Guinea governments acknowledge that focusing only on strengthening capacity of government is alone insufficient to promote democratic governance, and that a strong and effective civil society sector plays a crucial role in any such efforts.

The design of SPSN recognizes that whilst the strengthening of individual CSOs is important, it is also important to build and strengthen links between and amongst CSOs themselves, and that enhanced capacity for collective action is a necessary pre-requisite for influencing improved governance and service delivery. The PDD objective of civil society engagement and strengthening is in line with development effectiveness issues articulated in AusAID's overall Civil Society Engagement Framework (June 2012).

The capacity of CSOs in PNG to collectively organize to effectively engage with government and the private sector to promote democratic governance (for longer term improved service delivery) is also generally acknowledged to be weak.

It is therefore considered that the theory that underpins SPSN's design is **still largely relevant** to the promotion of democratic governance in PNG. However, the Review team also considers that its relevance, in practice, is being constrained by the following:

- *Inappropriate component resourcing* the majority of financial and human resources have to date been allocated toward community development type grants at the expense of resources (and therefore attention) to CSO capacity building, and other areas of the program more clearly related to the creation of an enabling environment for higher-level collective action.
- *Too wide geographic focus* the national scope of the program results in thinly spread, sometimes rather ad hoc, initiatives that limit the opportunity for planned cross component synergies, therefore reducing both local relevance and impact.
- Direction to increase focus on service delivery outcomes. Following the Development Cooperation Treaty Review (2011) and subsequent AusAID direction to the SPSN team to increase its focus on demonstrating service delivery outcomes, the focus on promoting core democratic governance practice (as outlined in the SPSN theory of change) has become less clear. Whilst recognizing that change is not a linear process, the theory of change sensibly considers attention to building awareness and capacity as a necessary building block required in order to create the enabling environment for medium term improvements in democratic governance, which in term lead to improved (longer term) service deliver outcomes.
- *Confusion as to the core objectives / focus for SPSN.* This direction to increase focus on service delivery has resulted in some confusion amongst the SPSN team and other stakeholders as to the core objectives of the SPSN program, at least in the short, medium and longer terms. It also calls into question the logic of supporting a program aimed at short term service delivery outcomes (by CSOs) under the AusAID democratic governance portfolio. It is arguably more appropriate for core basic service delivery initiatives (e.g. in health and education) to be located within or under the relevant AusAID sector programs, where there is more likely to be the requisite sectoral technical expertise to help ensure quality design and ongoing sustainability. Similarly it would make sense for CSOs supported under the democratic governance unit area to have a much

clearer and primary focus on supporting CSOs to play an effective role in creating the enabling environment for improved governance, linking as appropriate with sectoral areas.

# Q3. Since inception, has SPSN been able to adapt and respond to changing circumstances (a shifting political economy) in PNG?

SPSN has demonstrated its capacity and flexibility to respond to changes and emerging issues, especially those related to changes in AusAID priorities. This has included AusAID's increased service delivery focus, the subsequent additional thematic focal areas (for example on Disaster Risk Reduction), as well as the development of new partnership agreements in support of emerging opportunities (for example, collaboration with the Electoral Support Program and providing resources for CSOs working on voter education at the time of the elections).

The national government has recently indicated its plans (in the 2013 budget) to increase resources available at sub-national level to support improved service delivery. Whilst the SPSN strategy in relation to this emerging possibility is still being developed, SPSN could play a potentially valuable role in working to support local CSO initiatives to build capacity and coalitions for both monitoring and delivery of these additional resource allocations.

Similarly the private sector, and in particular the large resource extraction companies, have substantial resources available / allocated to support local community development initiatives. There is a clear logic for SPSN to support and build the capacity of CSO actors/forums to effectively engage with the private sector and government with regard to the monitoring of such corporate community development initiatives (including in relation to social and environmental safeguards and impacts). Significant SPSN-private sector engagement was envisaged as an area of activity in the PDD, but is still in the early stages of being developed/progressed.

## 2.3 Effectiveness

The consultant's TOR required that the following 5 questions regarding program effectiveness be explored:

Q1. To what extent has SPSN contributed to the achievement of objectives expected at this stage of program implementation? Identify strengths/achievements and areas of weaknesses/lack of progress.

There have been substantial initial delays in mobilizing across all areas of the SPSN program. The expectations (possibly misguided) regarding a quick start up following the transition program (DGTP) have clearly not been met. This is despite the fact that DGTP should have set the scene for quick mobilization, for example through development of grant systems, Community Development Worker (CDW) accreditation and trialing and roll out of ward planning. However, it is recognized that the DGTP was itself a somewhat flawed process, with significant ongoing uncertainties about AusAID expectations and future plans. In practice therefore, SPSN seems to have had a 'cold' start.

As noted above, SPSN's component objectives are considered, in a general sense, to be appropriate for a program aiming to improve democratic governance in PNG. However, there are activities being implemented within each of the component areas which are of questionable relevance, and the level of resources provided to these components in relation to their contribution to achievement of democratic governance outcomes is debatable. Most notable of these is the small grant program under component 2, as it has, to date, absorbed the majority of the SPSN team resources. Whilst there is clearly a demand for small grants, the MTR tends to concur with the scepticism expressed by the Independent Completion Report (ICR) team for the Community Development Scheme (CDS 2), a SPSN predecessor program with

a large small grants component - "whether or not the community projects approach is the most effective strategy for delivering community development beyond basic service delivery (for example in terms of advocacy and promoting better governance) is more of an unknown".<sup>8</sup>

Before looking at the strengths / achievements and weaknesses / lack of progress under each of SPSN's 5 components, it is worth first noting a number of big picture or cross component issues that are considered to have impacted on implementation progress.

- Lack of a clear strategy to guide or phase implementation. The simultaneous roll out of all components on commencement, seemingly without strategic links between each component, is likely to impact negatively on achievements within individual components. For example, the limited focus on capacity building skills for CDWs prior to small grant commencement is now causing concern in relation to the quality of the community engagement processes.
- *Limited communication and coordination across the program.* The PDD clearly envisages "integration and complementarity across components". An obstacle to moving towards achievement of program outcomes is (to date) the lack of adequate coordination across (and between) components. A staff member reflected a commonly held view that they felt they were "working in silos". This was identified as a risk in the PDD, that "the MC delivers SPSN as separate components and fails to generate sufficient integration between components" with the potential impact "integration and learning between components is lost and the SPSN overall contribution to democratic governance is limited".<sup>9</sup> This risk has indeed emerged in the first two years of implementation, although it is now being addressed.
- *Limited attention to capacity building*. The SPSN theory of change, whilst acknowledging change is not linear, sees improved capacity as a necessary basis for the creation of an enabling environment for democratic governance and improved service delivery. It would therefore have been logical (at least to the MTR team) to see greater emphasis on capacity building in the first part of the program. The Review team feels there has been insufficient focus on capacity building across all components.

The following provides a brief overview of progress to date<sup>10</sup> against each of SPSN's 5 components.

### Component 1 Objective – Strengthen practice and promotion of democratic governance by key partners

Component expenditure as of end December 2012 is 20.4% of the AUD 27 million allocated to this component.

### **Strengths / achievements**

The concept of <u>multi-year</u> support for key partners strategically placed to promote democratic governance is very positive. Several of the key partners have clear democratic governance objectives and are likely to demonstrate positive contributions to DG outcomes.

Key partners expressed appreciation for <u>core funding</u>, providing them with the security of core funding support for key programs whilst allowing them to seek additional support for programs from other sources

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> CDS2 Independent Completion Report, p3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> SPSN PDD p102

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> All expenditure versus budget figures based on most recent data available in six monthly report to July 2012

There are high levels of satisfaction with the SPSN facilitated <u>Joint Organizational Assessments</u> and subsequent plans for support of organizational strengthening.

One of the key partners, Transparency International PNG, has been supported for a range of activities aimed at <u>improved</u> <u>civic awareness</u>. This has included TIPNG camps focusing on engaging young people, supporting drama teams, preparing posters etc. They are pleased with the new arrangement of multiyear funding, and the increased attention and support for organizational strengthening (and access to Joint Organisation Assessments). They appreciated the professional nature of assistance provided by SPSN "*in developing MEF, strategic planning and communications strategies*". "The JOA brought all staff together, gave a chance to talk about things that needed to be improved. It helped us understand not just about program content, but also need to strengthen our support divisions such as finance"

NBC Director

Another of the key partners, the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC), also plays an important role in relation to promoting democratic governance. Indeed CIMC mandate is to <u>facilitate dialogue</u> between government, CSOs and the private sector, and are also supported to provide trainings for different groups. Whilst Port Morseby based, CIMC also has regional initiatives in different thematic areas.

SPSN team has also been working to support the resolution of a number of issues inherited from key partners previously directly managed by AusAID (for example, financial irregularities with respect to the use of the grants provided to the PNG Sport Foundation and Media Council). It is recognized that this 'cleaning up' work has been time consuming for the SPSN team, and has impacted on the time available to move forward with developing other partnerships.

### Weaknesses / lack of progress

The main areas of weaknesses / lack of progress identified by the Review team are as follows:

- There have been <u>delays</u> in finalizing grant agreements for existing partners (those previously supported directly by AusAID), and delays in confirming new partners. Delays have resulted from such things as: (i) contract content issues (relating to contractual requirements of the managing contractor); (ii) financial mismanagement under previous contracts, which as noted above the SPSN team have been attempting to resolve; and (iii) delays in getting national government agencies to "sign off" on support (this relates to delays with both DfCD and CIMC).
- The <u>criteria for the selection</u> of new partners has not been completely clear in terms of the link between the partner's primary organizational objectives / mission and core democratic governance objectives. Amongst the new key partners there are organizations whose focus is primarily service delivery, largely in isolation from government or other CSOs. Whilst there is little doubt these organisations are doing useful work in providing services to disadvantaged groups, the democratic governance link is unclear.
- There has been some confusion over <u>roles and responsibilities</u>, with some key partners reporting they were unclear '*who made decisions about what*' (AusAID or SPSN team). Whilst the different roles are clear in theory, in practice there have been some areas where there is overlap which results in duplication of effort (and inefficiency). For example, partners contacting AusAID directly to request grant funds transfers, which is the role and responsibility of the SPSN team. It appears that such issues have now been effectively addressed.
- The PDD envisaged substantial <u>links between key partners and other areas of the program</u>. The Review team was not aware of any significant links between these key partners and partnerships supported through other components. In meetings with small or medium grant partners, they had

little or no knowledge of, or links to, the work of these national level SPSN partners. There is thus seen to be a clear need to look for opportunities to better link the work of key partners, particularly Transparency International PNG, CIMC and NBC, with regional/local partners. There seems to be substantial interest in, for example, arranging regional meetings with interested SPSN CSO partners and the TIPNG Community Coalition Against Corruption, one of the aims of which is to strengthen anti-corruption links. There would also appear to be great value in improving linkages between SPSN regional partners and the CIMC regional networks.

- <u>Lack of adequate communication</u> between components and some SPSN team members has meant that SPSN staff in regional offices are often unclear about the work of key partners, or work being undertaken more generally under different SPSN components. "*We don't know much about other components we are responsible for small grants*" was a view expressed by some key program staff in both the Lae and Hagen offices.
- The PDD specifically highlighted the need for "*at least one new key partnership being with <u>a</u> <u>women's advocacy network</u>". This partnership would have a clear and strategic "fit" with the gender equality objective, and clearly an area of need. Although support is provided indirectly to one of the CIMC thematic sub-groups (focusing specifically on Family and Sexual Violence), there is a yet no partnership in place or proposed specifically addressing the broader issue of women's rights and gender equality.*

### Component 2 Objective - Communities working together to address identified priorities

Component expenditure up to December 31<sup>st</sup> 2012 is 7.9% of the AUD 23.9 million allocated for this component.

### Strengths / achievements

The Review team noted the following strengths / achievements of SPSN to date:

- The finalization of the majority of grants left over from DGTP.
- Signed grant agreements in place for 38 large and medium grants, and for 75 small grants.<sup>11</sup>
- Establishment of 22 Local Grants Committees (LGCs) and engagement with government at different levels in assessment and appraisal of Expressions of Interest (EOIs) and subsequent initiative plans (provinces for small grants national government for medium and large).
- Involvement of selected staff from provincial and/or local government in joint training in community planning processes, and (some) attendance during community planning processes and implementation briefings.
- There are some examples of the community accessing government funds to support their Komuniti Prosek Plen (KPP), for example from the District Service Improvement Program (DSIP) for the 10% contribution for an elementary school classroom in E. Highlands, and from provincial government grant contributions for two water supplies (one in NCD and one in Madang).
- The objective of the (KPP) process for small grants is positive, proactively encouraging greater participation of women and people with disabilities in community discussions.
- Medium and large grantees are able to build on successes previously piloted with AusAID support, and thus expand coverage with further funding from SPSN. There are a number of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Updated information provided by SPSN on February 5<sup>th</sup> 2013

examples of this, including those involving Australian NGOs building on the work of initiatives previously funded with ANCP support. All of these initiatives involve a coalition of actors, all working with local CSOs, and in most cases with provincial and/or local government.

### Weaknesses / lack of progress

Whilst all partners (or partners in waiting) were clearly pleased to receive support, all expressed general dissatisfaction with the lengthy delays experienced so far, and the amount of time and effort required to move forward through the SPSN/PGC approval system (the first small grant agreement was signed in August 2012).

Based on discussions with SPSN staff in the field, local small grant partners and Community Development Workers (CDWs), the Review team has a number of concerns in relation to the small grants process. A major concern relates to CDW capacity. The process depends to a large extent on the capacity of CDWs, who from SPSN reports is quite variable, often times weak/inexperienced. This is clearly a concern for SPSN, who with STA support in 2011 reviewed the current process<sup>12</sup>, and made a series of recommendations on the urgent need to focus on improving both CDW and staff capacity. This has not yet occurred, with planned capacity building to take place in 2013. This is of concern, given the first round of grants has been allocated, and many (potentially poor quality) KPPs will have been prepared. It is unclear to the Review team why this additional support for capacity building did not occur during the last 2 years, when there were no/few small grants happening.

Additional concerns relate to the process itself. The initial activity/project identification process is not always based on participatory processes<sup>13</sup>, and therefore this first step is not necessarily grounded in a clear principle of good governance. There is no necessary link to the content / focus of Ward Plans (where they exist). The Review is also concerned that the KPP process itself, even if well facilitated, is generally SPSN driven/controlled, across each step of the process. The Review team understanding of the process is that following LGC approval of the expression of interest, the local CDW facilitates the KPP; the CDW then prepares the KPP report (including budget), SPSN directly arranges procurement, and once funded the CDW prepares monitoring reports.<sup>14</sup> SPSN seems also to pay for food for ceremonies involved in the projects. We see how this expedites the process, but are not sure that it is fully consistent with some of SPSN's stated DG operating principles.

An important issue was raised by one of the SPSN advisors – "Inherent in the strategy to engage government in the KPP process is the assumption that government officers can respond to citizen demand. This ignores the location of power and accountability within government institutions. Officials are accountable for the implementation of government policy and directives, and in practice, how this is interpreted is subject to local power dynamics". <sup>15</sup>

SPSN relies heavily on this assumption that improved and more participatory project planning processes will result in improved governance. There is as yet no clear evidence that this is the case, or clear analysis on the extent to which small grants contribute to improved capacity and systems of democratic governance. This analysis, along with an analysis of the comparative cost-benefit of different options (e.g geographic targeting, small service delivery grants vs core DG support, large vs small grants, etc) should be undertaken prior to the design of future phases of SPSN.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Component 2 capacity Development Paper (undated) – p3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> SPSN regional staff advised the Review many of the EOIs being put forward by individuals, some of whom are from the location but living in Moresby, others being paid to write the EOI. There were also reports of EOI formats being sold by local government counterparts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Seems different understanding on who was responsible for monitoring

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Component 2 Capacity Development Paper (undated)– p3

Some other concerns noted by the review team include:

- Lack of information as to progress/delays meant grantees were often unclear if/when their initiative would/could commence.
- General lack of coordination or coherence amongst Component 2 initiatives, namely between the small grants approved at provincial level and the medium/large grants approved at national level.
- Opportunities to support CSO networking could be given more attention / support.

"We would really like to improve networking opportunities to learn from each other"

"Would be good to talk to and maybe partner with other CSOs working to improve governance, share experiences"

"We would like to see the regional office playing role of facilitator, bringing us together to share information. Let's start now by sharing our contact details"

Comments from Partners Meeting, Hagen, when asked for ideas for possible improvements for SPSN

Component 3 Objective – Improve local governance practices in selected areas

Component expenditure as at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2012 is 25% of the AUD 2.690 million allocation.

### **Strengths / achievements**

The review team noted the following main strengths / achievements under this component:

- Support is being provided for coalitions of government agencies and CSOs on the issue of Family and Sexual Violence (FSV) in Western Highlands, West Sepik, Eastern Highlands and Milne Bay.
- Linkages are being made with AusAID sectoral programs (health) in support of improved policy and advocacy for Maternal and Child Health.
- Support has been provided for the innovative and potential valuable initiative of the 'Paguna Peace Building Strategy'.

### Weaknesses / lack of Progress

Some areas of concern noted by the Review team included the:

- Need for a clearer strategy for stakeholder engagement in development of proposed initiatives, including mechanisms for consultation with established CSO.
- Need to improve understanding of and linkages with/between components, as well as the understanding of regional staff about component 3 objectives and its current and planned partnerships.
- Need to increase emphasis on facilitation of local learning events, especially activities to bring together partners working on similar thematic areas for example all local partners with program/components relating to FSV, HIV, access to credit, etc. These gatherings could focus on joint capacity building on the technical issues (engaging resource people with relevant technical

expertise); and/or promote better linking and sharing of learning across their programs and promoting linkages with local government.

- Lack of clarity in relation to the AusAID/SPSN decision making and approval processes. This can mean that "good ideas" can take lengthy periods of time before decisions are made and initiatives can be supported.
- Lack of some key human resources including the vacant Component 4 Community Development Local Government Adviser.

Component 4 Objective – Strengthen collaboration of men and women stakeholders for the promotion of democratic governance (networks and research)

Component expenditure as at December 31<sup>st</sup> 2012 is 74% of the AUD 1.170 million allocation.

### **Strengths / achievements**

The review team notes that:

- The component has proven to be a flexible mechanism in responding to useful AusAID initiated activities. Examples include support for civic education work prior to the 2012 elections, and collaboration with the health sector in providing support for 5 Provincial HIV/AIDS commissions.
- Four thematic initiatives are in place, three of which are supporting action to support people or networks of people with disabilities.
- At least one of these initiatives has benefited from support for Joint Organizational Assessment (PNG Assembly for Disabled People).
- There is an approved concept to support the development of a "National Policy and Strategic framework on Ward, Local Government and District Planning" (for commencement in 2013).
- Two potentially very useful research topics have recently been approved by AusAID. The first is on the question of links/relationship between 'Service delivery and democratic governance in PNG', and the second is on the issue of 'Social Inclusion in PNG' (which should provide useful information on who is included/excluded from what and why).

### Weaknesses / lack of progress

Some areas of weakness / lack of progress noted by the Review team are:

- Limited clarity around how stakeholders are best engaged in generating and clarifying ideas for potential SPSN support.
- Limited understanding of and linkages with other SPSN components.
- There appears to be no plan yet in place for the establishing/strengthening linkages to Pacific regional organisations or networks working on Democratic Governance (as envisaged in the PDD).
- As with component 3, there has been some confusion and differing expectations between AusAID and SPSN in relation concept development and approval processes.

- Lack of some human resources to support planned activities (including the vacant Component 5 Democratic Governance Adviser).
- There appears to be no plan yet in place for research "*with a major focus on women's participation in democratic processes*", also planned for in the PDD.
- Limited attention yet paid to the Component 4 role envisaged in the PDD "of promoting dialogue and engagement on democratic governance principles, practice and policy" and more generally to "provide operational support to AusAID bilateral program to engage with non-state actors and to progressively mainstream the principles of democratic governance".<sup>16</sup>

*Component 5 Objective – Strengthened human capital of men and women for the practice of democratic governance* 

Component expenditure as at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2012 is 7.2% of the AUD 4.04 million allocation.

### **Strengths / achievements**

The Review team notes the following strengths and/or achievements to date:

- The Joint Organisational Assessment (JOA) process is considered very positively by the partners involved.
- There are examples of highly valued support being provided for skills building in areas identified by the JOA, such as for strategic planning and improved monitoring and evaluation systems.
- Support agreements are in place with the Community Development Workers Association (CDWA), with an additional tripartite MOU planned between SPSN, CDWA and the National Accreditation and Trade Testing Board (NATTB).
- Support is planned for the finalization of the Ward Planning Curriculum (developed with CARE PNG), for piloting in 2013.
- A capacity building framework is being prepared for inclusion in the 2013 Annual Plan.

### Summary of weaknesses / lack of progress

The Review team notes the following areas of weakness and/or lack of progress with this component:

- There have been significant implementation delays and under expenditure, despite the relatively limited budget.
- The PDD envisaged a number of initiatives to set the stage for the capacity building strategy, including a sector needs analysis which would inform the development of a capacity building framework.<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately neither seems to have occurred. It is reported that some consultation has occurred but this seems to have focused on supply of training providers, rather than an up to date analysis of capacity building needs of CSOs/networks to inform strategy development.
- Only a limited number of organizations, primarily key partners, have benefitted from the JOA (and/or subsequent targeted capacity building support).
- The identified need for urgent support for capacity building for CDWs identified in 2011 has not yet been addressed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> SPSN PDD p37 and p38

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> SPSN Scope of Services p5

• Capacity building assessments and support seem primarily to address internal organizational or project management issues. Capacity building in areas relating to democratic governance practice appears to have been limited (for example, improved capacity to support civic education programs, networking skills, budget analysis, expenditure monitoring, advocacy, etc).

### Q2. Has SPSN been effective in improving service delivery in PNG's poorest districts?

The Review team questions the merits of this question, particularly at this stage of implementation of SPSN. The theory of change logic requires first and foremost capacity building to support the development of an enabling environment for democratic governance, which then leads to improved service delivery. It is therefore arguably not appropriate to be trying to assess service delivery outcomes during a MTR for a democratic governance program.

