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| 1. Partnerships for Infrastructure   Mid Term Review Report  June 2025 |

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Glossary

ACEASEAN Centre for Energy

ADIAustralian Development Investments

ADBAsian Development Bank

AIFFPAustralian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific

ASEANAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations

ASI Adam Smith International

AusAIDAustralian Agency for International Development

BRIBelt and Road Initiative

CEPCountry Engagement Plan

CSIROCommonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation

DACDevelopment Assistance Committee

DCCEEWDepartment of Climate Change, Energy, Environment and Water

DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

DP Delivery Partner

DRRCCDisaster Risk Resilience and Climate Change

EDExecutive Director

EFAExport Finance Australia

EL (1/2)Executive Level

EOIOEnd of Investment Outcome

EUEuropean Union

EVElectric vehicle

EYErnst & Young

FIFO Fly in fly out

FMOForeign Minister’s Office

FPICFree Prior and Informed Consent

G2GGovernment to Government

G7Group of Seven

GDPGross Domestic Product

GEDSIGender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion

GEMGender Equality Marker

GIHGlobal Infrastructure Hub

IFCInternational Finance Corporation

IKNIndonesia’s New Capital City

IMRInvestment Management Report

IOIntermediate Outcome

JICAJapan International Cooperation Agency

KEQsKey Evaluation Questions

KPIKey Performance Indicator

LACPLaos Australia Connectivity Partnership

LASEPLaos-Australia Sustainable Energy Partnership

LESLocally Engaged Staff

LGBTIQA+Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer/questioning, asexual

LTALong Term Advisor

MAPMekong-Australia Partnership

MELMonitoring, Evaluation, and Learning

MMW23Malaysia Maritime Week 2023

MOTMinistry of Transport (Thailand)

MPWHMinistry of Public Works and Housing

MTR Mid Term Review

MyHSRMalaysia High Speed Rail

NIANational Interest Account

NPPNew Policy Proposal

ODAOfficial Development Assistance

OECDOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

P4IPartnerships for Infrastructure

PAFPerformance Assessment Framework

PIDGPrivate Infrastructure Development Group

PMFPerformance Management Framework

POMProgram Operations Manual

PPIAFPublic-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility

PSEAHPrevention of Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment

PQIPartnership for Quality Infrastructure

QIIPQuality Infrastructure Investment Principles

RERenewable energy

SANSuitability Assessment Note

SDFService Delivery Framework

SEAGIFSoutheast Asia Economic Governance and Infrastructure Facility

SESSenior Executive Service

TATechnical Advisory

TAFThe Asia Foundation

TORTerms of Reference

TMRQueensland Department of Transport and Main Roads

USAIDUnited States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I) is Australia's premier regional initiative for infrastructure development in Southeast Asia. Established by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in December 2020, and valued at over AUD144 million, with the current phase to end in December 2025.

In March 2023, DFAT commissioned Alinea International to conduct a Mid-Term Review (MTR). Given the length of time required to develop a work pipeline for infrastructure, particularly across a range of countries, this MTR (commenced 30 months after program commencement) has served the function of providing early feedback on how one of DFAT’s larger and more complex programs is taking shape.

Early in the process of drafting the report, DFAT and P4I proactively began to make reforms based on early review findings. This saw the nature of the consultancy evolve from a typical MTR to an iterative process of feedback, exploration of issues, and action to implement recommendations. Consequently, significant parts of the initial report became obsolete. This report is therefore more akin to a report on a Review and Refocus approach (i.e., a process of evidence-based adaptation and continuous improvement) rather than a MTR.

# Achievements

**P4I has demonstrated an ability to respond in a timely manner to partner requests and provide quality services**. The MTR heard positive comments from counterparts and stakeholders about P4I and/or Australia's support for specific projects, indicating the program is positively contributing to Australia's strategic objectives.

**Feedback indicates P4I's government to government (G2G) work has been its most effective modality**. G2G activities are one of three P4I modalities, the others being infrastructure advisory services and knowledge sharing activities. G2G activities are supporting capacity building of counterparts and contributing to progress towards the programs Intermediate Outcomes (IOs) and End of Investment Outcomes (EOIOs) and helping to establish closer institutional relations with partners and thus contributing to Australia's strategic objectives.

**P4I is meaningfully integrating DRRCC perspectives across the program**. The program has capitalised on early efforts to embed internal DRRCC capacity and is actively integrating DRRCC into external activities. The Program has developed an effective tool that supports DRRCC mainstreaming and targeted activities and proposals.

**P4I is increasingly delivering policy advice and is beginning to see instances of advice being acted upon and policy change recorded**. P4I has provided policy advice to partners that has influenced strategy documents and roadmaps and has two activities in Cambodia that are expected to result in significant policy change in 2024.

**P4I is making progress integrating Indigenous Inclusion, in line with DFAT policy commitments**. P4I developed an Indigenous Compendium (as part of its GEDSI Strategy) that outlines the Program’s approach to Indigenous inclusion and has made progress against each of its four priority actions.

# Key Recommendations

**Greater coordination and consultation between P4I and DFAT Posts**. The MTR recommends greater coordination and consultation between P4I and DFAT posts to better inform activity development and implementation. DFAT has begun addressing this by involving Posts in reviewing activity proposals, including budgets. Additionally, there has been consultation on P4I's annual workplan and a joint effort to refresh P4I country strategies. DFAT has also established a coordination mechanism with senior post management, enhancing communication and collaboration. The MTR recommends that coordination and consultation mechanisms with posts be re-tested through the design of the next phase.

**The use, socialisation and coordination of P4I country engagement plans should be improved**. This would help strengthen P4I coherence, articulate the differentiated approach being taken by the program informed by country circumstances and support sector and activity prioritisation. To address this, country engagement plans are being updated by the program. The MTR recommends the use of country engagement plans be more actively considered in the design of the next phase.

**The way delivery partners are managed and collaborate could be improved, with a view to streamlining processes and optimising resource allocation to enhance operational efficiency**. To address this, P4I has completed Partnership Health Checks to improve ways of working between partners. Team composition is also being given more consideration during the evaluation of Activity Proposals.

**The Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) and Program Logic should be more closely aligned with DFAT's Design and Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Standards and Facilities PAF Guidance Note**. A review of the PAF baselines and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) has been completed through the quality assurance mechanisms established by DFAT.

**Separate the supervision and implementation roles in management of the program**. The embedded position of the DFAT Executive Director presents complexities and tensions for the program. DFAT has already refined the program staffing structure, including the role of the DFAT Executive Director. As part of the redesign of the next phase, DFAT will consider the scope, responsibility, and rationale for embedded roles.

**The geographical focus and sector prioritisation of the program could be strengthened**. In response, P4I is refreshing country engagement strategies in collaboration with posts to articulate an agreed approach and focus in key countries. Furthermore, the geographical and sector focus, as well as the location of P4I hubs/spokes, should be retested during the redesign of the next phase of P4I.

**There has been limited use of local staff in technical advisory roles**. To address this, DFAT has strengthened selection processes for activity team composition, which will be reflected in program documentation such as the Service Delivery Framework and key performance indicators. The MTR recommends that localisation be further considered during the redesign of the next phase.

**DFAT should procure and conduct an independent due diligence audit of P4I**. In response, a systems audit of P4I has been completed by the DFAT audit team and implementation of recommendations commenced. P4I Delivery Partners will be required to implement the agreed audit recommendations through an adaptation plan tied to contract milestones.

# Conclusion

This MTR has highlighted P4I’s achievements in promoting quality infrastructure, fostering Australian partnerships in Southeast Asia, and progress towards the program’s EOIOs. Action on identified areas for improvement has already begun and will continue to enable P4I to reach its full potential. By addressing these issues, and leveraging the program's strengths, P4I can improve its support for sustainable, inclusive, and resilient infrastructure development in the region.

