**REPORT**

**Review of Building Resilience in Treaty Villages Program (South Fly District, Western Province, PNG)**

**May 2016**

***FINAL***

**prepared by**

**Martin Syder**

**on behalf of**

**the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade**

**Government of Australia**

Contents

[**Abbreviations** 3](#_Toc450917531)

[**Executive summary** 4](#_Toc450917532)

[**1.** **Introduction** 7](#_Toc450917533)

[**2.** **Background and description of investment** 8](#_Toc450917534)

[**3.** **Review objectives and methodology** 9](#_Toc450917535)

[**4.** **Program achievements and review observations** 11](#_Toc450917536)

[4.1 Component one: strengthened Treaty village governance capacity 11](#_Toc450917537)

[4.2 Component two: enhanced community livelihoods 15](#_Toc450917538)

[4.3 Component three: improved physical and social environment 17](#_Toc450917539)

[4.4 Other comments 21](#_Toc450917540)

[**5.** **Analysis** 23](#_Toc450917541)

[**6.** **Recommendations** 26](#_Toc450917542)

[**Annex 1 Key informants and interviewees** 27](#_Toc450917543)

[**Annex 2 Summary of responses to key questions** 29](#_Toc450917544)

[**Annex 3 Sustainable economic development in Treaty villages: assessment of the proposal for a scaled-up program** 32](#_Toc450917545)

# **Abbreviations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| BRTV | Building Resilience in Treaty Villages |
| CDD | Community-driven development |
| CP | Community plan |
| CoE | Council of Elders |
| DDA | District Development Authority |
| HHIV | Health and HIV Program |
| HH | Households |
| INLOC | In-Loc International Ltd |
| GBV | Gender-based violence |
| GoA | Government of Australia |
| GoPNG | Government of Papua New Guinea |
| NGO | Non-government organisation |
| PGF | PNG Governance Facility |
| para. 52 | Paragraph number 52 |
| PFSDRD | Partnership Framework for Service Delivery and Rural Development |
| RRRC | Reef and Rainforest Research Centre |
| SEDTV | Sustainable economic development in Treaty villages |
| TV | Treaty village |
| TVA | Treaty Village Association |
| TB | Tuberculosis |
| VHV | Village Health Volunteer |
| WDC | Ward development committee |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene |

# **Executive summary**

This report presents the findings and recommendations of an **independent review** of the *Building Resilience in Treaty Villages (BRTV) Program,* delivered in South Fly District, Western Province, PNG This review covers the period from September 2014 (BRTV mobilisation) to March 2016.

The BRTV Program is a $1.8 million **pilot** investment in community-driven development (CDD) which aims to increase the self-reliance of 4 of 13 villages included in the **Torres Strait Treaty** between Australia and PNG. BRTV seeks to sustainably improve Treaty villages’ (TV) economic and social livelihoods and health outcomes. Pilot villages include: Sui-Parama; Sigabaduru; Mabaduan; Buzi/Ber.

Free movement provisions of the Treaty permit the traditional inhabitants of the Torres Strait and 13 coastal villages of PNG to travel between Australia and Papua New Guinea for traditional purposes. In 2015-16, almost 27,000 traditional visits to the Torres Strait placed pressure on Australian health, border protection and environmental protection services.

The South Fly District’s human development index of 0.26 ranks it as one of the world’s poorest regions. In 2010, Western Province was ranked lowest among PNG’s provinces for performance on service delivery expenditure. Signs of heavily compromised governance persist. The operating context is further complicated by poor infrastructure (no roads between TVs, for example), a long dry season, and vulnerability to natural disasters and the impacts of climate change.

The BRTV Program has 3 components: Component 1 - strengthening treaty village governance capacity; C2 - enhancing community livelihoods; and C3 - improving the physical and social environment.

A major BRTV strategy is to train and support **community rangers**. The ranger ‘model’ is adapted from a scheme that has been successfully operating in remote Australia under the auspices of the **Torres Strait Regional Authority** over a number of years.

This review is intended to:

* evaluate the BRTV Program’s progress and performance;
* assess the program’s operational & governance arrangements;
* assess the extent to which the program is aligned and coordinated with relevant National, Provincial, and District development plans;
* reflect on the program’s potential for scale-up (including an assessment of the **Sustainable Economic Development in Treaty Villages** prospectus of November 2015 – see Annex 3).

**Achievements, Observations and Findings**

The key (though not all) achievements delivered so far include:

1. The mobilisation in each pilot village of councils of elders (CoE) and ward members to endorse the program and to select rangers (12 women, 40 men).
2. The formation of advanced draft community plans (one for each pilot village).
3. Procurement of 4 boats and engines (one for each pilot village)
4. The training and testing of 52 rangers’ skills in WASH and health promotion competencies
5. The delivery of an additional 1.3 million litres of water storage capacity to pilot TVs.

The reviewer undertook a rapid assessment in each of the pilot locations, interviewed a broad range of key government and non-government informants (Annex 1), and reviewed key documents and reports. The data generated through this process was analysed against the high-level indicators of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, monitoring and evaluation, and sustainability.

Based on this analysis (details are provided in section 5 and the paragraphs indicated) the reviewer concludes that:

* Component 2 and 3 (C2 & C3) intended outcomes are highly relevant. C1 intended outcomes, however, are less than relevant. This is because C1 outcomes do not adequately capture governance needs at the village level (see paras. 35-40 for further analysis).
* BRTV has **not** been effective in strengthening TV governance capacity. It has, however, established solid working relationships and activated genuine interest in BRTV. This provides a basis for strengthening village governance, subject to adjustments to approach (see paras 35-40).
* BRTV has established moderately effective relations with the South Fly District Administration, but less than effective relations with other local government and non-government actors (paras. 48-53).
* BRTV has made an effective start to supporting enhanced livelihoods (C2), but more time is required to realise results (paras. 57-63)
* BRTV has transferred skills highly effectively to 52 community rangers resulting in significant provision of water infrastructure. Aspects of ranger-led primary health care (emergency response) have been effective, though hygiene promotion has been less effective (paras. 76-80).
* the inclusion of women as community rangers has been highly effective (para. 81)
* BRTV represents value-for-money and is time efficient (paras 118-122).
* the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is fit-for-purpose. However, changes to the M&E framework are required to align the framework with the recommended changes to C1 (paras 102-105).
* BRTV has transferred to rangers, sustainable skills and assets from which on-going benefit will be derived. However, without adjustment to engagement with customary leaders and local government, **it is unlikely that these capacities will deliver sustained benefits *for the maintenance and delivery of public goods*.**

Two recommendations are proposed.

**Recommendation 1: Extend the pilot program for 12 months (July 2016 – June 2017).** Elements of the pilot require change management or are not yet complete(see paras. 128-131)**.** An extension will generate invaluable lessons which will lead to a better-informed design of a scaled-up program (*if this is to be funded*).

**Recommendation 2:** **Subject to positive results from the extension, go to open market and invite submissions for a scaled-up program.** The size of a scaled-up investment ($4 – $6million) warrants market testing and would enable comparisons of the incumbents’ capacity and approach against those of other providers (see para. 132).

In summary, the reviewer considers the program’s achievements within an 18-month timeframe to be **highly significant**. The adaptation of the Australian ranger model to PNG is showing early signs of success. Improving engagement with village leadership, and with local government and non-government actors, has the potential to secure outcomes well beyond the cycle of the current pilot program.

**Review of Building Resilience in Treaty Villages Program**

# **Introduction**

1 This report presents the findings and recommendations of an independent review of the *Building Resilience in Treaty Villages (BRTV) Program,* a pilot activity delivered in South Fly District, Western Province, PNG (September 2014 – March 2016).

2 Initially, background comments and a description of the investment are provided (section 2). This is followed by an outline of the review’s objectives and the methodology used to establish findings and inform the report (section 3).

3 The substantive part of the report includes a discussion of program achievements and the reviewer’s observations based on fieldwork, document assessment, and key informant interviews (section 4). These observations are further enriched by an analysis of data and findings against the high-level indicators of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, monitoring and evaluation, and sustainability (section 5).

4 The report concludes with two key recommendations (section 6).

5 The report also provides an assessment of a proposal that has been prepared for an expanded follow-on program. This seeks support for strategies that will be delivered over 5 years and that will incorporate all 13 Treaty Villages (TVs). The assessment of the proposal is included in Annex 3.

# **Background and description of investment**

6 The *Building Resilience in Treaty Villages (BRTV) Program* is a **pilot** community-driven development (CDD) project which aims to increase the self-reliance of 4 of the 13 Torres Strait Treaty Villages (located in Kiwai LLG, South Fly, Western Province, PNG). The program aims to sustainably improve pilot village economic and social livelihoods and health outcomes. **Pilot villages include:** Sui/Parama; Sigabaduru; Mabaduan; Buzi/Ber.