In relation to the general question of poverty targeting in SPSN, whilst all Provinces, and 87 of the 89 districts across PNG have access to small grants, the allocation of funding per Province varies slightly depending on criteria outlined in the SPSN Geographic Strategy (June 2011). The Strategy details the method used to determine the allocation of small grant funds under component 2 across the 22 provinces in PNG. The criteria are based on the four parameters of Population, Provincial Revenue, Service Delivery Cost and Provincial Performance.<sup>18</sup>

As a result Provinces with higher populations but relatively lower revenue base may be prioritised, though this depends also on scoring in relation to criteria of service delivery cost and provincial government performance. SPSN plans for the provincial performance related criteria will be included in the next funding round, based on the experience of the first round.

Based on the first 3 criteria, the provinces of Eastern highlands and East Sepik are receiving higher amounts of funds for small grants (and expect support for 12 small grants each), with West New Britain, New Ireland and Western Provinces at the other end, with funds provided for 7 small grants each.<sup>19</sup>

SPSN has also established a system whereby during the KPP process data is collected relating to access to or distance from services (also using National Economic and Fiscal Commission data) for each community receiving grants. From this data it is clear that many communities being supported lack basic services.

However, given the nationwide spread of the program, there are very few grants available per district. Therefore, even in the poorest districts, only a small number of small grants will be available. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that there is unlikely to be significant or sustained impact on either democratic governance or the longer term goal of improved service delivery in these districts – at least through SPSN small grants alone. In order to be able to expect to see real impact in the poorest district, the program would need to have a more limited geographic focus, with more intensive support provided to poorest districts - and/or more clearly established linkages to other core AusAID programs such as the PGLP and the main sector programs (e.g. in health, education and transport).

In relation to poverty targeting, the Review team feels it would be useful to reconsider the requirement for 10% *cash* contributions from communities towards procurement. Whilst there may be advantages, it may also be the case that access by poorer communities is constrained by the 10% contribution, and that better-off communities are consequently more advantaged in accessing grants (those with existing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Data for the first three parameters were obtained from the National Statistics Office (NSO) 2000 Census and the National Economic Fiscal committee (NEFC) Fiscal Report for 2010. The data on provincial performance will be included starting in 2012 after the Provinces have experience in implementing the grant program" Executive summary, Geographic Strategy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> These figure from the strategy document for 2011, based on average small grant allocation of K50,000.

economic and or social capital)<sup>20</sup>. Accepting a 10% contribution in-kind (rather than cash) may be a way to promote more equitable access for poorer communities.

# Q3. Has SPSN complemented and supported the objectives and outcomes of other AusAID sectoral and governance programs?

Through discussions with SPSN and with other AusAID programs, there are a number of examples of good collaboration with AusAID sectoral programs. This has included the recent support around Special Education as well support for a number of Provincial AIDS Committees.

However, comments made during discussion with the AusAID health and education sectors teams indicate that they think SPSN (and DG programs generally) should be more clearly focused on building capacity of CSOs to 'hold the government to account', and to support the building of coalitions advocating for more effective, transparent, accountable use of these government programs/resources. The core role of the sector teams is to provide capacity building support, and other resources, to improve government service delivery.

For example, there is already a substantial CSO grants component within the AusAID health sector program (which may increase further). The CSOs receiving such grants are in some cases the same as those receiving support from SPSN or CPP. It would therefore be useful to establish improved mechanisms for collaboration and sharing of information between AusAID programs that support CSOs, for example cross program learning events that bring together sectoral and SPSN partners working on similar issues such as HIV/AIDS.

There is currently little coordination with Australian Non-Government Cooperation Program (ANCP) supported activities in PNG, several of which are supporting initiatives focusing on social inclusion and/or improved governance. As a starting point, AusAID Port Moresby maybe needs to develop improved understanding of what the ANCP supports/funds in PNG, and develop mechanism to systematically and proactively share this information with its program managers (including contractors).

The Review team feels that the clearest gap is in relation to the limited collaboration / linkages with the Provincial and Local Government Program (PLGP) and the broader Sub-National Strategy (SNS). Improved collaboration between SPSN and PLGP has the potential to improve the outcomes of both programs. There appears to be significant possibilities for collaboration on a wide range of issues. This is clearly so with respect to Ward Planning, but also with respect to engagement with key partners such as the NEFC and CIMC. This could also develop to include joint capacity building strategies and initiatives, and piloting of matching community grant support as part of the PLGP incentive package.

An important role for AusAID is to facilitate improved links within these current programs, and to look for opportunities to better integrate any future phase of SPSN with the work of PLGP.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> One of the small grants communities visited were being supported to build additional classrooms, and had reportedly heard about SPSN from a neighbouring school/community, which was unable to proceed as they were unable to generate the required 10% cash funding. The Chair of the community group that successfully secured an SPSN grant was an ex-Provincial Education Minister, who was able to access government funding for the community contribution.

Q4. Is SPSN's approach to monitoring and evaluation effective in capturing and reporting on activity and program level results? How might M&E be improved in line with AusAID and GoPNG performance frameworks?

SPSN's Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) was completed and approved in November 2011. The actual establishment of the M&E system remains work in progress.

Due to delays in SPSN commencement, there are relatively few initiatives that have actually started on the ground, and therefore little to effectively monitor. It is therefore not possible to yet say how effectively monitoring and evaluation is being carried out.

As noted in the section on relevance, the PDD has no purpose level statement and no impact indicators relating to the program goal. The MEF identifies 'indicators or evaluation questions' aligned to each of the 5 component outcomes, as well as against the outcome areas identified in the Theory of Change, namely Capacity, Democratic Governance and Service Delivery.

Many of the MEF indicators are quantitative and relate to service delivery, in order to provide input into monitoring AusAID's contribution to service delivery outcomes. The MEF has also appropriately adopted selected indicators from the AusAID Governance Performance Assessment Framework (PAF).<sup>21</sup> However, the PAF suggested indicators relating to CSO capacity to 'hold government to account' and 'improved CSO capacity in monitoring of government servicing delivery', have not yet been included in the SPSN MEF. The MEF democratic governance indicators appear to be focused primarily on increased 'engagement', assumedly engagement between government, CSO and private sector, but do not capture or measure any progress or improvements related to holding government to account (for example improved CSO capacity to monitor budgets or service delivery, improved networking or advocacy skills). Whilst it is noted that this may be measured in the final, end of program evaluation, it may be useful to try to attempt to capture progress through ongoing program monitoring.

It is positive to note that the SPSN team plans to supplement their ongoing monitoring activities with indepth qualitative research and case studies. Ideally this should commence as soon as possible, so information and lessons learned can used to inform the planning of future DG work.

Currently the SPSN 6 monthly progress reports to AusAID identify progress in each of the 5 components against the 3 theory of change outcome areas, not clearly against the MEF indicators or evaluation questions. The Review team assumes that once the MEF system is in place, data will be captured and analysed against MEF indicators, which can then be used in reporting progress across the component areas.

SPSN staff in the regional offices have not yet been fully trained in the use of the MEF, including respective roles and responsibilities in relation to monitoring and reporting. Some of the regional staff understood that much of the field level monitoring would be undertaken by CDWs. If this is indeed the case, it is the cause for some concern given the as yet unfulfilled capacity building needs of CDWs.

A SPSN database has been established ('Manubada') to capture and analyse grant information. It enables a variety of useful reports to produced, for example by partner, geographic location or thematic area. It also tracks each activity in terms of time taken to progress between different stages. The database usefulness of course depends on the quality of information being entered and how it is used. There needs to be internal discussion to improve team understanding (and possibly develop criteria) for determining things like the program markers, as some of the information in the database is clearly incorrect. The clearest examples of this related to a number of projects which have being marked as having primary focus on gender equality, when in further discussion this is clearly not the case. Consideration could also be given to more systematic use of database reports, and development of mechanisms for sharing relevant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Australia Aid Governance Performance Assessment Framework (working Draft August 2012)

aspects of Manubada content with CSO and government partners, and with relevant stakeholders in different sectoral areas.

As with other program areas referred to above, the resourcing for monitoring and evaluation appears less than envisaged in the PDD, which had allocated resources for a full time M&E adviser (along with STA support). The full time advisor position has not been recruited to date.

### Q5. What are the main risks / threats to achieving end of program outcomes?

This question is difficult to answer, largely because the anticipated "end of program outcomes" are not very clear. It is also difficult to judge to what extent progress towards each of the 5 component outcomes will collectively contribute to the program goal.

The "end of program" is also not clear, whether this is end of current contract (year 4), or at the conclusion of a 10 year program period envisaged in the design.

Having said that, the Review has identified a range of risks or threats to achieving the SPSN outcomes in the section above, and these are summarized in the conclusion section below. Suggestions on how some of these risks can be addressed in the remaining program period are included in the recommendations section.

### 2.4 Efficiency

The consultant's TOR required that the following question be addressed:

Q1. Is SPSN making efficient and appropriate use of available resources, including with respect to staffing and people's time, resource allocation, the contracting/management model and governance arrangements? What could be improved?

There have been substantial delays in the roll out of SPSN in the first 2.5 years compared to what was initially envisaged, across all components but especially in relation to component 1, 2 and 5. The first small grant deed was signed in August 2012<sup>22</sup>, more than 2 years after transition from DGTP to SPSN.

The table below provides an overview of SPSN expenditure as at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2012. Whilst expenditure is clearly not an indication of progress or effectiveness, it is indicative of the relative amount of resources allocated to different areas of the program, and shows the expenditure rate to date for different areas as well as to support SPSN operations and management.

Component	Contract Budget	Expenditure to 31/12/12	% Total Budget
Component 1	27,000,000	5,511,542	20.4%
Component 2	23,900,000	1,891,971	7.9%
Component 3	2,690,000	685,054	25%
Component 4	1,170,000	900,000	76%
Component 5	4,040,000	292,581	7.2%
Reimbursable Op Costs <sup>23</sup>	32,789,900	14,327,366	44%
Fix Manag Fees and Costs	8,410,100	4,728,301	56.2%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Program Director, SPSN

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Reimbursable Operational costs include costs incurred for office operations, personnel/staff, consultants, and 'other'

The significant delay in program mobilization and implementation (across most program areas) is certainly not what was anticipated, given the preparatory work undertaken during the DGTP years (for example, developing a small grants handbook, CSO toolkits, new funding criteria and guidelines). However, it is recognized that the DGTP did <u>not</u> effectively facilitate a smooth transition from CDS to DGTP, and therefore in practice, SPSN had to build up most of the new systems/processes from scratch. Initial expectations for a quick start were therefore somewhat unrealistic.

There are considered to be inefficiencies which need to be addressed in the grant processing system. For small grants, it has so far taken on average 14.5 months from expression of interest to finalizing the funding deed. For medium and large grants, the average time to process has also been 14.5 months.<sup>24</sup>

The reasons for these delays are various, including SPSN's own problems in staff recruitment and retention, the complexity of the task and the time required to get the grant committees established (particularly at provincial level). It would nevertheless be useful for SPSN to look for ways to improve future efficiency in grant application and processing.

The efficiency or effectiveness in the allocation of SPSN staff time in different program areas is also questionable. As noted above, the majority of staff appear to have spent most of their time over the past two years supporting the small grants program (this is more like 100% for the staff of regional offices). Program resources have been skewed towards the management of small grants, at the expense of important areas of work such as general CSO capacity building in relation to democratic governance, support for alliance building, networking, monitoring, evaluation and learning.

The current discussion within AusAID regarding the possibility of establishing a single management committee/governing council at the national level to cover all DGU programs at the national level would seem appropriate, both from efficiency and effectiveness perspectives. It may be that a similar model could be adopted at the provincial level.

The managing contractor model is considered appropriate given the size and complexity of the program. However, it is clearly expensive. As noted above, the Review feels there needs to be further clarification in relation to exact roles and responsibilities of AusAID and the managing contractor across all areas of implementation, so that both AusAID and the managing contractor can be more clearly held to account for the decisions and actions they are responsible and accountable for.

Suggested areas to improve efficiency are included in the recommendations section below.

## 2.5 Social inclusion

The consultant's TOR required that the following question be addressed:

1. Is SPSN effectively promoting gender equality, disability-inclusive development and other crosscutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, and has it increased inclusion of such marginalised groups in democratic governance processes?

SPSN has effectively mainstreamed issues of gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) across its systems and operations. There is evidence of changes in attitudes to people with disabilities and HIV positive people, and grant applicants clearly know that this is a program priority, and that the issue of inclusion must be addressed in proposal. The MEF plans for gender disaggregated data to be routinely collected and analysed.

SPSN has a very good Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) action plan, containing both practical and strategic actions. It includes for example plans to establishing databases, networks, identification of partners for capacity building support. Whilst this is very positive, and a useful basis for future

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> SPSN Monthly Report Jan-July 2012, p 16

programming, it appears (at the time of the MTR) that many of the activities are still in the planning phase and have not yet taken place. It will be important that focus and resources are allocated for these to take place as soon as possible.

Through support provided under component 4, SPSN has successfully made linkages with and is supporting a number of networks of people with disabilities, who are also to be provided with support for organizational strengthening.

Limited linkages have yet been made to support national level networks to promote gender equality. The obvious example is the National Council of Women, as it also operates at provincial and district levels, along with church women's leaders. Building the capacity and reach of these networks, and in particular focusing on engaging young women to network and advocate for gender equality, could help to address some of these issues. The PDD anticipated at least one of the new key partners should be a women's network. Although one of the partners, CIMC, does include support to a sub-committee looking at the issue of FSV, it does not address the broader issue of women's rights or gender equality.

This relates also to the plan to establish a Technical or Reference Group relating to Gender and Social Inclusion. Whilst potentially useful, in that it encourages linkages between SPSN and women's organizations or activities, the value of establishing another project specific group should be considered carefully. There appears to be a number of existing gender related working groups already in place, and so consideration should be given to how SPSN can better link with existing groups, as well as building individual links with women's rights and disability activists.

The SPSN internal review of component 2 capacity building noted above (in relation to CDW capacity needs), also noted that many staff and CDWs were 'not yet confident' to introduce gender equality and social inclusion during KPPs. Our Review team discussions with staff and CDWs confirmed markedly varying understanding of gender and social inclusion issues amongst the team. These capacity issues are reflected, for example, in the small grants being recorded in the SPSN database as having a primary focus on reduced gender inequality. This was the case in some of the locations visited, where although some women had participated in KPP discussions, there was no planned strategy or specific activities that would result in changed (inequitable) gender relations.

Given it is now midway through the current phase of the program, there is an urgent need for targeted capacity building for staff and other key stakeholders to support the practical implementation of a very positive action plan.

## 2.6 Sustainability of Benefits

The consultant's TOR required that the following questions be addressed:

# **1.** Are the achievements of SPSN likely to be sustainable in the long-term and are there components or activities that are clearly not sustainable?

Given delays in program development it is somewhat premature for the Review to comment on sustainability of benefits.

Nevertheless, the Review team agrees with the general sustainability related concern raised in the AusAID Quality at Implementation Report, regarding possible 'tension with SPSN programs between fast-tracking service delivery outcomes and influencing broader democratic governance practices, which is typically a slower, but a more sustainable route to development outcomes'.

This relates also to the concerns noted above regarding component resourcing, and the relatively limited attention given to capacity building of individuals and organization, and support for strengthening of CSO coalitions, which are consider an important and necessary contribution to sustainability of democratic governance outcomes.

It is however positive to note that a range of systems have been put in place to encourage sustainability of benefits through the community grants program. The question of sustainability is included in the standard format for grant proposals (and KPPs), and grant applicants must therefore think through/analyse the sustainability issues. How effectively this is in fact done is likely to be determined primarily by the capacity of SPSN staff and CDWs to facilitate such analysis.

The Review team thinks that is it likely that some of the initiatives supported through the medium and large grants programs will deliver sustainable benefits. Many of these SPSN partnerships are with wellestablished and more experienced organizations. Quite a few of these initiatives appear to be built on previous piloting and testing, and therefore would appear to have good prospects for being sustained. It is also likely that larger grants provided by SPSN will have some sustained impact on institutional capacity development, specifically amongst the "key partners". These organisations are not only stronger to begin with, they have the added benefit of participating in the JOA process and have access to dedicated resources for their own organizational strengthening.

However, the Review team does feel that the small grants program, as currently configured (e.g. with its wide geographic spread and lack of linkages to other related activities), is unlikely to have much impact on sustainable democratic governance outcomes.

A brief case study looking at sustainability issues in an SPSN activity visited by the Review team is included in Annex 4.

### 2. What actions can be taken to promote sustainability of benefits?

The issue of sustainability needs to be closely monitored as part of the MEF, and strategies developed to build on successes and amend strategies based on analysis of strengths and areas of weakness.

As noted above, given delays in mobilisation it is premature to judge the sustainability or otherwise of individual SPSN supported activities.

Nevertheless, the following provides some broad suggestions that could be considered in relation to promoting potential sustainability of benefits:

- Look at possible areas to build the capacity and confidence of staff to facilitate discussion on issues of sustainability with government and CSO partners in project development and monitoring.
- Improve coordination and cohesion between the 5 components.
- Increase focus on civic education to improve understanding of rights and responsibilities (of citizens and government) as a 'building block' for dialogue on democratic governance, as part of increase focus on building capacity of CSOs and CSO coalitions to effectively engage with communities and government across democratic governance practice areas.
- Prioritise plans for the development of MOUs with local governments, clearly outlining roles and responsibilities in relation to community grants.
- Ensure planned CDW training includes promoting understanding of mechanism that encourage (and issues that may hinder) sustainability.
- Take concrete action to better link with PLGP on areas such as capacity building and linking of incentives.
- Look to ensure that where (and when) Provincial Program Coordination and Monitoring Committees exist, practical linkages are made with these bodies.

## 2.7 Main conclusions

The following concluding points summarise the main issues raised in the analysis above.

The Review team concludes that there have been a range of positive developments in relation to SPSN implementation to date, including:

- The majority of staff are now in place, and appear highly committed to the program outcomes.
- Systems are in place to allow grants to flow, and an increasing number of grant agreements are also now in place.
- SPSN management have been flexible in responding to changes in program focus requested / required by AusAID.
- The Local Grants Committees, provincial and local government staff and Civil Society Organisation (CSO) small grant recipients are appreciating the opportunity to engage in the SPSN community planning process.
- CSOs who have been engaged in the Joint Organisational Assessment (JOA) process have considered it very helpful.
- Key partners appreciate the availability of core funding to support their activities, and a number of the key partners (such as the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council and Transparency International PNG) are central to promoting DG principles and practices in PNG.
- A high quality Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI) Action Plan has been developed, and SPSN has effectively mainstreamed issues of gender equality and social inclusion across its systems and operations.
- Innovative initiatives are being developed and supported such as the Panguna Peace Initiative.

There are nevertheless some concerns, including:

- Substantial delays in getting program resources fully and effectively mobilised have impacted on the planned 'roll out' of the 4 year program. However, it is noted that initial expectations were probably unrealistic, given that SPSN was initially designed as a 10 year program, and the DGTP did not provide a firm foundation for a smooth transition between CDS and SPSN.
- The small grants program (as it is designed) is considered to be too broad, geographically dispersed and absorbs a disproportionate amount of SPSN resources to manage its implementation. Small grants are also not necessarily linked to local ward or local government plans (when/where in place), thus limiting their potential contribution to improving CSO / local government partnerships.
- Support for CSO capacity building, linking, learning, and supporting coalitions for learning has not yet been given sufficient priority (on balance) within the overall workplan.
- There is a need to increase attention and program wide focus on the SPSN defined areas of 'democratic governance practice', for example increased multi stakeholder dialogue on policy issues, improved skills in budget analysis, monitoring of service delivery, collective action influencing ways government works, etc.
- There is an ongoing need to improve communication and coordination mechanisms between SPSN national and regional staff (and through them local stakeholders) across all program areas.

- There is a need to increase collaboration / synergies with other AusAID programs working in the area of both governance and service delivery.
- There is a need to further analyse how and in what areas to engage with the private sector on issues of democratic governance, and to develop practical engagement strategies based on this analysis.
- There is a need to review and clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of AusAID and SPSN with respect to some decision making processes.
- The GoPNG's National Department for Community Development (DfCD) has, at least for the past year or so, not been effectively engaged in supporting SPSN oversight and implementation.
- With less than 18months left of the current contract, there is an urgent need to start planning for a subsequent phase of SPSN.

# 3 CPP review findings and main conclusions

# 3.1 Overview of planned program scope

Church Partnership Program Phase 2 http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/initiative-church-partnership.aspx http://www.pngcpp.org.au/			
		Timeframe:	1 July 2010 to 30 June 2016
		Funding:	\$50,000,000
Objectives:	To enhance the capacity of PNG Churches to contribute to PNG development and social stability.		
	To help PNG Churches promote good governance, through strengthening their role in policy dialogue, service delivery, and peace and reconciliation activities.		
Intended Outcomes:	1. Improved services delivered by PNG Churches to local communities (improving the scope and quality of services in health, education, HIV/AIDS response, water and sanitation, microfinance, adult literacy, and peace building)		
	2. Strengthened PNG Churches institutional capacity for development (building the administrative, management, planning and financial capacity of Churches)		
	3. Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance (developing the Churches' governance structures, quality of Church leadership, and enabling the Churches to engage with government on issues of public policy and practice)		
Geographic focus:	NationwideChurches have presence in all 22 provinces, 89 districts. Most church run school and health facilities are in the rural parts of PNG.		
Management arrangement:	AusAID engages seven mainline churches in PNG by supporting partnerships between them and their Australian church NGO counterparts. The PNG churches include: the Anglican, Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, Salvation Army, Baptist, Evangelical Lutheran and United Churches. These groups cover 73% of the 96% who identify as Christian.		

## 3.2 Relevance and quality of design

The consultant's TOR required that the following 2 questions regarding program relevance be explored.<sup>25</sup>

# Q1. Are the planned objectives of CPP clear, realistic and appropriate given the social, economic and geographic context of PNG?

There are two main reference documents which outline the planned objectives and strategy for CPP Phase 2 (CCP 2), namely the CPP 2 Design Document (dated December 2009) and the CPP 2 Program Strategy June 2010-July 2013 (undated).

The design document describes the core *objective* of CPP 2 as:

'Partnerships of mutual accountability and learning between churches, NGOs, and governments of PNG and Australia, improves their individual and collective effectiveness'

It then notes that CPP 2 will contribute to 3 *outcome areas*, namely:

- 1. Improved services delivered by PNG Churches to local communities.
- 2. Strengthened PNG Churches institutional capacity for development.
- 3. Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance.

It then describes the *impact* of CCP 2 as being:

'Improved well-being of men and women, boys and girls, particularly in rural and remote areas'.