In addition to the key recommendations in the Executive Summary, a full list of all MTR recommendations, presented in order of appearance throughout this report, are included at page 45.

Introduction

# Partnerships for Infrastructure

Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I) is Australia's premier regional initiative for infrastructure development in Southeast Asia. P4I was designed as a two-phase program with two four-year phases. After procurement, but prior to contract finalisation, the program value was more than doubled but did not result in any design changes. Given significant changes in context, Phase 1 was extended to December 2025 and a total value of $144 million, to allow for the design of a second phase of implementation.

P4I’s primary aim is to support quality infrastructure that drives sustainable, inclusive, and resilient growth across the region. It operationalises this by providing partnership assistance across *Government to Government (G2G)*, *Technical & Policy Advice*, *Project Advice*, and *Knowledge & Learning* (government partnerships, and knowledge sharing), which constitute its four principal modalities, or “*service lines*”. Through these, P4I provides specialised support to sectoral policy and regulation, procurement, and prioritisation and planning activities, alongside its two cross-cutting priorities (gender equality, disability, and social inclusion [GEDSI], and disaster risk reduction and climate change [DRRCC]), which it applies across all advisory and partnership services.

Since its establishment, P4I has formed infrastructure partnerships with eight countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). DFAT contracted Ernst & Young to deliver the program through a consortium involving Adam Smith International (ASI), the Asia Foundation (TAF) and Ninti One, working as One Team.” DFAT also embedded an Executive Director and Deputy in the P4I program office.

# Purpose and Scope of this Mid-Term Review

Consistent with the commitments made within the P4I Design Document, the purpose of this Mid-term Review (MTR) is to inform approaches to continuous improvement in P4I’s program performance, showcase P4I’s key achievements to date, enrich DFAT’s understanding of Southeast Asia’s complex infrastructure programming needs, and support strategic decision-making to inform a second-phase extension of P4I.

As per the Terms of Reference ([TOR] at **Annex E**), all aspects of the P4I program were available for consideration by this MTR. As such, the MTR comprehensively assessed all elements of P4I's operations and strategy to inform a thorough analysis of the efficacy, efficiency, relevancy, and value-for-money demonstrated by P4I’s: contributions to Australia’s strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific, cross-cutting priorities, delivery modalities; focus sectors, and management and delivery structure.

# MTR Timeline and Iterative Process

In March 2023, DFAT commissioned the MTR, to be conducted between May and December 2023. Alinea International (the “Review Team”) was engaged to undertake this consultancy in May 2023.

In December 2023, the MTR team produced a draft report that outlined P4I’s key achievements and also identified issues where the program could make improvements. Early in the process of drafting the report, the Review Team shared their findings with DFAT, enabling DFAT and P4I to begin the process of reform to address issues identified. DFAT’s willingness to work proactively in addressing issues saw the nature of the consultancy evolve from an a-typical mid-term review to an iterative process of feedback, exploration of issues, and action to implement recommendations. Consequently, significant parts of the initial report became obsolete because in some instances, actions to be recommended by the MTR were already being implemented, and in other instances new actions were implemented or proposed. This report is therefore more akin to a report on a Review and Refocus approach (i.e. a process of evidence-based adaptation and continuous improvement) rather than a mid-term review.

In December 2024 the MTR team submitted this final report, which seeks to outline the initial analysis, achievements and issues identified, as well as the subsequent actions that respond to these issues.

# How to Read This Report

Noting the iterative process that this MTR has taken, the report is comprised of three sections:

1. **Methodology** (pages 12-13). This section provides a detailed overview of the Review Team’s approach and conduct of the MTR, including a discussion of limitations.
2. **Analysis and discussion of findings**: This section consists of five chapters that consider P4I’s:

***Relevance***(pages 14-21)evaluates P4I's contribution to Australia's strategic objectives, contextualised by considerations of the Program's regional practice environment, alongside its regional scope and activity prioritisation.

***Impact and Outcomes***(pages 22-24)assessesP4I's progress towards achievement of its Program Goal and EOIOs, alongside its IOs. This section also assesses the adequacy of P4I's Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) approaches at all Program levels, including discussion of P4I's performance management framework (PMF) and program logic.

***Management and Delivery Structure***(pages 25-29) considers P4I's One Team approach, DFAT's role, including the role of the DFAT P4I Executive Director and the program's location, resourcing, and staffing profiles. It also considers P4I's governance and transparency, alongside a detailed assessment of the Program's value for money.

***Model***(pages 30-35) reviews P4I's delivery modalities and evaluates the quality and impact of P4I's advisory to date. It also considers the spread and share of delivery modalities across the P4I portfolio, alongside an assessment of P4I's sectoral engagement and prioritisation.

***Cross-Cutting Priorities*** (pages 36-44) assesses the integration of DRRCC, GEDSI, and indigenous inclusion across P4I, and partners' infrastructure processes, standards, and approaches.

1. **Recommendations** (pages 45-46). Following analysis of MTR accumulated data (document review, KIIs and FDGs, and a survey), the MTR identified recommendations for DFAT consideration. In partnership with the MTR, DFAT and P4I began undertaking a series of immediate actions and planning future actions that respond to the issues identified. The original issues and on-going actions are listed in this section.

Please note the *Relevance*, *Model*, and *Cross-Cutting Priorities* chapters also include case studies which highlight P4I’s achievements and performance to date.

Methodology

# Overview

The review employed a mixed methods approach, incorporating document review, stakeholder interviews, and qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis to comprehensively assess P4I’s progress and performance to date. Consistent with the TOR (at **Annex E**), the Workplan (at **Annex F**), and DFAT’s *Design, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Standards* (2022), the MTR sought to answer three Key Review Questions:

1. *What can be learned about the relevance of P4I (strategic alignment, appropriateness of scope and modality)?*
2. *What can be learned about the effectiveness of P4I (progress towards outcomes)?*
3. *What can be learned about the efficiency of P4I and the value for money it provides (value for money, governance and management models, delivery of outputs, and expenditure)?*

# Data Collection, Analysis, and Sense-Making

## **Project Inception**

Prior to formal commencement of Phase 1 of this review, the Review Team met key P4I colleagues for a series of pre-briefing and MTR kick-off meetings, held via videoconference in May 2023. These meetings were used to introduce and familiarise the Review Team with P4I and the primary MTR audience, and to test and share information regarding MTR context, framing, timelines, and approaches. The initial meetings were also used to formalise and establish the scheduling for regular MTR meetings. During Phase 1 of this Review, an overarching Review Workplan (see **Annex F**) was drafted and submitted, providing a detailed overview of factors for exploration to be pursued by the Review Team.

## **Literature Review**

The Review Team conducted a comprehensive review of key P4I documents provided by DFAT and P4I partners. More than 650 documents were reviewed by the Review Team. These included: design documents, activity proposals, cables, activity completion reports, MEL documentation and frameworks, annual work plans, Investment Monitoring Reports (IMRs), Country Engagement Plans (CEPs), communications materials, risk management plans and annual performance reviews, amongst others.

Additional literature including academic studies, grey literature, and other resources were also analysed to inform the Review Team’s assessment of P4I’s performance. Early literature and evidence review informed the key review questions as well as the Review Team’s proposed key respondents, the pre-consultation stakeholder survey and content of the semi-structured interview guide. The Review Team provided a verbal briefing and submitted a one-page overview of key learnings, insights, opportunities, and challenges identified by the Desk Review to DFAT.

## **Key Respondent Survey**

To support efficient stakeholder consultation processes, Alinea undertook a Key Respondent Survey (at **Annex C**). This was distributed digitally to 75 respondents between 20-30 June 2023, prior to the conduct of key informant interview and in-country missions (see below). A total of 46 responses were received, representing a 61% response rate. A redacted high-level analysis of the results of the Key Respondent Survey is available at **Annex D**.