7 The **Torres Strait Treaty between Australia and PNG** recognises the importance of protecting the traditional way of life and livelihoods of the traditional inhabitants of the region. Free movement provisions of the Treaty permit indigenous inhabitants to travel for traditional purposes into the Torres Strait Protected Zone without visa and passport controls. Approximately 27,000 inward visits are conducted annually, placing pressure on Australian Treaty communities and government health, border protection, and environmental protection services.

8 The South Fly District is one of the poorest regions of the world with a human development index of 0.26, equivalent to the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2010, Western Province was ranked lowest among PNG’s provinces for performance on service delivery expenditure. Signs of heavily compromised governance persist. The operating context is further complicated by poor infrastructure (no roads between Treaty Villages, for example), a long dry season leading to acute water shortages, and vulnerability to natural disasters and to the impacts of climate change.

9 CDD is a part of Australia’s approach to improving governance and service delivery outcomes in PNG. It emphasises that citizens can be key agents and partners in governance, encouraging communities to identify collective priorities and means through which they can be achieved, mobilising their own resources and working in partnership with government, civil society and the private sector.

10 Australia’s PNG Health and HIV Program (HHIV) has a strong focus on Western Province, including cross-border health, in line with Australia’s national interest. Key areas of focus include primary health care, communicable disease control (particularly tuberculosis (TB) and drug resistant TB), and water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH).

11 The BRTV Program has 3 components:

* **Strengthening treaty village governance capacity** through community development planning, to allow villages to link with government and development partners;
* **Enhancing community livelihoods** through improved food security, fisheries management, transport, and disaster risk reduction; and
* **Improving the physical and social environment** through community education in health and WASH, and investment in and maintenance of water storage and sanitation facilities.

12 A major strategy of the program is to identify, train and support **community rangers**. These are key actors, responsible for partnering with their communities to deliver priorities agreed and endorsed by village **Councils of Elders** (CoE). The community ranger ‘model’ is adapted from a scheme that has been successfully operating over a numbers of years in the Torres Strait under the auspices of the **Torres Strait Regional Authority**.

13 The program is implemented by the Cairns-based **Reef and Rainforest Research Centre (RRRC)** and ranger capacity development is sub-contracted to **In-Loc International Ltd (INLOC).** The program commenced in September 2014 and is due to conclude in June 2016.

# **Review objectives and methodology**

14 This review is intended to:

* evaluate the BRTV Program’s progress and performance against its objectives, including documenting any key issues which have affected implementation to date, and identifying ongoing challenges;
* assess the program’s operational & governance arrangements;
* assess the extent to which the program is aligned and coordinated with relevant National, Provincial, and District development plans;
* and reflect on the program’s potential for scale-up (including an assessment of the **Sustainable Economic Development in Treaty Villages** prospectus of November 2015; referred to hereafter as SEDTV), and make recommendations to inform DFAT’s consideration to continue, phase out, or expand the current program.

15 The review program and key outputs included:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Activity:** | **To be completed by:** |
| Fieldwork: Cairns | 2-4 March 2016 |
| Travel Cairns to Pau Island (training camp adjacent to Mabaduan Village) | 5-7 March |
| Fieldwork: Treaty Villages & Daru | 8-14 March |
| Travel to Port Moresby | 15 March |
| Report preparation | 16-17 March |
| Presentation of **Aide Memoire** (Port Moresby) | 18 March |
| Submission of **Draft Report** | 6 April |
| Receipt of DFAT comments | 6 May |
| Submission of **Final Report** | 13 May |

16 The reviewer visited each of the sites of the BRTV pilot (except Parama, all located within Kiwai LLG, South Fly District):

* Buzi/Berr
* Sigadaburu
* Mabaduan
* Sui

17 The review methodology involved assessment of key documents and reports; key informant interviews; and rapid assessment fieldwork. The rapid assessment was conducted in each of the pilot locations via the following process (repeated in each location):

1. Introductions and welcoming speeches (open to all village members)
2. Village walkabout with rangers only to assess quality of works and pose questions (1.5 – 2 hours)
3. During the above, a separate discussion was held with female rangers (15 – 30 minutes)
4. Open village Q&A session with CoE, women, youth, and church leaders and villagers. Rangers and INLOC personnel were not present for this discussion
5. Summary comments and thanks (villagers, rangers, INLOC).

18 A rapid assessment methodology involves undertaking observations at a project’s site and posing sets of questions to relevant groups that are designed to focus on key issues. The methodology is usually employed due to budget and/or time constraints and does not use a sample frame. The reviewer attempts to speak with as broad a cross-section of project actors/beneficiaries as is possible in the limited available time. As such, the results are impressionistic and require triangulation against other sources. This was possible to an extent through reviewing reports and interviewing key informants (see Annex 1). These factors should be taken into account when reading the data in this report.

# **Program achievements and review observations**

19 This section outlines program achievements and discusses observations made during a field visit to Cairns and South Fly District, 2 – 15 March 2016.

20 Observations are based on discussions with rangers, village elders, women and youth leaders, and villagers from each of the pilot sites (except Parama) and from interviews with a range of politicians and public servants (see Annex 1). Numbers attending village meetings were not recorded, however, groups in the range of 50 – 300 persons participated.

## 4.1 Component one: strengthened Treaty village governance capacity

21 The BRTV Program proposal describes **intended key outcomes** for the component as:

* villages and wards have the capacity to prepare transparent and accountable consultative plans and culturally appropriate strategies to meet the needs of communities
* villages and wards link with provincial, district and local-level government and development partners in (a) accessing development funding for CDD initiatives and (b) supporting referral networks for services such as health care
* activities within this program are implemented so that the WASH and CDD outcomes are realised and sustained to the extent possible in the timeframes.

22 Summary of key achievements for component one:

1. CoE & WDC members convened to form an **Advisory Group** in each pilot village, the program endorsed, and rangers selected (40 males, 12 females, total 52)
2. Agreements signed between LLG representatives from each pilot TV and RRRC
3. Communication Strategy developed
4. Mabaduan training base (Pau Island) established
5. One **community plan** (CP) drafted for each pilot village (to be formally approved by Advisory Groups by June 2016)
6. Community rangers completed leadership and governance training (December 2015)

23 The reviewer considers achievements 1 and 5 to be the most significant. These are discussed below.

24 **CoE & WDC members convened to form an Advisory Group in each pilot village, the program endorsed, and rangers selected.** Advisory Groups have been fully briefed on the program and they have implemented agreed processes for selecting community rangers, including endorsing both women and men as rangers. Subsequently, 12 female and 40 male villagers were endorsed.

25 **Inclusion of women** raised the issue of gender early in the engagement with Advisory Groups and provided a clear pathway for women’s inclusion in a central strategy of the program, i.e., the community ranger model. In a robustly patriarchal society this is a commendable start.

26 Through this process, BRTV has earned **legitimacy** from the perspective of village leaders and villagers. The reviewer observed widespread demand for the program from Elders, women, youth and church leaders, and villagers at **all** village-level meetings. The delivery of high-priority tangibles (e.g., water systems), discussed further in 4.2 and 4.3 below, has further animated villagers and cemented BRTV’s legitimacy.

27 **One community plan (CP) drafted for each pilot village** (to be formally approved by Advisory Groups by June 2016).The CP is considered a contribution to each ward’s ward development plan (WDP) and contains a schedule of activities that the rangers and other actors are endorsed to implement.

28 The CP also outlines a governance structure for BRTV at the village level. This includes roles and responsibilities for each village’s Advisory Group, senior rangers, community rangers, and village members.

29 The Advisory Group is responsible for approving plans and for facilitating relations with government and non-government actors, essentially for the purpose of acquiring funding and support for activities consistent with CPs and government policies.

**Observations**

30 The reviewer has assessed the CPs and the proposed activities are consistent with the wider program framework. The comments below focus on the **process** leading to the drafting of CPs and the **governance responsibilities** articulated in the CP.

31 The reviewer posed questions to identify what leaders and villagers could recall about the development and content of the CPs, and what people understood about the next steps in the process (see Annex 2, Table 1 for a summary of comments).

32 People from each of Buzi, Ber, and Sui were vague about the content of the CPs and were not clear on ‘where to from here’. They were also unclear how much time had been spent facilitating discussions and what auditing had been undertaken of villagers’ skills, collective assets, and strengths. The reviewer was advised that rangers undertook basic audits[[1]](#footnote-1) of the samebutknowledge of this among villagers was variable, suggesting limited coverage.

33 The process undertaken to develop the CPs is not explained and quantified in the CP, therefore it is difficult to make assessments about its qualityand the extent to which it embodies a genuine CDD approach. The process should be documented in the CP so that each village has a record of how the plan was formed (and an indication of who/how many contributed to the process). This would also assist an outsider to be confident regarding the quality of the process.

