Philippines

Australia – The Asia Foundation (TAF) Philippines Partnership

# Coalitions for Change (CFC)

## Phase 2 Independent Progress Review, January-March 2021

## Final Report

April 2021

Peter Bazeley | Explication

*Contracted via Abt Associates’ Procurement, Administrative and Logistics Management Support Services for Aid Program Delivery (PALMSS) facility*

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*CfC IPR 2021: a review in the time of COVID-19*

## Abbreviations & Acronyms

|  |  |
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| AusAID | The former Australian Agency for International Development, prior to the country’s aid program being integrated into its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) |
| CfC | Coalitions for Change – this program (under the partnership between DFAT and TAF in the Philippines) |
| DFAT | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade |
| COVID-19 | Coronavirus disease |
| DHOM | Australia’s Deputy Head of Mission in Manila |
| GEDSI | Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion |
| IPR | Independent Progress Review |
| JSC | CfC’s Joint Steering Committee |
| MLE | Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| PALMSS | Procurement, Administrative and Logistics Management Support Services for Aid Program Delivery (Abt Associates) |
| [Joint] PMT | CfC’s [Joint] Program Management Team |
| PSP | CfC’s Partnership Strategic Panel |
| TAF | The Asia Foundation |

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Coalitions for Change (CfC)

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
April 2021

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| --- |
| **Summary**  The review was to help Post determine whether a program extension beyond June 2022 is warranted, and if so for how long.  Post’s questions for the review were focused on:   1. Performance against CfC’s end-of-program and intermediate outcomes; 2. Continuing relevance (including partnership and operational arrangements). This in the context of progress towards advanced middle-income country status, and also COVID-19.   ‘A’ (performance) would appear to be a relatively straightforward question (with some points of discussion): it is generally a positive story.  ‘B’ (relevance and design) is also straightforward and positive at the superficial level, but begs some bigger, more complex, questions which deserve further discussion and reflection beyond this review’s timeframe.  These relate to CfC’s (undoubted) relevance to the wider and most strategic objectives of DFAT’s presence and efforts in such a middle-income country in this region and how, then, the program should be imagined and what success should look like.  This in turn has bearing on CfC’s envisaged longevity, on properly understanding its contribution to change, its selection of reform tracks, and on its visibility.  Many of these questions are ultimately new or more substantive ongoing questions for the program’s joint governance (JSC-PSP-PMT), and that in turn infers some reflection on roles, responsibilities, and content.  A tangential question is raised over how ‘Component 2’ [[1]](#footnote-1) fits with the objects and thrust of the program, particularly if CfC’s purpose is reimagined, and whether Component 2 might best be configured as a standalone TAF initiative.  CfC’s putative extension to 2024 should be confirmed, but further dialogue over how such a program contributes to DFAT’s modern, aid-integrated, agenda might suggest a rather longer timeframe.  **Summary Conclusions & Recommendations**  *(Fuller discussion at paras 103 to 110.)*  *Summary conclusions:*   * Performing well (but empirical analysis of higher levels outcomes difficult) * Highly relevant   *Summary recommendations:*  *Immediate action*   1. Extend to 2024. 2. As a condition of extension, institutionalise contribution analysis within CfC’s approach to monitoring, learning and evaluation. This may require external advice, but it should be an internal (but independently critiqued) and ongoing function.   *Processes to start now*   1. The debate about how CfC fits with DFAT’s modern agenda, how it can contribute and what success looks like, should be broadened and deepened through a deliberate Post-led internal dialogue. 2. Review how Post communicates CfC’s place in and utility to DFAT’s most strategic agendas, what success looks like beyond short-term ‘results’ and how such a program should be imagined as an element of a modern aid-integrated country presence.   *And having determined those processes:*   1. Consider whether CfC should be reimagined as a longer-term feature of the country program (with appropriate in-built checks and balances) and how, with continuity being determined not by dates but by demonstrating its continuing relevance and contribution to change in evolving contexts. 2. Consider how (including through membership and members’ roles) CfC’s joint governance arrangements can capture the continuing relevance of the program *as a whole* to wider, higher-level objectives, both retrospectively and prospectively. 3. Review the codification of CfC’s ‘visibility’ in the light of the internal discussion suggested in Recommendation 2. 4. Review, in the light of decisions above, whether Component 2 should be maintained as a core CfC function or treated as a standalone TAF training and capacity-building initiative. |

## The review: background, purpose, process & limitations

Program background

1. Since 2012 the Coalitions for Change (CfC) program has constituted the centrepiece of a partnership between the Australian Embassy and The Asia Foundation (TAF) in the Philippines. Its origins can be traced to reflection more than a decade ago within [the then] AusAID Philippines as to how a modern bilateral donor might achieve impact in such a middle-income country, particularly in the context of complex governance, a lack of dependency on transactional aid flows, and – broadly – the role civil society[[2]](#footnote-2) might play in shaping policy and development outcomes.
2. CfC supports locally-led policy reform initiatives to improve the lives and livelihoods of Filipinos and promote economic development by encouraging civil society, the private sector, academe and government to work together and bring about public policy that contributes to mutual – if sometimes contested – priorities. CfC thinks and works politically and is based around TAF’s ‘development entrepreneurship’ model. It is often quoted in international academic and other literature on adaptive programming and doing development differently.
3. CfC is not confrontational: it is about civil society and other actors engaging constructively with and ultimately shaping policy reform processes. That includes – sometimes – proposing policy reforms.
4. Phase 1 (2012 – 2018) had some big wins, albeit over a comparatively [to Phase 2] narrow range of issues. While the program was heralded as a relevant and successful innovation, and deservedly extended into a second [current] phase, CfC Phase 1 reviews emphasised the need to:
   * Develop a greater *clarity of purpose* within CfC, particularly over the centrality of what genuinely ‘transformative’ development entails and its part in the wider development effort in the Philippines;
   * This linked to improving the scope and effectiveness of CfC’s program direction and governance mechanisms, with implications for both TAF and DFAT;
   * Improve impact and effectiveness by focusing on areas that showed promise, and pulling back from areas that were not yielding results;
   * Develop a deeper and more impactful conceptualisation of CfC’s approach to tackling gender inequality (broadened to gender equality, disability an social inclusion);
   * Rethink how success and impact are defined, focusing on CfC’s *contribution* to complex policy reform processes involving multiple internal and external actors and factors – as opposed to claiming impossible-to-evidence attribution of causation;
   * Consider how best to scale up the program and – at the same time – be less reliant on a limited pool of TAF ‘development entrepreneurs’.
5. A second phase was agreed from July 2018: initially for four years to June 2022 but with an option to extend for a further two years to 2024. Australia’s investment allocation for Phase 2 is currently set at AUD 27.7 million (an operating budget of around AUD 4 million a year), largely via a direct aid grant[[3]](#footnote-3) to The Asia Foundation in the Philippines. Investment per individual CfC policy reform initiative averages around AUD 150,000 per reform ‘track’.
6. CfC Phase 2’s hierarchy of objectives / theory of change is stated in its design document as below:



Purpose of the review

1. This 2021 review was principally to assist Post determine whether a program extension beyond June 2022 is warranted, and if so for how long. (Terms of reference at Annex 5.)
2. Questions asked of this focused review centred around two themes:
   1. Performance under Phase 2 to date;
   2. Continuing relevance (including partnership and operational arrangements). This in the context of the Philippines’ progress towards advanced middle-income country status, and also COVID-19.
3. Other reviews and advisory inputs during Phase 2 have already discussed important aspects of CfC’s current operations, notably:
   * Duncan Green’s reflection[[4]](#footnote-4) on CfC’s strengths and characteristics from a ‘doing development differently’ perspective and its contribution to the wider ‘thinking and working politically’ community of practice;
   * Chris Roche’s review[[5]](#footnote-5) of CfC’s monitoring, learning and evaluation;
   * John Sidel’s examination[[6]](#footnote-6) of CfC’s response to the changed context and priorities that COVID-19 has brought about and his ‘deep dives’ into four COVID-related initiatives.
4. Since its last independent review TAF has also published a substantive book[[7]](#footnote-7) on the substance, process and impacts of CfC Phase 1, coincidentally presented and critiqued at a seminar at the London School of Economics during this review.
5. My current review does not second-guess those commendable analyses, although I add some further observations in some areas. Neither does this report needlessly rehearse, except for illustration, data and information already presented in, for example, annual reports already submitted to DFAT. (Which, nowadays, represent a succinctly useful source of information on the program.)

Process

1. The review was undertaken remotely by one person, part-time, through a desk review of program documents and 34 online meetings with DFAT, TAF and partner (including Philippine government) stakeholders. (Schedule at Annex 4.) No original research or fieldwork was possible: the review depended on CfC-generated accounts and records, and mostly verbal discussions with those involved.
2. Meetings were in the main conducted as semi-structured interviews through February 2021. For each meeting a brief was provided to participants in advance explaining the purpose and emphasis of the review and providing a set of arguments and questions relevant to that particular interview. An *Interim Review Note*, with my principal observations, was submitted on completion of the interviews for discussion at DFAT-only and separate DFAT/TAF/JSC debriefing sessions.
3. At its own debriefing session DFAT (at DHOM level) welcomed the higher, strategic, level at which the review had been pitched and its emphasis on DFAT itself needing to reflect on how a program such as CfC should optimally contribute to its own purpose and efforts in the country. DFAT asked for the *Interim Review Note* and debriefing materials to be shared with TAF without change, which they were.
4. Comments from DFAT and TAF were received on a draft IPR report and incorporated, where applicable, into this final version. Some of the comments relate more to the further debate and discussion within DFAT that is called for in this report than to the report itself. That’s very positive.