The CPP Program Strategy document 2010-13 further elaborates on the expected outcomes, and includes two additional outcome areas, namely:

- 4. Strengthened CPP 2 effectiveness; and
- 5. Mainstreamed cross-cutting issues throughout the CPP 2 program

The strategy document also provides some further detail for each of the 5 outcome areas, including: (i) priority focus areas; (ii) expected objectives/results; and (iii) indicators.

So are these (various levels of) 'objectives' considered to be clear, realistic and appropriate?

In short, the general answer is 'yes'. These objectives were developed as part of a lengthy consultative process involving all key stakeholders, and appear to be *clearly* understood by the main stakeholders involved in program implementation. Building on the experience of CCP 1, and given the important role the churches play in supporting the physical and spiritual well-being of most Papua New Guineans (including in rural/remote areas), the objectives also appear to be *appropriate* to the social and economic context of PNG. Strengthened partnerships, strengthened church institutional capacities for development, improved service delivery by churches, and enhanced PNG church involvement in improving public sector governance are all considered to be appropriate objectives. They are also consistent with the broader policy framework and priorities of the Governments of PNG and Australia, such as with respect to the PNG – Australia Development Cooperation Treaty, GoPNG's vision 2050, the Partnership Policy Framework between the PNG Government and the Churches, as well as AusAID's other key policy frameworks and strategies (e.g. on good governance, working with civil society, social inclusion, etc).

However, with respect to how *realistic* the objectives are, a more qualified response is required. The main point to make is that the objectives are not specified in enough detail (e.g. baseline, quantifiable indicators, targets) to allow a clear assessment to be made of their realism. It is therefore not possible to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Most questions have been modified slightly from the original Terms of Reference in the interests of greater clarity and focus.

say, categorically, if these broad objectives are likely to be met, for example on time and within budget. The objective statements are more aspirational, rather than a description of specific expected achievements that can then be clearly assessed and measured. But this is in itself not a critique of how the CPP 2 objectives have been framed. A program of this nature should not have a blueprint design, its expected targets cannot be easily proscribed and quantified in advance, and the process is as important as the product. In this respect the design can be deemed to be realistic, in that it gives significant emphasis to principles of partnership, learning by doing, mutual responsibility, local ownership, flexibility, rolling design, etc. Importantly, it also has a long-term perspective and recognizes that the desired changes cannot be forced / imposed through external pressure or agendas. The political economy of PNG is thus taken into account, by working primarily with and through local institutions and actors.

As a final note on the 'realism' of CPP 2 objectives, it certainly seems that outcome area 3 ('Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance') is likely to be the most complex and difficult to achieve/influence. Whether or not this is a realistic objective remains open to question, and only time will tell. Also, as will be seen under section 3.3 (Effectiveness), a number of activity/output level achievements expected (in the design) within the first two years of program implementation have not, in practice, turned out to be realistic within the expected time frame.

With respect to the overall *quality* of the CCP 2 design, this is considered to be generally good. The following summary observations are made:

- At 18 pages long (main text), the design document provides a clear and concise description of *why* CPP 2 is considered an appropriate investment, *what* it intends to do and achieve, and *how* it will be managed.
- The design process appears to have been highly participatory, and thus key stakeholders understand the content of the design, building on their experiences and the lessons learned during CPP 1
- The design is not overly prescriptive, and instead allows for rolling plans to be developed which specify in more detail what will be done on both an annual and multi-year basis
- The design gives clear emphasis to addressing key social inclusion issues, including gender equality, disability and HIV/AIDS; and
- Issues of sustainability are appropriately addressed, and the key elements of a sustainability strategy elaborated.

While the main PDD is relatively brief, it is supported by a number of annexes (Volume 2). This includes: (i) a detailed discussion of the approach; (ii) CPP Governance and Management discussion paper; (iii) Management Information System considerations; and (iv) Risk Analysis and Management Plan. These are considered to be useful support documents to the main design.

Q2. Is the CPP program <u>still</u> relevant to the promotion of democratic governance, improved service delivery outcomes and strengthened institutional capacity of the churches? Has it adapted / responded to changing circumstances?

Overall, the basic elements of the CPP 2 design (and its rolling implementation strategies) remain relevant to need. The churches continue to be a key partner in providing improved service delivery outcomes (particularly in rural/remote areas), and there remains an ongoing need for the churches to further strengthen their re own institutional capacities to plan for, manage and monitor the delivery of such services. Indeed, it is unlikely that these basics will change in the decades to come. This will be ongoing work, involving a process of continuous improvement, for the indefinite future.

The appropriate scope and scale of Australian aid that could/should be applied to support this work over the long-term is another matter. But, for the moment, the work being supported through CPP 2 remains relevant to the broad development priorities of both the PNG and Australian Governments.

With respect to assessing CPP 2's continued relevance to promoting *democratic governance*, the situation is more complex. For a start, there are differing opinions (or at least levels of understanding) as to what democratic governance (DG) actually is, and how it is best promoted. There is also the issue of prioritization, particularly between providing support/resources for democratic governance as an <u>enabling</u> factor, and providing support that more directly results in service delivery outcomes. AusAID itself has provided some mixed messages on this issue, particularly since the Development Cooperation Treaty (DCT) review of 2010, after which greater emphasis was placed on the DG programs to demonstrate service delivery (rather than enabling DG) outcomes.

However, this does not appear to have affected the implementation of CPP 2 in any significant way, as the program continues to maintain a dual focus on supporting both enabling DG processes (strengthened church institutional capacity and enhanced church/state policy dialogue) as well as supporting direct service delivery outcomes (primarily in health, education and community development). This balance has not been so well maintained in AusAID's other DG programs, in particular SPSN (see section 2 of the report). The continued relevance and utility of AusAID's DG strategy is discussed in more detail in section 5 of this report.

In summary, despite some lack of common conceptual clarity about what DG is and how it is most effectively promoted, the CPP 2 design is considered to remain relevant to promoting DG, in as much as it still aims to directly contribute to 'strengthening the institutions of civil society and the state to work in partnership'.

With respect to CPP 2's ability to adapt and respond to changing circumstances since it started in 2010, the review team noted no significant issues of concern. Each of the PNG and Australian church partners continue to manage their own programs of work in line with their own institutional structures and procedures, and continue to adapt their programs of work as circumstances on the ground require / dictate. Given the lack of prescription in the overall CPP 2 design, and reliance on using local / established church institutional structures and management systems, the individual church programs are well placed to adapt to changing circumstances as and when required.

There are nevertheless some issues of concern with respect to the ability of the CPP's <u>overall</u> (programmatic) governance and management arrangements to adapt to changing needs/circumstances. These issues are discussed below under the sections on both effectiveness and efficiency.

# 3.3 Effectiveness

The consultant's TOR required that the following 5 questions regarding program effectiveness be explored.

Q1. To what extent has CPP contributed to the achievement of objectives expected at this stage of program implementation? Identify strengths/achievements and areas of weaknesses/lack of progress.

The findings provided below are grouped under CCP 2 outcome areas 1 to 4. Outcome area 5 (crosscutting issues) is addressed separately under section 3.4 of the report (Social inclusion). The numbering sequence of the first 3 outcome areas has changed since the original design. The currently used sequence is shown below.

#### Outcome area 1 - Strengthened PNG Churches institutional capacity for pro-poor development.

#### Strengths / achievements

All PNG church partners report that the strengthening of their own institutional capacity to undertake more effective pro-poor development work has been one of the most significant achievements resulting from CPP support, during both Phases 1 and 2. Development units within each church have been strengthened (to varying degrees) in terms of staffing numbers, staff knowledge and skills, management systems and processes (e.g. particularly finance and human resource management), and the development of strategic plans and policies.

Some examples of reported achievements over the past 2 years include:

- Broad consensus reached among church partners on a common 'Theology of Development'. This is significant, as it helps to clarify and strengthen the role of (increasingly professionalised) propoor development work as a core function of the churches in PNG, in addition to preaching and teaching the word of God.
- The development of Institutional Strengthening Strategies and / or strategic plans by a number of the PNG churches. Examples include the Baptist Union's Institutional Strengthening Strategy (2010), the Catholic Church's 5 year strategic plans (2011-2016) for 5 national commissions (e.g. Health, Education and Institutional Strengthening), the Anglican Church Strategic Plan 2012-2015 and the Evangelical Lutheran Church's Vision 2020.
- <u>Anglican Church</u>. The development and formal approval of a church Gender Policy reported to be the first of any church in PNG. The Anglican Church has also: (i) updated its Human Resource Management manual; (ii) become a certified member of the PNG Human Resources Institute; (iii) conducted in-depth financial training for key staff from all diocese; (iv) supported 8 finance officers to complete training in MYOB accounting software at Lae UNITECH; and (v) conducted performance appraisals for all CPP staff. It is reported that these (as well as other) institutional strengthening activities have resulted in noticeable performance improvements.
- <u>Catholic Church</u>. The development of a management information system by the Catholic National Education Commission (CNEC) which, when completed, will include essential basic data on all catholic schools (including staffing, enrolments, educational achievements, etc). This should significantly enhance the CNEC's capacity to effectively plan for, manage and monitor resource allocation and more effective educational service delivery. There is also reported to be marked improvement in financial management practices by Catholic Church Commissions as a result of CPP support for training in use of financial accounting software, financial management and audit as well as through one-on-one mentoring support.
- <u>Baptist Union</u>. Establishment of a centralised finance management and accounting system by the Baptist Union Office in Mount Hagen. This is reported to have greatly increased accountability and transparency in resource allocation and management, and to have had direct positive impacts on service delivery outcomes (e.g. through school and health facility managers knowing what money is available and when, including more predictable funding release). The BUPNG has also strengthened its rural outreach through an organisational restructuring process, including establishment of sub-regional centres.
- <u>Evangelical Lutheran Church</u>. A major process of renewal and organisational change within the ELC-PNG is underway, with support from multiple donors, including CPP. The process seeks to operationalise the strategic plan of the ELC-PNG: 'Vision 2020'. HR and management systems are being reviewed and strengthened, and training developed and delivered for ELC officers on

both management skills and good governance principles. 40 ELC-PNG senior staff members attended Leadership Management Training in 2011-12, and the ELC has run governance workshops for 3 ELC Districts and a highlands region Lutheran Health Services Board, with a total of 23 women and 78 men attending. District executives and leaders are now reported to have a better understanding of their management and leadership roles and responsibilities. Financial management and procurement process and procedures drafted by CPP have also been adopted by the ELCPNG treasury office.

- <u>Salvation Army</u>. Leadership and management skills are reported to have been enhanced among key Salvation Army officers through implementation of a range of ongoing training/learning activities, including: (i) a week long executive leadership training conducted for 22 male and 19 female officers; (ii) middle management training conducted for 17 officers, as part of a program to identify and support future leaders; and (iii) a social justice conference attended by 10 female and 26 male officers, at which issues of marital and domestic violence, HIV/AIDs and the abuse/neglect of children were addressed, and action plans developed. Also, a Planning Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) Officer has been appointed to further strengthen PME capacities.
- <u>Seventh Day Adventist</u>. Delivery of strategic management training by ADRA for Seventh Day Adventist Departmental Directors and Morobe Mission officers, which has since resulted in the development of departmental and local mission strategic plans. For example, the Education Director has developed plans for four district schools on infrastructure, effective school management and teacher training. It is also reported that improved communication channels have been established with provincial education authorities as well as with other church education officers.
- <u>Uniting Church</u>. Establishment of a Management Board by the Uniting Church to oversee and direct the work of the Church's Development Unit, and the recruitment of a new permanent Development Secretary, bringing additional capacity to strategic leadership. The UC is also placing significant emphasis on enhancing institutional capacities at the regional level (the United Church has 12 regions each headed by a Regional Bishop). For example, in 2011-12 the following regional office capacity building support was provided: (i) Regional workshop and capacity training for Western Region with 15 of the 35 participants being women; (ii) Regional Education Secretaries and Headmasters conference/workshop with 10 of the 40 participants being women; (iii) Regional Health Secretary and HIV & AIDS Coordinators conference/workshop with 12 of the 30 participants being women.

The CPP also continues to provide a valuable forum for the different church partners to share ideas, identify areas of common interest and concern, learn about good practices being implemented by other churches, develop common strategies to address common concerns, as well as resolve differences of opinion. In the continued absence of an effectively functioning PNG Council of Churches (PNGCC), the CPP is currently helping to ensure that some regular and structured church collaboration is maintained, at least among the 7 participating churches. The six-monthly Church Leaders Council (CLC), Program Partnership Council (PPC) and CPP Forums meetings are the key venues for such dialogue and information sharing. A number of joint training activities have also been organised, a common approach to capacity building is being developed (using a strengths-based approach) and joint working groups on Gender and on Monitoring & Evaluation have been established.

During interviews with church development unit officers, they generally demonstrated a professional approach to their work, a sound understanding of key management principles and a clear commitment to promoting holistic human development.

#### Weaknesses / lack of progress

Despite the clear progress being made in institutional capacity development, both within each of the churches as well as with respect to their ability to better coordinate and cooperate with each other, there is nevertheless always room for ongoing improvement. Also, institutional capacities to manage development activities still vary significantly between different church organisations. This is primarily a reflection of their overall revenue base and total staffing complement, over and above that provided directly through CPP funding. Some churches are much better financially endowed than others. However, institutional capacities also fluctuate over time and can be significantly determined by changes of personnel in key leadership roles, not just the financial resources available.

One particular area recognised by the churches as requiring significantly more capacity development work is with respect to improving their monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems. There is also a recognised need to more effectively communicate what the overall CPP program is, or is not, achieving both between CPP churches and to other stakeholders, including GOPNG and AusAID. The effectiveness of program monitoring, evaluation, reporting and communication is discussed in more detail below under TOR question 4.

The effectiveness of the overall CPP program is also currently constrained by some weaknesses in overall governance and management structures/arrangements. GoPNG engagement and commitment appears limited to date, the Program Partnership Council does not appear to be sufficiently focused on addressing key strategic issues, and the Program Coordination Office (PCO) is currently struggling to undertake the work expected of it. These issues are discussed further below under Outcome area 4, as well as under section 3.4 of this report (Efficiency).

#### Outcome area 2 - Improved services delivered by PNG Churches to local communities.

#### Strengths / achievements

All CPP church partners continue to use a significant part of their CPP grants to improve basic service delivery, often in remote rural areas, and with a primary focus on health, education, community development and HIV/AIDs awareness and care.

Some specific examples of reported service delivery achievements over the past couple of years include:

- <u>Anglican Church</u>: Literacy training is being provided in four diocese, with 85 teachers employed. In Port Moresby there are 166 students currently enrolled (115 female and 51 male), and the program appears to be managed in a highly professional manner with the help of a group of dedicated and motivated teachers. Information on HIV/AIDS prevention and care is integrated into the learning activities. In the Jimi Valley, literacy schools have formed a CBO with the purpose of raising funds to make the schools financially sustainable. Two community development projects have also been initiated in remote rural locations (using a strengths-based approach), one in Sagsag (NGI) and the other in Safia (Oro Province).
- <u>Baptist Union</u>: In Western Highlands, the Kwinkiya Primary School has been supported through the renovation and upgrading of teacher accommodation, improved financial management systems, and a better functioning school board. Enrolment has increased from around 300 to nearly 800 over the past few years.<sup>26</sup> Across all BUPNG run schools, lower staff turnover is being reported as a result of such improvements to school management. Child welfare is also being promoted through the appointment of School-based Welfare Officers at each school. The BUPNG also provides a significant program of HIV/AIDS awareness, testing and counselling

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Approval has recently been given by the Provincial Education Board for the BUPNG to establish a new secondary school at the same site.

support services – particularly focused on the needs of vulnerable women. The Mount Hagen Handicraft Group provides such vulnerable women with a source of income, moral and educational support.

- <u>United Church</u>: In collaboration with the Anglican Church, the United Church (UC) provides support to the Mother and Child Support program in the National Capital District. This group provides skills training and mentoring support to disadvantaged/vulnerable women, and is now reported to have 766 members in 15 communities. In East Elimbari (a remote area of Simbu Province), two elementary schools have been established and 2 teachers trained, and in November of 2011 a total of 17 children graduated from the school in Dumundiri, 15 of whom were girls. Enrolment increased from 17 for the first intake to 25 for the second. Three other remote area education activities are also being supported with CPP funding (2 in Enga and one in Central province). In Western Highlands and Hela Provinces, focus has been given to upgrading certificate level teacher qualifications to diploma level, and in 2011-12 a total of 25 teachers were supported. In terms of higher education, the United Church provides targeted CPP support to two UCPNG higher Education Institutes, namely Gaulim Teachers College and the School of Skills & Leadership. UCPNG also supports a range of health service delivery programs, HIV/AIDS VCT services, and small scale community development initiatives in remote rural areas.
- <u>Seventh Day Adventist</u>: In 2012, 156 elementary teacher students (70% female) were supported with CPP funds and, after meeting all academic requirements of Sonoma College, graduated with their teaching certificates. All these teachers have also been accepted by the PNG Teachers Services Commission to teach in registered elementary schools in PNG and have been given provisional registration as teachers. The supply of new teachers has enabled some 'dormant' schools to be reopened and some new schools to be established in rural communities. In 2011, an educational program in reproductive health was delivered for four SDA Secondary Schools, with a total of 1, 106 students participating. Also in 2011, a training of trainers in promoting improved family nutrition was held in Port Moresby and Lae, with a total of 66 participants attending (32 male and 34 female), made up of health professionals (doctor, nurses and paramedics), pastors, women leaders and laypersons. With respect to HIV/AIDS services, 313 clients were reported to have accessed SDA supported VCT services and 251 clients accessed mobile VCT services in Morobe over the past year.
- <u>Lutheran</u>: CPP funds supported have Workmeri Training School management to assess the impact of the CPP-funded teaching methods training which took place in 2010-11. This monitoring assessment found that there had been a marked improvement in teaching and learning processes in the 3 institutions of WTS. 25 remote-based male and female students are undertaking a Diploma in Teaching Training at Balob Teachers College, and will graduate in December 2012. Literacy classes continue to be run in 8 ELC Districts. Two teaching staff from Madang Nursing School have been supported to undertake a Diploma in Health Education at the University of Goroka, which aims to improve the standard of teaching and the quality of graduates. Nursing Schools were also supported to obtain teaching aids (including birthing demonstration kits and stethoscopes) and textbooks, to further improve the education of new nurses.
- <u>Salvation Army</u>: Support is being provided to Village Health Volunteers in targeted program areas, and a recent independent evaluation of this program indicates that this has contributed to improved health service delivery in remote areas.<sup>27</sup> Training for teachers at Lae Primary School and Kainantu Elementary School has been supported by CPP, and practical skills training (in carpentry / woodwork) has been provided to 24 female and 36 male students. In-service training

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> The evaluation also noted a number of areas requiring significant improvement, including record keeping, training evaluation and ongoing reporting.

has been provided to 22 SA health facility staff on mother and child health, and available data suggests that this has contributed to an increase in supervised deliveries at SA health facilities. The SA is implementing ongoing HIV/AIDS awareness and care training courses, including the training of 26 staff in Port Moresby (12 female and 14 male) in HIV awareness (with the aim of increasing attendance at the Ela Beach VCT centre), and with 39 people (19 female and 20 male) trained in HIV/AIDS Home Based Care in Kainantu. With CPP support the SA is also running a large number of small-scale community development projects, including on domestic violence, restorative justice, income earning opportunities, etc.

<u>Catholic</u>: A Student Behaviour Management policy has been developed and adopted/adapted by many school boards around the country, and training of teachers (11 female and 10 male) to conduct student training sessions on non-violent dispute resolution (using the 'Dare to Love' manual) was undertaken in 2011. These trained teachers are now delivering an ongoing program of training / counselling for students. This appears to be having a positive impact, with no serious incidents caused by disruptive students at Catholic schools being reported so far in 2012. HIV/AIDs VCT services continue to be provided at various locations across the country, with some monitoring data indicating that ARVT adherence rates among HIV positive mothers have improved, that more men are requesting support services and that the number of counselling sessions has increased at some centres. Catholic health services also continue to provide antinatal clinic services across the country, with 11,394 women attending in 2011, 11,068 of whom had voluntary HIV testing and counselling, with 89 of those testing positive.

Overall, the review team considers that the current focus of CPP supported church service delivery on improving basic education (elementary/primary/secondary), basic health care (including MCH and HIV VCT services), and some more general community development activities, is appropriate and where such support it is likely to be most effective in meeting the basic needs of poorer communities.

A significant strength of CPP PNG church partner organisations is also the generally high level of individual staff commitment to their work/calling, and their willingness to live and work in remote areas to serve the needs of poor/disadvantaged communities. Their network of community level church members also remains extensive and loyal.

#### Areas of weakness / lack of progress

While CPP is clearly helping to support service delivery by church partners, there are (inevitably) some areas of weakness and/or lack of progress compared to what was planned so far, such as:

- <u>Partially-completed projects</u>. For example, rural school and/or health infrastructure that is not yet adequately staffed and/or which does not yet have an adequate and sustained supply of operational supplies (e.g. teaching materials or medical supplies); and VIP latrines installed without hand washing facilities also provided.
- <u>Projects initiated with limited consultation with, or buy-in from, relevant government service-delivery agencies</u>. For example, with respect to village-level health or education services that will need to be sustained, in the longer-term, with government administrative and/or financial support.
- <u>Remote-area community level projects not adequately supervised/supported or monitored on a regular basis</u>. For example, village birth attendants who are trained, but then receive little in the way of ongoing supervision or support.

- <u>Spreading limited resources too thinly</u>. For example, establishing new educational or health facilities that must then be run / maintained by spreading existing limited resources (staff and other operational resources) ever more thinly, thus compromising the quality of services provided.
- <u>Taking on high-risk projects without adequate appropriate technical expertise / experience</u>. For example, supporting income generation / business / credit projects without adequate prior financial analysis and business plan preparation, and/or without providing adequate ongoing entrepreneurial/market-driven support and supervision.
- <u>Delays in getting planned **joint** church activities off the ground</u>. For example, 3 joint activities planned for 2011-12 have not yet been started, namely; (i) the Anglican, Lutheran and SDA Churches engaging with unemployed youth in Lae; (ii) the Catholic, SDA, Lutheran and United Churches working to promote non-violent student behavior in Kimbe; and (iii) the Baptist, United, Lutheran and Anglican Churches promoting phonics for elementary and primary education in Mount Hagen.
- <u>Engagement with key national government bodies</u>. There is limited evidence, to date, of progress with substantive <u>collective</u> engagement by the Church Leaders Council with the Churches Medical Council and Churches Education Council. Church relationships with DNPM and DfCD also remain fragmented and generally weak at the national level, although this could be primarily attributed to weaknesses within these government agencies.
- <u>Mixed objectives and/or messages</u>. From a secularist perspective, division of effort (by faithbased workers) between service delivery work and proselitysing might also be seen, in some circumstances, to be a weakness. Another secularist concern is, at times, that some churches emphasise health care messages that are not always consistent with mainstream secular healthcare recommendations and practices (e.g. with respect to family planning and HIV/AIDs prevention).