34 The **facilitation/formation of the CPs** was led by RRRC personnel – local actors (including the rangers) were **not** trained to facilitate this process. There is therefore little or no residual capacity in villages to facilitate future participatory planning, a key element of governance at the local level. The reviewer acknowledges, however, that this approach was expedient in the context of a time-poor activity.

35 As a way of making a rapid assessment regarding village-level governance capability, the reviewer aimed to clarify why previously supplied water systems[[2]](#footnote-2) had fallen into disrepair and what leaders were now thinking regarding maintenance responsibilities for the new/refurbished water systems (see Annex 2 Tables 2 & 3 for a summary of responses).

36 Through discussions with government and INLOC personnel, the reviewer was able to establish that the required spare parts for maintenance of the water systems are locally available and that there are locals with the required skills to repair the systems. It was also established that each pilot village has a WDC bank account (with the exception of Ber, which comes under Buzi). Payments from government in the order of K10,000 per ward per annum have consistently been made over a number of years and repair costs, in most cases, are modest.

37 Villagers did have access to the inputs required to maintain previously installed water collection sheds. The reviewer concludes, that **the key missing element WAs village governance**, essentially a matter of customary and WDC leadership.

38 The reviewer found that there was a **lack of recognition across all pilot villages** that customary and WDC leadership is *the* crucial player in mobilising local resources to either independently sustain, or sustain with government, public goods. Whilst there was much talk of securing funds from external sources (GoPNG and GoA) for maintenance, there was no acknowledgement of the risks that this entails or that households do have the financial wherewithal to make modest contributions to ensure that systems continue to function. The idea, for example, of Advisory Group-oversight of a water-user levy appears to be foreign, despite this being an institutionalised practice in other parts of rural PNG.

39 The **strength of the Advisory Groups** is their membership, whilst their **weakness** is their responsibilities as outlined in the CPs. Incorporating both CoEs and WDC members in Advisory Groups will hopefully circumvent the issues that are routinely created by elections – irrespective of LLG election outcomes, the groups should continue function because they are not solely reliant on ward members.

40 The responsibilities of the Advisory Groups are exclusively focussed on endorsing priorities and sourcing outside assistance (CPs p12) and their role in ensuring accountability and mobilising village resources is not clear or robust. The CP governance structure seems overly reliant on senior rangers as the custodians of accountability.

42 The reviewer agrees with the approach in the CPs that funds will be administered by a coordination team, consisting of senior rangers in discussion with community leaders.[[3]](#footnote-3) This neatly relieves the Advisory Group of the contentious area of money-management, enabling it to independently oversight the rangers.

43 This strategy is also consistent with the important **business model** that INLOC is establishing with the rangers. The emerging ranger business model aims to develop ranger capabilities to prepare ‘service tenders’, procure materials, and manage and report on the use of funds and is therefore **key to sustainability**. Given the technical capacities that community rangers now possess, there is potential for the rangers to win sub-contracts and to re-invest surplus earnings in village-level development activities.[[4]](#footnote-4)

44 The **reviewer endorses this approach, with the following caveat**: the business model is reliant on group functioning and shared decision-making. It is almost inevitable, once the program ceases, that disputes will arise within the ranger groups (and between rangers and other villagers). At this point, the business model will become dysfunctional if Advisory Group leadership is not willing and able to facilitate conflict resolution. Current engagement strategies do not equip Advisory Groups for this indispensable role.[[5]](#footnote-5)

45 In terms of the **overall sustainability of ranger groups**, INLOC’s approach is to instil in each group that once the program ceases they will need to generate income through application of the business model. Currently, rangers are not on regular wages – they are ‘tasked’ on an output basis for discrete projects negotiated with INLOC (on a daily rate of K20). The business model, combined with targeting government support over the cycle of the proposed scaled-up program (5 years), are the strategies designed to secure sustainability.

45 **Alignment with GoPNG policies.** Notwithstanding the comments above, the BTRV Program **is** strengthening aspects of customary and local governance and nurturing a cohort of potential future leaders. In so doing, the approach aligns with the PNG Vision 2050, the PNG Development Strategic Plan (2010 – 2030), and the Medium Term Development Strategy (2011-2015). Each of these acknowledge customary authority, local cultural knowledge and practices, and the need for organisation and authority at the village level. The documents provide a clear framework for development that is **integrated** (institutional, human, cultural), **equitable** (women, men, girls, boys, people with disabilities), and **fit-for-purpose** (competency-based, contextually appropriate, sustainable).

46 These key GoPNG policy documents also promote the principle that donors and NGOs should operate through GoPNG systems, or at a minimum, align investment priorities with GoPNG policy frameworks. Donor and NGO reporting to appropriate GoPNG agencies is also strongly advocated.

47 Assessment of CPs also reveals alignment with sector policies such as GoPNG’s Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Policy, 2015 and the National Health Policy (2011 – 2020). This occurs via the provision of WASH facilities and activities; the primary health care approach which empowers villagers to take responsibility for their health through nutritious diets and good hygiene practices aligns with the National Health Policy’s focus on basic, preventative health care.

48 In relation to para. 46 above, the reviewer was able to establish that there is regular informal information sharing between the **South Fly District Administrator** (DA) and the INLOC team. Both the DA and the District Treasurer (in separate discussions with the reviewer) indicated strong support for BRTV and its continuation.

49 The DA did also indicate (without prompting from the reviewer) that the relationship could be strengthened through an agreement in writing. The DA commented, “I want a line in my budget to support this program.’ He went on to explain that a formal agreement with DFAT or the program manager would be required to facilitate this.

50 The reviewer also spoke with the **Provincial Health Advisor** and the **District Health Coordinator** (separately). Both expressed support for the program but both indicated that they receive very little or no information regarding program activities. This is the most significant gap in terms of local government relations and needs to be rectified before the commencement of any scaled-up program.

51 Whilst relations with the sub-national bureaucracy are not as strong as they should be, the reviewer notes that ward members, the LLG President and Open Member are very supportive of BRTV. All ward members pro-actively participate - the program has established relations with this level of government that could be built upon.

52 The reviewer was also advised that there are provincial and district-level mechanisms where **non-government service providers** come together to report to government. The BRTV Program does not appear to participate in these.

53 Discussions with NGO actors also raised concerns regarding a lack of collaboration and information sharing. An example was given of a TB specialist from Queensland Health who was mobilised (allegedly) without notifying local health authorities or other relevant actors. The specialist allegedly raised concerns regarding a NGO which operates an extensive TB treatment and prevention program in South Fly District. Its TB methodology was (allegedly) publicly criticised by the specialist, despite the fact that the NGO’s approach aligns in all respects with current GoPNG TB strategy and methodology. Lack of information sharing was raised in a number of discussions with the reviewer.

## Component two: enhanced community livelihoods

54 This component draws on a range of strategies to improve food security and income earning opportunities for villagers. The intended component outcomes include:

* Improved food security
* Improved fisheries (and post-harvest) management
* Improved transport and communications
* Improved disaster risk reduction

55 **Summary of achievements**:

* Background discussions with pilot villagers on food security completed and section on the same included in each CP
* Plans for improvements to subsistence agriculture prepared
* Communal food drying and storage facility trialled in Buzi (plans agreed for facilities in other pilot villages)[[6]](#footnote-6)
* Procurement and commissioning of 4 boats and engines to Australian maritime standards (one for each pilot village)[[7]](#footnote-7)
* Disaster response training completed in each village (July 2015)
* Disaster response plan included in each community plan

56 **Outstanding:**

* Farmer training courses and supply of new cultivars (drought resistant, high yielding)
* Improved fisheries management infrastructure and training
* Fisher training courses

57 The limited progress in relation to a number of this component’s outcomes is not grounds for discrediting the performance of the implementing agencies. It is a reflection of over-ambitious programming (in terms of the time required to deliver).

58 The integrated approach taken in the program design is necessary to address the complex issues of vulnerability confronting TVs. The initial programming focus on Advisory Group mobilisation, ranger selection and training, and refurbishment of water systems was correct (notwithstanding the comments on C1). The activities proposed for C2 have a greater chance of success on the basis of this platform.

59 The most significant achievement to date for C2 has been in **improved transport and communications**. This has occurred through procurement of **4 speed boats,** provision of a **mobile phone** to each group of rangers, and training of rangers as boat operators. This has improved emergency response and logistical capabilities.