Limitations

1. Despite the limitations[[8]](#footnote-8) of this being a remote review in the time of COVID, the process was efficient (largely thanks to the logistics managed by DFAT and TAF program staff) and productive. However while I take away the distinct impression that CfC is operating to a new high of performance and learning, it is, in all honesty, difficult to state that empirically at the level of higher-level outcomes and impacts (para 6 above) without much more record-searching, cross-examination and analysis than this time-limited, one-person, part-time, remote review allowed.

## Phase 2 Performance


Advances made in the second phase

1. CfC has reached a new and tangible level of performance (under current metrics[[9]](#footnote-9)) in Phase 2.
2. Staff changes including a new program manager and the repositioning of key skillsets and responsibilities within CfC in Phase 2 have resulted in tighter, more coherent and more relevant direction and management of the program, including improved reporting[[10]](#footnote-10).
3. TAF’s *Strategic Adviser* now supports and takes an overview of the whole program (rather than just a component of it) and this has led to greater understanding and unity in objectives and approach across the program.
4. Consequently greater *clarity of purpose* has been achieved around both the substance and process of the program, centred on a sound and – now – well-articulated understanding of ‘institutions’[[11]](#footnote-11), public policy, and what ‘transformative’ approaches to development entail.
5. There has been a significant overhaul of CfC’s monitoring, learning and evaluation (MLE) systems and processes, centred on the better collation and use of more relevant and accessible tracking data on reform processes[[12]](#footnote-12). CfC is clearly a ‘learning organisation’, although Roche’s review (footnote 5 above) of CfC’s MLE systems recommended taking learning to ‘a new level’ and making greater use of the data collected[[13]](#footnote-13) for decision-making. Work in progress.
6. Allied to that, the concept of focusing resources where they seem most likely to provide a return on investment, and pulling back from lost causes and dead ends (CfC’s so-called “stopability”), has been well institutionalised.
7. CfC Phase 1’s lacklustre approach to dealing with gender equality as a policy issue (on which it was challenged) has also been substantially revamped. There is consideration of gender equality, disability and social inclusion (GEDSI) across the work stream now, and their significance is continually assessed. But – critically – CfC is now also applying its analysis and reform work to national-level GEDSI policy issues specifically, as standalone reform tracks. (See for example the headline topics in the list of ‘policy wins’ in para 29 below and in the reform tracks summarised in Annex 1.) Again, it is work in progress (and will remain so), but it represents significant headway and is on the right track … at last.
8. There has also been a significant scaling-up of the program in Phase 2: see chart below enumerating the reform tracks deemed successful[[14]](#footnote-14) by CfC.



*Source: derived from TAF/CfC Program Management Dashboard data as at 19/3/21*

1. Annex 1 provides a summary of the ±43 (to date) ongoing (or temporarily paused due to COVID) Phase 2 policy ‘reform tracks’. In addition, a further 13 policy reform tracks had been stopped (para 22 above) as at the end of Year 2.
2. These ±43 reform initiatives are locally-led by the ‘coalitions’ that CfC coalesces[[15]](#footnote-15), advises and facilitates. Established civil society organisations may be awarded CfC ‘sub-grants’ to develop and lead one or more reform initiatives, while individual subject-matter specialists and sub-contractors[[16]](#footnote-16) may be engaged directly. (Graphic below, with more descriptive detail provided by TAF at Annex 2.)



1. More often than not, CfC works with civil society organisations and individuals with whom it has had a long-standing relationship. One organisation, *Action for Economic Reform* (AER), has/was been awarded 43% of all sub-grants by value in the most recent year[[17]](#footnote-17), with 88% being spread across three organisations: AER as above, the *Legal Network for Truthful Elections* (LENTE) and the *Foundation for Economic Freedom* (FEF). A further three civil society organisations, *Cirolytix*, the *Project Inclusion Network* (PIN) and the *International Centre for Innovation, Transformation & Excellence in Governance* (INCITEGov) were awarded 5%, 4% and 3%, respectively, of grants by value in the same period. Allocations are subject to the Joint Steering Committee’s annual approval of workplans and budgets.
2. This relatively narrow range of civil society partners has been questioned by some. Early Phase 1 reviews assumed a wider interpretation of ‘civil society’ (footnote 2). Duncan Green (footnote 4) noted in his 2019 review that “CfC has a preferred model of civil society partners that is largely composed of elite networks – *e.g.* professional associations and advocacy groups – rather than mass organizations”. He recommended “a more comprehensive understanding of the civil society sphere” and that “a judicious broadening of alliances should strengthen, not weaken CfC’s work”. Other respondents in the current review inferred similar sentiments. TAF confirms that this is work in progress.

“Policy wins”

1. In its Year 2 annual report, CfC/TAF described policy reform “wins” in:
   * Peace and stability
     + Handbook on high-risk prison detention facilities
     + Access to elections for people with disability
     + Jail management
   * Promoting effective governance
     + Access to elections for people with disability
     + Wider housing options for poor and vulnerable
     + Enhanced inclusivity in conditional cash transfers
     + Protecting interns form sexual harassment
     + Bringing gender-related reforms to the table (such as teenage pregnancy)
   * Economic growth
     + A fairer, more efficient, tax regime
     + Promoting inclusive education
     + Transport [airport] and tourism priorities convergence
     + Legal adjustment to stabilise rice prices
   * COVID-related activities
     + People’s mobility
     + Learning continuity for vulnerable people.
2. Questions were raised during the review over the ‘weightiness’ of some of the reform streams, particularly in the context of significant scaling up of the program. (Currently 43 reform tracks on the books, compared to a handful in Phase 1 – graphic at para 23 above; and Annex 1.) Ultimately this is an issue of their relevance to broader objectives (not just their ‘alignment with’ – para 65 below), but also CfC’s “taking small bets and seeing where they take us” approach, as well as, possibly, investing in ‘future value’ (para 67(i) and footnote 21 below).

COVID-19

1. The emergence in 2020 of COVID-19 and associated societal and economic shocks resulted in a rapid re-examination of CfC’s priorities and activities – initially through TAF’s own early analysis of the pandemic’s implications for public policy and then subsequently in the context of the pivot in investment required under Australia’s *Partnerships for Recovery* paper[[18]](#footnote-18).
2. Australia’s COVID-19 development response seeks to [re-]establish a stable, prosperous, resilient Indo-Pacific in the wake of COVID-19 through partnership action in four areas:
   * Health security
   * Stability
   * Economic recovery
   * Protecting the most vulnerable, especially women and girls.
3. The *Partnerships for Recovery*’s principles embrace a whole-of-government approach, flexibility and responsiveness, effective partnerships, new approaches and instruments, and evidence-based interventions.
4. The majority of CfC’s existing program clearly already contributed readily to these (paras 32 and 33 above) objectives and principles. Other CfC activities were pivoted towards more COVID-related priorities (notably work on gender-based violence during lockdown, local government requirements, and education and peace & stability initiatives during COVID), while ten reform tracks have been paused (largely due to logistical constraints during lockdown).
5. Some new initiatives were also added in the context of DFAT’s *Partnership for Recovery* objectives:
   * Laboratory accreditation for COVID testing
   * Use of the Social Amelioration Fund for those particularly vulnerable under COVID
   * Data analytics for the Department of Education
   * Improved access to COVID information for local government units
   * Support to a civil society group bringing forward policy issues and options related to the pandemic.
6. It is I believe fair to say that CfC responded rapidly and impressively to the new COVID context and its policy implications. Valuation of the contribution CfC made to the COVID policy response, and the longer-term relevance of the reform tracks, is beyond the scope of this review. Again the ‘weightiness’ (*c.f.* para 30) of some of them might be questioned.

Component 2

1. Concerns were aired in CfC’s Phase 1 that its ways of working and its success were overly reliant on The Asia Foundation’s unique institutional presence and reputation, and on just one or two exceptionally experienced TAF Philippines policy practitioners in particular. In planning a second phase, therefore, a new set of activities – ‘Component 2’ – was established to build and expand capacity beyond TAF in the field of policy analysis and TAF’s ‘development entrepreneurship’ approach to policy influence. This is targeted at current and future ‘reform leaders’ with the aim of their subsequently identifying and acting on policy reforms in their own domains.
2. At the time of the review 335 individuals had attended face-to-face workshops and another 500+ had participated in online training events. Over 50% of participants have been women. A significant number have be drawn from the pool of Australia Award alumni. The majority are associated with civil society organisations, at various levels, including academe and think tanks. Relatively few have emerged from the public or private sectors.
3. Beyond the orientation and exposure workshops (described by CfC as ‘building demand’), CfC has mounted a development entrepreneurship mentor/mentee program for identified leaders. The initial cohort of mentees will graduate in July 2021.
4. In the next year CfC aims to develop a sustainable business model to propagate ‘development entrepreneurship’ such that it can be sustained beyond the life of the DFAT direct aid grant.

Discussion of performance

1. We can confidently say that CfC is performing impressively in Phase 2 at activity, output and probably intermediate-outcome level. Lessons have been learnt from Phase 1 (which was already an impressive if smaller animal) and incorporated into a bigger and more comprehensive, better organised and purposeful second phase.
2. However, there are some things to think about under performance, resolution of which is beyond the scope of this review:

Contribution to higher-level outcomes

1. CfC still finds it difficult (or perhaps just this external reviewer finds it difficult) to tell robust stories of its contribution to higher-level development outcomes. A topic much discussed before. CfC has been working on this, linked to tools within its new Program Management Dashboard (footnote 13 above). The dashboard’s aptly-named ‘Measures that Matter’ and process-tracking (its ‘Timelines’ of key milestones and pivotal events) would claim to be providing, or working towards providing, evidence of contribution to higher-level outcomes and impacts. But they’re not really. They suffer from the ever-strong and pervasive gravitational pull (experienced by so many aid programs) towards logging activity and output. That’s important for internal program management and needs to be recorded, but it’s not enough to inform, and it serves to befuddle, a funder’s assessment on whether taxpayers’ money is producing the assumed return – in the form of impacts – on its investment.
2. For CfC, which is by definition a transformational rather than a transactional aid program, this contribution to observed changes for the better in [implemented] ‘rules of the game’ is really the only measure that matters. (Assuming program management is doing things right at activity and output level which, as above, is not really in question.)