However, with respect to these general weaknesses noted in CPP support for service delivery, it is also important to note that:

- CPP resources for service delivery are, for many of the churches, a relatively minor part of the overall resources they have available for service delivery (e.g. compared to resources from within their church, from other donors as well as from the GoPNG for core health and education service delivery); and
- The weaknesses in church service delivery noted above are, in most cases, not unique to churches. All agencies in PNG (church, government, or NGO) which are trying to deliver basic services face a similar set of constraints particularly in remote rural areas. PNG is a difficult place to do this work effectively, for reasons such as high staff turnover, a limited pool of appropriately skilled staff to recruit from, security concerns that restrict staff travel, high costs of travel around PNG, difficulties in getting sustained government agency commitments to collaborative work and funding provision, etc.

#### Outcome area 3 - Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance

#### Strengths / achievements

Individually, some of the PNG partner churches continue to implement activities that are listed (in annual reports) as being relevant to improving public sector governance. Church annual reports focus on two main areas of activity, namely: (i) Peace building and reconciliation; and (ii) advocacy and engagement with government. Examples of achievements reported over the last 2 years by individual churches include:

#### Peace building.

- <u>Lutheran Church</u>. Conflict resolution kits delivered to Logaweng Lutheran seminary. Student pastors trained in conflict resolution, which can then be applied in the parishes they are sent to upon graduation (total of 79 participants 48 male and 31 female)
- <u>United Church</u>. The UCPNG has a program called Young Ambassadors for Peace (YAP) that works in the Southern Highlands and Bougainville, training people in community conflict resolution and mediation. In 2011 two Peace Building workshops were completed at Tari and Bougainville, and another workshop was held in Mt Karekare area in Kandep, Enga province where a gun surrender ceremony was conducted after the workshop.
- <u>Baptist Union</u>. In 2011, successfully conducted the planned Sanap peace training for 5 days, with a total of 36 participants (7 females and 29 males), the Yanguli relationship training with a total of 42 participants (20 males and 22 females, and the Ukni and Bongos Leadership training with a total of 27 participants (22 males and 5 females).

#### Advocacy and engagement with GoPNG:

- <u>United Church</u>. More than 100 women took part in advocacy forums with government agencies
- <u>Seventh Day Adventist</u>. Participation of 150 Youths in training on HIV, Health, leadership and vocational skills. ADRA PNG and the SDA Church Health Personnel have actively participated in workshops facilitated by the GoPNG's Health Department and the Department for Community Development.
- <u>Salvation Army</u>. On the CARE coffee program advisory board, government agencies have a role in the decision making process.

At a more programmatic / collective level, achievements reported also include:

- Ongoing work on researching the social and economic impacts of the LNG Project in the country, in partnership with several other NGOs and the Melanesian Institute. Report completed and workshop to present findings due end of 2012.
- Strong engagement of the CPP at Consultative and Implementation & Monitoring Council meetings
- Engagement of the HIV/AIDS sector group in development of the national strategy on HIV/AIDS; and
- DNPM and DfCD were engaged in preparations for Church Program Partnership Council meetings and continue to participate in this part of the Program's governance

#### Areas of weaknesses / lack of progress

The reported achievements (at least to date) appear somewhat limited in both scope and depth, particularly when one looks at the main expected aims / results of this outcome area as outlined in the strategic plan for 2010-13, namely:

• *'Enhancing the opportunities for the Churches to work together on national policy dialogue'*. Apart from the research work on the LNG project, it is not clear if any other opportunities for national policy dialogue have yet been substantively 'enhanced' through CPP supported mechanisms or activities.

- *'Taking forward the Partnership Policy Framework'*. As far as the review team is aware, while there is ongoing recognition that this is important, no concrete progress has yet been made in clarifying how this can or should be done.
- 'Increasing opportunities for CPP churches to assist other churches in engaging in Church State development initiatives'. Again, the review team was not made aware of any specific actions or initiatives taken to date through CPP supported mechanisms that would, as yet, lead to such increased opportunities for other churches.
- 'Closer engagement with GOPNG systems, including with the PNG Churches Education Council and PNG Churches Medical Council and working with the relevant national and local government agencies'. While individual church partners continue to engage, by necessity, with the CEC and CMC, the annual reports of each church do not provide any clear insight into whether or not this engagement is getting any 'closer' or more productive, or what collective strategies PNG church partners might be developing or pursuing to help improve the governance of these councils. Church partners do obviously actively engage with various government agencies all the time, particularly at more local levels. However the review team was not made aware of any clear collective strategies to further enhance such engagement.
- 'More effective participation from the Churches in the emerging Sector Wide Approaches in health and education will be important throughout Phase 2'. Again, the review team did not see any clear evidence that this has yet been given any significant collective priority by/through CPC supported mechanisms.
- *Engaging with the Department for Community Development through a high level steering group (the Development Cooperation Committee)*'. Engagement with DfCD at the national level appears to have been problematic for some time, primarily due to high levels of political/institutional turmoil within DfCD. The review team is not aware of the status of the 'Development Cooperation Committee', but it seems clear that CPP engagement with DfCD has not been very productive for the past year or so.
- *Clarifying the relationship of CPP with the PNG Council of Churches and other Christian peak bodies*'. Despite the obvious need for this matter to be progressed and resolved, at least in the medium to longer term, the review team saw no evidence that any substantive progress has yet been made on this issue.

As noted in a previous report on the CPP by AusAID's Office of Development Effectiveness (2010), *While each church engages with the government through their operations as a church, they have minimal influence or collaboration with the government regarding policy development and practice through the CPP.* This situation appears, as yet, to be unchanged. It certainly appears that the Church / GoPNG Partnership Policy Framework of 2008 has not been implemented or honoured. While there is some hope that the new O'Neil Government may wish to engage more actively and constructively with the churches on national development and service delivery issues, this has yet to be proven in practice.

The current status, function and focus of work of the Church Leaders Council and the Program Partnership Council also has a significant bearing on the ability of the CPP to influence church engagement in improving public sector governance. For example, at the last PPC meeting, most of the available time was spent on management/administrative issues, not on discussing strategic issues such as how to engage more effectively with government. The strengths and weaknesses of CPP governance and management arrangements are discussed in more detail below (Outcome area 4).

#### Outcome area 4 - Strengthened CPP 2 effectiveness

#### **Strengths / achievements**

Since the transition from CPP1 to CPP 2, there have been a number of achievements with respect to strengthening CPP governance and management arrangements, namely:

- The Church Partnership Charter provides a formally agreed basis on which the CPP operates, and provides an important reference point for guiding CPP direction and decision making processes
- PNG ownership of CPP management and implementation processes has been increased with the establishment of the PNG-centred governance arrangements for CPP
- The CPP Coordination Office in Port Moresby has been established, is now fully staffed and has its own office
- The six-monthly CPP Forums are providing a valuable opportunity to share information and lessons learned, as well as to maintain and strengthen personal contacts between CPP partners
- Joint working groups have been established (such as on gender, HIV/AIDS and M&E) to advance collaborative work on specific thematic issues
- Peer reviews of PNG church partner annual plans are being undertaken, which can support improvements in plan quality, identification of potential synergies / areas for collaboration, as well as information sharing and learning opportunities
- Multi-year funding arrangements have been put in place for most of the church partners, allowing carry-over of unspent funds
- A draft communication strategy, a CPP Coordination Office Procedures Manual, and a draft Monitoring and Evaluation Framework have been prepared by the CPP Coordination Office
- Work is also ongoing on a CPP (web-based) Management Information System, and a Strengthsbased Gender Review of CPP has been completed;
- ANGO / church partners continue to provide substantive support to CPP implementation, both remotely (from Australia) and through regular in-country support visits; and
- The PNG church institutional strengthening achievements under Outcome area 1 have also contributed to ongoing improvements in CPP's overall effectiveness.

#### Areas of weaknesses / lack of progress

There are nevertheless some notable areas of weakness and/or lack of progress with respect to improving the effectiveness of CPP 2 governance and management arrangements, namely:

- The Program Partnership Council appears to be, at times, overly focused on program management and administrative issues, which might be better handled by the Management Committee. Given that the PPC only meets twice a year, it is important that the agenda be carefully crafted, and then managed, to ensure that the available time is used to maximum strategic effect.
- The Church Leaders Council is not regularly attended by all participating Church Leaders, thus reducing its effectiveness in helping to make timely and conclusive decisions on policy matters of strategic significance.
- With respect to overall program governance and management matters, there appears to be, at times, a decision making vacuum. While the collaborative and consensual approach of decision

making by committee has its advantages on certain matters, at other times it represents a threat to program effectiveness.

- The Program Coordination Office (PCO) is not yet able to provide the range of support services initially expected of it. There have been problems with timely recruitment of suitably experience staff, staff performance management, and oversight and direction for PCC operations. This has led to substantial delays in progressing such work as the Communications Strategy, the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the development of the MIS. The general quality of consolidated program monitoring and reporting has suffered as a consequence. The PCO Manager is not always clear who she should (or can) turn to for direction and support on specific matters, and the required support or direction is not always forthcoming in a timely manner.
- Weaknesses in the operational capacity of the PCC, particularly with respect to supporting program-wide monitoring and reporting, are leading to some concerns (particularly on the part of responsible AusAID managers) about what is actually happening / being achieved by the CPP. Given the limited opportunities AusAID officers have to actually visit project sites and engage in ongoing dialogue with all church partners, the quality of reporting is key to establishing and maintaining their understanding and support. CPP monitoring, evaluation and reporting issues are discussed in more detail under key TOR question 4 below.
- With respect to the PCO there is a chicken and egg problem. Individual church partners are not willing to rely on or use the PCO for key strategic functions / support until it has demonstrated the capacity to deliver. And yet until the partners start to use / support the PCO, it will remain somewhat on the margins of overall CPP operations and limited largely to secretariat type functions (e.g. for the six-monthly CPP governance/management meetings and forums).
- There are also some weaknesses in the way that AusAID manages and oversights the CPP. There seem to be inadequate opportunities for responsible officers to engage as well-informed 'dialogue partners', with most of their time being spent on AusAID contractual and administrative matters / requirements. Limited opportunities, as already noted, to make field visits compounds the problem as it means that the responsible officer's knowledge of the program is largely limited to what they read, or discuss in more formal meetings held in offices in Port Moresby. Staff turnover in AusAID can also undermine the effectiveness of AusAID's institutional support to program implementation, particularly when inadequate time is devoted to well-structured hand-over/take-over processes.
- With respect to the role of ANGO / church partners, a number of the designated CPP coordinators have other significant work responsibilities in addition to supporting CPP implementation (e.g. for other country programs). This can, at times, clearly limit their ability to provide the full level of management, technical and/or administrative support that may be required and/or desired by their PNG counterparts.

These areas of weakness / potential concern are generally well known among the key CPP partners. They are by no means new revelations discovered by the review team. The key question is therefore how, if possible, to best address them. Some suggestions are provided in Section 6 of this report (Recommendations).

#### Q2. Has CPP been effective in improving service delivery in PNG's poorest districts?

While it is beyond the capacity of this review to assess the overall scope and scale of church services in PNG's poorest districts, or the exact extent to which they may or may not have been improved as a result of CPP support, the following can be noted:

- PNG partner churches continue to have a presence in PNG's most remote / poor districts, where GoPNG services are often limited or non-existent.
- All PNG partner churches support direct service delivery activities in some of PNG's poorest / most remote districts. Some churches, such as the Uniting Church, have specific 'remote-area' projects funded through CPP resources. Nevertheless, there is no specific requirement in the CPP design to target identified 'poorest' districts.
- The CPP is deemed to have been effective in improving churches' institutional capacity to plan for and manage pro-poor development, and to this extent it seems reasonable to assume that this has contributed to improved service delivery that targets poor communities (using resources from all available sources).
- The level of CPP financial resources directed specifically for service delivery is relatively modest, estimated at an average of around 35% of each churches total CPP budget each year or some A\$ 2.5m per year for all 7 churches. Compared to the resources allocated for service delivery by other AusAID sectoral programs, such as in the health, education, infrastructure and law and justice sectors, this is a very small amount.

The issue of whether or not AusAID should be more clearly targeting its resources at identified poorest districts is discussed further under section 5 of this report (AusAID's overall DG strategy), and is also addressed in the recommendations.

# Q3. Has CPP complemented and supported the objectives and outcomes of other AusAID sectoral and governance programs?

Through discussions with CPP church partner organisations, as well as with some of the managers of AusAID's sectoral and other governance programs, it would appear that:

- CPP is recognized as a useful complement to AusAID's overall development cooperation portfolio (working in support of the mainstream churches 'makes sense'), and its objectives are seen to be largely consistent with those of other programs (both governance and sectoral)
- However, there has been only minimal direct collaboration between the CPP and other AusAID sectoral and governance programs in practice. The SPSN program has invited CPP partners to attend some training events (e.g. on M&E), and there is ongoing ad-hoc information sharing between various programs, but nothing which could be described as strategic collaboration.
- Each AusAID funded initiative, even within the DG Unit, is managed largely as a stand-alone program, with no clear strategy or framework (being implemented) to help ensure complementarity and synergies of effort between programs (for example having common areas of geographic focus, integrated planning and implementation timelines, etc). The review team was made aware of no clear evidence that the planning of CPP activities pro-actively took into account linkages with other AusAID program activities, or vice-versa.
- There is no evidence of other AusAID sector programs considering channeling some of their support through CPP mechanisms (as envisaged in the CPP 2 program strategy 2010-13), except to the extent that some CPP PNG church partners have accessed grant resources through programs such as the Incentive Fund and SPSN.
- The CPP Annual Reports do not (as again envisaged in the CPP2 program strategy) yet clearly summarise service delivery activities that have formal links with other AusAID programs; and


• AusAID does not yet appear to 'collate and summarise project activity and funding sources across different AusAID programs that offer opportunities for linkages with CPP through a program-wide database'.

In summary, this is considered to be an area of weakness, not just with respect to CPP, but also with respect to AusAID's overall development cooperation program. That is of course easy to say, but extremely difficult to 'fix'. There are many practical reasons why this is the case, some of which relate to the difficulties posed by working within and through fragmented and often institutionally weak PNG systems, and some of which relate to AusAID's own institutional weaknesses.

A common concern voiced by many AusAID program officers/managers based in PNG is that they are spending the bulk of their time managing internal AusAID administrative processes (such as contractual, risk management and audit requirements), and have very little time left to work on more strategic matters such as policy dialogue, relationship building with and between partners, and strategic coordination of different initiatives/programs. In addition, they are also often pressured by expenditure imperatives (sometimes at the expense of good development process) and have little opportunity (or budget) to conduct field visits.

Some of these AusAID institutional issues are the subject of further discussion in section 5 (AusAID's DG strategy) and are also addressed in the recommendations (section 6).

Q4. Is CPPs approach to monitoring and evaluation effective in capturing and reporting on activity and program level results? How might M&E be improved?



A draft M&E Framework (MEF) has recently been produced for CPP 2 (dated August 2012). This includes a useful schematic outlining the main elements of CPP 2's theory of change / program logic.

The MEF for CPP outlines three levels of enquiry:

- 1. Churches Activity Level M&E
- 2. Program Level M&E for the overall CPP
- 3. Independent M&E.

The MEF also notes that two quality assurance mechanisms will be used:

• Annual Peer Review process involving the seven CPP churches reviewing each other's Program Activity Plans and Annual Reports. This collaborative exercise allows church staff to learn from

each other's programs, including the tools and methods for M&E being used, provides peer critique of the logic, strengths and gaps of designs and reporting and encourages co-programming.

• Periodic presentations and peer review of specific projects, including the M&E tools and methods used to capture results and change.

The question is, to what extent are its main elements currently being applied in practice? And furthermore, are M&E activities/systems producing useful information that supports management decision making (including critical reflection, learning and innovation) and accountability?

#### Strengths / achievements

- The M&E Framework document is clear and concise, and is considered practical and useful. It provides a sound basis on which CPP's M&E activities can be improved on an ongoing basis
- Each partner church produces an annual activity plan, in a similar format, which provides a basis on which progress against plan can (at least to some extent) be assessed.
- M&E capacities within Church partner development units are being progressively improved through the development of knowledge and skills (training, peer group learning, exchange of good practices), systems development (tools, reporting formats, processes) and through practice. An M&E working group has been established to support shared learning, and a number of church development units have established a position for a dedicated M&E officer.
- Gender disaggregated data is being collected and reported by most partner churches regarding the beneficiaries of training / workshop events, as well as (in some cases) the ultimate beneficiaries of service delivery (e.g. number of men and women receiving HIV/AIDS VCT services).
- Each church partner also produces an annual (and a six-monthly) progress report, in a similar format, which provides a summary of progress against plan. These are of variable quality, but in general give a reasonable to good sense of what is being achieved.
- For the 2010-11 financial year a CPP PCO annual report was produced, providing some sense of the CPPs overall programmatic achievements during that period.
- A number of PNG church partners have commissioned independent evaluations of specific CPP funded activities / projects over the past two years. Two such reports cited by the review team look to be of good quality and useful products for supporting learning and improved future activity design.
- There is general recognition among CPP partners that M&E and reporting is an area requiring further concerted capacity development efforts / improvements.

#### Areas of weaknesses / lack of progress

There are also a number of areas of weakness in CPP M&E and reporting noted by the review team, including:

• Weak capacity within the PCO to support program wide M&E and improved communications. The officers recruited to specifically support these two key functions had limited relevant experience when they were recruited, and have so far struggled to make any significant contribution to improved M&E or communications. A draft communication strategy has been developed, but is not yet formally approved and is not being effectively implemented.

- It is currently extremely difficult to get an overall sense of what CPP is doing and achieving, without having to go through, in some detail, the 7 separate annual reports. There is currently no readily available and clear summary of what each church is doing and where, particularly with respect to supporting service delivery improvements.
- No maps or other appropriate schematics are being used in annual reports to help provide a clear visual summary of what is being done and where, either by individual churches or by the overall program.
- The format used for individual church annual reports does not make for particularly easy reading, and is not considered to be a particularly good use of space on the printed page. For example, the tabular format used to report activity level progress confines all such reporting to one column (out of 4 or 5 columns), with the rest of the space used to repeat the outcome area, the results expected, the indicators, etc. The financial details (what was budgeted and what was spent by the end of each year on different areas of activity) is also not clearly or consistently presented in all church annual reports.
- As noted, the annual reports from each church vary quite significantly in quality. Some could certainly provide a bit more detail and/or analysis. There is also a practical problem with the pdf formatting of one or two of the annual reports seen by the review team, which can only be read by continually rotating the view of each page. Frustrating!
- The peer review of annual reports has not yet happened/started. This would provide an excellent opportunity to review and summarise programmatic level achievements and issues, and facilitate the production of the overall program level annual reports.
- The development of an MIS has been ongoing for some time, and does not appear to be being effectively or efficiently managed. There are also significant concerns (among some CPP partners as well as from the perspective of the review team) about its likely practicality and eventual utility. It risks putting the cart before the horse, in that there is as yet inadequate clarity about what should go into such an MIS, the basic systems for collecting and recording key information within individual churches are in many cases not yet adequately developed, and the PCO which would have to manage this system is not currently in a position to do so effectively.
- An overall CPP annual report has not yet been produced by the PCO for 2011-12 (as at the time of drafting this report). The previous report, for 2010-11, is also somewhat weak when it comes to providing a clear big-picture summary of overall programmatic achievements and issues.
- It appears that the latest (2011-12) annual reports were sent by the ANGO church partners directly to AusAID, without being copied/sent to the PCO. It is not quite clear why this happened, but it seems clear that this is not how it should work.
- Finally, while AusAID expressed some concerns to the review team about the quality of overall CPP reporting, it does not appear that any structured or documented feedback has been provided to church partners by AusAID as to exactly what they would like to see improved, and how.

In summary, while there is a significant amount being achieved through the CPP at the individual church level, this is not yet being captured, summarised and communicated as well as it could be, both through the regular reports and other communication tools. At the overall program level, there are even more significant weaknesses with respect to monitoring and reporting, which it would appear can only really be addressed through getting the PCO to <u>effectively</u> take on, and support, this function.

#### Suggested improvements required

There are a number of relatively straightforward / practical things that could be done to help improve the monitoring and reporting of CPP progress and achievements. These include:

- Recruiting suitably qualified and <u>experienced</u> officers into the PCO to support the key M&E and communication functions
- Conducting an annual peer review of each church's annual report, facilitated by the PCO. This would also be used as a forum for identifying and agreeing on the key content for the overall CPP program annual report
- Requiring each individual church partner to prepare, and maintain/update, a key set of basic information in a common format on the scope of activities being implemented under CPP, and to share/present this at each six-monthly CPP Forum meeting (e.g. a simple list of key activities by each of the 3 main outcome areas, including a one line description of the activity, the geographic location(s), the primary target group/beneficiaries, and the annual budget).
- Review and modification of the annual report template, to reduce wasted space and some duplication of information being presented.

Section 6 of this report (Recommendations) also provides suggested improvements to CPP M&E.

#### Q5. What are the main risks / threats to achieving end of program outcomes?

It is important to recognize that the CPP's key expected outcomes do not really have an end date. Improving church institutional capacities for pro-poor development, improving service delivery by churches, and increased engagement by the churches in improving governance in PNG will be ongoing 'work-in-progress' for the indefinite future. It is really only AusAID, or other donor, funding that will (presumably) end at a specific point in the future.

With this in mind, the main risks to making continued progress towards achieving CPP outcomes are seen to be as follows:

- Inability of CPP partners to establish and support a more effective PCO function. The review team considers this to be quite critical to supporting overall programmatic outcomes, particularly outcome area 3.
- Lack of progress in establishing a new umbrella church representative body (including an effective Secretariat) that is formally recognized, and financially supported by, the GoPNG. This is required as part of a longer term exit / sustainability strategy at least for AusAID.
- Continued deterioration in GoPNG's ability to deliver good governance and needed services, which will inevitably also impact on the ability of churches to provide development services.
- Impatience and / or over-high expectations on behalf of AusAID, resulting in either: (i) increased micro-management of the program by AusAID; and/or (ii) scaling back of financial support; and/or (iii) a decision not to continue funding church-managed development work post 2016. AusAID needs to remain patient, realistic and supportive of CPP.