60 The reviewer was able to confirm with staff from the Mabaduan Health Centre that rangers have added significant capacity to local health services. This includes female rangers assisting with child births and male and female rangers with emergency cases (trauma, burns, snake bites). The RRRC M&E system contains data on more than 100 cases of such assistance – these are verified by written briefs prepared by rangers on each individual case.[[8]](#footnote-8)

61 The vessels procured are compliant to **Australian maritime standards** therefore they can be used for transportation of Australian and other officials as they comply with occupational health and safety requirements. This provides expanded opportunities for generating income on a fee-for-service basis (in addition to the safety/comfort advantages compared with the standard ‘banana’ boat).

62 Access to watercraft is crucial given there are no roads in the area and health facilities are only accessible by sea. The reviewer observed demonstration of competent and unsupervised water craft skills by male and female rangers, which indicates effective training. All rangers have also been trained in basic engine maintenance skills. Female rangers are the first women in the area to be trained in boating skills and to take charge of motorised water craft.

63 The spare parts required to maintain the vessels are available through local suppliers. The ownership of water craft resides with BRTV (presumably RRRC legally) for the duration of the program and on completion the vessels will be gifted to each pilot village. During the program, the assets are managed by the rangers with oversight from the Advisory Groups.[[9]](#footnote-9)

64 The reviewer notes that **disaster response plans** are included as an attachment to each of the CPs. These are generic and have not yet been tailored to individual villages. Presumably, activities designed to customise plans and identify disaster response responsibilities will be undertaken.

## Component three: improved physical and social environment

65 Through this component the intention is to improve infrastructure and the village environment for improved water security and environmental health.

66 The key intended outcomes include:

1. WASH promotion through maintenance and improvement of water storage and sanitation facilities and training in hygiene
2. Improved disease prevention and health promotion through trained and supported village health volunteers (VHV)

67 **Summary of achievements**:

* 52 rangers trained and tested in basic WASH and other competencies (by August 2015)[[10]](#footnote-10)
* Additional water storage of approximately 1.3 million litres added to pilot villages and some non-pilot TVs (90,000 litres)[[11]](#footnote-11)
* 6 new water wells constructed (between 70 – 90% complete at time of fieldwork)
* Well capping training completed
* First Aid Certificate 1 and health and hygiene training completed for 52 rangers
* 12 female rangers trained in paediatrics and birthing assistance
* TB awareness completed in each of Mabaduan, Sigadaburu, and Buzi/Ber
* TB home nursing training for women’s groups of Mabaduan, Sigadaburu, and Buzi/Ber completed.

68 The significant achievements under this component include the **training and testing of rangers’ skills in WASH competencies** and the delivery of an additional **1.3 million litres of water storage capacity** to the pilot and some non-pilot TVs.

69 Frequent water shortage problems have been exacerbated in recent decades by rising salinity, flooding and drought. INLOC personnel established during their early engagement that villagers commonly consume less than a litre of water per day during dry periods (prior to water infrastructure repairs). This means, *inter alia*, that energy and concentration levels are low.

70 The water and hygiene infrastructure constructed or refurbished by the rangers includes:

* **Water collection sheds**, consisting of support structures for corrugated iron roofs, guttering, down pipes, storage tanks, and taps
* **Water collection from other structures** (houses, churches - especially in Sui village), consisting of corrugated iron roofs, guttering, down pipes, storage tanks, and taps
* **Wells**, consisting of a circular concrete sleeve (to depths of 4 – 9m), a well cap, and a manually operated pump (to be fitted)
* **‘tippy taps’ or handwashing stations**, consisting of a simple bush material stand, a couple of pieces of cord and a plastic bottle or container and soap.

71 In addition, the rangers have refurbished **Mabaduan Health Centre**. This was funded separately (by DFAT), however, the additional capacity generated through BRTV contributed significantly to the works. The health centre now has vastly improved administration and ward areas, and running water and functional toilets.

72 Infrastructure for **sanitation** includes ‘tippy’ taps and pit latrines. Tippy taps have been delivered to schools and aid posts and are currently being erected at household cooking stations. Traditional pit latrines are inadequate for the conditions in the TVs, being subject to flooding and surface dispersal, which contaminates groundwater and spreads effluent. The RRRC has commissioned an engineering firm to develop a new sanitation system, however, to date no satisfactory design has emerged that will meet the difficult conditions, though this expected soon.

73 The **wells provide an important back-up to the water storage facilities** during the dry season. Most villages have wells that were constructed by villagers prior to the BRTV Program. The **well design and construction techniques** introduced by INLOC are clearly superior to the traditional wells in terms of:

* construction technique (the use of a ‘gin’, a simple technique using ropes, pulleys and local timber, improves safety during construction and enables excavation to greater depth)
* water quality and reliability of supply (well depths of 4 – 9m provide access to clean water during dry periods)
* ease of water retrieval (winch and pulley manual retrieval or manual hand pumps made from locally available materials)
* sustainability and safety (lining with a concrete sleeve and capping the wells ensures long-term functionality, reduces contamination, and protects against people falling in; fences have been erected around well sites during construction periods for added safety).

74 In addition to WASH-related construction and maintenance competencies rangers have been trained in:

* Personal hygiene (hand washing, sanitation, household and community rubbish disposal)
* Community first aid (burns, trauma, snake bite)
* Pests and animal control
* Clean water (collection, storage, sterilization)
* Governance and leadership
* Ranger ethics, including in gender-based violence awareness
* Proposal preparation, costing of works
* Presentation and training techniques

75 Following this training, rangers made a number of health promotion presentations (in Kiwai and Agob languages):

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Ranger group** | **# of presentations[[12]](#footnote-12)** | **# of attendees** |
| Buzi | 6 | 120-150/meeting (up to 900 total) |
| Ber | 3 | 40-60/meeting (up to 180) |
| Sigadaburu | 10 | 150-200/meeting (up to 2000) |
| Mabaduan | 12 | 200-250/meeting (up to 3000) |
| Sui | 2 | 80-120/meeting (up to 240) |
| **Total** | **33** | **6,000 (approx.)** |

**Observations**

76 The reviewer inspected water infrastructure in each of the pilot villages. The construction quality compares favourably with other water systems observed by the reviewer in many locations in PNG.

77 The reviewer was also able to verify that **genuine skills transfer** has occurred in concreting, plumbing, and carpentry. The evidence for this conclusion is based on:

* **rangers,** each group indicated that it has been empowered through the training, has learned new skills and feels confident that it can maintain existing systems. The reviewer was shown examples of work completed without supervision
* **INLOC trainers** indicated that each group of rangers has completed concreting, plumbing and carpentry works independently of supervision to a satisfactory standard
* **villagers**, pointed out to the reviewer works that had been completed by the rangers independently of supervision.

78 The **competency-based *in-situ* training methodology** also appears to enhance skills transfer and sustainability. Theoretical instruction is backed-up with practical demonstrations and multiple opportunities to apply skills in the local context. Skill application takes place in the village where learning is shaped by the constraints and assets of local context. Trainees are also locally embedded, i.e., most rangers are parents and have strong local kinship ties. They are therefore likely to remain in the village where potentially their skills will continue to be applied.

79 The methodology also develops rangers’ **mentoring skills**. Rangers do not receive instruction from the INLOC experts on all of the competencies they are expected to demonstrate. Each ranger is required to mentor other rangers in the competencies for which they have not received INLOC instruction and vice versa.

80 The reviewer asked each group of rangers to rate the **quality of training and support provided by the INLOC team** by ranking training quality on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest). Each group rated the training quality as 4, except Mabaduan which rated it as 3 (see Annex 2 Table 4 for further details).

81 With each group of rangers, the reviewer met **separately with female rangers**. The purpose of this was to give women an opportunity to raise concerns confidentially. They were asked if the INLOC trainers had treated them as equals to the male trainees (the reviewer explained that ‘equality’ in this context meant that INLOC trainers provided the same training and skill-application opportunities and the same level of attentiveness to females and males). All replied yes.

82 Further discussion generated many comments that indicated that female rangers feel proud, empowered, up-skilled, and included.

83 The only concern raised (by one group of female rangers) was the low numbers of females relative to males (12 women of a total of 52, see Annex 2 Table 5). This group suggested that more women should be recruited and trained.

84 **Health promotion.** RRRC M&E records show that 33 presentations have been delivered by ranger groups to villagers, school and women’s groups across 5 of the 6 pilot sites. The reviewer posed a number of questions designed to give an indication of the impact of hygiene promotion awareness (see Annex 2 Table 6).

85 Among those that met with the reviewer at open village meetings, in 3 of the 5 sites more than 50% had attended at least one ranger-led hygiene promotion presentation. In 2 of 5 villages, less than 50% of those present indicated recall of hygiene promotion (at Sui there was no initial recall of hygiene promotion activities and only after further discussion and prompting did a small percentage of those present indicate recall).

86 The **use of hand-washing stations** is a proximate indicator of hygiene behaviour change. The rapid assessment results suggest that this change has not been adopted by villagers at 2 of the sites (Mabaduan – the largest village – and Sui). At the other 3 sites, behaviour change as indicated by use of hand-washing stations appears to be variable.