## **Key Informant Interviews**

The Review Team conducted in-depth interviews with a total of 139 respondents, 16 of whom were consulted on multiple occasions. These respondents represented P4I staff, consortium members, government counterparts, and other stakeholders (see **Annex A)** for a full list of stakeholders consulted as part of the MTR, their titles, and their locations). Semi-structured interview guides were developed for each stakeholder type to frame consultations.

## **In-Country Missions**

To maximise nuanced and detailed data capture and analysis, consultations were conducted in-person wherever feasible, with in-country missions conducted in Thailand (19-26 July 2023), Lao PDR (26 July – 2 August 2023), and Cambodia (2-8 August 2023).

## **Aide Memoire**

Following comprehensive consultation with key informants, the Review Team presented initial MTR findings to P4I DFAT teams (Bangkok Post, ASEAN Mission, and Canberra) in a video-conference sessions on 18 and 29 August 2023. The Aide Memoire was also provided to DFAT in slide deck (.ppt) format to facilitate internal DFAT consultation, review, and validation prior to formulation of the Draft and Final Review Reports.

# Limitations

All reviews are subject to some limitations. In the case of this MTR, key impediments included the following:

Due to time and resourcing constraints, it was not feasible for the Review Team to consult with each of P4I’s stakeholders, nor observe P4I staff and projects in-situ in every partner context. This means that the views of certain key informants are not captured by the Review Team. To mitigate the effects of this constraint, the Review Team worked closely with P4I and DFAT to ensure the MTR collected qualitative data from the greatest number and diversity of informants possible.

Throughout remote interviews, Review Team members were comparatively limited in their ability to build rapport with respondents and interpret non-verbal communication, which may have constrained the degree to which the respondents were willing to share detailed information or views. Further, some of P4I’s delivery and government partners may have been self-constrained in their provision of frank views to the Review Team, as they likely wish to maintain strong working relationships with P4I. This is especially true of instances in which the Review Team was unable to conduct interviews with P4I counterparts and stakeholders without a DFAT representative present. In part to manage this limitation, all stakeholders were prompted to provide informed consent prior to commencing their interview and assured that any reporting of subjective views would be presented in an anonymised and de-identified fashion.

Activity documentation saved within the P4I SharePoint site was at times incomplete, meaning the Review Team was unable to identify, source, or access relevant products and evidence related to all P4I activities.

Relevance

# Evaluating P4I’s Contribution to Australia’s Strategic Objectives

Australia’s 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper* undertakes to pursue infrastructure financing arrangements that “*are based on strong, transparent rules, promote fair and open competition, and are transparent and non-discriminatory, with predictable regulatory systems*” as a means of facilitating Australia’s economic and security interests, and enhancing the peacefulness, security, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.[[1]](#footnote-2) It follows that fostering strong relationships with counterparts will be key to positioning Australia as a desired collaborator for times when infrastructure enabling and financing needs arise.

Australia’s ability to quickly service partners’ requests can positively support its degree of influence in the region, and to date, P4I has supported this agenda by demonstrating an ability to act responsively, generating meaningful relational benefits for Australia. Select examples include technical and policy advice to:

* **Enhance Cambodia’s cybersecurity law and regulatory framework**. This activity sought to strengthen capacity to manage critical information infrastructure and assist the Government of Cambodia to develop a framework for cybersecurity risk management. One MTR respondent reported that Cambodian Government counterparts had informed P4I that the program’s input was *“the best that they had received*” from any partner and that, for this reason they were eager to prioritise future engagement with Australia.
* **Enhance container processing and circulation in select ASEAN member states**. This activity sought to deepen ASEAN’s understanding of the critical factors influencing regional container circulations and provide guidelines to enhance processing procedures. Multiple interviewees raised this activity as an example of responsive advisory on the part of P4I, with one reporting that the relevant Deputy Secretary General had “*been deeply grateful for the expertise that P4I has been able to bring*”.
* **Enhance project management and procurement capability to support transition and construction of Indonesia’s New Capital City**(IKN). Following consultations, Indonesia’s Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) requested that P4I provide capacity support to the IKN initiative. P4I documents indicate that in making the request, MPWH’s IKN steering committee (ETF) “*expressed a desire to bring the best international examples of complex program management in a construction environment to the IKN project* [in order] *to help it oversee program activities in a more effective manner*”. P4I has since been providing management support to the ETF including by establishing project management structures and processes for the IKN Project Management Office (PMO), developing a PMO dashboard to track schedules, milestones, risks, and supply chain materials required for contracted physical works.

The Review Team notes that the investment is in its early stages and development outcomes are likely to need more time to come to fruition. An evaluation of the Program further down the track should focus on understanding the extent to which P4I is achieving development outcomes that are commensurate with the ODA investment. Given P4I’s EOIOs and IOs, close reflection is required to assess whether greater linkages can be made between the diplomatic/relationship outcomes and development outcomes, and/or whether diversified financing channels may be more fitting for a future iteration of P4I.

Even where partnership objectives are concerned, P4I has made some choices that indicate the Program may not be servicing its higher order objectives as effectively as possible. For instance:

* **Stakeholder feedback indicated P4I has a conservative risk tolerance that tends to cause delays in decision making** for feasibility and project preparation for investments, especially where the identity of the proponent is unknown, or remains undetermined. In each relevant instance analysed by the Review Team, existing investor demand was significant enough to suggest that opportunities would proceed to market regardless of Australia’s ultimate choice to support or not support feasibility and project preparation. However, the Review Team notes that quality project preparation takes time and needs to navigate risks and sensitivities. In light of this, the MTR recommends that a clear decision frame be developed to enable more streamlined decision-making processes on project preparation and other supports.
* **P4I has often sought to provide advisory support services** delivered by its partners for reasons of efficiency and in line with the contracted one-team model. This means P4I could be missing opportunities to connect partners with the highest quality or most relevant support available in the market. The MTR recommends that through the design and procurement of the next phase, the optimal balance between fast, flexible access to delivery partner expertise versus a facility type model (and/or broader partnerships approach) be re-tested.
* **P4I’s coordination with other infrastructure financing partners has improved over time, however, there remains scope to enhance this engagement with other relevant programs underwritten by DFAT and Export Finance Australia** (EFA) such as the AIFFP, *Australian Development Investments* (ADI; previously known as the Emerging Markets Impact Investment Fund), and regional infrastructure supports provided to ASEAN (e.g., project pipeline updates). We note that while engagement with the *Private Infrastructure Development Group* (PIDG) and the *Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility* (PPIAF) occurred throughout 2023, there remains scope to enhance coordination in ways that better align pipeline visibility for both parties*.* While resourcing constraints may explain this limited coordination, it also means the broader DFAT strategic ecosystems may be missing opportunities to benefit from the substantial market insights being generated by P4I’s regional engagement. A substantial share of the stakeholders interviewed as part of this MTR independently raised this recommendation with the Review Team and expressed confidence in the benefits enhanced internal and external coordination would bring to P4I.
* **The P4I “brand” could more prominently feature Australia.** P4I’s brand recognition is substantial for a nascent program, and there are many instances of partners expressing gratitude to Australia for P4Is services. This is a significant achievement across so many countries. Despite this, a significant subset of stakeholders consulted were unaware that the program is Australian led and/or Australian Government funded. This could be both an unintended consequence of P4I’s branding,[[2]](#footnote-3) and/or a result of how consortium partners are representing the Program when interacting with stakeholders.