## 3.4 Efficiency

# Q1. Is CPP making efficient and appropriate use of available resources, including with respect to staffing and people's time, resource allocation, the contracting/management model and governance arrangements? What could be improved?

In general, the CPP mechanism is considered to be a relatively efficient and cost effective way of delivering support for improved governance and service delivery in PNG. It primarily channels money through established church organisations (using their offices, systems and extensive networks of existing people and ongoing activities), does not have high overhead/administration costs, uses limited expatriate consulting expertise (at least compared to some other contracting models), and there are no 'profits' to be paid. The Australian church partners (ANGOs) are accredited through existing ANCP mechanisms, which also helps avoid duplication of effort.

It is estimated that each church generally allocates between 25 to 40% of their CPP budget to their own institutional strengthening activities. Between 30 to 45% appear to be allocated to service delivery. The rest (around 20 to 30%) is allocated to supporting activities related to either Outcome area 3, or to general management / M&E/ partnership / administration and support costs. This is considered to represent an appropriate balance.

The efficiency of CPP finance / contract management has also been improved in Phase 2 by the move towards multi-year funding agreements with most of the church partners. Five of the churches currently have such multi-year funding arrangements. This allows for the roll-over of funds between financial years, thus (in theory at least) improving cash-flow management efficiencies.

The current structure and designated functions of the PCO, as well as the establishment of a separate physical office space for the PCO, are considered to be (for the most part) appropriate to need, and <u>could</u> <u>be</u> an efficient way to support overall program management, monitoring and communications.

Nevertheless, there remain areas of inefficiency in the way that the overall CPP is managed, for example:

- Despite the move to multi-year funding agreements, the release of annual budget allocations to each church has been significantly delayed for the last two financial years. For the 2012-13 financial year, monies were only released in November almost 5 months late. The problem seems to be related to both the late preparation of annual plans/budgets by churches as well as slow review / approval by AusAID. It is also understood that the nature of the individual funding agreements with each church mean that even relatively minor variations in resource allocation between activity areas/funding categories requires either new contracts to be prepared each year or significant contract amendments to be approved.
- The fact that there are 7 separate funding agreements one with each church / ANGO partner is maybe <u>not</u> the most efficient way to contract and manage the overall program. However, there also seems to be resistance (from most churches) to the idea of one agent (church or other) managing an umbrella contract on their behalf.
- The overall governance, management and reporting structures of the CPP are quite complex and time consuming, and could possibly be streamlined to improve efficiencies. Having observed one of the PPC meetings (in Madang), the review team is of the opinion that the PPC is not making the most efficient and effective use of its time. Many of the issues discussed at that meeting were things that could be better handled by the Management Committee, or were issues that had infact already been discussed and largely resolved at previous meetings.
- The consensual approach to decision making, through committee processes, has significant merits in promoting partnership and shared responsibility. However, it is not always an efficient use of

everyone's time and resources. There is at times a vacuum in clear decision making on certain issues.

• Weaknesses in PCO capacity, and the way that it is supported, also impact directly on the efficiency of CPP overall management, particularly with respect to such things as inter-church communications and clear and timely reporting to AusAID. As previously noted, the PCO is not currently able to efficiently and effectively fulfill some of its core functions, partly due to staff performance problems, but also due to unclear lines of supervision and support. The current practice of rotating the PCO host church every two years is also problematic, as it takes no specific account of host church capacities to efficiently and effectively support the PCO, requires new staff contracts to be established, and risks disrupting established working/supervisory relationships.

Recommendations to help address some of these inefficiencies are provided in Section 6 of this report.

# 3.5 Social inclusion

Q1. Is CPP effectively promoting gender equality, disability-inclusive development and other cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, and has it increased inclusion of such marginalised groups in democratic governance processes?

The review team's strong impression is that the participating churches are, for the most part, effectively promoting awareness on gender equality issues and implementing programs to address HIV/AIDs. There is less evidence of specific programs being implemented with CPP funding to address disability-inclusive development, however many churches do have their own ongoing programs to support people with various disabilities (including sight, hearing, mobility and mental impairments).

Some specific examples include:

- The 'Theology of Development' document presented at the Alotau CPP Forum earlier this year explicitly addresses issues of social inclusion (equality, access, protecting the vulnerable, etc).
- Each of the CPP partners is implementing policies, programs and activities which in one way or another promote different elements of social inclusion.
- Child protection focal points have been designated / appointed within each Anglican diocese, and the Anglican Church also has an officially approved Gender Policy.
- All partner church CPP work programs include HIV/AIDS support initiatives some stand alone and some integrated into other education, health or community development activities. This work is being taken seriously and is being allocated significant CPP resources by most churches.
- The on-going collection and reporting of gender disaggregated data by many church partners is an indication that gender awareness within the churches is considered to be of increasing importance. Nevertheless, there are limited examples of gender specific objectives and indicators in most CPP partner plans/work programs.
- A CPP Gender Reference Group has been established (although it still needs to more clearly define its role and work program).
- Finally, the independent 'Strengths Based Gender Review' report on CPP of April 2012 provides a generally positive assessment of CPPs contribution to advancing gender equality issues, noting a number of specific areas of achievement. For example: (i) the National Catholic AIDS Office (NCAO) is reported to provide excellent disaggregated data, which is a first and necessary step for enabling gender sensitive program monitoring; (ii) the UCPNG/ACPNG supported Mother and Child Support Program (MCSP) and the Salvation Army PNG's (SAPNG) Women Only

Weekends are considered good practice examples of women's empowerment activities; (iii) the adult literacy programs of 6 partner churches have a majority of female students, and often include learning activities related to both gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS awareness issues; and (iv) the Salvation Army and SDA church are both running programs directly focused on men, including the leadership responsibilities and role in reducing family violence.

The Strengths Based Gender Review report also includes a number of key recommendations with respect to further enhancing CPP's effectiveness in promoting gender equality. Some of these are also reflected in this report's recommendations (Section 6).

# 3.6 Sustainability of benefits

Q1. Are the achievements of CPP likely to be sustainable in the long-term and are there components or activities that are clearly not sustainable?

With respect to sustainability, the CPP 2 Design Document notes the following 3 main points:

- 1. 'There are several options emerging for how the functions and benefits of CPP can be institutionalized in the long term. A stronger PNG Council of Churches (PNGCC) would provide for a broader policy dialogue with government and other church denominations. Church leaders are interested and committed to the process of rebuilding the Council of Churches, and Phase 2 should encourage and actively support this. The PNGCC could also eventually take over some CPP functions'.
- 2. 'The new Partnership Policy Framework with the GoPNG provides a platform for future formal collaboration with government particularly in health and education. This would require a stronger Churches Medical Council and Churches Education Council which Phase 2 should also more pro-actively support. Coordination arrangements for Phase 2 will demonstrate clear linkages and alignment to these existing partner country systems.'
- 3. 'The program budget for Phase 2 reflects an aim of increasing reliance on non-AusAID funds through strengthening capacity for local community income generation, raising funds from Church membership, and accessing funds from government and a variety of donors'.

The review team believe that these still represent the most important factors likely to impact on long-term sustainability of CPP supported benefits, after such time when AusAID/donor funding ends.

While it is still relatively early days in the implementation of CPP 2, it is also in these 3 areas that CPP progress appears, as yet, to be most limited. But then these really are the 'hard yards', over which external parties (such as AusAID) have the least direct influence. Nevertheless, for the next few years, added impetus and focus needs to be developed to try and progress these sustainability 'requirements'.

At the level of each individual church partner, the prospects for sustainability of benefits are considered good, primarily due to the on-going achievements noted under Outcome are 1 (institutional strengthening of churches for pro-poor development). Increased professionalism of church development units, more robust management systems, and their ability to demonstrate the delivery of results, are likely to increase their chances of attracting recurrent and development program funds, both from within their church organisations as well as from various external sources (government, aid donor and/or private sector).

A brief case study highlighting some CPP activity level sustainability issues is provided at Annex 4.

#### Q2. What actions can be taken to promote sustainability of benefits?

The main actions that (still) need to be pursued to promote sustainability of benefits are already noted in the CPP 2 design, as summarised above.

These are further captured in the recommendations provided in Section 6 of this report.

## 3.7 Main conclusions

Based on the CPP findings profiled in the preceding sections, the following are the review team's main conclusions:

- The CPP remains a relevant and effective element of AusAID's overall development cooperation program in PNG. It is building partner church capacity to support pro-poor development and also directly supports improved service delivery by churches. The flexible structure of the program design, and the iterative way it is being implemented, is helping to ensure that the core partnership and local ownership principles are being effectively supported and promoted.
- Given the churches' established presence in remote rural areas of PNG, they have the ability to reach some of the poorest communities who are currently not adequately covered by basic government services. However, there is no requirement (in the design or implementation strategy) for CPP resources to be targeted at any specific poorest groups or geographic areas.
- CPP is also a relatively efficient way to deliver support, given that it primarily works with and through established (or emerging) PNG church institutional structures (with the exception of the current overall program coordination arrangements). CPP supports the more efficient and effective use of other existing church financial and human resources for pro-poor development work, and is helping partner churches to access additional funding through demonstrating their improved professionalism in program/project planning and management.
- The churches are increasingly active in promoting gender equality and other social inclusion strategies, with CPP support. They are supporting significant HIV/AIDs awareness, counseling and testing support programs, both stand-alone as well as integrated into other activities such as adult literacy programs. The development of a broadly accepted 'Theology of Development' is helping to further establish the churches' development work as a core part of their mission.
- On balance, it is considered that the institutional strengthening support provided through CPP is the most effective element of the support provided to date. This is building church capacity to more effectively plan and manage pro-poor development activities over the long term. Direct CPP support for specific church service activities is useful, but generally represents a modest contribution to their overall service delivery support finances (e.g. from GoPNG for health and education staff salaries and for school/health infrastructure). Also, AusAID itself invests far more heavily in direct service delivery through its main sectoral programs in health, education, infrastructure and law and justice.
- CPP achievements with respect to supporting 'Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance' are less easily identifiable. Individual churches continue to engage with government agencies (particularly at sub-regional level) on various matters, including service delivery. However, there appears to be little evidence yet of enhanced strategic engagement of the partner churches, as a collective voice, with government. There is talk, but not much in the way of concrete action or results. The Partnership Policy Framework between the GoPNG and the Christian Churches remains moribund, and no specific strategies or actions to improve the functioning of the Church Education and Medical Councils appear to have been advanced directly through CPP supported mechanisms.

- There is as yet little evidence of CPP having established complementary linkages with other AusAID governance or sectoral programs. However, this is not unique to CPP, as most AusAID programs seem to be implemented largely as stand-alone initiatives, without a clear integrating framework (at least in practice rather than just on paper).
- The CPP is effectively supporting ongoing dialogue, information sharing and relationship building between participating churches through the CLC, PPC, the Forum meetings and Joint Working Groups. However, the CPP's overall program management mechanisms are not considered particularly efficient or effective in promoting timely decision making on some issues. Clearer division of functions and responsibilities between the CLC, PPC and Management Committee is required.
- The Program Coordination Office is not currently able to effectively undertake some of the key functions expected of it (over and above its secretariat functions), due partly to the limited experience and capacities of key technical staff and partly because of inadequate supervision and support mechanisms/arrangements. This is impacting negatively on overall program monitoring, reporting and communication capacities –and thus the quality of related products.
- AusAID has its own institutional and operational weaknesses which reduce its ability to manage, monitor and support programs such as CPP as effectively as it would like to. AusAID Officers with direct program oversight responsibilities seem to be tasked with significant administrative / contract / risk management responsibilities that limit their ability to engage deeply on more strategic matters, both for their 'own' AusAID programs as well as with respect to promoting strategic linkages / complementarities between programs. There is also relatively high A-based staff turnover, and sometimes inadequate staff transition planning. It was also stated that there are very limited resources available for AusAID officer field monitoring and support visits (at least within the DG Unit), which given the importance of such visits in terms of learning and relationship building (as well as understanding the political economy of PNG), seems to be a false economy.
- Government of Papua New Guinea national agencies directly involved in supporting CPP, namely the DNPM and DfCD, also have institutional weaknesses which limit their ability to effectively support CPP implementation. The frequency and quality of their engagement in key decision making forums, such as the PPC, appears to have been inconsistent. Budget allocation and expenditure details under the State / Church Partnership Policy Framework were requested from DNPM by the review team, but have not been made available to date. More active and consistent support from key GoPNG agencies would clearly be desirable.

# 4 Opportunities for cross-learning between CPP and SPSN

As noted in the findings for both SPSP and CPP, the opportunities for cross-learning between the two programs have been limited to date (although some useful initiatives have started). This is not surprising in light of the fact that SPSN, in particular, has spent much of the past two and a half years focused primarily on establishing its own operational capacity.

However, going forward, there are certainly opportunities for the two programs to promote more in the way of cross-learning, as well to provide each other with mutual practical support. Such opportunities could include:

- Establishing mechanisms for joint meetings with provincial and LLG administrations where both programs have ongoing activities.
- Jointly organising specific training/learning events, and/or making opportunities available for respective program staff/stakeholders to participate in each other's training/learning events at both national and provincial levels. For example, two areas of current SPSN activity of potential interest and value to CPP are the Komuniti Projek Planning process and the conduct of Joint Organisational Assessments.
- Linking the work of the CPP and SPSN Gender Reference / Working Groups.
- Attendance at each other's key stakeholder meetings (such as SPSN attendance at the CPP Forum)
- Sharing activity/work plans, identifying common geographic field-activity sites where mutually supportive work could be carried out, organizing joint monitoring / supervisory visits to such common activity sites, etc
- Sharing progress reports, analytical studies, activity evaluation reports, etc on an ongoing (and structured) basis
- Given SPSN's significant staffing resources and technical capacities at its head office in Port Moresby, SPSN might be able to provide some specific technical support to the CPP PCO, for example with respect to digitized map production, production of communication materials, facilitating the conduct of joint organizational assessments, etc. This could be on a fee for service basis, or it could be agreed (with AusAID) that SPSN could cost such support into its own budgets.

Expectations with respect to cross-program collaboration nevertheless need to be realistic. Each program is complex, has a lot of 'internal' stakeholder relationships to manage, and already have a lot of their own reporting, meeting and information sharing requirements to meet. AusAID can nevertheless play a role in promoting and facilitating such cross-program collaboration, as and when they see it appropriate and/or necessary to do so. In the future, it would most helpful if all such programs could be designed at the same time, have common implementation periods and specific mechanisms in place to promote their integration / synergies of effort.

# 5 Reflections on AusAID's Democratic Governance strategy

In addition to assessing the SPSN and CPP programs, the review team was also asked to 'Assess the relevance of the existing Democratic Governance Strategy and whether AusAID has effectively implemented the strategy through its programs'. It was also asked to 'identify lessons from SPSN and CPP to help inform the design of future DG strategies'.

Our attempt to help answer these questions is provided below.

#### First of all, what is the DG strategy?

It is stated in the DG Strategy document that:

*Programmatic coherence is provided for in this Democratic Governance Strategy by focusing on two key principles:* 

**Principle 1:** Support state and civil society to work in **partnership** in order to strengthen their complementary roles and responsibilities, thereby facilitating political stability, service delivery, and sustainable economic development.

**Principle 2:** Work at as **local** a level as possible in supporting civil society, the sub-national levels of the PNG state and, where relevant, private enterprise, to articulate demand for democratic processes and institutions, and strengthen their capacities to meet that demand and become drivers of change.

These two principles will shape future democratic governance programs including Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (Empower People, Strengthen the Nation), and will allow synergies to emerge between the program's components, contributing to increased aid effectiveness.

Furthermore, the DG strategy states that:

DG embodies the notion of shared governance, in which civil society, democratically elected local government and the private sector, together with the national government (the state) participate in public matters including policy making and implementation, resolution of public problems and the allocation of public resources. It involves working directly with communities as citizens, engaging with the ways in which they can both influence development and call for accountability; and

The Democratic Governance Strategy provides for an integrated approach, supporting the linkages that enable government and civil society to complement each other. The strategy links the supply and demand sides of governance and the roles of state and non-state stakeholders.


#### Does the existing DG strategy remain relevant?

In theory, these principles look to be (and remain) relevant to PNG, and indeed to most other countries. Working with both civil society and state agencies to promote partnerships, and the concept of shared-governance, makes sense.

However, it is unclear to some (including the review team) what this really means in practice, and how it is to be effectively implemented. The DG strategy is very general, and does not clearly help define the scope and focus of program design and management arrangements.

The DG strategy is also only one of many similar/related AusAID policies, strategies and frameworks, including the Civil Society Engagement Framework (June 2012), the Effective Governance paper (Nov 2011), GoA Aid Effectiveness commitments, the GoA-GOPNG Development Cooperation Treaty, AusAID's Governance Performance Assessment Framework, etc. Each of these gives slightly different emphasis to different things, and it is not always clear how they align with each other, or which one takes precedence.

One diagram, from the PLGP design document, helps to profile the current structure / configuration of AusAID programs in PNG:



Service Focused Programs

This makes the distinction between 'Governance and Service Enabling Programs' and 'Service Focused Programs'. The DG element clearly fits under 'Governance and Enabling Programs'. To the review team, this seems clear and pragmatic. While it makes a distinction between the two main types of programs, it is also clear that there are important and necessary links between them. They need to complement and support each other. Also, Service Focused Programs also clearly need to contain some governance strengthening element themselves, while the Governance Programs must also keep their eye on the service delivery end-point, while focusing on practical ways to improve governance.

However, each type of program also needs to maintain focus, understand the limits of its scope, and know when (where and how) it should work closely with other programs and/or let other programs take the lead.

A problem with the DG strategy is that it doesn't really seem to add much value to helping understand how this will work - from a program design and management perspective. It highlights the need to 'Support state and civil society to work in **partnership** in order to strengthen their complementary roles and responsibilities' and to 'Work at as **local** a level as possible in supporting civil society and the sub-national levels of the PNG state....'. This then also raises the question as to what makes a DG program different from any other sub-national program, as all such programs should (or at least could) be working in concert with such principles?

In talking to managers of AusAID's health and education sector programs, the review team was told that these sector programs expected to see the DG programs (namely SPSN) working on the community demand / engagement side of the equation. This seems like a clear and reasonable expectation. However, in practice there seems to be no working mechanisms to help ensure that there are synergies of effort, and learning, between the sectoral and the governance / enabling programs (including DG programs). SPSN

is also, at least to date, spending considerable effort on more direct service delivery activities, particularly through its small grants program.

There also seem to be little in the way of operational synergies even between core governance programs such as SPSN, CPP and the PLGP. The review team thinks that developing clear complementarity between these programs (in particular SPSN and PLGP) could be critical to the long term effectiveness of all of them, and indeed to the rest of the Australian development cooperation program, especially in terms of impacting at sub-national level. For example, one of PLGP's primary outcomes is:

'Enhancing demand for and evidence of service delivery improvement through improved mechanisms for performance monitoring and accountability between sub-national government and national government and between sub-national government, local politicians, civil society and the public at large'.

This seems to be very much something also expected of SPSN and CPP.

It is noted that the PLGP is using a targeted / focused approach to providing support, with a clear phasing strategy based on an ongoing assessment of provincial governance institutional capacity development. The review team considers that the DG programs, namely SPSN and CPP, could usefully develop a complementary / similar focus, maybe 'led' by the PLGP. There would be significant advantages to more focused application of resources in identified geographic areas – particularly to address poverty / the poorest.

In terms of DG strategy relevance, it is not clear to the review team whether or not there is actually a need for a specific DG strategy (and Unit within AusAID), rather than having a more mainstreamed approach to supporting improved governance (in general) in PNG. We understand why there has been a shift from a more narrow CSO support focus (under CDS Phases 1 and 2) – but are not sure that this merits a specific DG strategy and operational unit. Maybe a greater need is to have a clear Civil Society engagement strategy for PNG, which incorporates the key principles of partnership and working at a local level as possible.

#### Has it been effectively implemented by AusAID?

Given the review team's concerns about the practical relevance of the DG strategy, and the fact that there are ongoing questions about what it really means, it is difficult to see how it can be effectively implemented. Both SPSN and CPP are giving some emphasis to promoting partnerships between government and civil society, but this is, to some extent, business as usual. There is no clear sea change as a result of the DG strategy being in place, from what the review team has observed.

The review of the Development Cooperation Treaty, which resulted in added emphasis being placed on all AusAID programs to demonstrate service delivery outcomes, appears to have further complicated the picture. The service delivery 'push' has led to some levels of uncertainty, particularly within programs such as SPSN, about how much emphasis should be placed on supporting the facilitating/enabling environment for service delivery, and how much emphasis (and thus resource for implementation and monitoring) should be placed on demonstrating service delivery outcomes. The review team feels that the balance has shifted, certainly too much for core DG 'enabling' programs, in favour of demonstrating service delivery at the expense of enabling governance outputs and outcomes.

There also appears to be very limited evidence as yet, of significant engagement by DG programs with the private sector, in particular the big resource development companies and their respective foundations. This is not easily done through an organization such as AusAID (with its relatively complex processes, accountability and monitoring requirements), however given the scope, scale and impact of such resource development projects in PNG (particularly in remote / poor communities), there remain obvious advantages to developing complementary programs of development work.

However, the main concern about effective implementation of any of AusAID's current development cooperation strategies comes back to the lack of clear integration / collaboration / communication between different programmatic elements. As noted by the SNS review team in 2009:

'The current disconnect between AusAID's sectoral focus and its support for decentralisation through SNS creates inefficiencies and inconsistencies in program delivery undermining overall efforts to improve service delivery. The MTR was surprised to find how poorly understood SNS is among other AusAID programs.

This issue is of course well recognized by AusAID, and efforts are being made to give the overall development cooperation program more coherence, particularly at the sub-national level. For example, the PLGP design document highlights the critical need to promote better linkages:

'AusAID's overall Sub-National Strategy (SNS) is pivotal in defining and managing the interfaces and opportunities for synergy between the various AusAID programs that support sub-national service delivery, particularly in this area of performance management.'

'An important consideration for this theory of change is the ability of the program to connect with related initiatives to build synergy and complementarity'. From an AusAID perspective, this lies at the heart of its Sub-national Strategy where collectively all major AusAID-funded programs are expected to contribute to sub-national service delivery improvements.

However, this remains a vision, rather than a current reality. And for the moment, the DG elements of the AusAID development cooperation program remain as siloed as any other element of the overall program.