Beyond adoption to implementation?

1. The issue of contribution to *change* – in the form of new behaviours and opportunities in society and the economy – is particularly acute given the much-quoted observation that the Philippines is not necessarily short of policies: it is effective policy *implementation* that’s often suboptimal. CfC’s definition of a ‘successful’ reform track is essentially the *adoption* of its recommendations or policy products by the relevant public policy organisation, not necessarily its implementation.
2. Of course, CfC cannot be held accountable for societal and economic development that is the responsibility of a sovereign government. (And by the same token it cannot and should not claim causal *attribution* for any such development.) But it should and must be able to tell convincing stories about how it made a significantly-worthwhile contribution to significantly-worthwhile change being brought about. I believe CfC does make such important contributions to change, but – having read into and discussed CfC’s progress for years now – I find it hard to put my finger on it empirically. (There are some exceptions, notably in John Sidel’s deep dives into Phase 1 which provide some confidence.)
3. And of course, it is early days to be seeing higher-level outcomes and impacts from Phase 2 outputs … but we are nonetheless nearly a decade into CfC as a whole now.

An internal process

1. Recommendations are made below about doing more on contribution analysis, and they centre on this being a process that CfC itself pursues. It is not work to be left to external evaluators (as the Program Management Dashboard suggests), as they will have as much difficulty as I did to collate the data and tell contribution stories[[19]](#footnote-19). Only CfC fully understands the context and knows the storyline and the evidence for it, and only CfC can efficiently and effectively recount it.
2. It was put to me that this is like asking a parent to criticise their child in public, and that it is something that therefore must be done by others. But I disagree. The Asia Foundation is an intelligent institutional partner in this endeavour and is as committed as anybody is to achieving tangible impacts. It is well able – and best positioned – to assemble and narrate the evidence scientifically and dispassionately. Perhaps with some specialist help, but albeit as an internal (but of course independently critiqued) process.

Program governance

1. Governance mechanisms – a Joint [DFAT+TAF] Steering Committee (JSC) advised by a Partnership Strategic Panel and supported by a Joint [DFAT+TAF] Program Management Team – have also evolved over time and are much improved compared to CfC’s early years.
2. Described as “clunky but effective”, governance arrangements have yielded a program portfolio that is, as above, performing by most current measures. CfC has produced results of which both DFAT and TAF are proud and which Post finds useful and complementary to its other initiatives[[20]](#footnote-20). Notwithstanding the sensitivity of some of the policy reform topics, political gaffs and reputational risks have been avoided, both reflecting and reinforcing a high degree of trust in the relationship.
3. So, as with much else in the new CfC, there is a strong argument for saying program governance “isn’t broken, so don’t fix it”. However, in Part B below (‘Relevance’), I ask some questions (paras 89-94 below) as to whether governance mechanisms are necessarily nuanced to keep an eye on the far horizon and maintain the long-term relevance of a program like CfC within evolving contexts. Let’s not forget that CfC came about because nobody had asked those questions of [the then] AusAID’s previous substantive engagement with civil society in the Philippines, which had rolled on with extension after extension for over 25 years.

## CfC’s Relevance

1. The continued relevance of a program – a standard evaluation criterion – was always going to be the central question for this review, set in the context, as it is, of decisions needing to be made about the further extension of an already long-running program.
2. ‘Relevance’ is about whether the intervention is [still] ‘doing the right thing at the right time in the right way’ to contribute optimally to delivering on its stakeholders’ goals.
3. Do its objectives, design and programming choices [still] sit comfortably with regional, country, and partners’ needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so as circumstances change?
4. At first sight we can confidently say that CfC as a concept remains highly relevant.
5. Support for CfC and what it contributes to wider development and foreign policy objectives remains generally high across DFAT, at least among those who know the program and what it does.
6. The program’s partners (including the limited number of Philippines government stakeholders interviewed) also value and speak highly of CfC’s support to policy processes and – importantly – its constructive, pragmatic and flexible (and typically locally-led) ways of working.

**“… crucially, when discussing governance, it’s important to consider the demand side too – that is to say the capacity of society to itself engage on issues of governance and … to seek to shape … policies and institutions.**

**Here there is a huge role for civil society, and for development programs to help build civil society’s strength in this area.”**

A 2009 ‘Issues & Options Beyond 2010’ paper commissioned by the Australian Embassy in Manila

1. As already noted, CfC was born out of a process of reflection (text box, right), over a decade ago, as to how a medium-sized bilateral donor’s engagement can effectively support the resolution of thorny issues of economic growth and social inclusion in a middle-income country which is important to it, but which is no longer reliant on transactional aid flows to achieve its aims. And one where politics, governance and policy-making are particularly complex and unpredictable to boot.
2. We can thus say that intelligent, adaptive, support to policy reform that thinks and works politically and focuses on institutions (as in the ‘rules of the game’), as CfC does, is likely to be on the mark – and it has proven to be so.
3. In terms of efficiency and value for money, working on public policy may imply significant analytical and strategic time inputs (by both DFAT and its implementing partners), but is fundamentally low-cost in dollar terms compared to more transactional forms of development assistance. But the returns on investment – bang for bucks – in policy-reform processes are potentially disproportionality high, as they could impact on society and the economy as whole. And by definition – if implemented – those impacts will be promulgated and sustained well beyond the duration of the investment itself.
4. DFAT has also emphasised other important attributes of CfC:
   * Its ability to transcend and to adapt to changed political priorities and contexts through Philippines electoral cycles and administrations;
   * Likewise the continuity and stability of its utility to Post, notwithstanding the evolution of Post’s people, priorities and work-streams;
   * The high level of trust (51 above and text box, right) developed between Post and TAF in the Philippines.

**“We wouldn’t be running significant policy initiatives through CfC if there was not that level of trust.”**

DFAT Manila

1. More focused selection of reform areas (considered and approved by the Joint Steering Committee) has maintained CfC’s portfolio alignment with the overall thrust of DFAT’s country program, while also providing for more opportunistic exploration of emerging ‘policy windows’. These are always filtered through CfC’s largely successful ‘technically feasible and politically possible’ lens.
2. More recently the relevance of the portfolio to current and newly emerging priorities was demonstrated through its rapid and substantive pivot towards social and economic issues consequent to the COVID pandemic, as well as some strategic issues deriving from DFAT’s current consideration of wider / regional contexts (maritime policy, cybersecurity, and future of work).
3. However, a meaningful discussion of relevance is not simply about a program being “in line with” wider objectives. ‘Alignment’ is rather easy to claim where higher-level objectives are broadly-framed. Crucially it is also about whether it is the right thing being done in the right way maximally to contribute to the attainment of those objectives, and what success at that level would look like. So, for that reason this review asked the much harder question of DFAT as to what it (DFAT) is trying to achieve through its wider presence and efforts in the Philippines, and how. What’s the strategy? (By which I mean calculated approach, not a list of programs.)
4. Responses were varied and emphasised different things. (As one person put it, “there are many DFATs”. However, there were some common underlying threads:
   * Australia wants to remain an important and valuable friend to the Philippines for its foreign affairs and development cooperation objectives in the Philippines.
   * The contexts are evolving and of increasing significance.
   * Where the Philippines’ government of the day is considering important policy issues of acknowledged mutual interest, Australia would very much like to be called upon as a trusted partner and potential resource in such policy deliberations.
   * These comprise issues of recognised mutual (Australia-Philippines) interest and shared values.
   * Increasingly the perspective is a regional one, albeit within a Philippines national jurisdiction.
5. From this I conclude:
   * CfC’s continuing relevance is even greater than it was at the time of its AusAID-era conception and [but] is dependent on its ability to contribute to the achievement of DFAT’s substantive wider objectives, as for example mooted in 66 above.
   * This has significance in two broad areas of portfolio selection and program management:
   1. DFAT needs to be able to [continue to] set out its thematic and policy interests in dialogue with TAF over CfC’s direction and emphasis.
      * + This belies the observation – however well made – that CfC reforms are most successful when they are selected for their thinking-and-working-politically interest rather than the funder’s interests.
        + It may well include activities that are – tactically – building broader future value[[21]](#footnote-21) as much as any particular current priority.
   2. From some of the perspectives highlighted in 66 above, one might infer that CfC’s value, and its on-the-mark backing by Australia, needs to be seen and recognised more by the Philippines government than it maybe currently is.
      * + CfC and DFAT have together codified the consideration of how ‘visible’ DFAT and/or TAF should be in each CfC policy reform track. Classification essentially relates to the reputational and, potentially, political risks associated with a particular policy issue. It has probably erred on the cautious, but this has, as above, resulted in few if any gaffs or embarrassments to date.

However, this may also have served to obfuscate credit where credit is due, to some extent, and thus run counter to the tactics implicit in 66 above. (That said, a foreign government seeking credit for policy assistance needs to be a subtle business, as one former Philippines government respondent put it to this review.)