# Considering P4I’s Practice Environment

Estimates as to the exact scale of the global infrastructure financing gap differ, though credible projections put it in excess of USD 15 trillion to 2030.[[3]](#footnote-4) Emerging markets and developing economies are home to the world’s most significant financing needs, with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) indicating that Southeast Asia requires year-on-year infrastructure financing growth of over USD1.7 trillion to meet demand.[[4]](#footnote-5) With annual infrastructure investment averaging only USD881 billion prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Southeast Asian nations are more incentivised than ever to seek alternative funding sources to help fill these gaps.[[5]](#footnote-6)

Much of this financing has typically been provided by sovereign lenders, in certain cases contributing to geopolitical tension and increased regional economic competition.[[6]](#footnote-7) Since 2013, China has provided upwards of USD1 trillion in infrastructure financing as part of its *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI). Of this, the *Lowy Institute* estimates that China provided the Indo-Pacific with an annual average of USD16 billion in economic infrastructure between 2013-2017.[[7]](#footnote-8) This has driven other sovereign lenders, such as the Group of Seven (G7) members, to enhance their own financing commitments. For instance, in 2022, these countries introduced the USD600 billion *Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment* (PGII), which incorporated the USD300 billion *Global Gateway* established by the European Union (EU).[[8]](#footnote-9) This followed Japan’s USD200 billion *Partnership for Quality Infrastructure* (PQI), and DFAT’s own AIFFP, which will disburse AUD4 billion in loan and grant financing to the Pacific and Timor-Leste. Likeminded countries such as Australia and the EU have undertaken to coordinate their infrastructure investments to enhance complementarity.[[9]](#footnote-10)

Box 1: Laos-Australia Connectivity Partnership

P4I is supporting a USD202.4 million World Bank project that will increase east-west connectivity between Thailand, Lao PDR, and Vietnam by providing technical assistance to the Laotian Government (GoL) and enhancing institutional capacity to enhance multimodal transport. P4I’s enabling services (delivered under the LACP) include project preparation and feasibility studies on upgrading cross-border facilities, feasibility assessments for the development of logistics facilities, and technical support for the development of Lao PDR’s first multimodal transport strategy. The review team understands that P4I is also developing a *DRRCC Green Design Package* *and GEDSI in Infrastructure Dialogue and Knowledge Product* to increase GoL’s institutional capability to implement climate resilient and socially inclusive infrastructure development approaches.

Despite the growth in these initiatives, Southeast Asian nations, and particularly lower income countries, often struggle to assemble pipelines of bankable projects that can attract the financing required to breach infrastructure gaps. In most cases, this stems from a lack of depth in capital markets, alongside lack of robust enabling policy and regulatory frameworks that present risks to potential infrastructure investors, and significant upfront barriers to accessing adequate project preparation expertise, in turn stalling financiers that would otherwise be poised to invest.[[10]](#footnote-11) P4I’s delivery modalities have been designed (in part), to facilitate the capacity enhancements, alongside the legislative, regulatory, and institutional reforms which are required to support this process.

P4I’s modalities are reflective of the fact that Australia’s historical comparative advantage is in providing technical assistance, rather than direct loan or grant financing (which demands a quantum of capital that exceeds the capacity of the ODA budget), that is more readily provided by likeminded donors, such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, noting the latter invests over USD1 billion per annum in humanitarian and development-focused infrastructure. In recent years, Australia has sought to overcome this limitation by expanding its use of blended finance tools (consistent with the recommendations of the 2023 Development Finance Review) such as PIDG and the Australian Climate Finance Partnership (ACPF). Initiatives such as the AIFFP and the new South East Asia Investment Finance Facility (SEAIFF) demonstrate that Australia can provide concessional and loan financing for foreign infrastructure when investment opportunities are deemed to be in the national interest (commanding significant financial and/or strategic returns); elements which are, in principle, more readily available in Southeast Asia’s comparatively advanced infrastructure markets. There is evidence of the reputational benefits that accrue to financiers of hard infrastructure, even when the opportunity at hand is not strictly bankable (or will not feasibly generate financial returns for the investor in the immediate term). For instance, throughout consultations for this MTR, stakeholders frequently raised Australia’s support for the first Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge and provided evidence of the many compounding returns to Australia that remain tangible, even thirty years after its completion.

Box 2: The First Thai-Laos Friendship Bridge

The First Thai-Laos Friendship Bridge was the first bridge to be constructed across the lower Mekong, establishing a vital connection between Nong Khai in Thailand, and Vientiane in Lao PDR. Australia, through the then Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), allocated AUD42 million in grant funding for the bridge's feasibility studies, design, and construction between 1991-1994. Following completion, the bridge has yielded significant hard and soft returns to Australia, Thailand, and Lao PDR, facilitating people-to-people links, and enhancing productivity, trade, and investment.[[11]](#footnote-12)

The work undertaken for Dili Airport remains the most robust example of contributing to financing facilitation of hard economic infrastructure, although the Review Team understands from P4I that the LACP, IKN, and PTP activities also contained “*aspects of project preparation work*”.[[12]](#footnote-13) This relative lack of activity may be partially due to the fact that the design of P4I’s progenitor, the Southeast Asia Economic Governance and Infrastructure Facility (SEAGIF) envisaged “*support for pilots and supplementary project preparation*”, rather than a dedicated financing facilitation activity stream. Infrastructure project preparation activities bring a unique set of risks, costs and trade-offs that must be carefully considered. These include high upfront costs of between 5-10% of investment value which may be unrecoverable in the event a project does not successfully proceed to completion, alongside sensitivities associated with land use, resettlement, and safeguarding, among other complexities.

There is an opportunity for P4I to help governments in the region, particularly the less-developed countries, to address their most pressing infrastructure financing needs, and to strengthen relationships in ways that enhance Australia’s influence in the region. The MTR recommends that next phase design actively consider the share of funding a future P4I should apportion to project preparation. A change in this regard would also be consistent with the recommendations of *Invested: Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040*, which suggests that “*The Australian Government should consider expanding its project preparation support, including for key projects of commercial, economic or other strategic value, with appropriate measures in place to mitigate risk*”.[[13]](#footnote-14) Notwithstanding this recommendation, the MTR acknowledges that P4I’s inception, which coincided with the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic, may have impeded elements or examples of project preparation which would have otherwise come to pass. Likewise, the rapid expansion in project budget and scope which took place between P4I design and program mobilisation is also likely to have influenced the initiative’s footprint throughout the period under review.

Box 3: Dili Airport Overview

In 2021, the DFAT’s Timor-Leste desk, in consultation with Post and the AIFFP, requested P4I undertake feasibility analysis to support AIFFP’s financing of select redevelopment components of the Presidente Nicolau Lobato International Airport in Dili, Timor-Leste. P4I’s support enabled the AIFFP to more accurately scope investment approaches, provide cost estimates, and enhance ODA strategies. Australia’s co-financing is also supporting the objectives of the 2019 Airport Master Plan, developed by the Timorese Government in partnership with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which recommended staged infrastructure redevelopment to enhance airport operations. P4I's contributions included project implementation advice and procurement strategy development for the ancillary facilities under AIFFP’s scope of work, including construction of access roads, airport rescue and fire-fighting facilities, airport security fencing, approach lighting and other vital airport infrastructure, alongside design work (provided via sub-contracting arrangements).

# Regional Scope and Activity Prioritisation

**P4I conducts work in eight countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam) in addition to ASEAN**.[[14]](#footnote-15) The development and income status of these partners is varied, with Malaysia boasting a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) per capita that is over seven times greater than that of Lao PDR. P4I’s design envisaged that country engagement would vary across three groupings, based on the level of development in each country and the type of support that would yield greatest impact.[[15]](#footnote-16)

P4I expenditure across partners has been subject to variation over time, including additional funding for ASEAN engagement. Up to mid-2023, P4I’s funding for the five poorest countries received 51% of all program activity funding. However, in the 2023-24 financial year, three of the partners (Cambodia, Lao PDR, and the Philippines) saw significant increases in their total shares of program activity funding (see Table 1 overpage).