In summary, AusAID's support for improved governance (including democratic governance) is considered to be well intentioned but, for the most part, inadequately coordinated, too theoretical and, at times, un-realistically ambitious. There is also (often) a glaring gap between AusAID's strategies / high level policy statements and frameworks, and the practical aspects of program management / supervision of programs on the ground. AusAID's program managers/officers seem to have little in the way of clear and consistent operational guidance/policies to follow, resulting in different officers often taking very different approaches to program management.

In some respects it might also be argued that there is <u>too much</u> AusAID money being spent on (at least some types of) DG iniatives, particularly on such things as managing small service delivery grant schemes which can divert attention from effectively supporting important 'enabling' factors (such as strengthening networks, advocacy, civic awareness, participatory planning systems, etc). There is no dichotomy between these things (demand or supply, governance or service delivery), except to the extent that not every individual program can do everything all at once.

As a final point, the DG strategy does not provide any clear guidance on targeting the poor, or the poorest districts in PNG.

# 6 Recommendations

Recommendations for SPSN and CPP, and in relation to AusAID's broader DG strategy, are provided below.

It is important to note that a number of these recommendations are already being acted on by key stakeholders, given that the MTR process was participatory and to a significant extent reflects a general consensus as to what needs to be done to further improve program implementation.

# 6.1 SPSN

Given that SPSN now has less than 18 months to run, under the current contract, implementation of many of the recommendations provided below is somewhat dependent on whether or not there is going to be a Phase 2. Recommendation 1 is therefore critical to helping prioritise some of the specific actions required to implement the recommendations, as well as the level of resources that should be applied to implementing them.

**Recommendation 1**: Immediately initiate plans to undertake scoping and design work for a possible Phase 2 of SPSN.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- Take account of the main findings of this review, as well as the lessons learned from managing previous transitions between the CDS, DGTP and current phase of SPSN. These transitions have generally not been well managed, causing significant uncertainty and loss of momentum.
- Coordinate the scoping and design process with plans to review and/or re-design other AusAID governance programs, including the ongoing review of AusAID's overall governance strategy.
- Incorporate an ongoing review <u>mechanism</u> into any future phase design, rather than one-off point in time independent reviews.
- Recognise the importance of building on what works, the long-term nature of the institutional and social changes being promoted, and the fact that the objectives for individual programs need to be clearly defined and realistic.
- Ensure adequate resources are made available for appropriate applied research into what works and what doesn't in terms of implementing democratic governance principles and practices.
- Undertake in depth consultations with key GoPNG partner agencies regarding their expectations for a program such as SPSN, including which national agency(s) should be taking a lead role in supporting program implementation.

**Recommendation 2**: Prioritise the development of improved coordination and cohesion across program components for the remaining program period.

- The SMT ensure that key program staff, including regional office managers (and through them regional staff), have the opportunity to engage in identifying ways to improve coordination and cohesion across components.
- Clear and practical actions, including roles, responsibilities and timeframes are established.
- AusAID and PNG stakeholders/partners are made aware of planned strategies/actions and have opportunities to effectively engage in promoting improved coordination and cohesion.

**Recommendation 3:** Increased attention be given to promoting the understanding and implementation of SPSN 'Democratic Governance Practices' across all program areas.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- A rapid assessment be undertaken to better understand the current levels of knowledge and understanding amongst staff and a sample of partners specifically in relation to 'democratic governance practices'.
- Regular discussions on 'democratic governance practices' are facilitated both within the team as well as with key partners (civil society and government) in order to improve understanding and agreement on how such principles can be best implemented in practice.
- Resources are allocated to support relevant applied research and learning events to increase focus on, and discussion of, democratic governance practices (e.g. to inform development of strategies to link in with the DSIP, the private sector, etc).
- Prioritise filling the vacant Democratic Governance and Community Development and Local Governance Advisor positions.

#### Recommendation 4: Increase focus on CSO capacity building for Democratic Governance.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- A rapid assessment be undertaken amongst local partners, INGOs and other donors to update information on locally available resources (human and material) who can support SPSN to facilitate discussions and support building local capacity in democratic governance practice areas.
- Create increased opportunities for Key, Large and Medium grant partners to play a greater role in capacity building of other partners through initiatives such as local workshops and joint learning events.
- Facilitate existing (or new/emerging) networks or learning forums to bring together CSOs working in similar sectors/themes across different components (for example, the partners across different components now working separately on FSV and Ward planning).
- Prioritise action to build capacity of Provincial and LG CDWs involved in supporting small grants (particularly in areas of democratic governance, GESI, monitoring and mentoring).
- Assess potential to increase the number of partners able to access support for JOA (for example through building a local JOA facilitator team).
- Review available resources for this enhanced role of capacity building in SPSN and look for areas for reallocation of resources if considered insufficient. As part of this, ensure sufficient resources are available to allow the Capacity Building adviser/staff from component 5 to undertake visits to regional offices to assess and support and monitor local capacity building efforts.

**Recommendation 5** – Review and (as appropriate) revise current ways of working to improve program efficiencies and effectiveness.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

• There are no new calls for expressions of interest for small grants in this phase of SPSN, at least until it is clear whether or not there is likely to be a successor phase post July 2014. The

next/final funding round of small grants should be focused on determining/prioritising support for some of the existing unfulfilled EOIs.

- LGCs and the NGC are supported to review processes and look for improved efficiencies in grant processing.
- Respective roles and responsibilities of head office and regional office staff are reviewed and as appropriate clarified, particularly to help ensure regional office staff are adequately informed of, and engaged in, the planning and implementation of all program activities that impact at a subnational level.
- Ensure regional offices are equipped and supported to access and effectively use the SPSN database, and have access to all relevant program informational materials in a timely manner.
- An assessment is made of the pros and cons of further devolution of some regional office staff to provincial level (including opportunities for co-location with SNS/PLGP or local partner government offices).
- Prioritise plans for MOUs with Provincial Administrations, to help clarify roles and responsibilities (SPSN/government). The same could be considered, at an appropriate point in time, with key national government agencies.
- The roles and responsibilities of AusAID/SPSN in different stages of grants processing (primarily with large and medium grants) are reviewed and as appropriate clarified.
- The engagement and role of regional office staff is increased in relation to all initiatives/grants planned or operating in their region, while keeping in mind the established rationale for centralised management of component 1, 3 and 4 activities (linked also to recommendation 6 below).

**Recommendation 6:** Look for opportunities to improve links / synergies with other AusAID programs, including DG, Governance and sectoral programs.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- Regular meetings are held bringing together representatives from across all AusAID DGU programs (AusAID and program staff) to progressively enhance inter program collaboration.
- Mechanisms are developed and institutionalised for regular consultations between SPSN and PLGP/SNS at both the national and local levels to ensure enhanced practical coordination for the remaining program period.
- Mechanisms are developed and institutionalised for regular consultations between SPSN head office and key AusAID sector programs, particularly in Health and Education, in order to establish clear expectations and defined areas for collaborative and/or complementary action.
- AusAID progress the idea of a single National Joint Governing Council for all DGU programs, and a similar joint governance model at provincial level (where appropriate).

**Recommendation 7:** Promote systems and mechanisms to improve collaboration between SPSN partners across the 5 component areas.

- Establish mechanisms to promote improved links between TIPNG, CIMC, NBC and regional partners, as well as coalitions or initiatives supported under components 3 and 4.
- Support the development of simple, practical action plans in selected provinces (possibly linked to PLGP) which promote collaborative activities to promote democratic governance practices.
- Support local, small scale, well facilitated learning initiatives to increase understanding, coordination, and opportunities for shared learning amongst programs (both CSO and government), especially amongst initiatives working in the same geographic areas.

**Recommendation 8:** Ensure sufficient resources are available to ensure the timely implementation of the Gender and Social Inclusion Action Plan.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- The GESI coordinator is supported to undertake periodic field visits to regional offices to ensure regional teams are aware of and understand GESI principles and roles in implementation of the action plan. Look for opportunities to engage staff from AusAID's Gender Unit in field visits.
- As part of regional visits, the GESI coordinator monitors staff (and where possible local partner) capacity in relation to GESI, and reports on capacity building needs.
- Links are improved, where practical opportunities arise, with national women's advocacy networks.
- Linkages are developed and resources shared with Pacific regional networks and PNG based INGOs working on issues of women's empowerment.

**Recommendation 9:** AusAID should review its own resource allocation and management practices with respect to how effectively it supports its DG program managers to carry out the work expected of them.

- A time and effort study be conducted to determine more precisely how AusAID program managers in Port Moresby (including DG unit staff) currently allocate their time between key functions, particularly contract management / administrative duties versus engagement with key partners/stakeholders on strategic management issues and tasks.
- An internal AusAID management guideline / operational procedure be developed to help program managers understand how to better balance expenditure imperatives with actual program implementation needs / status.
- The need for AusAID DG program managers to regularly travel out of Port Moresby on learning and monitoring visits is appropriately supported through allocation of adequate time and travel funds.
- The strategy of placing co-located AusAID officers (Provincial Representatives) within Provinces be continued and expanded, as an important element of support to all AusAID's sub-national programs. Having more AusAID (supported) staff out in the Provinces, is an excellent way of better understanding, and responding to the reality of, the political economy of PNG.

# 6.2 CPP

**Recommendation 1**: The Program Partnership Council should bring forward their own planned review of CPP governance and management arrangements to the earliest opportunity.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- Take into account the findings of this review report.
- Prioritise the urgent need to strengthen the capacities of the Program Coordination Office to more effectively fulfill the basic functions of program M&E, reporting and communications. This should not require any more financial resources, but existing resources need to be more efficiently and effectively used. Staff skills and experience is the main concern, coupled with lack of adequately clear and effective PCO direction, oversight and supervision. Consideration could be given to having an experienced ANGO selected professional to be based in the PCO in an advisory role.
- Where possible/practical, draw on the program management expertise of Managing Contractors working in PNG on related AusAID programs (such as SPSN).
- Address the need to further clarify the respective functions and decision making responsibilities of the CLC, PPC and Program Management Committee (PMC) in order to make decision making processes more efficient and effective. The CLC and PPC need to focus more on strategic issues, such as how to collectively engage more effectively with GoPNG and how to re-establish/reconfigure a better functioning PNGCC, while the Management Committee should have clear responsibility and authority for management and administrative decision making and action. Consideration could also be given to having AusAID more regularly represented at Program Management Committee meetings so they can both learn and contribute.

**Recommendation 2**: Consolidated CPP program monitoring, reporting and communication should be given more priority / attention.

- This work should continue to be coordinated by the PCO, with the active support of all PNG church partners and ANGOs.
- CPP partner draft annual reports should be peer reviewed by PNG church partners, with appropriate input from/support from their ANGO partners. A key purpose of the peer review should be to help prepare the annual CPP program overview report.
- The key data / information required from each church program to go into annual reports should be agreed and systematized, so that it can be more clearly presented and consolidated. For example, each annual report could usefully include (<u>in addition</u> to the general narrative already provided):

   (i) a list of all ongoing CPP funded activities, showing sector/outcome area, geographic area, target beneficiaries (M/F), budget, current status; (ii) a map showing main CPP funded activity locations; (iii) note on any joint church activities being planned or ongoing; (iv) list of any independent evaluations carried out / status; and (v) a CPP budget vs actual expenditure summary (with reasons for variation) that also clearly shows how much is being allocated by outcome area.
- The current annual report pro-formas should be reviewed, with a view to improving layout and clarity of presentation.

- The utility of the proposed MIS should be very carefully reviewed, and if appropriate, either significantly re-scoped or stopped.
- The use of maps and other visual aids should be promoted to help profile key CPP summary information in both formal reports and other communication materials.

**Recommendation 3**: The CLC and PPC members should give increased focus, both during their meetings and in-between meetings, to developing and advancing strategies to more effectively progress work under Outcome Area 1, namely 'Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance'.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- Conduct an assessment of what actually happened (or not) with respect to monies already allocated through DNPM under the State / Church Partnership Policy Framework, including who got what, when and for what. This would help understand how the Policy Framework might be resurrected.
- Identify opportunities to enhance the understanding of key Church officials and ley workers about how GoPNG planning, budgeting and decision making systems are structured and how they work, as well as how this knowledge can then be used to forge closer GoPNG / church partnerships at both national and sub-national levels.
- Engage with AusAID and their health and education sector program managers, specifically to see how synergies of effort can be best enhanced with respect to supporting improvements in the way that the CEC and CMC operate.

**Recommendation 4**: Opportunities to establish greater linkages / synergies with other AusAID governance and sectoral programs should be identified and more vigorously pursued.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- AusAID promote and facilitate such work more proactively, for example through identifying key entry points, facilitating joint planning and review meetings, etc. One key opportunity to better align all such programs would be to synchronise the design processes and timelines for subsequent program phases. Should a further phase of CPP be anticipated past 2016, design of any such next phase should therefore be more integrally linked to/take account of other key AusAID Governance initiatives, including in particular SPSN and PLGP.
- Particular focus be given to developing greater linkages / synergies with SPSN, the PLGP and with AusAID's health **a**nd education sector programs.
- The PPC include this on their agenda of strategic issues to pursue, and task the Management Committee and PCO to pursue this issue as appropriate. Such efforts should be carefully focused, with the aim of making small incremental gains.

**Recommendation 5**: Continue to strengthen the focus on gender and women's empowerment within CPP funded church work programs.

- The CLC and PPC make renewed efforts to develop a 'more deliberate gender strategy' for the CPP (as noted in the CPP 2 design). More specific recommendations for the focus of this work are provided in the Gender Strengths Based Review report of April 2012.
- The Gender Reference Group continue to be supported and its work program further clarified / detailed. The organization and delivery of basic gender awareness training for all CLC and PCC members (who have not yet received such training) could be on the list of priority actions.
- Gender disaggregated data be more systematically collected and reported by all church partners as a basic reporting requirement. Good progress is noted, but more can be done.
- Periodic review, case-study and/or evaluation activities be planned and implemented by each church partner, or jointly, to look at women's <u>empowerment</u> issues in more detail. This will help analyse the gender disaggregated data that is being collected, and support institutional learning about what is and is not working to genuinely empower women.
- Focus continue to be given to supporting some activities that specifically address the need to support <u>men</u> deal with issues of domestic violence, anger management, alcohol, HIV/AIDs, leadership roles, etc.

**Recommendation 6:** CPP partner contract / financing agreements should be reviewed, and as appropriate amended, to ensure that these are not unnecessarily complex or restrictive with respect to making timely required amendments and ensuring funds are released in a timely manner.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- AusAID and partner ANGOs trial the (already discussed) new schedule for partner annual activity plan preparation, to see if this effectively addresses the late release of funds at the beginning of each new financial year.
- Partner ANGOs jointly agree on, and table to AusAID, any concerns they have with contractual restrictions placed on the reallocation of budgeted funds, or with the contract renewal/amendment process in general, so that any such concerns can be addressed in the interests of supporting efficient and effective program implementation.

**Recommendation 7:** AusAID should review its own resource allocation and management practices with respect to how effectively it supports its DG program managers to carry out the work expected of them.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- A time and effort study be conducted to determine more precisely how AusAID program managers in Port Moresby (including DG unit staff) currently allocate their time between key functions, particularly contract management / administrative duties versus engagement with key partners/stakeholders on strategic management issues and tasks.
- An internal AusAID management guideline / operational procedure be developed to help program managers understand how to better balance expenditure imperatives with actual program implementation needs / status.
- The need for AusAID DG program managers to regularly travel out of Port Moresby on learning and monitoring visits is appropriately supported through allocation of adequate time and travel funds.

• The strategy of placing co-located AusAID officers (Provincial Representatives) within Provinces be continued and expanded, as an important element of support to all AusAID's sub-national programs. Having more AusAID (supported) staff out in the Provinces, is an excellent way of better understanding, and responding to the reality of, the political economy of PNG.

**Recommendation 8:** Key GoPNG strategic partners in the CPP, namely the DNPM and the DfCD, make additional efforts to participate more regularly and actively in the PCC, as well as to strategically support achievement of CPP outcomes more generally.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- Information be provided by DNPM to the PCC on funding previously allocated through the State / Church Partnership Policy Framework, so as to help clarify exactly what monies were (or were not) allocated, for what and to whom.
- DNPM and DfCD prepare a joint paper, for presentation at a forthcoming PCC / Forum meeting, on how they think the Partnership Policy Framework might be best reviewed and, as appropriate, re-invigorated.
- DNPM and DfCD make greater efforts to send appropriately experienced and senior officials, on a regular basis, to attend six-monthly PCC meetings.

# 6.3 DG strategy

**Recommendation 1**: The current AusAID Governance review process should also assess whether or not a separate DG strategy is actually required.

In doing so, the following should be taken into account:

- Consider whether or not to continue having a separate DG strategy, or alternatively combine in into AusAID's broader governance support strategy for PNG
- Consider whether it might in fact be clearer / more practical to talk about a civil society engagement strategy, which incorporates the current key principles of partnership and working at a local level as possible.
- Take into account what key GoPNG agencies and PNG Civil Society partners think would be most helpful.

**Recommendation 2**: Future sub-national support programs (new phases or new programs) should ideally be designed at the same time, including with common implementation periods, areas of geographic focus and specific mechanisms to promote their integration / synergies.

In doing so, it is recommended that careful consideration be given to:

- Identifying / selecting a 'lead' program, such as the PLGP, around which other programs can undertake complementary work.
- Establishing a clearer longer-term (and phased) strategy to guide AusAID's sub-national support activities, including greater clarity over the issue of areas of common geographic focus.
- Re-visiting the core issue of poverty reduction, and thus whether or not PNG's poorest districts and communities should be specifically targeted as part of a deliberate strategy of geographic focus.

• Explicitly addressing the linkages between core governance and service delivery programs.

**Recommendation 3**: AusAID's expectations for core governance / DG programs to demonstrate service delivery outcomes should be clarified.

In doing so, the following should be considered:

- The SPSN program take a lead in helping to conduct analysis on this issue (as already agreed through conduct of research by SPSN on this issue).
- The views of GoPNG and civil society partners be actively sought and taken into account.
- AusAID prepare and distribute a position / guidance paper on the issue at the earliest opportunity.

# Annexes

# Annex 1 – Review team terms of reference

### **Independent Progress Review of Two Democratic Governance Programs**

### 1. PURPOSE

The purpose of the review is to:

- a) Assess the implementation and achievements of two major Democratic Governance programs currently implemented under the Australian aid program in Papua New Guinea: Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN) and the Church Partnership Program Phase 2 (CPP);
- b) Recommend improvements to strengthen current implementation of both programs and identify lessons to inform the design of future democratic governance programs in PNG; and
- c) Assess the relevance of the existing Democratic Governance Strategy and whether AusAID has effectively implemented the strategy through its programs.

As these two initiatives (SPSN and CPP) have adopted different modalities and are operating in quite different circumstances, it is hoped that this review will present opportunities for cross-learning.

#### 2. BACKGROUND

#### **Partnership for Development**

The 2010 Review of the PNG-Australia Development Cooperation Treaty (the DCT Review) recommended that the Australian aid program in PNG narrow its focus and target resources towards priority sectors. At the 2011 Australia-PNG Ministerial Forum, ministers agreed to four schedules to the PNG-Australia Partnership for Development (the Partnership) to reflect the priority sectors of: education; health and HIV/AIDS; transport infrastructure; and law and justice; with governance programs supporting the enabling environment for service delivery. The choice of sectors is based on an analysis of where Australian aid can make the biggest difference and achieve the greatest gains in reducing poverty and improving development outcomes. The Schedules include performance indicators and funding commitments.

### Australian Support for Improving Governance

The Australian aid program has a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening governance in Papua New Guinea. Significant among these are the Economic and Public Sector Program assisting the effectiveness of national government departments and agencies, the Provincial and Local Government Support Program focusing on provincial and local level governments, and the Democratic Governance program which aims to support greater engagement of civil society and the private sector in public sector governance and service delivery. AusAID is presently developing an overarching strategy to strengthen governance for improved development outcomes in its four priority sectors.

### AusAID support to Democratic Governance

The term democratic governance embodies the notion of shared governance, in which civil society, democratically elected local government and the private sector, together with the national government (the state) participate in public matters including policy making and implementation, resolution of public problems and the allocation of public resources. It involves working directly with communities as

citizens, engaging with the ways in which they can both influence development and call for accountability.

AusAID's assistance in support of democratic governance has been guided by the Democratic Governance Strategy in Papua New Guinea since 2009. The Democratic Governance Strategy goal is: "Men and women, civil society, and the state working together on issues of public interest, shaping policy, allocating resources, and enabling the exercise of rights". By strengthening the institutions of civil society and the state to work in partnership, the strategy aims to contribute to social and political stability, and to efficient resource allocation by working at as local level as possible. These are essential conditions for the effective delivery of services and sustainable economic development.

AusAID support to Democratic Governance in PNG is through the following initiatives: Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN) (Empower People, Strengthen the Nation), the Church Partnership Program (CPP), CARE International Integrated Community Development Program (ICDP), and the Electoral Support Program (ESP). AusAID has recently reviewed the CARE ICDP program and completed a review of the Media for Development Initiative (MDI). A rapid review of Australian electoral support was recently completed and a more comprehensive review of 12 years of Australian electoral support will be conducted in October 2012.