1. So broadly speaking, relevance is as much about tactics and the intents of DFAT’s wider presence and efforts (and, consequently, program governance) as it is about content.
2. And now more than before it’s about the *regional* context, too.
3. Whatever the future holds, short-term or long-term, it is clear that there is more to think about in terms of clarity of purpose, and CfC’s relevance to that, *on the DFAT side* than there is now on the TAF side. This review has, to my mind, opened an important and interesting discussion on that, with diverse and new-to-CfC stakeholders in Canberra[[22]](#footnote-22) contributing valuable insights.
4. Other design and conduct considerations fall out of this wider discussion of the relevance of CfC and its role in DFAT’s Philippines portfolio:

How CfC is imagined

1. If we are to imagine (as above) CfC as *“a way of engaging on important public policy issues”* as opposed to *“a governance project”* it would be valid also to consider:

Longevity

1. The initiative doesn’t really have a middle or an end. It is a continuous process – or resource – that supports processes of policy engagement which DFAT will likely always want to pursue. (Even if the subject matter changes as the context evolves.) CfC has already become increasingly integral to DFAT’s wider presence and efforts in the Philippines, albeit that it is (for tactical and operational reasons) implemented through a trusted partner.
2. But running somewhat contrary to that actuality, the CfC initiative has been projectised into bite-sized chunks of relatively short duration (with attendant decisions on periodic extensions and new phases and all that making those decisions entails).
3. A significant compromise to effectiveness that this ‘bite-sizing’ introduces is the need repeatedly to spool-down and spool-up CfC’s portfolio, reflecting these relatively short (in relation to the nature of policy reform) cycles of looming program end-dates, extensions and new phases. As can be seen from the graphic at para 23 above, it has taken two or three years to scale up the portfolio in Phase 2, notwithstanding the availability of a new level of funding from July 2018. No doubt a degree of staff churn and loss of experience inevitably also accompanies such will-we-won’t-we programming cycles.
4. I suggest the re-imaging of CfC as a longer-term entity than currently envisaged – not a project with any arbitrarily defined end. Of course, budget cycles and funding streams would vary over time and would have to be accommodated, but they don’t in themselves, in advance, need to define the entity’s beginning, middle or end.
5. The continuity of the initiative would shift from being defined by dates to being defined by ongoing and largely internal (as opposed to repeated external) analysis of its continuing relevance and effectiveness. There would have to be appropriate – perhaps ‘smarter’ forms of – incentives, checks and balances in any partnership agreement over the ongoing substance, process and values of the program and its external relationships.

New metrics of what success looks like?

1. Allied to this[[23]](#footnote-23) would need to be meaningful progress to the “next level” of monitoring, learning and evaluation referred to in Roche’s MLE review (footnote 5) – and, in my view, routine and credible analysis of CfC’s contribution to delivering important policy outcomes.
2. From the beginning, CfC, and therefore Post, has found it difficult to narrate the kind of ‘results’ that are sought under more traditional notions of what aid-funded programs are supposed to deliver. Graham Teskey in his ‘afterword’ to CfC’s book on thinking and working politically in development (footnote 7 above) posited that the demand for linear cause-and-effect results attributed to project interventions would be the downfall of adaptive, ‘doing development differently’, programs. I don’t think that is inevitable, but (re)defining what success *does* look like for such a program has, certainly, to be a priority.
3. My view is that Post’s messaging about CfC’s value and impacts has to be communicated with renewed vigour and in more modern, progressive and strategic terms. Terms that relate to what CfC is to DFAT in this new era of integration of aid with foreign affairs and DFAT’s wider agendas. Too little is understood in Canberra about the remarkable (if subtle) integration of aid with wider foreign affairs interests that is CfC. CfC is not just an aid-funded program *‘in line with’* broader DFAT country-programming parameters, but it is – much more interestingly – actually an instrument integral to and delivering on the objectives of Australia’s wider presence, efforts and approaches – not least in the kind of middle-income South East Asian country whose prosperity and stability is important to Australia.
4. At a purely practical level that will help generate a better and more relevant concept of how CfC’s performance should be gauged. At the more strategic level it will demonstrate how development initiatives are adapting and contributing to a new set of parameters defining modern aid engagement.
5. However, this raises obvious further questions for TAF and how it wishes to be perceived or called upon, and those needs discussing.

The structure of the partnership and its implications

1. From its concept stage, CfC was configured as a direct aid grant to an international NGO for a number of reasons. The identification of relevant policy and civil society skills and experience was certainly one. But others were more tactical and related to managing potential reputational and political risks inherent to new approaches and ways of working in sensitive contexts.
2. Officially, grants "… help address one or more of the Australian Government’s policy outcomes while assisting the grantee achieve its objectives" (footnote 3 above). This implies a more subtle partnership arrangement than a customer-supplier contract for services provided. A direct aid grant might be said to be about providing resources for an established organisation to get on and do what it does best, confident that what it does is relevant to the grant-giver’s interests too. That confidence needs to be maintained, of course, otherwise the purpose of the grant becomes obsolete, at least from the grant-giver’s perspective.
3. Careful management of the relationships, described as “arm’s length”, with TAF afforded a “long leash”, has successfully allowed TAF the flexibility and authority to pursue CfC in its own style, while also allowing strategic input by DFAT.
4. Both parties have had to learn themselves into this subtle relationship, and have done so to good effect. There is inevitably sometimes mild contention over what “arm’s length” and “long leashes” look like for each party – particularly perhaps over choice of reform tracks (degree of interest to CfC in terms of its ‘thinking and working politically’ work streams *vs.* degree of relevance to DFAT’s wider objectives), and aspects of aid quality (gender, and monitoring, evaluation and reporting, for example).
5. I believe the now well-established relationship is productive and delivering. So, once again, there are good grounds for saying it’s “not broken so don’t fix it”. However, the question was raised in this review, as previously, as to whether there are other forms of partnership that should [also] be considered. Arguments put forward are around whether:
   * A competitive tendering process would provide optimal reassurance over value for money;
   * A wider pool of skills, experience and – in particular – networks (para 280 above) might be identified and tapped;
   * A contract for services (as opposed to a direct aid grant) might provide DFAT with more influence [control?] over the substance, process and qualities of the program (including things such as the range and qualities of sub-grantees and sub-contractors). This particularly in the context of the almost ten-fold increase in the number of reform tracks, with its attendant (potentially[[24]](#footnote-24)) increase in reputational and other risks. (‘Do no harm’ and safeguarding were examples given of such potential considerations.)
6. Countering such thinking would be:
   * The centrality of *trust* to the conduct of the initiative (para 62 and elsewhere), founded on close dialogue as partners with established reputations well beyond the program itself.
   * The observation that the majority of successful reform tracks relate to networks, contacts and relationships which predate (sometimes by a long way) the current program.
   * The strong, time-enduring, wider institutional backing that the established NGO provides in the context of, for example, the development and roll-out of thinking-and-working-politically concepts and approaches.

Inputs to CfC’s governance

1. As above (paras 50-52), the management of the DFAT–TAF partnership has been generally successful, with a high-level Joint Steering Committee (JSC), as well as regular but more informal dialogues, providing for productive debate over the program’s content and priorities, within mutually-agreed parameters. The JSC is informed by the contextual analysis of a Partnership Strategic Panel (PSP), comprising subject-matter specialists nominated by both DFAT and TAF. The program governance structure provides for robust and informed debate. A Joint Program Management Team translates the JSC’s decisions and priorities into programming action, as well as serving as the secretariat to the steering committee.
2. Overall, the structure and operation of the JSC and its supporting elements works and the contestability it provides is much valued.
3. My reading is that the analysis and discussions of the JSC and the PSP are structured around the performance and features of individual reform tracks, reform by reform. What I don’t read from the minutes of the JSC (I have not attended any meetings) is a structured across-the-board discussion of the overall emphasis and direction of CfC, and the continuing relevance *of the sum of the parts* to its stakeholders’ interests … which, from all of the above, I would suggest is the nub of the matter as CfC gets rolled on into further phases and extensions.
4. Similarly, I don’t read much about the assessment of CfC’s impact over time. (Or as I would phrase it, its *contribution* to higher-level policy outcomes.) Nearly a decade into CfC, is the JSC satisfied that the program is contributing meaningfully to policy reforms that make an important difference – and on what basis?
5. DFAT has found it difficult to maintain continuity of input to CfC’s governance from Canberra. In some ways this is an inevitable consequence of normal staff turnover, and changing agendas and priorities-of-the-day at HQ. But I was struck during this review by the interest in CfC shown by units in Canberra that have to date had relatively little to do with the program – particularly those working on DFAT’s strategies for the region as a whole, not least in terms of how aid is best configured in middle-income countries. (To date Canberra’s involvement with CfC has tended to focus on governance as a sectoral / thematic interest.)
6. I suggest some reflection on what kind of input to CfC’s joint direction is most strategically fit-for-purpose in terms of considering CfC’s longer-term substance and performance, and its relevance in an evolving context. This might include more emphasis than at present on:
   * Retrospectively: the analysis of CfC’s contribution to bringing about change, discussed throughout this report[[25]](#footnote-25);
   * Prospectively: the relevance of CfC (its overall balance, methods and products) to evolving social, economic and political contexts.

The relevance of Component 2

1. ‘Component 2’ – building capacity in development entrepreneurship – was introduced to Phase 2 in response to earlier concerns about the sustainability and replicability of CfC approaches, given the centrality of a small pool of long-serving TAF staff to their success. This assumes that CfC is, in part, a capacity-building project.
2. A lot of the argument presented in this report focuses on ‘reimagining’ CfC as something more strategic and, among other things, a longer-term process of policy engagement relevant to DFAT’s higher-level presence and efforts in the country. In that context it is less obvious to me whether Component 2 – while very worthy – logically sits on the same platform as the rest of CfC.
3. Even in the event of a decision that Component 2 does properly rest within the main body of CfC, there would need to be further reflection, as the mentees and trainees ‘graduate’, on whether they have the impact intended in the absence of supportive organisational resources (such as is clearly the case with TAF’s own in-house development entrepreneurs). ‘Capacity building’ is always so much more than just ‘training’, and invariably involves significant organisational and institutional adjustments too. It was beyond the scope of this review to investigate this.
4. That said, there are acknowledged wider benefits to supporting tomorrow’s leaders on their paths to becoming influential actors and shapers of national development.

Anyone for an evaluation?