**This evolving distribution of P4I resources indicates responsiveness on the part of P4I, and the initial trend in financing distribution towards more developed countries likely reflects the slower pace of and bureaucracy involved in working alongside less developed countries**. There are opportunity costs associated with all financing decisions, including P4I-associated investments. Going forward, and in line with currently available trend data from P4I, it is reasonable to expect that P4I spending will generate equal or stronger development outcomes in countries where the same ODA value would have been expended bilaterally. Similar to many donor-ODA-funded investments, P4I has a budget allocation that is expected to be fully spent within the allocation timeframe, and P4I has been subject to pressure to ensure expenditure of P4I funds within its allocated timeframe is fulfilled.

Table 1: Key P4I counterpart statistics overview

| Partner | GDP  (Nominal, Per Capita - USD)[[16]](#footnote-17) | WEF Global Competitive-ness Ranking Infrastructure (2019)[[17]](#footnote-18) | Australian ODA 2022-23 (AUD millions)[[18]](#footnote-19) | 2024 total value of P4I activity allocation (AUD millions) | % change on 2023 total value of P4I activity allocation | Current share of total P4I funding[[19]](#footnote-20) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Malaysia | 13,382 | 35 | Nil | 3.624 | + 34% | 6% |
| Thailand | 8,181[[20]](#footnote-21) | 71 | Nil | 4.668 | - 1.6% | 7% |
| Indonesia | 5,016 | 72 | 265.7 | 8.040 | + 7% | 13% |
| Vietnam | 4,475 | 77 | 61.7 | 5.779 | + 45% | 9% |
| Philippines | 3,905 | 96 | 68 | 7.294 | + 193% | 12% |
| Timor-Leste | 2,741 | - | 77.3 | 5.605 | + 1.5% | 9% |
| Cambodia | 1,924 | 106 | 46.7 | 9.819 | + 12% | 15% |
| Lao PDR | 1,858 | 93 | 22.6 | 14.168 | + 64% | 22% |
| ASEAN | 5,812 | - | 88.7[[21]](#footnote-22) | 3.876 | +1.6% | 6% |

A significant share of stakeholders interviewed as part of this MTR indicated a degree of confusion as to why certain projects were selected for prioritisation and others rejected. Going forward, closer consultation and decision-making frameworks that align spending with regional and bilateral priorities determined by DFAT would assist the program to achieve a greater level of coherence.

Box 4: Understanding P4I’s activity identification and prioritisation

P4I’s Service Delivery Framework (SDF) nominates a four-phase activity lifecycle, the first of which addresses both activity identification and prioritisation. The purpose of this phase is to “*generate and prioritise activities aligned with P4I’s portfolio in that country and sector, P4I’s goal, EOIOs and IOs*”, and is made up of five subcomponents, namely:

1. *Generate and identify opportunities* in collaboration with DFAT, Posts, counterpart agencies, and Australian Government stakeholders. Sources for activity identification include direct requests, prior or existing service delivery activity expansion, and the delivery partner networks and personnel.
2. *Classify activity and consult* in which opportunities are allocated against relevant program IOs, and provided a classification of either Principal, Significant, or Mainstream (do no harm) for G2G, DRRCC, and GEDSI cross-cutting themes.
3. *Prioritise activities* in which a Suitability Assessment Note (SAN) is developed to provide a high-level summary and initial appraisal of the proposed activity.
4. *Prioritisation Panel* in which a group of P4I staff including Program Executive, MEL, GEDSI, DRRCC and G2G advisers considers the SAN in broader context of P4I’s portfolio across countries, partners, sectors, and themes; feasibility; program budgets and risk; Australian Government priorities; and time sensitivity.
5. *Approval Gateway* in which opportunities approved by the Prioritisation Panel are cleared by relevant P4I staff and proceed to activity-lifecycle Phase 2: Plan and Approve.

In addition to nominating these steps to support activity identification and prioritisation, the SDF notes that “*while being responsive is a key characteristic of the program, P4I must respond not just to demand as it is expressed, but to respond with consideration of the Australian Government’s strategic objectives and P4I’s portfolio context, objectives and country priorities to ensure a cohesive approach*”. It likewise notes that “*P4I’s activity prioritisation process is dynamic to balance responsiveness and intentionality, while embedding strategic consideration, governance and risk management practices*.”

**P4I provided the Review Team with numerous examples of projects that demonstrated clear alignment with DFAT’s regional and bilateral priorities.** These included P4I’s engagements with:

* ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) to deliver the shipping container study in 2022 (see Box 7), alongside delivering advisory on an ASEAN pipeline project which was undertaken at the request of DFAT’s then Head of Mission to ASEAN.
* Thailand’s transport and energy sectors (see Box 6), which was developed with, and approved by, Bangkok Post.
* Timor-Leste’s Presidente Nicolau Lobato International Airport (see Box 3), undertaken at the request of DFAT’s Timor-Leste desk and AIFFP.

**These examples demonstrate that P4I has been proactive in working to attain greater programmatic and country-level coherence**, including by appointing a Head of Regional Engagement, and a small group of Country Engagement Leads, who act as coordination points for P4I’s bilateral engagements, often managing multiple countries at once. Expanding the resourcing available to this team will be critical to ensuring increased strategic alignment and coordination going forward.

The infrastructure space is crowded, highlighting the need to focus on areas of Australian comparative advantage while being responsive to partner government requests and priorities. For instance, P4I expended AUD1,766,708 to support the Thai Ministry of Transport (MOT) to transition Thailand’s public transport fleet to electric vehicles (EV) and, at the time of the MTR, was vetting additional supports to assist with implementation (although these have not proceeded). Although this work was conducted at the request of MOT (demonstrating strong responsiveness to partners’ and DFAT’s priorities, as discussed above), it represents almost 40% of all P4I spending in Thailand to date. This expenditure is particularly notable given that elements of this advisory were already being addressed by pre-existing support from Japan, Korea, Germany, France, the World Bank, and ADB, many of which also have representatives embedded within the MOT.

Impact and Outcomes

This section presents the findings and analysis of the MTR regarding progress of P4I towards achievement of its outcomes and makes some early assessments regarding impact. The MTR has two summary findings that pertain to a *cumulative assessment* of P4I’s impact generated since program inception.

1. There is some evidence of progress towards outcomes, under normal circumstances outcome achievement would be expected to be greater, however COVID19 was a significant barrier to P4I progress.
2. There is insufficient evidence to provide a *comprehensive* assessment of progress towards outcomes because of weaknesses in the theory of change (see **Annex B**) and the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to capture evidence of change.

**The mitigating circumstances for both summary findings are particularly the interruption of COVID-19 that delayed mobilisation and activity development across all P4I’s workstreams.** The Review Team notes that these impacts were especially acute for IO1 (*Australian and Southeast Asian government agencies and other institutions jointly program partnership activities*), with many MTR respondents reporting that P4I’s Government to Government (G2G) activities were impeded by lockdowns, travel restrictions, and other barriers to face-to-face engagement that facilitate productive partnership brokerage. There was more limited evidence that COVID-19 had a disproportionate effect on P4I’s ability to progress IO2 (*Southeast Asian agencies increasingly embed gender equality and disability and social inclusion into infrastructure decisions*) and IO3 (*Southeast Asian agencies increasingly integrate climate and disaster considerations into infrastructure decisions*). Other early-stage program-level challenges included the difficulty of standing-up a new investment across multiple countries, and difficulties associated with establishing and negotiating ways of working to support the “One-Team” approach (see the *Management & Delivery Structure* chapter for further discussion). Analysis throughout the body of this report indicates that some improvements have been made across all of these domains throughout the life of the program, although it remains too early to determine what effects these improvements may have on overall progress towards the Program Goal, EOIOs, and IOs.

# Assessing Progress to Date

It should be noted that under DFAT’s M&E Standards, an investment is not accountable for achievement of its program goal, but only the EOPOs and below.