## SPSN and CPP

This review considers two different programs engaging civil society in support of democratic governance, service delivery and poverty reduction:

Strongim Pipol, Strongim Nesen			
http://www.ausa	http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/democratic-governance-init1.aspx		
http://www.spsn	ipng.com/		
Timeframe:	1 July 2010-30 June 2014		
	Note: SPSN was designed as a five year program but was contracted for four years due to AusAID's financial management and procurement arrangements. It is expected that a one year extension will be granted to the current contract.		
Funding:	\$100,000,000		
Objectives:	To enable civil society, together with the state and others, to better meet the needs and priorities of men, women and children in communities across PNG.		
	SPSN works through five components:		
	<i>Component 1 – Strengthened Key Partners.</i> Supports the strengthened practice and promotion of democratic governance by Key Partners.		
	<ul> <li>Key partnerships exist or are being negotiated with Transparency International- PNG, the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council, the Department for Community Development, the National Broadcasting Corporation, Buk Bilong Pikinini, Callan Services, Eastern Highlands Family Voice and Port Moresby City Mission.</li> <li>Component 2 – Communities Working to Meet Identified Needs. Includes the allocation of small, medium and large grant funds as follows:</li> </ul>		
	<ul> <li>of small, medium and large grant funds as follows:</li> <li>Small Grants: for the support of village level projects of 1-12 month's duration. Approximately 1,000 grants of K5,000 – K80,000 per grant.</li> <li>Medium Grants: support longer duration projects (1-2 years) involving either single communities or networks of communities. Approximately 30 grants of</li> </ul>		

	K81,000 – K160,000 per grant.		
	<ul> <li>Large Grants: support larger scale projects of 1-2 years' duration.</li> <li>Approximately 30 grants of K161,000 – K500,000 (AU\$70,000 - 225,000) per grant.</li> </ul>		
	<i>Component 3 – Improved Local Governance.</i> Supports community, government, development partners and the private sector to work together to identify and model how particular development needs (service delivery) can be addressed through improving local governance.		
	<i>Component 4 – Strengthened Collaboration</i> . Builds or strengthens SPSN's national collaboration between stakeholders (governments, the private sector, and civil society) for the promotion of democratic governance for development and service delivery.		
	<i>Component 5 – Strengthened Human Capital</i> . Develops the capacity of men and women for democratic governance. A capacity development framework guides the allocation of resources under the component, linked to human capital needs identified through the implementation of other components.		
Outcomes:	(a) Strengthened capacity		
	(b) Democratic governance		
	(c) Access to services		
Geographic focus:	All provinces in Papua New Guinea as well as the National Capital District and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. SPSN has field offices in Port Moresby, Lae, Mt Hagen, Kokopo and a sub-office in Buka.		
Management arrangement:	A Managing Contractor (MC), URS, manages services for implementation. The managing contractor operates mostly as a facilitator and enabler of other parties for the delivery and implementation of the program rather than being the main direct implementer of outputs and activities.		
	A Joint Governing Council (JGC) is responsible for the policy and strategic direction of SPSN, as well as overseeing its implementation. The JGC will also participate in (and be the forum for) broader policy discussion between AusAID, GoPNG, civil society and the private sector. A National Grant Committee (NGC) is also operational and is responsible for the review and approval of large and medium grants. Provincial Grants Committees (PGCs) to assess and approve small grants have started to be put into operation in each of the 22 provinces of PNG.		

Church Partnership Program Phase 2				
http://www.ausa	http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/initiative-church-partnership.aspx			
http://www.pngo	http://www.pngcpp.org.au/			
Timeframe:	1 July 2010 to 30 June 2016			
Funding:	\$50,000,000			
Objectives:	To enhance the capacity of PNG Churches to contribute to PNG development and social stability.			
To help PNG Churches promote good governance, through strengthening their role in policy dialogue, service delivery, and peace and reconciliation activities.				

Intended Outcomes:	1. Improved services delivered by PNG Churches to local communities - improving the scope and quality of services in health, education, HIV/AIDS response, water and sanitation, microfinance, adult literacy, and peace building.
	2. Strengthened PNG Churches institutional capacity for development - building the administrative, management, planning and financial capacity of Churches.
	3. Enhanced PNG Church involvement in improving public sector governance - developing the Churches' governance structures, quality of Church leadership, and ethical management. Enabling the Churches to engage with government on issues of public policy and practice.
Geographic focus:	Nationwide Churches have presence in all 22 provinces, 89 districts. Most church run school and health facilities are in the rural parts of PNG.
Management arrangement:	AusAID engages seven mainline churches in PNG by supporting partnerships between them and their Australian church NGO counterparts. The PNG churches include: the Anglican, Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, Salvation Army, Baptist, Evangelical Lutheran and United Churches. These groups cover 73% of the 96% who identify as Christian.

### 3. KEY ISSUES

**Focus on Partnership for Development Priority Outcomes**: The shift in AusAID program focus in 2010 following the DCT Review and the subsequent focus on four priority development outcomes led to a sharpening of focus for SPSN and CPP. In line with direction from AusAID and GoPNG, SPSN has a service delivery focus on health (including HIV and AIDS); education; gender; and disability. CPP has a service delivery focus on education, health and HIV/AIDS and community development. AusAID is interested to know how effectively the programs have contributed to Partnership outcomes.

**Review of Governance Programs:** In 2012, AusAID commissioned a review of its governance programs with a focus on why public sector governance in PNG has continued to underperform and why the effectiveness of international assistance has been limited. A draft report from this analysis is being developed which will underpin the development of new governance initiatives during 2013. The development of new initiatives will also be informed by this review of two democratic governance programs, the review of Australian support to elections in PNG as well as a review of the Economic and Public Sector Program currently under way.

## 4. SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

Purpose:

- a) Assess the implementation and achievements of two major Democratic Governance programs currently implemented under the Australian aid program in Papua New Guinea: SPSN and CPP;
- b) Recommend improvements to strengthen current implementation of both programs and identify lessons to inform the design of future democratic governance programs in PNG; and
- c) Assess the relevance of the existing Democratic Governance Strategy and whether AusAID has effectively implemented the strategy through its programs.

The review will be guided by the OECD DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability and AusAID's additional criteria of gender equality, monitoring and evaluation and analysis

and learning. The review will focus primarily on relevance, effectiveness and sustainability. The main questions for the review under each of these headings are outlined below.

Unless otherwise specified, the review should include separate responses to the DAC criteria and review questions for both SPSN and CPP. Where relevant, the review should reflect on the differences or similarities, strengths and weaknesses of the two programs. If during the course of the review, the review team identifies any unintended consequences of CPP or SPSN (positive or negative) these issues should also be documented and assessed.

In addition to the separate reviews of CPP and SPSN, the review team should also assess the ongoing relevance of the strategic focus of the democratic governance program.

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Relevance	<ol> <li>Does the 2009 AusAID Democratic Governance Strategy remain relevant and important to achieving both governments' development goals in Papua New Guinea?         <ul> <li>If so, how can AusAID work to ensure the objectives of the strategy are met through the PNG program?</li> <li>Are there any critical gaps in current AusAID support for democratic governance in PNG?</li> </ul> </li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Are the SPSN and CPP programs relevant to the promotion of democratic governance, improved service delivery outcomes and strengthened institutional capacity of civil society, government and the private sector?</li> </ol>
	a. If not, what changes need to be made to the programs to ensure continued relevance and progress towards Democratic Governance objectives?
	3. Have SPSN and CPP complemented and supported the objectives and outcomes of other AusAID sectoral and governance programs? If so, provide brief examples.
	4. Has the program been able to adapt to a shifting political economy in PNG in order to provide targeted support to key institutions and actors to generate reform and collective action? If so, how has this been done?
Effectiveness	<ol> <li>Are the objectives of both programs clear, realistic and appropriate given the social, economic and geographic context in PNG?</li> </ol>
	2. To what extent have the programs contributed to the achievement of objectives expected at this stage of program implementation?
	<ul> <li>a. Identify success stories and key milestones, and also identify which activities are having less success.</li> <li>b. What are the risks to achieving the end of program outcomes?</li> <li>c. What changes could be made to improve progress towards end of program outcomes? What lessons can be drawn more broadly for AusAID's approach to promoting improved governance in PNG?</li> <li>d. Is the initiative making appropriate use of Australia's and other partners' time and resources to achieve initiative objectives?</li> <li>e. Are the programs effective in improving service delivery in PNG's poorest districts and regions? If so, provide brief examples.</li> </ul>
	3. Are the program approaches to monitoring and evaluation effective in capturing and reporting on activity and program level results?
	a. How can M&E approaches be improved to better capture such results in line

with GoPNG and AusAID performance frameworks?			
4. Are the programs effectively promoting gender equality, disability-inclusive development and other cross-cutting issues, and have they increased the participation of women, people with disability and people living with HIV/AIDs in democratic governance processes?			
5. Assess the effectiveness of contracting / management models, resourcing and staffing requirements and governance arrangements for SPSN and CPP? Provide recommendations for existing and future democratic governance programs.			
<ol> <li>Are the achievements from these programs likely to be sustainable and enduring?         <ol> <li>Provide up to four short case studies of outcomes and approaches from CPP Phase 1 and previous democratic governance initiatives (e.g. CDS and DGTP) that are still being sustained through CPP and SPSN. What is the likelihood these will be sustained without continuing international assistance at the end of the current phases?</li> <li>Are there components or activities that are clearly not sustainable? What</li> </ol> </li> </ol>			

### 5. REVIEW METHOD

The findings will provide learning and analysis for AusAID, GoPNG and other national and international development partners. They will be used to inform the development of new program approaches to partnering with and strengthening civil society and democratic governance in Papua New Guinea.

The review mission will include time in Port Moresby, Madang, Lae and Mount Hagen where the PNG churches are headquartered and there are SPSN regional offices. Field work will include visits to SPSN and CPP activities in urban and remote area locations as appropriate.

The team leader will draft a Review Plan by 15 October 2012. The Plan will expand on the review questions, describe the methodologies to be used and provide an indicative report structure. The review will be undertaken according to the approved Plan.

Element	Purpose	Responsibility
Concept Paper	Details of each program, achievements and	SPSN and CPP
	challenges (SPSN and CPP)	
Issues Paper	Provide the review team with an understanding of	AusAID post and key stakeholders
	the nature and cost of support provided and the	to compile
	democratic governance context.	
Document	Reading key documents – a non-exhaustive list is	Review team leader
Review	included at Annex A	
Review design	Clarify theory of change to be evaluated;	Review team leader, consulting
	determine assessment criteria, select field visit	with team members, AusAID post
	sites and data collection methods	and other stakeholders as necessary
Fieldwork in	Data collection, Interviews with stakeholders,	Review team with assistance from
PNG	Stakeholder focus group discussions	AusAID post
Reporting	Analysis and feedback	Review team leader supported by
	Report drafting and finalisation	review team

While the final methodology will be agreed through the Review Plan, indicative elements of the review are as follows:

## 6. COMPOSITION OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM

The review team will consist of:

- a. Team Leader (responsible for finalising the written report) with strong expertise in monitoring and evaluation and good understanding of the Australian aid program;
- b. An international democratic governance expert with PNG experience;
- c. An expert with experience working with PNG churches; and
- d. A Papua New Guinean national with democratic governance, churches and/or senior public sector experience.

Officials from the PNG Government and AusAID will accompany the review team and provide ongoing guidance and clarification to the team.

In addition to the technical skill implied by each role, team members should collectively have:

- a. knowledge of development in PNG;
- b. experience in aid program development, planning, monitoring and evaluation;
- c. knowledge and experience in gender equality and disability inclusive development programming;
- d. excellent interpersonal and communication skills, including a proven ability to liaise and communicate effectively with Pacific Islanders; and
- e. ability to provide timely delivery of high-quality written reports.

## 7. REPORTING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TEAM

The team leader will:

- a. plan, guide and develop the overall approach and methodology for the review in consultation with other team members;
- b. be responsible for managing and directing the review's activities, representing the review team and leading consultations with key informants, including government officials and other donor agencies;
- c. be responsible for managing, compiling and editing inputs from other team members to ensure the quality of reporting outputs;
- d. be responsible for producing an aide memoire, synthesising review material into a clear draft review report and a final review report;
- e. represent the team in peer reviews, if required; and
- f. determine when it is not appropriate for the team member from AusAID to participate in particular discussions.

Other team members will:

- a. work under the overall direction of the Team Leader;
- b. provide advice, relevant documentation from the GoPNG and AusAID, and an understanding of GoPNG and AusAID processes; and
- c. contribute to the required dialogue, analysis and writing of the report, as directed by the team leader.

AusAID post will also identify a review manager who will be the primary point of contact between the review team leader and AusAID post. AusAID post will provide administrative and logistical support.

### 8. TIMING AND DURATION

The independent review will commence on 15 October 2012 and be completed by 15 February 2013. The timing and duration for the scope of services is up to 60 days for the team leader and up to 30 days for the other consultants as per the table below. Final dates will be negotiated and stated in contracts.

Task/Output	Indicative	Max Inputs Days			
	Timing	Team Leader	Int DG Spec	Church Spec	PNG DG Spec
Draft concept papers due	12 October	0	0	0	0
Document review and draft review plan	19 October	7	5	5	5
Review mission	15 October -10 November	25	21	17	17
Post-mission briefing in Canberra and Sydney	11 - 14 November	4	0	0	0
Draft Report	7 December	14	6	3	3
Appraisal/Peer review processes in Port Moresby and Canberra	14 January -06 February 2013	7	1	1	1
Final review report	15 February 2013	3	1	1	1
TOTAL		60	34	27	27

A peer review examines and contests the findings of the draft review reports to ensure the results are relevant and applicable to AusAID's operating environment. The peer review also considers a draft Learning and Dissemination Plan (prepared by AusAID) to ensure the best value is obtained from the review. The peer review will be organised by the AusAID Post program manager and may be conducted by email or through a review meeting.

# 9. OUTPUTS

The Team Leader shall provide the following reports:

- a) Review Plan/Draft Methodology for agreement with AusAID, submitted by 19 October. This plan will outline the scope and methodology of the review, and preliminary findings of the document review.
- b) Review Mission Aide Memoire to be presented to AusAID Post, GoPNG and other stakeholders at the completion of the in-country mission on 6 November. The format for the aide memoire will follow AusAID's template (to be provided) and will be no more than five pages. Feedback on the aide memoire will inform the draft report.
- c) Draft Report to be provided to the activity manager, AusAID Port Moresby, by 7 December. Feedback from AusAID and other stakeholders will be provided within two weeks of receiving the draft report.
- d) Final Report final documents within 10 working days of receiving comments on the draft report. The report will be no more than 40 pages (plus annexes, case studies and a stand-alone executive summary). A clear analysis of the initiative's progress, key lessons and recommendations should be clearly documented in the report.

All reports should present findings on CPP and SPSN in two separate parts.

# **10. KEY DOCUMENTS**

The list of documents to be reviewed includes (but is not confined to):

- 1. Democratic Governance Strategy
- 2. PNG Australia Partnership for Development including Schedules
- 3. PNG Vision 2050
- 4. PNG Development Strategic Plan 2010-2030
- 5. PNG Medium Term Development Plan 2011-2015
- 6. SPSN Program Design
- 7. SPSN Annual Plan
- 8. PNG Church Partnership Program design Phase 1
- 9. PNG Church Partnership Program design Phase 2
- 10. ICDP Independent review
- 11. Media for Development Phase 2 Independent evaluation

## Annex A

AusAID guidance on Evaluation reports/DAC criteria etc.

### Annex B

*List of relevant reports etc. from AusAID post* Table of recommendations and respons

# Annex 2 – Review schedule and list of agencies and people consulted

Date	Location	Activity	
Mon 15 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Syd/PNG	Travel and arrival of reiew Team Leader in Madang	
Tue 16 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Madang	Attendance at CPP Forum – meetings / discussions with participants	
Wed 17 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Madang	Attendance at CPP Forum – meetings / discussions with participants	
Thu 18 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Madang	Attendance at CPP Forum meetings / discussions with participants	
Fri 19 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Madang	Meeting with Provincial / Ward Planning team, visit to Rivo village and meeting with Lutheran VBA training team	
Sat 20 <sup>th</sup> Oct	РОМ	Travel to POM –review of field notes and documents	
Sun 21 <sup>st</sup> Oct	РОМ	Reading. Arrival in POM of Julie Klugman. Meeting with Julie Klugman and Jennifer Clancy to discuss work plan and method	
Mon 22 <sup>nd</sup> Oct	РОМ	Meetings with Democratic Governance Unit, SPSN team, DNPM	
Tue 23 <sup>rd</sup> Oct	РОМ	Meetings and visits to partners	
		Anglicare literacy, DPALLG, SPSN, CPP Coordination Office, teleconference with Steve Hogg et al	
Wed 24 <sup>th</sup> Oct	РОМ	Meetings and visits to partners	
		Buk Bilong Pikinini, Transparency International, Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council, Institute of National Affairs, Catholic Church Education Office, SPSN office	
Thu 25 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Lae	Meetings and visits to partners	
		SDA Church, ADRA, Evangelical Lutheran Church, visit to Gabensis Primary School VIP Toilet project	
Fri 26 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Lae	Meetings and visits to partners	
		SPSN team, SPSN Provincial Grants Committee, visit to two SPSN small grant applicant communities	
Sat 27 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Lae /	Meeting with Anglican church	
	Goroka	Travel to Goroka. Visit to Barola clinic – Village Birth Attendant training (SPSN small grant recipient0	
Sun 28 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Goroka	Meetings and visits to partners	
		Visit to Asaro Elementary School (SPSN small grant applicant)	
		Meeting with Jen Clancy and Provincial Community Development Adviser	
Mon 29 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Goroka	Meetings and visits to partners	
		CARE International, AusAID Representative in Eastern Highlands, Partner Forum, Eastern Highland Dep. Administrator, Eastern Highlands Family Voice, NBC	
Tue 30 <sup>th</sup> Oct	Kundiawa	Travel and visit to Dumundiri community, East Elimbari (CPP / United Church health and literacy support)	
Wed 31 <sup>st</sup> Oct	Kund / Hagen	Meeting with Simbu Dep Provincial Administrator and Community Development Adviser	
		Travel to Hagen. Team meeting to review issues arising to date and forward plans.	

# Review schedule / activities (field work)

Date	Location	Activity	
Thu 1 <sup>st</sup> Nov	Hagen	Meetings and visits to partners	
		Deputy Provincial Administrator and Community Development Adviser, Kamoko 1 field visit (SPSN grant recipient), Mount Hagen Handicraft Group (CPP supported)	
Fri 2 <sup>nd</sup> Nov	Hagen	Meetings and visits to partners	
		Baptist Union office, Visit to Baiyer river primary school and health facilities (CPP supported_, Partner Forum	
Sat 3 <sup>rd</sup> Nov	Hagen	Meeting with full SPSN highlands regional team. Team meeting to review key issues arising from field work.	
Sun 4 <sup>th</sup> Nov	Hagen/ POM	Travel. Review and transcribing of field notes. Preparation of Aide Memoire template.	
Mon 5 <sup>th</sup> Nov	POM	Meetings with partners	
		Anglican church leaders, Rob Brink and DGU team members, SPSN, CPP Coordination Office	
Tue 6 <sup>th</sup> Nov	РОМ	Meetings with partners	
		AusAID Health Sector Team, AusAID Education Sector Team, Gender Stakeholders meeting, Uniting Church Development Unit, Mother and Child Support Group (CPP), Salvation Army, SNS Independent Completion Report team, SPSN Offices	
Wed 7 <sup>th</sup> Nov	РОМ	Meetings with Economic and Public Sector Program, SPSN, and DGU	
Thu 8 <sup>th</sup> Nov	РОМ	Drafting Aide Memoire	
Fri 9 <sup>th</sup> Nov	POM	Aide memoire delivery	
		Meetings / consultation with Peter Aitsi, Stewart Scheiffer, and AusAID PLGP team members.	
		Debrief with DGU team members (feedback on draft Aide Memoire)	
Sat 10 <sup>th</sup> Nov	POM/Syd	Travel. Review and update of visit schedule and list of persons met during PNG work.	
Sun 11 <sup>th</sup> Nov	Sydney	Reading and review of field notes. Sorting documents. Preparation for ANGO meeting.	
Mon 12 <sup>th</sup>	Sydney	Meeting with ANGOs at Caritas office. Travel to Canberra	
Tue 13 <sup>th</sup>	Canberra	Meetings with AusAID Canberra	
Wed 14 <sup>th</sup>	Canberra	Meeting with Steve Hogg	
	Junconiu		

# List of people and agencies consulted

# **Madang Province**

All members of the CPP Program Partnership Council (PPC), and in particular:

Name	Organisation	Position
Patrick Gaia	Baptist Union of PNG	Chair of Church Leaders Council
Ambassador Lucy Bogari	Dept of Foreign Affairs	Independent Chair of PPC
Chris Jensen	ADRA PNG	Joint Dep. Chair of PPC

Win Ali	Salvation Army PNG	Joint Dep. Chair of PPC
Dawn Beeson	Salvation Army PNG	Projects Coordinator
Colonel Neil	Salvation Army PNG	Regional Commander (to be)
Bena Seta	United Church PNG	CPP Program Coordinator
Steven Tasker	Baptist World Aid Australia	Management Committee Member
Isabel Robinson	Anglican Board of Mission	PNG Program Coordinator
Lauren Kathager	Australian Lutheran World Service	Program Officer – PNG and INdon
Michael Constable	Uniting World	Host agency rep
Margaret Sete	Program Coordination Office	Manager

Madang Provincial Administration (support for Ward Planning by SPSN)

Name	Organisation	Position
Simon Simoi	Provincial Administration	Director of Policy, Coordination and Implementation
Nicholas	Provincial Administration	Provincial Planner
John	Provincial Administration	Master Trainer – Ward Planning

Community members from Ward 6 of Ambenob Local Level Government, including Simon Sil the Ward council member of the LLG (support for ward plan by SPSN)

Lutheran Health Services - Village Birth Attendant training team (supported by CPP)

#### **Port Moresby**

Name	Organisation	Position
Sophia Close	AusAID	First Sec, DGU
Jennifer Clancy	AusAID	Second Sec, DGU
Junita Goma	AusAID	Program Manager, DGU
Jane Nohou Ilam	AusAID	Program Officer, DGU
Belinda Bayak Bush	AusAID	DGU Team
Robert Brink	AusAID	Director, DGU
Cathy Amos	AusAID	SNS Senior Sub-Program Manager
Andrew Elborne	AusAID	First Sec EPSG Unit
Judith Ugava	AusAID	SNS Program Director
Josephine Baig	AusAID	SNS Program Manager
Steve Hogg	AusAID	Principle Director Operations, Pacific and PNG
Jo Ronalds	AusAID	Pre-posting to POM, SPSN

Name	Organisation	Position
Katherine Yuawe	AusAID	Assistant Program Manager, Gender
Jason Kalimba	AusAID	Program Officer, Gender
Dr. Geoff Clarke	AusAID	Program Director, Health & HIV
Kai Talyor	AusAID	Second Sec, Health and HIV
Aiden ?	AusAID	First Sec, Health & HIV
Keith Joyce	AusAID	First Sec, Education
Reiko Take	AusAID	Second Sec, Education
Jane Christie	AusAID	Program Director, Education
Tamara Green	AusAID	Second Sec, Education
Dr. Geoff Elvy	Coffey International Development	EPSP Program Director
Peter Aitsi	Newcrest Mining	Country Representative
Jeremy Syme	SPSN / URS	Program Director
Trevor Ole	SPSN / URS	DPD Support Services
Martin Syder	SPSN / URS	DPD Implementation
Martin Brash	SPSN / URS	Capacity Building and Intuitional Strengthening Adviser
Naihuwo Ahai	SPSN / URS	DPD Strategy and Communication
Erica Ogoba-Kukari	SPSN / URS	Gender and Social Inclusion Coordinator
Jessica Kenway	SPSN / URS	STA Monitoring and Evaluation
Casper Kokun	SPSN/URS	Database Officer
Sabi Pati	SPSN/URS	Field program Coordinator, Port Moresby Filed Office
Simon Henderson	Electoral Support Review Team	Team Leader
Dickson Guina	Department of Provincial and Local Level Government	Deputy Secretary
Joe Warus	Department of Provincial and Local Level Government	Director, Governance and Institution Development Division
Reichart Tanda	Department of National Planning and Monitoring (DNPM)	Act First Assist. Secretary, Foreign Aid Division
Jessica Keina	DNPM	Act. Senior Aid Coordinator
Loia Vaira	DNPM	Assist. Director, AusAID Branch
Petnika Mambu	DNPM	Program Officer – Comm Devt.
Gertrude Kilepak	DNPM	Policy Officer - Sectoral Policy, Budgets & Statistics Division