1. Finally, all this may to lead to a conclusion over whether and how CfC should be evaluated in due course. There is little appetite for an after-the-event independent evaluation and, as far as I can see from the data available, it would be very difficult to ‘value’ CfC in such a conventional way unless considerable econometric and other resources were thrown at it.
2. Throughout this and earlier reviews I have suggested that much more useful would be the analysis of CfC’s *contribution* to observed, meaningful, change (para 41 above). Furthermore (paras 48 & 49) I suggest that this is so important and integral to understanding what CfC should do over its implementation that this should be configured as a continuing internal MLE process, not as a one-off or periodic external event.
3. But there’s a process involved in configuring the process: DFAT and TAF need to consider the implications of any of this and other reviews’ recommendations, reflect on what success really looks like at the most strategic level, and from that establish how and where ‘contribution’ would most appropriately be analysed.
4. Some useful initial readers on contribution analysis include:
   * A discussion of the thorny issue of making claims about causation in complex contexts:

<https://www.betterevaluation.org/sites/default/files/ILAC_Brief26_Making%20causal%20claims_2.pdf>

* + Approaches to ‘contribution analysis’:

<https://www.intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Contribution-analysis.pdf>

<https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/70124/ILAC_Brief16_Contribution_Analysis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

<https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/contribution_analysis>

## Conclusions & Recommendations

1. By the measures currently applied to CfC, we can say that the program is **performing well**. (This includes its performance within new parameters and priorities introduced under COVID-19.)
2. Similarly, in terms of the social, economic and developmental contexts at the time of its design and now, CfC, in its objectives and ways of working, remains **highly relevant** and is **valued**.

Immediate action:

Recommendation 1

1. For those reasons CfC **deserves to be granted its putative extension**. There is merit in any extension taking the program through and beyond the next elections (in 2022), such that it can then reassess where the program stands under the new administration, once its priorities are known. Extending the current programto 2024 (as already mooted) is therefore rational.

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| **Recommendation 1** | Extend the current program to 2024  *(Post in dialogue with TAF)* |

Recommendation 2

1. With or without any ‘re-imagination’ of CFC (recommendations below), TAF should immediately invest in better understanding and articulating CfC’s **contribution to change** (not just policy acceptance). (Paras 43 to 49)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Recommendation 2** | Commence immediately – as a condition of extension – the institutionalisation of contribution analysis with CfC’s approach to monitoring, learning and evaluation. This may require external advice, but it should be an internal (but independently critiqued) and ongoing function.  *(TAF in close dialogue with Post and final sign off by the JSC)* |

DFAT processes (to start now):

Recommendation 3

1. In examining CfC’s relevance, this review encouraged DFAT stakeholders to discuss a more strategic relevance: **relevance to the more fundamental purpose of Australia’s presence and efforts in the region and this middle-income country in particular** and the modern – and meaningful – integration of aid with wider foreign affairs and other interests. At this level, CfC’s approaches and ways of working on policy reform become **even more relevant**.
2. If CfC and its ways of working are indeed something of particular relevance to wider DFAT interests, beyond its original AusAID-era objectives, essentially constituting a *process of policy engagement*, then we **might imagine CfC slightly differently**:

* It becomes a process or style of working, not a project, integral to DFAT’s wider ongoing presence and efforts and with no readily defined end-point;
* ‘What success looks like’ needs to be defined in terms of CfC’s utility to these wider, more strategic, DFAT interests;
* The selection of reform tracks might (in the main but not exclusively) display increasing proximity to DFAT interests of the day.

1. Such re-imagination of what CFC ‘is’ would have **implications for its governance**, and probably in the longer term the nature of its agreements (particularly in terms of longevity and how that is provided for).
2. But all of that is **contingent on developing a new clarity of purpose**, on the DFAT side now, over what it wants to get out of CfC, why and how … and how that is communicated within DFAT to ensure a proper understanding of the program and how it should be judged and valued.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Recommendation 3** | The debate about how CfC fits with DFAT’s modern agenda, how it can contribute and what success looks like, should be broadened and deepened through a deliberate Post-led internal dialogue.  *(Post with Canberra)* |

Recommendation 4

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Recommendation 4** | Review how Post communicates CfC’s place in and utility to DFAT’s most strategic agendas, what success looks like beyond short-term ‘results’ and how such a program should be imagined as an element of a modern aid-integrated country presence.  *(Post)* |

Having determined those (recommendations 3 & 4 above) processes:

Recommendations 5 - 8

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| --- | --- |
| **Recommendation 5** | Consider whether CfC should be reimagined as a longer-term feature of the country program (with appropriate in-built checks and balances), and how, with continuity being determined not by dates but by demonstrating its continuing relevance and contribution to change in evolving contexts.  *(Post)* |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Recommendation 6** | Consider how (including through membership and members’ roles) CfC’s joint governance arrangements can capture the continuing relevance of the program *as a whole* to wider, higher-level objectives, both retrospectively and prospectively. (Paras 89 to 94.)  *(Post and TAF)* |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Recommendation 7** | Review the codification of CfC’s ‘visibility’ in the light of the internal discussion suggested in Recommendation 2 on the points raised in para 67 (ii).  *(Post and TAF)* |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Recommendation 8** | Review, in the light of decisions above, whether Component 2 should be maintained as a core CfC function or treated as a standalone TAF training and capacity-building initiative.  *(Post in dialogue with TAF)* |

Acknowledgements

1. Program teams in TAF and at Post worked very hard and efficiently to set up this ‘virtual review in the time of COVID’ and all 34 online meetings worked perfectly. I’m very grateful.
2. I also much appreciated respondents’ well-articulated insights and candour, and willingness to discuss such a wide range of issues and parameters. DFAT’s discussion of strategy at the highest level, as it relates to this sort of program, was particularly interesting and important.

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Annex 1

CfC Phase 2 Policy Reforms

Coalitions for Change creates spaces for local organisations and reform leaders to engage in policy dialogue on topics that are important to the Philippines’ social and economic development.

**Component 1: Policy Reforms**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theme** | **Broad Sector-Reform** | **No. of Policy Opportunities** |
| **COVID-19** |  | **2** |
|  | COVID19 response | 2 |
| **Governance** |  | **12** |
|  | Enabling Civic Participation during Elections amid COVID19 | 3 |
|  | Providing Decent Shelter for Informal Settlers | 2 |
|  | Promoting Gender-Based Violence Response Mechanisms | 1 |
|  | Addressing Teenage Pregnancy | 1 |
|  | Increasing Funds for Building Resilient Communities | 3 |
|  | Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) Transition Support | 2 |
| **Social Development** |  | **7** |
|  | Supporting Persons with Disabilities (PWD) Employment and Accessibility | 4 |
|  | Future of Work and Employment | 3 |
| **Peace and Stability** |  | **4** |
|  | Promoting Regional Stability and Preventing Violent Extremism | 3 |
|  | Learning Continuity | 1 |
| **Economic Reform** |  | **18** |
|  | Agriculture Productivity | 1 |
|  | Rationalizing Tax Incentives | 2 |
|  | Safer Aviation | 3 |
|  | Improving People's Mobility | 3 |
|  | Improving Land Governance | 3 |
|  | Increasing Investments | 1 |
|  | Improving Internet Connectivity | 5 |
|  | **Total Number of Policy Opportunities** | **43** |

**Component 2: Leadership and Coalition Development**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Learning Streams: Webinars, Online Course and Mentoring | **3** |

*Source: TAF/CFC Program Management Dashboard @ 19/3/21*

Annex 2

What CfC ‘coalitions’ comprise

(A submission to this review)

Jaime Faustino


*TAF CfC Strategic Adviser*

We think coalitions are a platform to help reformers influence the public policy process.

Almost all coalitions are informal in that they do not create a formal organization with a set of procedures. Often they may have a broad “statement of principles” that organizations and individuals to sign on. “An example around CfC support to a local broadband coalition follows. Part of the reason to keep it informal is to have the ability to take action quickly in response to events, pivot or adjust any and all part of the theory of change including the specific reform, strategies etc. So for example when we think a statement is needed, the various “informal” coalition members get a copy of the draft statement and can opt in or out. The more traditional formal coalitions that donors support here, in the Pacific Islands, PNG, and Indonesia tend to get bogged down on internal consensus-building processes. The formal coalition approach is incorrect but the informal structure allows for greater speed, flexibility, and focus.

To clarify some of the roles between the Foundation and our partners:

* In terms of selecting, dropping, changing specific reforms, developing and changing strategies, activities and outputs, the Foundation staff and our partners (sub-grantees and sub-contractors or consultants) work on those together. In other words, there is very close coordination in those areas.
* In terms of execution like talking to legislators or government agency staff or business associations and building the informal coalition of people and organizations in and out of government, that is done by the partners (sub-grantees or consultant) because it is in the public political arena. We see them as responsible for designing and implementing the technical and political dimensions of the public side of the reform campaign. [Graphic below.]



All activities are implemented with either 1) existing civil society organizations or 2) a group of consultants hired through sub-contracts who work as a team.

In all cases, the CSO sub-grantee or consultant teams, we think there are four roles that make a complete team: team leader, technical experts, political networkers, insiders. So for example, in tax reform we have insiders in the economic planning agency whom we work with hand in glove to introduce the reform.

In general we prefer to work with organizations through sub-grants. That is the DNA of The Asia Foundation. To restate, most sub-grants relationships are arms-length [but] the CfC version is to work very closely with them. In some cases we are in daily contact with them. In some of David Booth’s work between 2013 and 2014, you can get a sense of how he began to explain the difference in our approach:

* In his March 2013 paper [Facilitating development: an arm’s length approach to aid](https://odi.org/en/publications/facilitating-development-an-arms-length-approach-to-aid/) he argued for the more traditional approach.
* In his September 2014 paper [Politically Smart, Locally-led Development](https://odi.org/en/publications/politically-smart-locally-led-development/) with Sue Unsworth you can notice a subtle reformulation. “The central message is that donor staff were successful because they adopted politically smart, locally led approaches, adapting the way they worked in order to support iterative problem-solving and brokering of interests by politically astute local actors.”
* In a December 2014 [Development Entrepreneurship paper](https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Development-Entrepeneurship-How-Donors-and-Leaders-Can-Foster-Institutional-Change.pdf) he and I co-wrote, the reformulation shows up more clearly.