* **EOIO 1 *(Strong partnerships among Australian and Southeast Asian government agencies and other institutions build regional commitment to quality infrastructure development)* and EOIO 2 *(Southeast Asian agencies improve decision-making and practice towards quality infrastructure)***

The P4I Program Logic Narrative (2022) states that evidence the EOIOs have been achieved is only expected to emerge “*by the end of the Program*”. Whilst this is self-evident, P4I should also be able to demonstrate progress towards the outcomes at this stage of programming. The Review Team has not found sufficient evidence of this progress against EOIO 1 and 2 in all cases. The review team recognises however, that it is not unusual to experience difficulty measuring progress against EOIOs at this stage (year 3) of an eight-year initiative. The Review Team also acknowledges that since the initial period of data collection and analysis of this MTR, P4I has reported progress in its 2023 Draft Program Performance Report against some of the performance expectations outlined in the program PAF for both EOIO 1 and 2.

* ***IO3 Resilient Infrastructure (Southeast Asian agencies increasingly integrate climate and disaster considerations into infrastructure decisions)***

Program data showing progress towards this intermediate outcome was strongest, and this was supported views expressed in stakeholder consultations.

* **IO1 Partnerships *(Australian and Southeast Asian government agencies and other institutions jointly program partnership activities*), IO2 Inclusive Infrastructure *(Southeast Asian agencies increasingly embed gender equality and disability and social inclusion into infrastructure decisions),* IO4 Policy Reform *(Southeast Asian agencies improve infrastructure policy and regulatory frameworks)* and IO5 Organisational Capacity *(Southeast Asian agencies improve capacity to deliver quality infrastructure).***

The Review Team has been presented with discrete examples that suggest P4I has influenced or facilitated progress in these performance domains, however the evidence is not comprehensive or consistent. Consequently, progress cannot be attributed to the actions and work of P4I – a key requirement for credibly assessing performance against the Program Logic. As above, the Review Team does acknowledge however that P4I’s Draft 2023 Program Performance Report states that from 2022 to 2023 there has been a “…*significant increase in the number of instances of IO achievement, spanning partnerships, policy, capacity, inclusion and resilience”*. This may indicate that more comprehensive evidence is emerging as the program matures and improvements are made to the PAF. While the MTR was not able to review the instances of intermediate progress reported in the PPR, the Delivery Partner reports that in 2023, P4I delivered 45 activities that reached 3,236 direct beneficiaries, 34% of whom were female and seven of whom reported living with a disability. This represents a 2.5-fold increase on the number of beneficiaries from 2022. Through these activities, P4I reported 15 instances of IOs being achieved - a significant increase over the three instances achieved in 2022.

# Performance Management Framework and Program Logic

P4I has chosen to adopt a “*flexible ‘performance management approach*” to MEL because the Program “*in many ways resembles a facility*” and anticipates that “*objectives across key areas are [expected to be] progressively identified*” across the life of the Program. In practice, this means that P4I does not maintain a “*traditional*” MEL framework but has instead adopted a Performance Management Framework (PMF) that simultaneously supports “*both planning and assessment of program activities*”.[[22]](#footnote-23)

DFAT’s *Facilities Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) Guidance Note* specifies that an “*operational Performance Management Framework*” should be in place “*within 6 months of start-up*” of any Facility or Facility-like program. While an interim MERL Framework was submitted and then agreed in August 2021, P4I’s draft PMF was not submitted until August 2022, more than 18 months after program commencement. Stakeholders indicated that this was due to delays in finalising the revision to the Program Logic, which had been in place since inception and was revised in 2021 and agreed June 2022. The current PMF notes that the Program Logic required revision “*because it was developed* [at design stage] *before COVID-19, and that prolonged travel restrictions had made developing G2G partnerships – which were the core focus of the singe EOIO at the time – difficult*”. Updates to the Program Logic were also catalysed by the enlargement of the program’s scope following budget boost in 2020. The significance of the delays associated with establishing the Program Logic and PMF also mean it is distinctly challenging to robustly assess P4I’s performance, particularly throughout the program’s earliest stages of operation.

There is opportunity for revised Program Logic to adopt more specific language, reflecting P4I’s performance and knowledge of the terrain. Current terminology nominates IOs such as “*Southeast Asian agencies improve capacity*”, “*increasingly embed*” GEDSI, and “*increasingly integrate*” DRRCC in quality infrastructure decisions, but does not offer a precise meaning of these terms, or define measures of success.[[23]](#footnote-24) In practice this lack of specificity enables any indication of progress, no matter how minor, to be technically sufficient (by the terms of the Program Logic) to constitute evidence of achievement against IOs, regardless of whether or not this has been brought about by P4I. Future MEL frameworks would benefit from greater use pf qualitative or quantitative data points that provide meaningful, measurable, and comparable signals of performance.

# Activity-Level Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning

P4I demonstrates a strong commitment to activity-level MEL processes, evidenced by the presence of these procedures in key program development documentation such as Activity Proposals, and the standard Performance Reporting Template which is mandatory for all activities.

The requirement that all activities contribute to “*at least one Intermediate Outcome*” specified by P4I’s Program Logic is also a key mechanism of ensuring P4I’s activity-level alignment with overarching objectives, EOIOs, and IOs.

Notwithstanding this, the Review Team found that the use of activity-level MEL Plans could be improved. Activity-level MEL Plans were not consistently developed for all activities, and where they did exist, differed in quality and robustness. For instance, it was not uncommon for “*evidence*” cited as an indicator of performance and achievement to be a self-assessment by the activity lead, rather than any data relating to impact or output (e.g., *# of workshop participants*). Activity-level MEL Plans rarely included indicators that sought to measure the experience and satisfaction of counterparts and stakeholders (e.g., *# of participants who reported they were satisfied with the quality of training provided*), suggesting that P4I is missing valuable opportunities to gather real-time information about how it is perceived, and how it could adapt its performance to enhance outcomes. Finally, and although P4I maintains a commitment to the integration of cross-cutting themes throughout its activities, activity-level MEL rarely included indicators or measures that were disaggregated by sex, gender, and/or disability status; even for activities designated as “*GEDSI Principal*”. The MTR recommends that moving forward, P4I should ensure that activity-level MEL plan indicators are standardised to enable real time monitoring of program activities, outputs, and outcomes, alongside capture of meaningful data relating to cross-cutting thematic integration across P4I.

Management and Delivery Structure

DFAT holds a contractual arrangement with EY, which has consortium partners, considered “One Team”. The MTR found there is scope to further evolve the involvement of consortium partners, and to enhance the impact of their respective and collective insights.


# One Team Approach

Partner Profiles and Responsibilities

Figure 1 below provides a high-level overview of the identities and roles of the five consortium members that constitute the P4I “One Team”.

P4I's One Team Members and Roles

DFAT *leads Australia’s relationship with Southeast Asia. It brings the trust and reputation of the Australian Government and our deep history of working with Southeast Asia to support economic development. DFAT has overall responsibility for P4I, including through the DFAT-appointed Executive Director*

EY coordinates *the delivery of P4I’s workstreams, support Southeast Asian governments in addressing complex infrastructure problems, share knowledge and work to strengthen government relationships.*

The Asia Foundation *provides strong contextual understanding of Southeast Asia, leveraging experience in female empowerment and gender equality, inclusive economic development, environment and climate action, and regional cooperation*.

*ASI is a global advisory company specialising in delivering high-impact, inclusive development programs around the world…ASI applies its expertise in adaptive program management to support the performance and operation of P4I*.

Ninti One *brings its Indigenous participation expertise to P4I, including by exploring opportunities for Indigenous-to-Indigenous knowledge sharing*

.

**Each consortium or “One Team” member has distinct ways of working and expertise to contribute to P4I that, when taken together, total a well-rounded set of skills and knowledge**. Whilst the MTR understands that a proportionate use of all four organisations in all P4I pieces of work was not the intention of the consortium approach, the value-add of some consortium members could be leveraged more. Stakeholder consultations and document review made clear that TAF’s deep insights into country level political economies has been under-utilised, including with respect to CEPs, activity proposals, implementation, and protocols.