Name	Organisation	Position
Peta Mills	AusAID / DNPM	AusAID Co-located Officer
Lydia Imara	DfCD – Office for the Development of Women	Program Officer
Jennifer Jack	DfCD – Office for the Development of Women	Policy Officer
Grace Nari	National Council Of Women	Program Officer
Emily Taule	Transparency International PNG	Executive Director
Jerry Bagita	Transparency International PNG	Operations Manager
Paul Barker	Institute of National Affairs	Executive Director
Wallis Yakam	Consultative Implementation & Monitoring Council	Executive Officer
?	Media for Development / NBC	
Joanne Grenenge	Buk Bilong Pikinini (SPSN Grant recipient)	Executive Officer
Luke Ebbs	Buk Bilong Pikinini	Deputy Officer
Margaret Sete	CPP Coordination Office	Manager
Zita	CPP Coordination Office	M&E Officer
Leroy	CPP Coordination Office	Communications Officer
Bernard Paru	Anglicare PNG	Literacy Manager
Shirley Tapi	Anglicare PNG	Literacy Trainer / Teacher
Doris James	Anglicare PNG	Literacy Teacher
Roselyn James	Anglicare PNG	Literacy Coordinator / Teacher
Iru Joel	Anglicare PNG	Literacy Teacher
Linas Lala	Anglicare PNG	Literacy Teacher
Bishop Peter Ramsden	Anglican Church	Bishop of Moresby
Joseph Kepapa	Anglican Church	Primate / Archbishop
Bena Seta	United Church PNG	CPP Coordinator
Kerren Vali	United Church PNG	CPP Senior Program Officer
Mary Anne Kehalie	Caritas PNG	CPP Program Coordinator
Sister Mary McCarthy	National Catholic Education Commission	National Education Coordinator
Dorothy Kasawen	National Catholic Education Commission	Finance / Admin Officer
Paula Goinde	National Catholic Education	Assistant NCE Secretary

Name	Organisation	Position
	Commission	
Sylvester Ganisi	National Catholic Education Commission	National Education Secretary
Hapea Tore Auma	Mother and Child Support Group, Korobosea (CPP supported)	Program Coordinator / Trainer
Valesi Ausosa	Mother and Child Support Group	Director
Jennell Poigeno	Mother and Child Support Group	Admin Secretary
Felicia Dobunaba	Consultant	SNS Independent Completion report team

## **Morobe Province**

Name	Organisation	Position
Bernard Pillon	SPSN program / URS	Momase Regional Field Program Coordinator
Jeffery Kaka	SPSN program / URS	Development Coordinator
Klun Kimbing	SPSN program / URS	Development Coordinator
Shirley Lung	SPSN program / URS	Office Administrator
Jebson Kare	SPSN program / URS	Finance Officer
Jacqueline Dou	SPSN program / URS	Procurement Officer
Arenao Sesignol	Provincial Administration/PGC member	Provincial Planner
Micah Yawing	Provincial Administration/PGC member	Provincial Health Adviser
Geoving Bilong	Provincial Administration/PGC member	Deputy Provincial Administrator
Berei Kalo	Provincial Administration/PGC member	SPA – Education Services
Darren Yorio	ADRA PNG	CPP Program Coordinator
Jimmy Jacob	ADRA PNG	CPP M&E Officer
Gad Koito	SDA Church	Health Director
Judith Nagamisovo	SDA Church	Child Ministries Director
Jim Wayane	SDA Church	Asst. Education Director
Yoba Dame	SDA Church	Associate Director, Education
Rt Rev Giegere Wenge	Evangelical Lutheran Church	Head Bishop
Bindra Yunare	Evangelical Lutheran Church	Secretary, Evangelism Dept.

Name	Organisation	Position
John Larandiloloa	Evangelical Lutheran Church	Senior Prof. Assist, Education
Ambie Bulum	Evangelical Lutheran Church	Office of General Sec, Personal Assist
Paul Omot	Evangelical Lutheran Church	Secretary, Education Dept
Cathy Mui	Evangelical Lutheran Church	Act. Director, Women Division
Faen Mileng	Evangelical Lutheran Church	Youth Director
Mary Tankulu	Evangelical Lutheran Church	CPP Program Coordinator
Asenath Tubian	Evangelical Lutheran Church	CPP Program Officer
Dalina Bakine	Evangelical Lutheran Church	CPP Program Officer
Vinca Siuna	Evangelical Lutheran Church	CPP Office Manager
Betty Gali-Marlpo	Anglican Church	CPP Program Coordinator
Roselyn Killangis	Anglican Church	CPP Finance Director
Tony Luke	Anglican Church	CPP Finance Manager
Mr. Isaac Dow	Gabensis Village Primary School (supported by CPP)	Headmaster
Various	Mona Kunduk Nawa Association (SPSN small grant applicant)	Various
Various	Army Tattoo Social Youth Group (SPSN small grant applicant)	Various

# Eastern Highlands Province

Name	Organisation	Position
Solomon Tato	Provincial Administration	Deputy Provincial Administrator
Siviri Lalave	Provincial Administration	Community Devt. Adviser
Daniel	CARE PNG (supported by SPSN)	Country Director
Rebecca	CARE PNG	ICDP Manager
Margaret Selon	CARE PNG	Governance Coordinator
Jancy Tagep	CARE PNG	Governance Senior Field Officer
Freddy Hombuhanje	AusAID	E Highlands Representative
Agnes Inape	NBC (supported by SPSN)	E Highlands Station Manager
John Ericho	Eastern Highlands Family Voice (supported by SPSN)	Executive Director
Jean Jano	Eastern Highlands Family Voice	Program Manager
Toxin Apaya	Eastern Highlands Family Voice	Finance/Admin Manager
Peter Kaman	Evangelical Baptist Church	Community Services Coordinator
David Kima	Evangelical Alliance of PNG	General Secretary
Micheil Paton	Save the Children	Child Protection and Legal Adviser

Name	Organisation	Position
Jonathan Resis	Unggai Bena District Administration	District Community Devt Officer
Eriko Fufurefa	Kafe Women's Association	President
David Mehuwo	Asaro Elementary School (supported by CPP)	Chairman Board of Management
Mary Tom	Asaro Elementary School	Head Teacher
Awuyo Simbe	Asaro Elementary School	Board Member
Steven Mutozo	SPSN	Community Development Worker
James Piiso	Barola Haus Mama (supported by SPSN)	Ward Councillor
Tasman Tusero	Barola Haus Mama	Director
Amos Annabei	Barola Haus Mama	Trainer
Lynn Simbou	Kainantu District Administration	District Community Devt Officer

# Simbu Province

Name	Organisation	Position
?	Simbu Provincial Administration	Deputy Administrator, Corporate
Palma Golka	Simbu Provincial Administration	Community Development Adviser
Pastor Jackson	United Church, Dumundiri	Pastor
Various	Dumundiri community (supported by CPP)	Various, including Literacy School Teacher and Ward Councilor

# Western Highlands

Name	Organisation	Position
Pym Mamindi	Provincial Administration	Deputy Administrator
Dulcie Niba	Provincial Administration	Community Development Adviser
Cathy Rumins	SPSN Joint Governing Council	Member
Wak Panjiki	Komoka 1 (SPSN grant recipient)	Chairman
Gabriel Mapa	Komoka 1 (SPSN grant recipient)	Board Member
Councilor James	Komoka 1 (SPSN grant recipient)	Treasurer
Various	Komoka 1 community members	Various
Michael Pagasa	Baptist Union of PNG	HIV/AIDS Program Director
Barbara Pagasa	Mount Hagen Handicraft Group (supported by CPP)	Manager
John Kaewa	Baptist Union of PNG	General Director
Joseph Lakai	Baptist Union of PNG	Health Director
David Akis	Baptist Union of PNG	Education Director

Name	Organisation	Position
Esther Nokulu	Baptist Union of PNG	Community Devt Manager
Michael Elton	Baptist Union of PNG	Business Services Manager
Kevin Bong	Baptist Union of PNG	CPP Coordinator
Dengmai	Baptist Union of PNG	Water Technician
?	Tinsley District Hospital (supported by CPP)	Medical Officer in charge
John Low	Kwinkiya Elementary School (supported by CPP)	Headmaster
Regina Piam	SPSN / URS	Highlands Region Field Program Coordinator
Elizabeth Kelly	SPSN / URS	Development Coordinator
Harry Kubali	SPSN / URS	Development Coordinator
Sam Awaisa	SPSN / URS	Development Coordinator
Michelle Kopi	SPSN / URS	Development Coordinator
Ken Kerowa	SPSN / URS	WASH technician
Philip Kapal	SPSN / URS	Procurement Officer
Paul Sinan	SPSN / URS	Finance Officer
Roselyn Nii	SPSN / URS	Office Manager
Enos Putt	SPSN / URS	Driver / Admin assistant

# Sydney

Name	Organisation	Position
Jack de Groot	Caritas Australia	CEO
David Syme	CDS (previously ADRA)	Manager
Chris Jensen	ADRA Australia	Director, International Programs
Daniel Norris	Baptist World Aid	Program Manager, Asia
Alzina Zammit	Salvation Army International	Project Coordinator
Isabel Robinson	Anglican Board of Mission	Program Coordinator (PNG)
Britt Metzzer	Caritas Australia	Pacific Team
Wilman Tung	Caritas Australia	PNG Coordinator
Jo Ronalds	AusAID	PNG, Dem Governance Unit

# Canberra

Name	Organisation	Position
Stewart Scheiffer	AusAID	Head of Aid,PNG
Steve Hogg	AusAID	Director, PNG and Pacific Operations

Name	Organisation	Position
Ben Esguerra	AusAID	Program Officer, Quality and Effectiveness Branch
Penny Roberts	AusAID	PNG Governance Program
Sophie Tenby	AusAID	Governance Specialist, Policy Section
Marcus Khan	AusAID	?
Rob Tranter	AusAID	Director
Rachel Rawlings	AusAID	NGO Policy and Programs
Donna Kingelty	AusAID	NGO Policy and Programs
Katherine West	AusAID	NGO Policy and Programs
Jo Hatham	AusAID	NGO Policy and Programs
Tony Regan	ANU	State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
?	ANU	State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
?	ANU	State, Society and Governance in Melanesia

# Annex 3 – List of key documents reviewed

#### SPSN specific documents

A Coordinated Panguna Peace Building Strategy, Design Document, SPSN, September 2012 Advocacy and Democratic Governance in PNG, DGTP, URS, May 2006 AusAID-SPSN Stocktake Meeting (Notes and Action), September 2012 AusAID's support to civil society in PNG: Evolution of ideas and approaches from CDS to DGTP to SPSN, Concept Paper, URS (undated) Community Development Scheme 2, Activity Completion Report, URS, May 07 Community Development Scheme 2, Independent Completion Report, AusAID, June 08 Community Development Worker - National Occupational Skills Standards, SPSN, Nov 2009 Community Development Worker Standards Review Workshop Report, SPSN, May 2012 Component 2, Capacity Building Strategy, Annie Kennedy (SPSN adviser), Undated CSOs in PNG, an analysis of context, changes and capacity (Internal Document, DGDT, Aug 09) Democratic Governance Practices Training Activity, SPSN, September 2011 Democratic Governance Transition Program Scope of Services, AusAID, (undated) Democratic Governance Transition Program Lessons Learned Workshop Report, DGTP Team (Mar 2010) Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Action Plan 2012-2013, SPSN, October 2012 Management Framework, Component 1 of SPSN: Key Partners, URS, June 2012 SPSN Program Design Document, AusAID Design Team, Sept 2009 SPSN Annual Plan, URS, 2010 SPSN Annual Plan, URS, 2011 SPSN Annual Plan, URS 2012 SPSN Annual Plan 2013 (Draft), URS, November 2012 SPSN Operations Handbook, URS, August 2010 SPSN Six Month Report, URS, December 2010 SPSN Six Month Reports, URS, June 2011 SPSN Six Month Reports, URS, December 2011 SPSN Six Month Reports, URS, July 2012 SPSN Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (Draft), SPSN, December 2011 SPSN Grievance Policy (undated) SPSN, Various Project Specific Documents (KPPs, Concept Notes) Updated Gender Equity and Social Inclusion Action Plan 2012 – 2013, URS, (October 2012)

Management Framework - Component 1 of Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen (SPSN): Key Partners - June 2012

Steps and Standard Formats connected to each component (various - undated)

Technical Handbook - The Determination assigning Service Delivery Functions and Responsibilities to Provincial and Local Level Governments (DPLGA Jan 2010)

Transparency International PNG Annual Report 2011

Ward Planning Process Training Manual - Facilitators Guide CARE International PNG

Roles and responsibilities - Ward Planning (Care International PNG)

Quality at Entry Report for SPSN, March 2011

Quality at Implementation Report for SPSN and Integrated Community Development Program, February 2012

## **CPP** specific documents

Adult Literacy Program Quarterly Reports, Anglicare, 2012

Annual Budgets and acquittals for each church partner for 2010 to 12

Annual Reports from each church partner for 2010-11 and 2011-12

Annual Report 2009-10, Mother Child Support joint program, Anglican Board of Mission and Uniting Church, September 2010

AusAID - PNG church partnership program funding guidelines, undated

CPP Annual and Multi-Year Program Strategies, from 2004 to 2013

CPP Baseline-Midterm Comparative Analysis, Jane Cousins, February 2007

CPP Church Partnership Charter, 2009

CPP 2 Concept Note, CPP partners, undated

CPP Communication Strategy, Program Coordination Office, April 2012

CPP Partnership Annual Plans for each church, from 2010 to 2013

CPP Phase 2 Design Document, April 2009

CPP Phase 2 Design Document Annexes (Volume 2), Feb 2009

CPP Draft Monitoring & Evaluation Framework, October 2012

CPP Gender Review Report, Jane Anderson, April 2012

CPP Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Workbook, Jan Cossar, October 2012

CPP Coordination Office Procedural Manual, undated

CPP Case Study Report, AusAID Office of Development Effectiveness, September 2010

Evaluation Report, Salvation Army's Village Health Volunteer Program, Dr. Miriam Cepe, May 2012

Micro-finance and its role in the fight against HIV / AIDS : A case study of the Mt Hagen Handicraft Group, Isabel Robinson, October 2008

Mother and Child Support, Progress Report, Kerren Vali (United Church CPP Coordinator), May 2012

Mother and Child Support Program – Guide to using a strengths based approach, Christopher Dureau, July 2010

Partnership Policy Framework and Guidelines between the Government and the Christian Churches in Papua New Guinea, 2008

PNG LNG Good Community Report, CPP PCO, undated

Quality at Entry Report for CPP, AusAID, June 2009

Quality at Implementation Reports for CPP, AusAID, January 2011and February 2012

Strategic Plan 2012-2015, Anglican Church of PNG, January 2012

Study of Mount Hagen Handicraft Group project, Tracey Delaney, July 2010

Theology of Development Statement, undated

Translating Gender in the PNG Church Partnership Program, Jane Anderson, SSGM discussion paper, July 2012

## AusAID general / other documents

Aide Memoire - Independent Review of the PNG-Australia Economic and Public Sector Program (EPSP), September 2012

Aid Memoire - Independent Completion Report (ICR) Sub-National Strategy (SNS) Phase 1: 2007-12, November 2012

AusAID Civil Society Engagement Framework, June 2012

Democratic Governance : 2010 Sector Performance Report, AusAID, undated

Democratic Governance Strategy in PNG, August 2007

Draft Aide Memoire : PNG-Australia Incentive Fund Independent Progress Report, October 2012

Effective Governance : Thematic Strategy, AusAID, November 2011

Governance Performance Assessment Framework, AusAID, August 2012

Helping the Worlds Poor through Effective Aid – Australia's Comprehensive Aid Policy Framework to 2015-2016, AusAID, May 2012

Mapping AusAID's Engagement with Civil Society in the PNG Country Program, Ms. Rebecca Reye-Effective Development Group, July 2010

Papua New Guinea Sub-National Strategy : Mid-Term Review Report, Tony Lands and Felicia Dobunaba, April 2009

PNG Governance Review (draft), Ian Morris, October 2012

Provincial and Local Level Governments Program, Design Document 2012-17, November 2011

Working Beyond Government: Evaluation of AusAID's engagement with civil society in developing countries, Office of Development Effectiveness, March 2012

## Others

Citizens Access to Information in PNG, Citizen Survey, Inter Media Group, June 2012

Integrated Community Development in Remote and Disadvantaged Districts : Program Design Document, CARE in PNG, November 2011

Independent Review of two remote area service delivery projects in PNG, Alison Heywood, August 2012

# Annex 4 – Case studies

# **CPP Case Study**

## Mount Hagen Handicraft Group (MHHG)

The MHHG was established in Mount Hagen in January 2007 to assist women in the settlements overcome poverty and support women infected with HIV/AIDS. The project was initially supported with funds from AusAID's Sanap Wantaim Program and forms one element of the HIV/AIDS program activities of the Baptist Union of Papua New Guinea (BUPNG). The project is currently supported with funds from CPP (among others), administered by BUPNG.



The MHHG started with a group of around 30 women. It continues to have a similar core membership, but also now supports a much larger network of HIV positive people (women and men) who are referred to as the 'True Warriors'. There is also a group of women only, called the 'True Friends', who support awareness raising activities on HIV/AIDS and deliver training.

The MHHG has now been running for almost 7 years, and provides the following main kinds of support:

- Spiritual and emotional support for vulnerable women, including provision of a safe place to come and talk in a supportive environment
- Training in bilum making, sewing and cooking
- Training in business management, finance management and marketing
- Training / awareness raising on gender-based violence and on HIV/AIDS (including medical facts, treatment, care and de-stigmatisation)
- Management of a group savings and micro-credit scheme; and
- Core management and administrative support for the bilum making business.

The MHHG has been successful in helping to lift individual women out of poverty, address stigma associated with HIV/AIDS, and support improved access to treatment and care for people living with HIV/AIDS. It has also made significant steps towards being financially self-supporting through bilum sales, including to a number of overseas markets.

Nevertheless, the continued effective operations of MHHG remain significantly dependent on ongoing management and financial support from the BUPNG (including, for the present, through use of CPP funds). While Barbara Pagasa, the Manager of the MHHG, hopes to see the group being financially self-sufficient in another 2 or 3 years, it seems likely that continued (externally funded) managerial and administrative support will be required for longer than that.

In general, the prospects for the sustainability of the MHHG, and the benefits it is providing, look promising. Whether it can be fully self-financing or not is open to question. But it doesn't need to be as long as there are willing supporters from within government, the private sector, other non-government organisations and/or donors. With its current committed leadership, active members and demonstrated benefits, it can be reasonably expected that some ongoing external financial support can be obtained for the foreseeable future.

# **SPSN Case Study**

## **K1** Association

The K1 Association represents three wards within one clan in the Southern Highlands, covering an estimated 7,000 people. Three successive projects (from DGTP onwards) have helped to build the momentum and legitimacy of the organisation.

Following the first round of DGTP support, K1 established subcommittees for women, people with disabilities, and people with HIV/AIDS. Previous small grant support was provided for income generation activities. The subcommittees established small piggeries, poultry and vegetable gardens. These have been sustained and are starting to generate some



income for the members. Money raised has been used to buy more pigs and chickens to supply other groups. The K1 subgroups are clearly happy with program support, commenting for example "*now that I earn income and sell at the market, I'm respected more in the community*".

Beneficiaries mentioned the additional income has been used for a number of reasons, including the payment of school fees, transport costs to take goods to market and to access medical support. Individuals within groups have established external links with government and CSOs. For example, David, coordinator of the disabled subcommittee (who is blind), sits on the Provincial Disabled Association and has been involved in national workshops on disability. A number of HIV positive people are linked into HIV support groups, including the Anglicare Stop Aids program and Baptist/CPP supported True Warriors network (Refer Mount Hagen Handicraft Group, Case Study 1).

K1's proposal for SPSN large grant support for a savings and loans scheme valued at K458,828 has been approved. SPSN will pay for the majority of costs incurred during the initial period, including for example office establishment, staff salaries, K1 Board member sitting fees and refreshments, and travel to Moresby for training an individual in relation to credit scheme management (airfares budgeted quarterly).

From discussions it is clear that people feel very positively about the idea accessing credit, with what they had been told would be low interest rates (K1 made it clear that interest rates would be low "*so people wont go to other places to access credit*"). It appeared however there had been limited participation across subgroups in relation to how the scheme would operate, interest rates, and who could get access (and for what purpose). KPP documentation for example indicated loans would be used for income generation activities (agriculture, livelihoods initiatives), whilst during discussions with subgroups people indicated they planned to use loans for things like home improvement.

The K1 Association has no previous experience in management of a savings and loans scheme. Unfortunately there had not yet been any connection made with a well-established micro credit scheme that is operating in Mt Hagen, close to K1. This organisation - PARD – which is also receiving large grant support from SPSN, has extensive experience in management of credit programs in Western Hhighlands with previous funding through the EU. It would have seemed appropriate for SPSN to link K1 to PARD in response to the demand for credit. Alternatively linking K1 to local resources available within PARD for training and ongoing mentoring purposes, rather than paying for an individual from K1 to travel to Port Morseby for training, might be a better idea.

Again, whilst the community are clearly happy with the idea of 'cheap money', small credit scheme are notoriously difficult to manage effectively and sustain, and can cause social tensions amongst the

community and developing CSO. Given the low levels of interest to be paid, and high level of recurrent costs (include 8 staff salaries for managing the scheme), prospects of sustainability post SPSN are unclear.

It will be important that SPSN keep a close watch over the program, promoting links with local expertise, and ensuring there is accountability and transparency in the scheme so as not to create social tensions, and the possibility of impacting negatively on a seemingly growing and well-functioning CSO.