*“Structured properly, grants seem capable of providing the balance between, on the one hand, accountability for the action and the resources and, on the other hand, the autonomy critical to attracting the right set of leaders. In the required type of grant agreement, the broad objectives are agreed on, but workplans, activities and outputs are only indicative, allowing an iterative process to be undertaken. In other words, the activities and outputs are illustrative and are implemented based on assessments of what might be the most effective way to introduce a reform.” (pp. 27-28)*

But in some cases, for a range of reasons we have been unable to find an appropriate civil society organization. In those cases, we move to option 2 – assembling a team of sub-contractors. We often start with one or two individuals, noodle around, make educated guesses about which reform, test ideas and listen to constituents, identify and bring in the missing pieces to the team, create an informal coalition such as Move Metro Manila to give them a platform.

My guess is the selection of partners (whether through grants or contracts) is one of the most important keys to CfC’s success. The other is the development entrepreneurship process that helps us and our partners clarify, test, vet, pivot, adjust etc.

So both sub-grantees and sub-contractors are part of and leaders of the informal coalitions.

*Jaimie Faustino*

*CfC Strategic Adviser*

*The Asia Foundation*

*March 2021*

Move As One Coalition Logo



**Statement of Principles**

**Who are we?** Formed last May 2020, Move As One is a broad civil society coalition of 140 organizations and over 77,000 individuals advocating for the ₱185 billion Biyahenihan Mobility

Solutions Package to prevent more COVID-19 transmission.

**What are we fighting for?** We are working towards a safer, more humane, and more

inclusive public transportation system in the Philippines. *Ligtas. Makatao. Para sa Lahat*. (Safe. Humane. For all.)

**What are our key organizing principles?**

1. ***Prioritize Public Health.*** Expand active and public transport supply to prevent transmission of

COVID-19 due to crowding.

1. ***Push for people-mobility over vehicle mobility.*** Fight for active transport such as biking

and walking. Discourage private car use, which takes up road space.

1. ***Our road transport standards must be inclusive.*** This includes permanent protected bike lanes, wider walkways, ground level crossings. There should be no more elevated crossways to make it more accessible for our PWDs, senior citizens, pregnant women.
2. ***Remove the boundary system for PUVs.*** Pay of drivers and transport workers should be stable and independent of the passengers they carry.
3. ***Consolidate our PUVs for timely, predictable, and coordinated routes.*** Discourage competition on the road. There should be a “just transition” and “just reform” for both transport workers and commuters.

Annex 3

Review Schedule (January – April 2021)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Meeting** | **Date** |
| Discussion with DFAT re ToR etc.   * Inge Stokkel, First Secretary Development Section * Pablo Lucero, Portfolio Manager | 12 January |
| Orientation with TAF data sources | 13 January |
| Meeting with TAF Country Representative   * Sam Chittick | 1 February |
| Meeting with current DFAT JSC and Political Counsellor   * Richard Sisson, Deputy Head of Mission * James Yeomans, Political Counsellor   (Inge, Pablo, Tanya to join) | 3 February |
| Meeting with TAF JSC w/ Strategic Advisor and PMT lead   * Sam Chittick, Country Representative * Ethan Geary, Deputy Country Representative\* * Jaime Faustino, CfC Strategic Advisor | 4 February |
| Meeting with Joint-PMT Team   * Erika Geronimo, TAF - Program Leader * Patricia Taglay, TAF - Assistant Program Officer (M&E) * Pablo Lucero, DFAT - Portfolio Manager * Tanya Quijano, DFAT - Senior Program Officer * Marikit Castillo, TAF - Program Officer * Ria Tagle, TAF - Assistant Program Officer * Edgar Formento, TAF - Finance Officer * Inge Stokkel, DFAT - First Secretary (Development Section) | 5 February |
| Discussion with CfC Mobility Team   * King Ocampo, Program Officer * Toix Cerna, Consultant * Rob Siy, Consultant and #MoveAsOne Coalition * Jaime Faustino/Erika Geronimo * Patricia Taglay/Marikit Castillo\* | 8 February |
| Discussion with CfC Tax Reform Team   * Kimberly Pobre, Senior Program Officer * Men Sta.Ana, Actions for Economic Reform * Arjay Mercado, Actions for Economic Reform * Jaime Faustino/Erika Geronimo * Patricia Taglay/Marikit Castillo\* | 9 February |
| Discussion with CfC School Disruption Team   * Kathline Tolosa, Senior Program Officer * James Miradora, Program Officer * Erika Geronimo * Patricia Taglay * Marikit Castillo | 10 February |
| Discussion with CfC Gender Sector   * Steph Tan, Senior Program Officer * Hygeia Chi, Program Officer * Jaime Faustino and Erika Geronimo * Diana Kathrina Fontamillas, Consultant * Shebanna Alqaseer, Consultant * Patricia Taglay/Marikit Castillo | 10 February |
| Attend CfC’s ‘Thinking & Working Politically’ Book Launch   * London School of Economics | 10 February |
| Meeting with DFAT Political Section at Post   * Bianca Suarez, Maritime * Andie Fidelino, Cybersecurity | 11 February |
| Meeting with DFAT Philippine Section in Canberra   * Emma Stone, Director * Ben Cumming, Assistant Director * Bernadette Thompson, Assistant Director * Inge Stokkel, First Secretary Development Section * Thanh Le, Incoming Development Counsellor * Pablo Lucero, Portfolio Manager * Tanya Quijano, Senior Program Officer | 12 February |
| Meeting with former DFAT Governance Senior Program Officer   * Karl Manalang | 12 February |
| Meeting with TAF PSP Members   * John Sidel, London School of Economics, CfC Action Researcher * Jaime Chua, TAF Public Sector Development and Services (PSDS) Director | 12 February |
| Meeting with DFAT’s Regional Engagement Branch and Program Design Team   * Emily Rudland, Regional Engagement Branch Head * Kirsten Hawke, DFAT Program Design | 15 February |
| Meeting with PSP Members   * Sofia Ericsson, PSP Member * Nick Smith, former PSP Member | 15 February |
| Meeting with Christine Bantug   * TAF Timor Leste Program Management Manager * Former CfC Program Lead | 15 February |
| Discussion with CfC Disability and Elections: Vulnerable Sector Office with Commission on Elections   * Steph Tan, SPO * Chrys Pablo, former SPO * Jaime Faustino/Erika Geronimo * Atty. Ona Caritos, Legal Network for Truthful Elections * Brizza Rosales, LENTE * Patricia Taglay/Marikit Castillo\* | 16 February |
| Meeting with Component 2 Team   * Rene Sanapo, Lead * Jaime Faustino * Erika Geronimo * Ria Tagle * Levi Miscala * Alyssa Alfonso * Patricia Taglay/Marikit Castillo\* | 16 February |
| Meeting with Chris Roche   * La Trobe University, Independent Reviewer, CfC MLE System (June 2020) | 16 February |
| Discussion with CfC Cybersecurity Sector   * Kimberly Pobre, Senior Program Officer * Bas Claudio, PO * Grace Mirandilla, Consultant, Better Broadband Alliance * Jaime Faustino/Erika Geronimo * Patricia Taglay/Marikit Castillo | 17 February |
| Meeting with PSP Member   * Paul Hutchcroft | 18 February |
| Discussion with CfC Inclusive Employment   * Regina Pasion, SPO * Bettina Bautista, APO * DepEd Director 3 Jennifer Lopez, Bureau of Human Resource and Org Development * Krissy Bisda, Consultant * Dada Alarkon, Consultant * Jaime Faustino/Erika Geronimo | 18 February |
| Meeting with former Development Counsellor   * Ben Davey | 18 February |
| Meeting with Angela Corcoran   * Assistant Secretary for the Southeast Asia Maritime Branch | 19 February |
| Meeting with Richard Moore   * Evaluator for DFAT/TAF Malaysia and Thailand Reform Partnerships | 20 February |
| Meeting with CfC Partner for Economic and Political setting   * Filomeno Sta. Ana, Coordinator, Actions for Economic Reform | 22 February |
| Meeting with Usec. Jonathan Malaya   * Department of Interior and Local Governance | 23 February |
| Meeting with former DHOM & Development Counsellor   * Mat Kimberley, former Deputy Head of Mission | 24 February |
| Follow-up meeting TAF Country Representative   * Sam Chittick | 24 February |
| Meeting with DFAT Economic Teams   * Jenni McEwin * Jed Sevilla * John Exequiel * Daniel San Jose * Madelaine Valte-De Jesus * (Pablo & Tanya to join) | 25 February |
| Interim Review Note submitted | 4 March |
| Debriefing with DFAT | 10 March |
| DFAT-TAF Joint Debriefing   * JSC * Joint PMT | 12 March |
| Draft Review Report submitted | 30 March |
| Follow-up discussions with Post | 6 April |
| Feedback on draft received | 16 April |
| Follow-up discussions with Post | 19 April |
| Final Review Report submitted | 21 April |