In most countries covered by the program, TAF brings long-standing in-country presence and deep political-economy expertise, making them well placed to advise on contextual risks associated with activity selection, including the likelihood of the activity influencing government decision making and direction. Notwithstanding this, TAF has played only a minor role (oftentimes associated with on-the-ground logistics support) in activity implementation. There is evidence that TAF’s role may be evolving, with the review team informed that TAF was closely involved in co-designing both LACP and LASEP and plays an important logistics role in delivering both programs in Laos, as well as leading a GEDSI-related activity in Timor-Leste and having an increasingly important role in other activities.

To date, Ninti One’s engagement has been limited to their role on the PMG, assistance in sourcing the Indigenous Inclusion Adviser, and their support in organising a study tour, which concluded in October 2023. The MTR was informed that they have also been involved in ongoing work on inclusion such as the indigenous compendium as well as broader analytic work and have led discussions on the proposed placement of indigenous interns with the program. Their footprint in the region is small compared with the other consortium members, and therefore perhaps not surprising that their role in implementation has been commensurately limited.

# DFAT’s Role and Embeddedness

**The P4I investment design document proposed a hybrid model for implementation, with DFAT leading the consortium that includes ASI providing operational backbone, EY and TAF providing technical services, and Ninti One providing indigenous engagement advice**. The design noted risks with this model, primarily around potential conflict and disagreement on responsibilities and accountabilities between DFAT and the primary technical delivery partner, EY. The hybrid model, when assessed for effectiveness, efficiency, value for money and sustainability against a range of delivery approaches was considered in the design and *‘judged to deliver the best combination of access to specialist expertise, facilitation of G2G relationships and ensuring Australian Government strategic control’[[24]](#footnote-25)*.

The design further noted that a ‘One Team’ approach would be required to mitigate these risks. The One Team approach consisted of four elements, all of which were incorporated into the P4I design. Firstly, a full-time dedicated DFAT officer as the Executive Director, secondly, the co-location of the DFAT Executive Director and the delivery partner teams; third, clear definitions of roles and responsibilities between the Executive Director and the Deliver Partner; and fourth, the ‘One Team approach’ needs to extend to close working relationship with Posts.

As per the design, P4I has appointed two DFAT Officers to key roles within the Program, including the position of Executive Director (ED) (EL2), and Deputy Director (EL1), with both positions embedded within the P4I team. The ED role carries responsibilities commensurate with those that are standard for a contracted Team Leader and retains the delegations of a DFAT EL2 position. There are benefits and challenges associated with the model, and DFAT should consider whether the challenges outweigh the benefits.

**DFAT acts as both contract manager and team leader on P4I, meaning it is managing a contract that it is also responsible for implementing. This may blur lines of accountability, making contract management challenging and complex.** As contract manager, DFAT is responsible for ensuring that the Delivery Partner is compliant with the full suite of DFAT policies, risk and safeguarding measures, and value for money (VFM) requirements. In this role, DFAT must also hold the Delivery Partner accountable for program implementation and achievement of progress towards the EOIOs and IOs. The Delivery Partner, in turn, places much of the responsibility for ensuring these expectations are met on the ED.

Although efforts have been made to address these issues, these have not fully resolved challenges in the model, including:

* A significant proportion of stakeholders reported that Program staff report that they find it difficult to hold the Delivery Partner accountable when the ED holds ultimate decision-making power (and is of a more senior rank than other embedded or associated DFAT employees).[[25]](#footnote-26)
* A DFAT Officer who is also a team leader responsible for implementation has conflicting priorities and accountabilities between implementation (which they are directly responsible for), contract management (which they are at least partially responsible for), compliance (which they are responsible for, but have limited ability to ensure because they are not the Delivery Partner), and achievement of outcomes (which sits with the Delivery Partner).

The Review Team appreciates the motivations behind DFAT’s adoption of a hybrid management model for P4I (namely, the presence of delegated and cleared individuals with direct access to DFAT colleagues at Bangkok Post and the Mekong Australia Partnership (MAP) that can direct its investment and engagement strategy in alignment with Australian Government priorities), greater visibility of a complex program, and the openness and willingness of DFAT to try new approaches to implementation. Notwithstanding this, the current structure should be reviewed as part of the next-phase design.

There are alternative models available to DFAT that may be well placed to enable similar benefits without the complexities and tensions attendant to embeddedness. These alternatives include seconding a DFAT officer to the Delivery Partner, embedding a DFAT ‘strategic advisor’ (without delegation for clearance or team management duties) within P4I, or adopting a traditional contractor model in which no DFAT staff are embedded within P4I.

The Review Team notes the many challenges that DFAT has faced in attempting to ensure that the P4I program delivers and is held accountable. The initial DFAT reporting structure generated undue stress amongst officers, in part because it resulted in an overlap of responsibilities across colleagues of the same seniority. This initial structure was subsequently changed in an effort to mitigate these negative effects, with all MTR respondents reporting these developments have resulted in a more positive working environment. In practice, the “refresh” achieved this by allocating all contract management functions to the responsible Canberra section (while retaining an experienced locally engaged program management staff member based in Bangkok). Although these changes made internal relationships easier to manage, it did not entirely resolve the inherent tensions in the channels of accountability maintained by P4I within DFAT.

In addition to the above, DFAT has continued to strengthen the structure of the Program through the appointment of regional engagement teams, creating a Head of Performance and Knowledge position; and putting in place technical advisory leads. These initiatives have evolved to engender clear responsibility for various Delivery Partners on aspects of the Program.

# Location, Resourcing, and Staffing

Although P4I respondents often noted that a physical presence in Bangkok enabled ease of transport and travel across the region and was co-located with other regional programs, securing visas for LTA staff has proven difficult. Similarly, multiple stakeholders expressed reservations about the resources required to establish and maintain headquarters in Bangkok, including staffing support, fit out, and other associated costs, including significant upfront commitments of funding for an agreed program of work in Thailand.

A significant share of respondents raised separate concerns with the balance of resources that have been directed towards program management, as opposed to program activities and outcomes achievement. The Review Team recommends DFAT keep in mind the costs and benefits of maintaining a Bangkok presence in the next design when considering location, and also consider a statement of requirements for procurement among one-team members, including how to best balance the mix of hub staffing, outsourcing and insourcing.

# Governance and Transparency

The design of P4I included a governance structure constituted by a Board and a Strategic Advisory Team that had, to end of 2023, been only partially implemented. In the absence of these two governance functions, P4I’s Program Management Group (PMG) took on the role usually assumed by a governance board or committee. The PMG comprises the contractor representatives of each member of the consortium and is therefore not an independent body, rather, those responsible for implementation and management of the Program were also acting as P4I’s governing body. Since its first meeting in December 2023, the Board has been engaged on several occasions to provide oversight and strategic direction to P4I.

# Value for Money

One of this MTR’s Key Review Questions asked, “*What can be learned about the efficiency of P4I and the value for money it provides*?” (see **Annex G**). However, the question is more challenging than might first appear because it assumes that there are alternative approaches to achieving these (or similar) outcomes that may bring lesser or greater VFM. Given this is a distinctly unique and new approach to infrastructure investment, there is a dearth of material for comparison available. This challenge notwithstanding, the Review Team assessed numerous factors and approaches to VFM that, when taken together, indicate that value for money on P4I needs to be addressed. These are presented below.

Cost Consciousness

***Rate Tables within Activity Budget***

In contracting P4I, DFAT agreed to a set of fixed rate cards that are used to engage personnel from each of the implementing partners. The rates are determined based on the seniority of the personnel, combined with a loading (for overhead costs) associated with the organisation to which they belong. Whilst the rates have been included in the contract as a result of an open tender process whereby DFAT compared bids from six potential suppliers and determined that the bid from this consortium represented best value for money, the rate structure itself poses VFM questions due to the high level of difference between rates from different implementing partners, despite them offering comparable skills and services to the consortium.