87 A question about **conserving water** was posed to identify what shared sense of water management might exist within villages, but also as a primer for discussion regarding mechanisms and regulations designed to sustain the new water systems.

88 Across the sites (with the exception of Ber) the practice of locking taps and only opening them for limited periods each day is the common method for reducing water wastage. The reviewer did not find any evidence that water management committees responsible for on-going awareness, monitoring, maintenance and fundraising are in place. Villagers from Mabaduan and Sui indicated that they are intending to convene water management committees in the very near future.

89 Good hygiene practices demand changes in behaviour that confronts deeply embedded cultural institutions. It is therefore not surprising at this early stage that the rapid assessment shows variable uptake of key behaviour change practices such as hand-washing. The indicative results suggest that hygiene promotion needs to be iterative and user-friendly and is perhaps strengthened by specific targeting (e.g., school, sports, youth and church groups).[[13]](#footnote-13)

90 **Collaboration with district health professionals** to boost the status of awareness activities, ensure accuracy of information, create partnerships, and ensure that the rangers are not supplanting the official health system should also be pursued. The reviewer did not observe any health promotion information (visuals, posters, etc) in the locations visited.

## 4.4 Other comments

**BRTV priorities**

91 The relevance to villagers of BRTV’s activities and intended outcomes is a key factor in generating local ownership and support. The reviewer attempted to gauge villagers’ views on the highest priorities they would like to address. At each village meeting, people were asked to identify what they considered to be their village’s 4 highest priorities (see Annex 2 Table 7).

92 Water supply (5 villages) was nominated by all groups to be the highest priority. Food security (4) and health (3) were also high priorities. Two villages emphasised market access (livelihoods) and human resource training (HR capacity development). Issues that were also raised, but did not make the top four for any village included: disaster readiness, roofing iron, and border security.

**Budget and expenditure**

93 Expenditure to the 18 months to 31/12/15 was AUD1.5m.

94 **Personnel costs** as a percentage of overall budget are 40.5% (Oct-Dec 2015 Progress Report). The reviewer considers that 40.5% spent on personnel is an effective, value-for-money investment. The investment has produced measurable results that are having significant impact (and should continue to do so) on villagers’ lives. In the governance arena, many interventions spend large proportions of budgets on technical assistance and the resulting outputs are either much less clear or meagre by comparison with this project.

95 **Operational costs** as a percentage of overall budget are 54% (Oct-Dec 2015 Progress Report). It is not clear how this percentage is calculated so the following comments are tentative. If this percentage captures only costs directly associated with on-ground delivery, then considered alongside the comments above on personnel costs, the overall shape of expenditure minimises overheads in favour of service delivery.

96 The reviewer notes the use of the Mabaduan (Pau Island) training facility (locally supplied land, tents, appropriate technologies, etc). This appears to be cost-efficient way of delivering training compared with many programs where hotels are utilised. In the final program report it would be good to know how much has been saved through this innovation.

97 **Administration costs** as a percentage of overall budget are 5.5% (Oct-Dec 2015 Progress Report). Assuming that this includes all RRRC project management personnel and administrative costs, this is a low administrative charge by comparison with many projects. It would be good to know if this in fact captures all project management costs, or if these are spread across other expenditure lines.

98 **Project management costs.** It would be useful to separate costs for personnel directly involved in on-the-ground capacity development from those that provide head office and in-country project management. It is not clear how the latter is accounted for in the expenditure report (under administrative or personnel costs?). This would help to establish an appropriate level of project management resourcing for a scaled-up program.

99 **Cost/benefit analysis.** It would be useful to also ensure that the M&E system and the coding of financial data is sufficient to enable cost / benefit analyses. As the program moves into areas that should deliver direct economic benefits such as agriculture, market access and supply-chain management, methods for measuring the value of such benefits relative to costs should be incorporated into the M&E/financial system.

100 **Project management.** The RRRC has produced timely and good quality progress reports, including expenditure statements reconciled against the original program budget. The overall program delivery also suggests highly effective logistical and procurement coordination. The M&E system is regularly updated and aligns with reporting requirements. Requests for data made by this reviewer were satisfied in a timely and thorough manner.

# **Analysis**

101 In this section the reviewer draws on the content of section 4 and assesses each component of BRTV against the high level indicators of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Sustainability.

102 **RELEVANCE.** BRTV relevance is considered with respect to intended key outcomes and alignment with GoPNG policies and villagers’ preferences.

103 Component 1 intended outcomes are relevant, but incomplete. There should be an explicit outcome on Advisory Group governance. For reasons explained in paras. 30-40, the need for an expanded role for the Advisory Groups is the most significant governance deficit of BRTV.

104 Component 2 and 3 intended outcomes are relevant to high-priority, basic needs not currently being met by other providers.[[14]](#footnote-14) There is also a clear inter-relationship between outcomes and activities, resulting in an integrated BRTV design.

105 In paras. 45-47the program’s alignment with GoPNG policies is demonstrated both in terms of service delivery and methodology.

106 C2 and C3 outcomes align with villagers’ preferences (discussed in para. 91). The relevance of these is confirmed by baseline data which highlight climate and environmental vulnerability, low household incomes, and poor health outcomes.

107 **The reviewer concludes that the BRTV C2 and C3 intended outcomes are highly relevant. C1 intended outcomes, however, are assessed to be incomplete and therefore less than relevant. This likely results from the roles and responsibilities of the Advisory Groups as defined in the CPs, which in turn is not sufficiently consistent with customary leadership frameworks. C1 outcomes and the M&E system need to be modified accordingly.**

108 **EFFECTIVENESS.** BRTV effectiveness is considered with respect to TV governance capacity (Component 1), relations with government and non-government actors (C1), enhancing community livelihoods (C2), improving physical and social environment (C3), and project management.

109 Site visits confirmed that engagement strategies have effectively generated widespread demand for and legitimacy of BRTV (para. 26). BRTV has also effectively delivered outcomes for women through their inclusion in the community ranger groups (albeit less than equitable and limited at this stage). These factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions of strengthened governance capacity.

110 The methodology utilised for CP formation (paras. 32-34) is unlikely to strengthen local capacity in participatory planning and the limited knowledge of Advisory Group personnel and villagers of CP processes and content suggests that the CP engagement strategy has been less than effective.[[15]](#footnote-15)

111 The governance role prescribed for Advisory Groups in the CP is truncated (CP p12). The rapid assessment (para. 35-38) confirmed that Advisory Group members have not grasped the key role they need to play in **overseeing public goods**, **resolving conflict**, and **generating self-reliance**. Overall, this suggests that institutions of ‘cargo cult’ remain embedded and that additional concentrated investment in leadership will be required to move the ‘rules of the game’ towards institutions of self-reliance.

112 Important governance and leadership training has taken place with the community rangers, with progress made towards developing a ranger business model (see paras 43-45). However, it is too early to assess if this investment has been effective.

113 **The reviewer concludes that BRTV has not yet been effective in strengthening TV governance capacity. It has, however, established good village-level working relationships and activated genuine interest in BRTV. This provides a platform upon which village governance could be effectively strengthened, subject to adjustments to approach (see paras 38 & 44).**

114 In paras. 48-53 the discussion considers relations with government and non-government actors.

115 **The reviewer concludes that BRTV has established moderately effective relations with the District Administration, but relations with other sub-national government and non-government actors are less than effective. The reviewer found no evidence of coordination with provincial or district levels of government. Consideration also needs to be given to strengthening relations with DFAT’s Health and HIV Program and international NGOs.**

116 **The BRTV Program has made an effective start to supporting enhanced livelihoods (C2), but more time will be required to deliver strategies and to realise results. The pilot is incomplete.**

117 In section 4.3 the discussion considers improvements to the physical and social environment (C3). **The BRTV Program has been highly effectively in transferring skills to community rangers resulting in significant provision of water and some sanitation infrastructure. Aspects of primary health care (emergency response) have been effective, though hygiene promotion has been less successful, but an encouraging start has been made. The inclusion of women as community rangers has been highly effective and provides a platform from which advances towards gender equality could potentially be made.**

118 **EFFICIENCY.** Assessments regarding efficiency can be made by calculating delivery units (such as a litre of water storage capacity) on a cost or time basis and then comparing these ratios with those of similar interventions.

119 To 31 December 2015 the project had spent AUD1.5m and had delivered an additional 1.3million litres of water storage capacity. The cost of each litre of added water storage capacity was therefore AUD1.15.[[16]](#footnote-16) But each $1.15 invested has also contributed to the range of achievements outlined in paras. 22, 55, & 67. The reviewer also notes the success of the project in securing in-kind support from the **PNG Border Development Authority** in the form of 9 water tanks and two birthing beds.