Annex 4

Terms of Reference

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| **Position Title:** | Independent Progress Reviewer for Coalitions for Change Program Phase 2 |
| **Program Overview** | The Coalitions for Change Program Phase 2 (CfC) is a direct aid grant to The Asia Foundation (TAF) to collaborate with Philippine partners and organizations who advocate for policy reforms that aim to strengthen institutions and contribute to inclusive economic growth and social development. The design of CfC is for AUD24 million covering 6 years. The initial agreement is for AUD16 million to be implemented for 4 years from 2018 to 2022 with an option to extend for 2 more years from 2022-2024 subject to favourable assessment of the initial 4-year implementation. CfC supports policy makers and reform champions from government, civil society, academic community and the private sector in pursuing technically sound and politically possible reforms. CfC builds on the gains and lessons from Phase 1 under the *Australia-Asia Foundation Partnership* *in the Philippines* (AUD 42 million; 2011-18). CfC has a new, albeit small, component which aims to identify and develop the skills and knowledge of reform leaders and champions who could push for their own reforms or work with CfC. CfC contributes to Australia’s development cooperation objective of building stronger institutions for transparent and accountable governance in the Philippines. Gender equality, disability, and social inclusion dimensions are mainstreamed into the program’s reform work. The end-of-program outcome is to have transformative reforms[[26]](#footnote-26) effectively implemented. Intermediate outcomes are: (a) reforms are adopted by relevant agencies; and (b) reform leaders identified and acted on policy reform opportunities. Corresponding outputs are: (a) policy-making supported and influenced; and (b) capabilities of leaders and potential leaders developed to apply development entrepreneurship[[27]](#footnote-27) principles, of which greater than or equal to 50 percent are women. As an adaptive program, CfC puts emphasis on iterative learning where implementation strategies are regularly assessed and recalibrated.  Although designed to span six years, DFAT and TAF signed a four-year (2018-2022), AUD16 million grant agreement for phase 2 noting the program will be reviewed at midpoint to assess its effectiveness, efficiency and continued alignment with the priorities of the Philippines and Australian governments, prior to completing the final 2 years (2022-2024).  CfC provides financial and technical support to build the capacity of formal and informal coalitions and build knowledge through evidence-based research in support of reforms including priority sectors of the Australian development cooperation program in the Philippines. CfC reform areas include a set of completed and ongoing reform activities as well as delivery of leadership and coalition development trainings:  Component 1: Policy Reform Implementation:   * Governance * Economic * Social development and * Peace and stability); and   Component 2: Leadership and coalition development through development entrepreneurship (i.e. workshops, talks, mentoring and building a community of practice).  Since March 2020, Coalitions for Change pivoted majority of its activities to respond to the needs, requirements and priorities of the Philippine Government as well as to align with the Australian Government’s Partnerships for Recovery strategy and Philippines Program Country Response Plan to address the COVID-19 pandemic through health security, stability and economic recovery.  CfC has the following governance arrangements:   1. The Joint Steering Committee (JSC) is the highest governing body of the CfC. The JSC is comprised of two representatives from each organisation and co-chaired by the Deputy Head of Mission of the Australian Embassy in the Philippines (Manila Post) and Country Representative of TAF. The JSC meets on a quarterly basis with strategic-setting occurring every mid-year in the approval of Annual Plans). The JSC provides overall guidance on the program including decisions on budgets, activities, and strategies as well as in starting, continuing, and stopping reform initiatives. 2. The Partnership Strategic Panel (PSP) is the advisory body of the JSC. They provide high-quality strategic input, quality assurance, and technical contestability to improve the quality of activity planning and strategies of CfC activities. The PSP reviews and shares insights on reform updates and proposals from reform teams to assist in ensuring they are responsive to CfC’s transformative criteria. They offers advice to the JSC in pursuing or stopping reforms. Currently, the panel is composed of two independent academics and one senior official each from TAF San Francisco and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Canberra. 3. Manila Post and TAF operational staff composed of program managers and officers make up the Joint Program Management Team (PMT). The Joint PMT serves as CfC’s operational and coordination body. It provides technical secretariat support to JSC. TAF PMT manages day-to-day operations while Post PMT manages the agreement and coordinates with subject matter specialists at Post in the review of reform initiatives to ensure joint learning and complementation of programs across DFAT portfolios.   A Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation (MLE) Review and GEDSI Assessment of CfC was conducted by Chris Roche of La Trobe University from May to June 2020. The report concluded that CfC’s MLE system is in good shape and the program is compliant with DFAT’s MLE standards.  Commissioned by TAF, Duncan Green of Oxfam GB conducted a review of CfC in the second quarter of 2019. The review found that the program has much to share for the broader aid community, in particular reform movements that employ iterative and adaptive programming.  Both Green’s and Roche’s reviews have found that CfC is well-placed to contribute to the broader aid community of adaptive programming and management. CfC has been successful in doing reforms through local leaders, in encouraging contestability, and in putting in place a well-structured yet flexible MLE system. However, the program can still make further progress. CfC could improve its GESI analysis and considerations, governance arrangement, sustainability via its Component 2, and generating evidence for impact.  DFAT’s partnership with TAF has evolved alongside Australia’s recognition that it needs to change its way of delivering its development cooperation program in engaging middle-income countries like the Philippines. The Philippines program, for some time, has featured a mix of politically-adaptive policy reform work, like CfC, to complement technical assistance and building the capacity of institutions. This mixture of modalities in delivery aims to effectively implement programs and leverage resources, not just from government, but from a wide range of stakeholders. TAF, with its deep networks and familiarity of socioeconomic and political terrain of the Philippines, holds proof that they can pursue meaningful reforms across different thematic areas. |
| **Objectives** | The Independent Progress Review (IPR) is expected to assist Manila Post determine whether a program extension beyond June 2022 is warranted based on: (a) how the program is tracking against its stated end-of-program outcomes; (b) continued relevance of the program objectives as well as effectiveness of the partnership and operational arrangements; and (c) if and how the program remains strategically responsive to Australia’s interests in the Philippines, including as stated in DFAT’s Partnerships for Recovery Strategy Document and Manila Post’s COVID-19 Country Response Plan. The IPR will present recommendations on program management and implementation arrangements, and options moving forward. |
| **Scope and Focus** | 1. The assessment will cover the first two-and-a-half years (July 2018 – December 2020) of implementation. 2. The assessment will use DFAT’s monitoring and evaluation guidelines. TAF’s MLE system can support the assessment, noting the adaptive and non-linear nature of the program. Below are the key review questions:   Based on the review’s assessment of the program’s performance to date against its end-of-program outcome, is there merit in continuing CfC until 2024 and/or beyond?   * + How is the program performing against its end-of-program outcome of having transformative reforms implemented? How is it performing against the intermediate outcomes (e.g. reforms are adopted by relevant agencies; leaders identify and act on policy reform opportunities)?   + Is the CfC design still relevant to achieve its program objectives? What partnership and/or operational arrangements should be kept and what should be reconsidered?   How can adaptive and flexible programs like CfC remain relevant in advancing Australian and Philippine interests as the country progresses towards advanced middle-income country status and considering the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic? |
| **Scope of Services** | The independent progress reviewer will provide the following services:   1. Read the list of documents provided; including previous related independent reviews (e.g. MLE review) and ensure that the IPR builds on those issues and recommendations 2. Understand the changing environment within DFAT in terms of its emerging Partnerships for Recovery agenda and the Philippines regulatory regime under COVID19 3. Noting the current COVID-19 pandemic, plan and conduct the independent progress review virtually utilising the appropriate mechanisms and platforms; 4. Participate in a verbal briefing (with Post by phone and email on key issues particularly in developing the review plan prior to actual review); 5. Initial planning, allocation of tasks and review of relevant documents/materials[[28]](#footnote-28); 6. Liaise with Post to finalise the review plan, schedules of meeting and arrangements. The review plan should meet DFAT’s Aid Program Monitoring and Evaluation Standards (Independent Evaluation Plans – Standard 5) and consider TAF’s Strategy Testing approach to monitoring, learning and evaluation; 7. Conduct consultations with internal stakeholders in Post (Deputy Head of Mission; Counsellor Development; Governance Team; First Secretary Development; Portfolio Manager Governance; other Counsellors, First Secretaries, and Portfolio Managers for parts of Post with an interest in CfC); 8. Attend a briefing session on CfC’s MLE system and discussion around the MLE program management tool of a specific reform 9. Conduct consultations with external stakeholders, including:  * TAF (Country Representative, Deputy Country Representative, TAF Program Management Team, and reform teams); * Selected CfC grantees, sub-partners and individual coalition members; * Members of the Partnership Strategic Panel (current and previous[[29]](#footnote-29) members, if possible); * Key former DFAT and TAF personnel who have been directly and indirectly involved in the management, implementation and monitoring of CfC;  1. Provide high quality, independent and professional advice and expertise to ensure that objectives of the IPR are met; 2. Advise DFAT of any risks, concerns, or issues that may adversely impact on the conduct of the review in a timely manner; 3. Provide well-written reports in a format to be agreed with DFAT; 4. Use evidence to support the review and final assessment; and,   Provide exit debriefing to DFAT and TAF. |
| **Deliverables / Reporting Requirements** | The independent progress reviewer is expected to deliver the following documents and reports:   1. A review plan – providing details on how the evaluator will execute the progress review. The plan should include inputs, assumptions, approaches, guide questions, timeframes and corresponding deliverables. The plan will be finalised after consultation with DFAT and TAF. (DFAT Aid Program Monitoring and Evaluation Standards – Independent Evaluation Plans Standard 5) <https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/monitoringevaluation-standards.pdf> ; 2. Submission of a mid-review note (no more than 4 pages) on preliminary findings and recommendations to be presented to DFAT and then TAF; 3. Mid-review briefing to present the preliminary findings and recommendations to DFAT and then TAF; 4. A draft IPR report with executive summary provided to Post and then to TAF in editable Microsoft Word format. The report will meet DFAT’s quality standards (DFAT Aid Program Monitoring and Evaluation Standards – Independent Evaluation Reports – Standard 6)   <https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/monitoring-evaluation-standards.pdf>  A final IPR report of no more than 30 pages in length (excluding annexes and in editable Microsoft Word format), with a standalone executive summary provided to Post and then to TAF. |
| **Timing** | The IPR will be conducted from January to March 2021. |
| Independent Progress Reviewer Responsibilities | The IPR will be conducted by an external evaluator who is not directly involved in the management and implementation of CfC. Recognising the benefit of having someone with sufficient appreciation of the objectives and rationale of CfC, the IPR may be undertaken by someone who has had involvement during the design, review or evaluation CfC1 and/or the current phase of the program.  The independent progress reviewer is expected to have skills and knowledge on:   1. Policy reform, advocacy and institutional strengthening; 2. Development effectiveness; 3. Program design; 4. Iterative and/or adaptive management programming 5. Gender equality and social inclusion; 6. Monitoring, learning, and evaluation 7. Governance (e.g. leadership, partnerships and cross-cutting issues); 8. Civil society engagement and coalition-building; 9. Research methods; 10. Facilitation; and 11. Report writing;   The independent progress reviewer is expected to have familiarity and understanding of:   1. Australian Government and DFAT policies; 2. TAF’s priorities in the Philippines; 3. Socioeconomic and political realities in the Philippines; and, 4. Thinking and working politically (TWP), development entrepreneurship (DE), doing development differently (DDD) and/or problem-driven iterative approach (PDIA). 5. CfC’s MLE system   The IPR will be conducted by a specialist with corresponding expertise and skills required as well as responsibilities:   * Must have (i) at least 10 years of experience in development effectiveness, program design, monitoring and evaluation, institutional development and evidence-based policy advocacy work; and (ii) good facilitation and writing skills * Key responsibilities:   + - Assess how CfC is tracking against its end-of-program outcomes;     - Manage the review and execute the review plan, conduct the review, and ensure achievement of IPR objectives;     - Produce outputs including the review plan, draft and final reports and presentation/briefing materials;     - Facilitate discussions and gathering views and comments from Post and TAF on IPR outputs;   Present findings and recommendations of the review to Post and TAF |
| DFAT Manila Post and TAF Philippines Responsibilities | The responsibilities of Post and TAF in the IPR will be as follows:  DFAT Manila Post   1. Managing the set-up of the review including drafting and finalising the terms of reference, selecting and contracting external expertise, identifying stakeholders to be consulted (particularly from DFAT Canberra), and providing advice to the independent progress reviewer on the reading list; 2. Provide the independent progress reviewer a briefing on priorities of Australia in the Philippines, how CfC plays a part in pursuing Australian objectives in the country 3. Provide the independent progress reviewer key documents relevant to the review; and, 4. Respond to the independent progress reviewer’s inquiries and requests for clarification.   TAF Philippines   1. Provide advice to Post on stakeholders to be consulted and once agreed, assist in scheduling and arranging meetings and interviews; 2. Brief the independent progress reviewer on CfC and as needed; 3. Provide the independent progress reviewer with TAF reports, knowledge products, and communication materials; 4. Respond to the independent progress reviewer’s inquiries and requests for clarification.   Where appropriate, DFAT and TAF officers and staff will join the independent progress reviewer in select meetings and interviews with external stakeholders. |
| Independent Progress Review reading list | The reading list for the independent progress reviewer will include, but not limited to:   1. DFAT M&E Standards (Standards 5 and 6); 2. DFAT Partnerships for Recovery strategy; 3. Australian Embassy COVID-19 Country Response Plan; 4. DFAT Gender, Child Protection and Safeguards policy documents; 5. Aid Quality Checks and Partner Performance Assessments; 6. June 2020 Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation Review Report by Chris Roche; 7. August 2019 Program Review Report by Duncan Green; 8. Consolidated Independent Reviews Results conducted for CfC 2 9. CfC Program Design Document (Partner-led design document and DFAT Investment Design summary; includes the CfC MLE Framework); 10. CfC 2 Operations Manual; 11. CfC MLE, [communication and knowledge products](https://asiafoundation.org/tag/coalitions-for-change/) (i.e. action research outputs, reform stories, reform book, among others); 12. CfC Annual Report (Year 1 and Year 2); Web-based Program Management Tools and Dashboard; 13. Duncan Green, “[Is this the best paper yet on Doing Development Differently/Thinking and Working Politically?”](https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/is-this-the-best-paper-yet-on-doing-development-differentlythinking-and-working-politically/) January 14, 2015 14. Duncan Green, “[How Does Coalitions for Change in the Philippines compared to other Adaptive Management Programmes?”,](https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/how-does-coalitions-for-change-in-the-philippines-compare-with-other-adaptive-management-programmes/) Sept 2019. 15. Sidel and Faustino, [Thinking and Working Politically in Development: Coalitions for Change in the Philippines](https://asiafoundation.org/publication/thinking-and-working-politically-in-development-coalitions-for-change-in-the-philippines/), July 2020 16. Graham Teskey review, “[One book, two blokes, many small bets, and some spectacular outcomes”](https://abtgovernance.com/2020/09/22/one-book-two-blokes-many-small-bets-and-some-spectacular-outcomes/), September 22, 2020 |