120 Whilst cheaper solutions on the basis of cost/litre of storage capacity might be available, it is highly **unlikely** that such solutions would impart locally-embedded capacity similar to that resulting from this pilot’s methodology.

121 The reviewer also considered financial reports on personnel, operational, and administrative costs (paras. 93-97) as a percentage of total expenditure. Subject to clarification of calculation methods, these suggest an efficient use of funds based on a budget highly oriented to service delivery.

122 *Prima facie*, the program is time-efficient. An extensive range of outputs has been delivered (paras. 22, 55, 67) in 18 months. The reviewer knows from experience that it commonly requires 12-18months to deliver a single WASH system into a rural PNG village using an experienced local contractor, and typically this delivers less residual capacity.

123 **The reviewer concludes that BRTV represents value-for-money. The program is considered efficient against both cost and time criteria**.

124 **MONITORING AND EVALUATION.** The reviewer considers that the M&E framework provided in the pilot proposal is fit-for-purpose when considered against the original outcomes and activities. There is a clear logic between intended outcomes, key result areas, and key performance indicators. Indicators are clear and measurable. However, changes to the M&E framework are required to align the framework with the recommended changes to C1 (see para. 103).

125 **SUSTAINABILITY.** Evidence suggests that on-going benefits will continue to flow to households beyond 30 June 2016 irrespective of any scaled-up program. The rangers possess a range of assets and new skills that they can continue to apply in the village setting. These also present opportunities for employment outside of the village and household benefit from remittances. There is also potential for rangers to apply the business model (para. 43) to secure contracted work.

126 As has been suggested, however, medium to long-term sustainability will hinge on combining these significant and sustainable capacity gains with effective governance at the village level and with improved sub-national government integration.

127 **The reviewer concludes that the BRTV Program has successfully transferred sustainable skills and assets to rangers from which on-going benefit will be derived. However, if the issues noted above are not resolved, it is unlikely that these skills and assets will deliver sustained benefits *for the maintenance and delivery of public goods*.**

In summary, the reviewer considers the program’s achievements within an 18-month timeframe to be **highly significant**. The adaptation of the Australian ranger model to PNG is showing early signs of success. Improving engagement with village leadership, and with local government and non-government actors, has the potential to secure outcomes well beyond the cycle of the current pilot program.

# **Recommendations**

128 **Recommendation 1: Extend the pilot program for 12 months (July 2016 – June 2017)**. Elements of the pilot require change management or are not yet complete, including:

* 1. the governance role of the Advisory Groups need to be expanded and **tested** (as per para. 111);
  2. awareness regarding the CPs needs to be improved (paras. 32) and content modified (paras. 40 & 103)
  3. aspects of C2 (food security, fisheries management, disaster risk reduction) and of C3 (sanitation) need to be completed;
  4. the ranger business model needs to be tested (para. 43-44);
  5. information sharing and coordination with government and non-government actors needs to be improved (paras. 48-53).

129 Addressing these areas through extending the pilot will generate invaluable lessons which will lead to a better-informed design of a scaled-up program (***if this is to be funded***). The RRRC should be invited to prepare a pilot extension proposal. This will describe how it is going to respond to each of the issues identified above, including an outline of relevant engagement, training, and support processes for Advisory Groups, and a budget and implementation schedule. Given the established systems and facilities, and that further capital investment will not be required, the reviewer would expect the budget to be 20 to 40% lower than the expenditure of year 1 of BRTV.

130 The main risk with this approach, is that expectations among non-pilot Treaty villagers are high. These will need to be managed through considered communications and strategic relationship-building. It may be possible with some extension activities to involve non-pilot TVs. For example, modest repairs to water systems in non-pilot villages could be considered; the distribution of high yielding plant cultivars could potentially include a wider groups of TVs. The feasibility of such strategies will need to be explained by RRRC in its extension proposal.

131 There is also a risk that relations with sub-national government will continue to be less than optimal. Two facets will need to be addressed: (1) improving information sharing and coordination; (2) the status of the CPs with respect to the government planning system and the DDA. Relations, however, are strong with ward members and it would be helpful to know how these could be leveraged to assist to address these issues. Subject to priorities, the PGF team could also play a role in brokering and supporting relationships.

132 **Recommendation 2: Subject to positive results from the extension, go to open market and invite submissions for a scaled-up program.** The size of the scaled-up investment ($4 – $6million) warrants market testing and is a requirement under Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines (though there are exceptions to this). Market testing would enable comparisons of the incumbents’ capacity and approach against those of other providers and yield greater confidence in the overall direction. If the program is to remain in DFAT’s governance area, a tendering process could be facilitated by the PNG Governance Facility within its ordinary operating budget. To maintain program continuity, it is recommended that the tendering process be scheduled for May-June 2017.

# **Annex 1 Key informants and interviewees**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Organisation** | **Position** | **Name** |
| Reef & Rainforest Research Centre | CEO | Sheriden Morris |
| Reef & Rainforest Research Centre | Senior Project Manager | Stan Lui |
| Reef & Rainforest Research Centre | Project Manager | Jo Johnson |
| In-Loc International | CEO | Dave Rutherford  (Plus 2 In-Loc trainers) |
| CSIRO | Senior Scientist | James Butler |
| Torres Strait Regional Authority | CEO | Shaun Barclay |
| PNG Border Authority | Provincial Coordinator | Gelam Mark |
| WP Provincial Health Authority | Provincial Health Advisor | Alice Honjepari |
| South Fly District Administration | District Health Coordinator | Alois Nakamole |
| South Fly District Administration | District Treasurer | Nancy Gauga |
| South Fly District Administration | District Administrator | Moses Ase |
| Daru Hospital | Nursing Officer | Asam Konenge |
| World Vision Daru Field Office | CSO WASH Program Manager | Sonia Yeung |
| Kiwai LLG | Women’s Rep | Buna Narua |
| Health and HIV Program | Provincial Manager | Paul Quinlan |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Organisation** | **Position** | **Name** |
| Buzi/Ber Village | Ward member, CoE, WDC, rangers, women and youth leaders, church leaders, villagers | 150+ |
| Sigadaburu Village | Ward member, CoE, WDC, rangers, women and youth leaders, church leaders, villagers | 100+ |
| Mabaduan Village | Ward member, CoE, WDC, rangers, women and youth leaders, church leaders, villagers | 150+ |
| Sui Village | Ward member, CoE, WDC, rangers, women and youth leaders, church leaders, villagers | 50+ |
| DFAT | Torres Strait Liaison Officer | Clayton Harrington |
| DFAT Canberra |  | Madeleine Scott  Tim Hainsworth |
| DFAT Port Moresby |  | Julie Hart  Doreen Iga |

# **Annex 2 Summary of responses to key questions**

Questions posed to Advisory Group members and villagers attending open meetings in each pilot location (except Parama).

**Table 1**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **How was your CP developed? What does it contain and what are the steps moving forward with your CP?** |
| Buzi | Lack of clarity and awareness within the meeting about the CP and how the first draft was developed; some suggested that the CP was something drafted by the rangers and that the CoE will have input into a ‘final draft’: ‘we are waiting to see final draft, then we can comment’. Not clear on content or on the way forward |
| Ber | We met with some people from RRRC and discussed our priorities; we understand now that there is a draft but we have not yet met with the rangers to discuss it. Not clear on the way forward |
| Sigadaburu | Clear re-call of meetings with RRRC personnel, the purpose of which was to agree on the priorities for the CP; the purpose of the meetings was also to identify assets and skills that exist within the village which in turn can contribute to activities agreed in the CP. Members of the CoE indicated that the next steps were to review and formally approve the plan. Once approved the plan is the guide that the rangers will follow and implement |
| Mabaduan | We did some awareness first in our village about the need for a community planning process; RRRC then ran some meetings and we identified priorities for inclusion in the CP; the CoE and the WDC and other interested community members were involved; we understand that the CP has now been drafted but we have not read it; the CP needs to be finally approved by the CoE – once this has occurred it is our role (village leaders) to support the rangers and community to work according to the plan |
| Sui | We met with people from RRRC and agreed on some priorities; we do not recall discussing our assets and skills and what we might contribute to the program; not clear on the way forward |

**Table 2**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 2.2 | **Why did the water systems provided by the Australian Government some years ago fall into disrepair?** |
| Buzi | We don’t know; no one came to assist us to do the maintenance; they were provided by Australia so it is Australia’s responsibility |
| Ber | We have waited for assistance – it has been promised by government officials but it never came |
| Sigadaburu | We did not know how to fix them; we did not organise ourselves and there was no assistance |
| Mabaduan | No one came to assist us & there are no funds for the repair work; the government or OTML is supposed to take responsibility but we never hear from them or see them |
| Sui | Ours was destroyed completely by high tides and we cannot re-build it from the ground up; OTML/SDP has delivered some materials (tanks, roofing iron) for water supply but that was some years ago. They never came back to complete the job and now the materials are getting spoiled |