1. Component 2 aims to develop a larger number of leaders and development entrepreneurs who can build broad-based and robust coalitions and networks to pursue transformative reforms, through research, training, mentoring and communications. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Previously broadly defined as the individual, and aggregate of, non-governmental organisations that represent or advance the interests of society and its citizens. This captures more than simply the established ‘NGOs’ and community-based organisations. It would include, for example, business / private-sector bodies, the media, and faith-based organisations. Some would also include ‘societal instruments’ such as ombudsmen and elected representatives as being part of ‘civil society’ in the widest context. More conceptually, ‘civil society’ can be thought of as a coalescing among citizens — often in relation to the affairs of the state — in pursuit of public goods. ‘Civil society’ is both a voluntary social/political capital and an economic force. (Source: CfC Phase 1 Independent Completion Review, February 2018.)

   Of course civil society also includes those who want to capture the state for particularistic benefit – and that does not make them a force for positive change, let alone for the provision of public goods. (Paul Hutchcroft, in commenting on a draft of this report.) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Such ‘grants’ are not [necessarily] tendered contracts but financial assistance provided "to help address one or more of the Australian Government’s policy outcomes while assisting the grantee achieve its objectives". *(Australian Government Department of Finance RMG411.)* [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Duncan Green, ‘Coalitions for Change – Doing Development Differently in the Philippines?’, August 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Chris Roche, La Trobe University, ‘Review of Coalitions for Change MLE system’, July 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. John T. Sidel, ‘CfC’s Response to the COVID-19 Crisis: Initiatives, Impacts Implications’, July 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. ‘Thinking and Working Politically in Development - Coalitions for Change in the Philippines’, John T Sidel and Jamie Faustino, The Asia Foundation (2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Principally the lack of ability to discuss things off-line and informally, finite time for discussion and follow-up enquiry, and limited ability to triangulate / ground-truth published reports and documents. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Metrics in CfC’s process tracking are at this stage predominately at the level of activities, outputs and – perhaps less robustly – interim outcomes. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Although I’m not completely sure how all 224 communication products detailed in CfC’s Year 2 report will get utilised and by whom … [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. ‘Institutions’ *here* meaning the ‘rules of the game’ that provide the incentives and disincentives for change and different economic and societal outcomes. (For CfC the institutions in question relate in most cases to national legislation or departmental policy.)

    *Note however that CfC’s 2014 IPR presented two rival definition of ‘institutions’ – both of which are valid in the CfC context: First, in the* New Institutional Economics *sense of ‘the rules of the game’: the rules, incentives and sanctions that ultimately shape how individuals, groups, coalitions, organisations, sectors and perhaps whole populations behave—socially, economically, and politically. They may be written and formal (for example, legislation) or informal and implied (for example, societal conventions or traditions)—and many things in between. Second, in the mainstream political science sense of organisational structures that are characterised by coherence, complexity, autonomy and adaptability. Across these four characteristics, effective institutions (whether bureaucracies, militaries or political parties) have the capacity to endure over time.* [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Captured in a new online ‘Program Management Dashboard’, access to which is shared with DFAT. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The Program Management Dashboard tracks seven MLE ‘tools’ in real-time for each and every reform track, *viz.* theories of change, parameters of ‘transformation’, ‘Measures that Matter’, milestones and timelines of pivotal events, team composition & roles, analysis of coalitions and ‘action mapping’, and gender equality, disability & social inclusion. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. CfC defines a reform initiative as being “successful” (in this context) when its recommendations or policy products are accepted by the relevant public policy institution. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. They may already exist in part or in whole within an existing civil society organisation’s interests or they may be informal and temporaneous and constructed by CfC for the purpose in hand. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. 57 individual researchers, specialists, advisers, technical assistants, facilitators, ‘networkers’ and community organisers in Year 2. Some are assigned as team leaders for an initiative. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. This included the additional involvement of AER in COVID-related work. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. ‘Partnerships for Recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response’, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (undated) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. A ubiquitous problem for evaluators everywhere, particularly where programs see evaluation as some later person’s problem and don’t necessarily capture the necessary higher-level data as a program progresses. Perhaps one of the reasons why the value of traditional aid evaluations is being questioned. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Increasingly CfC initiatives are developed in dialogue with a range of Post sections and interests, including political. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. By recognising ‘future value’ we are acknowledging that part of CfC’s utility is about pre-positioning: maintaining the presence and wherewithal to engage quickly and flexibly in emerging but as yet unknown policy issues and priorities. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. To date Canberra’s interests in CfC have centred more on its approach as a governance-sector project, rather than its strategic content. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Indeed, it’s something for now, with or without re-imagining the longevity of the initiative. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. I stress “potentially”. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Including, I suggest, a role for the independent members of the Partnership Strategic Panel in critiquing the substance and process of the proposed internal (to TAF) analysis of contribution, and ‘what happened next’ analysis of higher-level outcomes and impacts (see para + associated graphic). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Transformative change is defined as strategically leveraged development that reaches well beyond the intervention itself by adjusting the institutions that shape the course of progress, at some scale and with prospects of sustainability. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Development entrepreneurship is the entrepreneurial thinking and principle to mobilise people, ideas and resources to navigate local socioeconomic and political realities. Employing the approach of thinking and working politically, development entrepreneurs begin by finding reforms that are 'technically sound' and 'politically feasible'. This involves 'learning by doing' and highlights the role of local leaders who lead and undertake reforms. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Including entries in the web-based program management tools dashboard. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)