**Table 3**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **How will the water systems that you now have be maintained and who will take responsibility?** |
| Buzi/ Ber | It is the rangers’ responsibility; we will assist where we can but they will lead |
| Sigadaburu | The CoE will apply to the government for assistance and the rangers will do the work, maybe we can also get help from NGOs |
| Mabaduan | The rangers now have the skills so they will be able to do the maintenance; we apply to government for assistance as it is needed – we don’t want to use outside contractors, the rangers will do the work, it is their responsibility to maintain the systems |
| Sui | We will seek assistance, but the rangers have to take responsibility now that they have been trained |

**Table 4**

Rank INLOC’s training quality on a scale of 1 (low) to 4 (high):

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Ranger group** | **Score: 1 (low), 2, 3 or 4 (high)** |
| Buzi/Ber | 4 |
| Sigadaburu | 4 |
| Mabaduan | 3 |
| Sui | 4 |

The discussion with rangers regarding the quality of INLOC’s training generated a host of positive remarks. For example:

‘they are very good’

‘we have learned many new skills such as how to make a gin and do proper concreting’

‘their explanation is very clear’

‘they are very helpful’‘very professional’

The Mabaduan group explained that its ranking of a 3 (as opposed to 4) was given because individuals within the group believe they should be paid more.

**Table 5**

The current female/male numbers in the ranger cohort are as follows:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Ranger group** | **Female** | **Male** | **Total** |
| Buzi/Berr | 3 | 8 | 11 |
| Sigadaburu | 3 | 12 | 15 |
| Mabaduan | 4 | 12 | 16 |
| Sui/Parama | 2 | 8 | 10 |
| **TOTAL** | 12 | 40 | 52 |

**Table 6**

The first question attempts to measure coverage of hygiene promotion awareness; the second tests basic behaviour change through asking about hand washing habits (use of the new hand washing stations, i.e., ‘tippy taps’); the third probes the issue of water conservation; the fourth elicits the audience’s impression of the communication skills of rangers. Rangers and INLOC personnel were not present when these questions were posed.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Pilot village visited** | **Have you attended hygiene promotion training?** | **Do you use ‘tippy taps’?** | **Do you conserve the water in the new facilities, if so, how?** | **On a scale of 1 (low) to 4 (high), rate the communication skills of the rangers** |
| Buzi | > 50% of those present - Yes | Sometimes | Taps are only open in the mornings | 3 |
| Ber | > 50% of those present – Yes | Sometimes | No | 4 |
| Sigadaburu | < 50% of those present - Yes | Sometimes | Yes, we only have taps open at certain times each day (2 hours in morning & 2 hours in late afternoon) | 3 |
| Mabaduan | > 50% of those present – Yes | We have given up using tippy taps (‘they are good though’) | Yes, we only have taps open at certain times each day (2 hours in morning & 2 hours in late afternoon) | 3 |
| Sui | < 50% of those present - Yes | We have given up using tippy taps | We lock taps, but rules not always observed & sometimes conflict over access | 2 |

**Table 7**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Buzi** | **Ber** | **Sigadaburu** | **Mabaduan** | **Sui** | **Total** |
| **Water** | **X** | **X** | **X** | **X** | **X** | **5** |
| **Sanitation** |  |  |  | **X** |  | **1** |
| **Food security** | **X** | **X** |  | **X** | **X** | **4** |
| **Livelihoods[[17]](#footnote-17)** |  | **X** | **X** |  |  | **2** |
| **Health[[18]](#footnote-18)** | **X** |  | **X** |  | **X** | **3** |
| **Education[[19]](#footnote-19)** | **X** |  |  |  |  | **1** |
| **HR capacity development[[20]](#footnote-20)** |  |  |  | **X** | **X** | **2** |
| **Lighting[[21]](#footnote-21)** |  |  | **X** |  |  | **1** |
| **Communications[[22]](#footnote-22)** |  | **X** |  |  |  | **1** |

# **Annex 3 Sustainable economic development in Treaty villages: assessment of the proposal for a scaled-up program**

This annex provides an assessment of RRRC’s proposal, Sustainable economic development in Treaty villages (SEDTV). This proposal is for a scaled-up program incorporating all TVs (13) over 5 years. The reviewer provides comments on sections in the order that they appear in the original proposal. Information in brackets refers to paragraph and page numbers in the SEDTV proposal.

136 “As with the pilot project, **future** TV leaders will be the key agents and partners in the development, governance and implementation of this community-driven development program.” (para. 3, page 1)

137 As earlier comments suggest, the key agents should be **both** current customary/WDC leaders and the leaders emerging from the ranger cohort. This statement undermines (unintentionally) the status of current customary leadership. Whilst government may not be considered a ‘key agent’, it should be framed in the proposal as a key partner.

138 The strategies and intended outcomes are essentially the same as the pilot. The reviewer concurs that the intended outcomes, strategies (notwithstanding C1 comments) and integrated nature of the overall design, remain not only highly relevant, but feasible.

139 (Para 18, page 5.) The proposal promotes the building of ‘capacity across the entire South Fly District’. This is over-ambitious. A scaled-up program should focus on the 13 TVs and the strategic linkages that need to be fostered at district and province levels in order to secure sustainability. These are discussed in paras. 141-143 below.

***Objective 1: Strengthen Treaty Village Governance Capacity***

140 There needs to be clearer and specific outcomes regarding governance and leadership. Tailored governance outcomes for the Advisory Group and additional activities designed to strengthen and test the quality of village governance, and associated budget, are required.

141 **Community Planning.** The reviewer endorses the overall CP strategy, which seeks to develop a plan that informs the ward development plan. Concerns are:

* the governance narrative and structure (discussed in analysis of the pilot paras. 102-113)
* the facilitation of community planning processes, currently led by RRRC personnel
* the participation of local government officers in the process and
* the status of community plans with respect to the government’s planning and resource allocation framework, i.e., ward and LLG plans and recognition of the CPs by the DDA.

142 Consideration should be given to either (a) training a local cohort of ward/community planning facilitators or, (b) utilising experienced PNG community planning facilitators to lead the process. This is **not** a role for the community rangers, as they have a clear business interest in the priorities established through community planning processes and their leadership in this area could therefore generate conflicts of interest. Whether (a) or (b) is initially adopted, the scaled-up program should be aiming to impart a cohort of personnel that can competently facilitate participatory planning and prepare project proposals.

143 A discrete governance outcome should also be a formal agreement such as an MoU (or inclusion in the new **Partnership Framework for Service Delivery and Rural Development** (PFSDRD)) with either the Western Province Provincial Government or the South Fly **District Development Authority**. This should underwrite a partnership approach to SEDTV. The practical focus of the agreement should be to outline contributions and the roles and responsibilities of each of the partners. For example, rangers are currently engaged in health promotion but there is no agreement with provincial and district health authorities demarcating responsibilities. Communications and reporting responsibilities would also be outlined so as to ensure that SEDTV program management participates in a formal information sharing and consultative processes with local government.

***Objective 2. Enhance Community Livelihoods and Independence***

144 The reviewer agrees with the proposed outcomes and activities under this objective.

145 The reviewer endorses the intention to utilise ‘pilot’ rangers as mentors (as noted in the activities sub-section, p7 of the SEDTV proposal).

***Objective 3. Improve Physical and Social Environments***

146 The reviewer agrees with the proposed outcomes and activities under this objective.

147 Outcome 3.2: The strategies used under the pilot have worked well and should be continued (for water supply), though hygiene promotion needs on-going inputs and as much support as possible from government and non-government actors.

148 Objective 3 activities (page 8) “Recognise the social, cultural, and physical barriers associated with access to health services, especially for women and children, and support local structures to improve access for marginalised groups.”

149 The above could be a general statement at the outset of the proposal applying to ‘… access to all program activities …’ rather than buried under an objective as an activity statement. Flowing from this, specific activities under each objective designed to promote inclusion should be proposed.

150 **Program benefits**

1. Gender equality. Para. 149 is applies.
2. Additional activities should be noted for strengthening relations with GoPNG, especially at the sub-national level. This also applies to relations with NGOs. The M&E system would need to be adjusted accordingly (see paras. 162-164 below).
3. Improved local participation will be achieved through continuing with the successful ranger strategy, but also through increasing attention on governance deficits among village leaders.

151 **Partners**

1. Consideration should be given to broadening the contributions from Treaty villagers.

152 **Governance and management arrangements**

1. A mobilisation plan should be the first major output of the SEDTV program. This should provide details of the first six months of programming and explain the rationale for the proposed phasing strategy of the scaled-up program. The possible risks associated with running SEDTV over two phases are noted in para. 157 below.

153 **SEDTV budget**

The budget needs to reflect the significant scale-up that is required for the SEDTV program.

154 Pilot expenditure on a per village basis provides a guide for assessing the validity of the SEDTV budget. If AUD1.86m is spent by June 2016 (a safe assumption), the spend per pilot village will be AUD465,000. The proposed budget for SEDTV across 13 villages is AUD372,000 per village. On that basis the proposed budget appears insufficient.

155 If a further assumption is made that spending on the current pilot villages will be reduced by at least 50% during SEDTV, then the per village spend for the 9 remaining rises to AUD455,000. Given the expenditure level under the pilot phase (i.e., roughly AUD465,000 per village), the additional logistical costs (due to distance and scope), and the fact that aspects of the pilot remain undelivered and will have to be delivered during SEDTV, the budget again seems insufficient.

156 If we compare annual expenditure on trainers and specialists we find that AUD320,000 was spent in FY14/15 on 52 rangers, whilst the SEDTV budget proposes AUD300,000 per annum on 108 rangers. This suggests that the training of rangers will be phased across the five years.

157 Phasing ranger training over this period carries risks. Villages that enter the ranger training in years 3 & 4 will be disadvantaged with respect to some of the longer-term objectives such as food security and supply chain strategies. Access to much needed water infrastructure is also delayed. Moreover, the issues of ranger performance and the all-important ranger business model, would also be managed more effectively over a 4 or 5-year cycle. **An up-front planning and training ‘surge’ incorporating each of the 9 remaining villages simultaneously, in preference to a phased training approach, is recommended.**

158 The capital items budget line is only AUD375,000 over the 5 years and 9 villages compared with AUD320,000 for the 2-year pilot with only 4 villages. This needs clarification. Based on pilot expenditure and scope, we would expect capital expenditure to be in the order of AUD700,000 for SEDTV.

159 Recognising that not all issues are the same across villages, consider including a contingency fund in the project budget to respond to context-specific issues. Under the current program, the reviewer observed a community health worker’s house that has become uninhabitable. This could be refurbished by the rangers, however, the delivery team has been advised that funds for repairs cannot be released because the repairs would **not** contribute to a direct WASH outcome. Alternatively, attempting to source funds from government for this work could be a way of strengthening partnerships.

160 Administration costs in the SEDTV budget appear too low i.e., 8% of proposed expenditure (per annum). By comparison administration costs were 5% for FY 2014/15 and 5.5% for the period 07/14 to 12/15. Given the significant scope increase of SEDTV (by a factor of nearly 3) the budget must be sufficient to ensure effective and efficient program management.

161 Consider including budget for a modest office set-up in Daru and a local program manager. SEDTV will require additional logistical capacity and effective local presence will also assist to resolve the issues identified regarding relations with government and other stakeholders.

**Monitoring and evaluation**

162 (Para. 14, page 10.) The pilot program has benefitted from robust baseline data. The reviewer endorses the approach of again collecting baseline data against the KPIs listed in the M&E framework (Annex 2 of the SEDTV proposal).

163 Generally, the KPIs are relevant and measurable. The following minor amendments are suggested to KPIs:

* KPIs often use the term ‘people’ – M&E data collection should disaggregate all KPIs so that results for women and for men are available. Collecting data on youth will also at times be relevant
* KPI: number of CDOs trained to initial employment standards, could be ‘… ~~trained~~ competent to initial employment standards.’
* KPI: number of CDOs engaged in specialist training delivery and mentoring, could be ‘number of CDOs competent to engage in specialist training delivery and mentoring.’
* There should be a KPI on formal agreements with government and a KPI against which interaction with government through meetings, stakeholder fora, etc., can be measured (there are KPIs that indicate the level of engagement between community leaders and government, but not between the RRRC management team and government).
* Crucially, there needs to be 1 or 2 KPIs that will enable measurement of strategies designed to test the quality of Advisory Group governance and leadership.

164 (Para. 15, page 10.) The reviewer endorses the strategy for assessing skills acquisition. This is central to overall success. However, it is not clear how the mentoring capability of rangers will be measured and results incorporated into the M&E system.

**Risk assessment and management**

165 The risk assessment matrix (Annex 3 of the SEDTV proposal) includes a comprehensive list of the main risks. Of particular interest is the following risk:

“Poor governance uptake by community representatives”. The likelihood of this risk is estimated as ‘possible’ with a consequence of ‘moderate’.

166 The reviewer considers this risk ‘highly likely’ with a consequence of ‘major’. Demand from leaders for the program or attendance at planning meetings is not a proxy for good governance.

**Other comments on the proposal**

167 The proposal should reference the **gender-based violence (GBV) awareness training** that was delivered during the pilot program and outline how this will be strengthened and integrated into the expanded follow-on program. In this regard, there may also be a role for supporting the **village courts’ system** or for linking with other parts of the Australian Aid program that can offer support in this area. Poor performance and gender-bias of village courts was raised by female rangers with the reviewer.

168 **Family planning** should also be addressed. Households will continue to experience vulnerability where large families remain the norm. Given the context and the focus on health promotion this is a crucial issue, especially for women.

169 The **In-Loc instructor/supervisor cohort** should include Papua New Guineans, either the ‘cream’ of the current ranger group or suitable tradespeople. This further strengthens local capacities and reduces transactions costs and affords the opportunity for longer instructor rotations.

170 The nursing officer who delivered the first aid training recommends that all rangers should be provided with their own **first aid manual**.

171 Consider the feasibility of a **more permanent (yet modest) training facility** for SEDTV. Subject to budget implications, this leaves behind a facility from which income could be generated, it provides a testing ground for carpentry skills, and it makes living more conducive to longer trainer rotations (pre-fabricated options could also be considered).

1. Written evidence of this was also provided but the information is not included in the CPs. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. As per advice from INLOC, water collection sheds in all 13 TVs, supplied by GoA approximately 10 years earlier, have fallen into disrepair. With the exception of Sui, the collection sheds, water tanks, and much of the plumbing, were *in situ* at the commencement of BRTV. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The CP document should also provide more details on the money-management strategy: who will be the signatories on the bank account? What will be the process for approving expenditure? What reporting will be required, and to whom, on the administration of funds, etc.? [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The Open Member wants to hire the rangers for a roofing iron project; James Cook University is intending to hire the rangers for a significant water quality study; there is potential to provide transportations services with the new procured watercraft; the PNG Border Development Authority is considering hiring the rangers to undertake border patrols, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The comments also imply that a name change would be appropriate. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The facilities can be used for storing both garden vegetables and trade store goods such as rice [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. DFAT assisted RRRC to register the boats for cross-border transportation. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. These outcomes also relate to component 3, however I note them here as improved transportation and communication capacity have been key factors in realising these results. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Email communication with Sheriden Morris, Managing Director, RRRC, 11 May 2016 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The capacity development of rangers is an achievement that applies across components – I include it here as the bulk of ranger work so far relates directly to C3. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Water storage consists mainly of Tuffa tanks on concrete water stands. In Mabaduan a large-capacity steel tank has been installed beneath a water shed on a large hill. This has the potential to provide piped water to a number of locations throughout the village. The non-pilot TVs in receipt of water supply assistance are Katatai and Kadawa. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Presentations were also made at Parama but the reviewer did not visit this village therefore the data has not been included. Presentations were also made to schools (in English) and to women’s groups. As is evident the number of presentations in each village varies. This is a function of the size of the village and the confidence and keenness of rangers. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The reviewer acknowledges that schools have been targeted. This should continue. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The World Bank funded Rural Service Delivery and Local Governance Program is active in Mabaduan Village where they are hoping for one small grant for elementary education. Other pilot villages indicated no other contact with government or with NGOs. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The reviewer acknowledges that these are challenging issues that would ‘stretch’ many practitioners. Generally, rural Papua New Guineans are cynical about planning processes which makes it difficult to achieve ‘traction’. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. To be truly accurate, one would need to take into account the value of the existing water infrastructure which has been ‘leveraged’ by this project. If it were not for this, the capital expenditure line in the budget would need to be increased substantially which in turn would require a reduction in the number of pilot sites so as to remain within the current budget envelope. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Livelihoods in this case encompasses any activity that contributes to household wellbeing (aside from the other categories listed in the table). It includes market access, income generation, housing improvements, employment opportunities, etc [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Health includes provision of an aid post (that is staffed and supplied with drugs) and in the case of the women of Sigadaburu and Sui, a birthing room and trained mid-wives. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Elementary and primary education [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Post-primary technical and leadership training for youth and adults [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Household and public-area lighting [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Improved telecommunications [↑](#footnote-ref-22)