***Management Fees***

The overall share of management fee payable to the Delivery Partner in the initial P4I contract was comparable to similar DFAT programs, despite an overall lower share offered “at risk”.

In the amendment to extend the contract, the management fee was increased as a percentage of the overall contract value. The Review Team was informed that this increase was the result of the planned substantial scale up in the activity budget within the contract, which increased as a proportion of total contract value, the expansion of the Program office, and additional administrative requirements because of changes in DFAT policy.

The Review Team acknowledges a series of reports from stakeholders indicating that the Delivery Partner had, on select occasions, provided quotes that were perceived to be inflated. Notwithstanding this, the MTR acknowledges that activity budgets can be subject to revision as proposals are refined.

Encouraging Competition and Activity Budgets

The Activity Budget within the program specifies pre-approved rates for services to be contracted through implementing partners. These providers (and pre-approved rates) were selected as part of the winning tender, through an open and competitive procurement process. Whilst various P4I teams and the Program Executive review activity proposals and consider team composition, estimated staffing time required, contingency budget and other activity-related costs, specific VFM assessments are not included.

The Review Team notes that P4I put in place panel arrangements to access technical support for several cross-cutting themes such as GEDSI in 2023. While there has been limited instances of engaging external local expertise, such as in Laos, P4I could be missing greater opportunities to offer advisory services either at a lower cost and/or of greater relevancy to the country context by drawing upon local firms for more work.

Evidence Based Decision Making

Throughout stakeholder consultations, lack of transparency regarding decision making and activity costs was widely reported as an ongoing concern. Numerous respondents noted that they did not understand the rationale behind decisions made regarding selection of activities (and rejection of other activities).

Likewise, and as discussed above, challenges with the governance structure (independent board and steering committee) has resulted in some respondents expressing doubt about evidence-based decision making. Throughout consultations, respondents raised numerous and diverse concerns in relation to activity selection. A recurring theme in relation to decision making was the pressure felt by the Program to spend funds.

Performance and Risk Management

The resources allocated to G2G activities were understandably low throughout 2021 and 2022 due to COVID related travel restrictions that impeded G2G progress. However, since borders opened G2G activities have remained low and were increased only marginally through the 2022 contract amendment (16,250,000 to 17,782,082, an 8% increase). It can be argued that increased resourcing towards establishing G2G activities would have commensurate benefits related to outcomes for Australia’s relationships in the region.

Results Focus

It has become common practice in DFAT programs to have a large proportion of management fee “at risk”, or payable based on performance through achievement of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), Deliverables, or Partner Performance Assessments. Despite this, the P4I program guarantees a minimum management fee and has a relatively low percentage of the management fee payable to the implementing partner at risk. In the initial agreement, 35% of the total management fee was “*at risk*”. In the extension of the contract the percentage “*at risk*” fell to 21% alongside an overall increase in both the size and scale of the overall management fee. This results in a reduction of the Delivery Partner’s accountability for program results and generates further misalignment in the incentives of the Delivery Partner from those of DFAT.

Accountability and Transparency

The P4I contract is structured to draw on existing partners’ networks, avoiding the cost and inefficiency of tendering each individual activity. The activity budget of the P4I program can be used to contract personnel from the implementing partners at pre-agreed rates. Stakeholder criticism highlighted that his model can in some cases deliver outcomes inconsistent with VFM. The MTR recommends that more rigour be established around how decisions are made, in a manner that enables oversight and monitoring by DFAT and the Board.

Model

# Delivery Modalities

P4I maintains four distinct delivery modalities. These are *G2G*, *Technical & Policy Advice*, *Project Advice*, and *Knowledge & Learning* (see Table 4 below for further detail). Individual activities undertaken by P4I can be comprised of more than one service at a time (with *G2G* and *Technical & Policy Advice* being combined most frequently). For this reason, Australian Government expertise can, in principle, be leveraged across multiple modalities, though no domestic partners have been involved in *Project Advice* engagements. Further, each delivery modality is designed to contribute to one or more of the IOs nominated by the PAF, in turn supporting the program to advance its EOIOs and Program Goal.

Table 4: P4I Delivery Modality Definitions and Overview

**Delivery Modality**[[26]](#footnote-27)

***G2G, or “Organisational Linkages”***

***Technical & Policy Advice***

***Project Advice***

***Knowledge & Learning*Description**

*P4I promotes linkages between Australian and Southeast Asian government agencies and other institutions. P4I acts as a partnership platform to share Australian experience and expertise in infrastructure governance*

*P4I advises (and facilitates dialogue) on infrastructure policies, practices, processes, and systems in Southeast Asia.*

*P4I advises on specific infrastructure projects. A principal feature of this service line is assistance with infrastructure project preparation, but it could also involve advice on existing assets.*

*P4I produces, commissions, and shares knowledge for collaborative learning. The production and sharing of relevant information and the convening of learning events plays a key role in establishing developing relationships as well as advocating for policy change and building capacity.* **Example Outputs**

*Partnership agreements; dialogue platforms; study tours; secondments.*

*Quick response advice; capacity building; policy analysis and recommendations; procedures and tools; coaching.*

*Pre-feasibility and feasibility studies; safeguards analysis; inclusion and resilience advice; financing strategy; procurement support; project costing.*

*Policy and dialogue forums; knowledge products; research; external communications; education and training.*

# Evaluating the Quality of P4I’s Advisory

**There are several examples of excellence across P4I’s portfolio** (as demonstrated by the case studies spread throughout this report), and multiple counterparts reported to the Review Team that they were satisfied with the advisory services they had received from P4I.

Box 5: Port of Melbourne Mission to Malaysia Maritime Week 2023

In June 2023, P4I supported the Port of Melbourne to participate in Malaysia Maritime Week 2023 (MMW23). This event allowed Australia to show practical support to Southeast Asian counterpart governments, including Malaysia, as they seek to transition towards eco-friendly maritime fuels. Australia sponsored a panel discussion at which it presented the results of P4I's study on the potential for the Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) to become a regional hub for green fuel bunkering. The session, attended by the Malaysian MOT Secretary-General and over 150 participants from government, industry, and media, strengthened G2G ties. After the visit, POM and PTP agreed an MOU to establish a green shipping corridor, focusing on large Australian importers. This collaboration on maritime transport decarbonisation positions Australia as a preferred partner for Malaysia as it becomes a strategic green shipping hub.

This notwithstanding, some stakeholders reported being less satisfied by the support they received from P4I. Although concerns with the delivery of contracted services is not unusual in the aid program, feedback included suggestions that P4I’s advice and services can be:

* ***Generic***: Some stakeholders expressed frustration at what they described as a “*cookie-cutter*” approach to advice, i.e., that P4I did not provide contextually specific guidance.
* ***Slow****:* The majority of counterparts interviewed reported that P4I’s activities had been delayed or not implemented in accordance with agreed timeframes.
* ***Opaque***: Stakeholders including DFAT posts and regional government counterparts reported that they were unable to access key information about program activities. This included meeting and/or training agendas, workplans, activity budgets, and TORs, among other products.

P4I’s most dominant delivery modality is *Technical & Policy Advice,* and it is within this delivery modality that the above-mentioned characteristics were most often identified.[[27]](#footnote-28) In seeking to understand why, the Review Team notes that MTR stakeholders identified the following practices as weakening the calibre of P4I’s advisory:

* ***Fly in fly out (FIFO) modalities*** that are cost intensive and reduce scope for regular, in-person, interactions between P4I’s counterparts and advisors.
* ***Staff turnover*** in P4I activity teams was viewed by many counterparts to be high, with attendant delays.
* ***Limited engagement and procurement of locally based staff and advisors*** hampers the degree to which advisory is adequately informed by localised political and economic analysis and facilitated through appropriate channels and procedures.

This feedback may indicate that the quantum of P4I’s activity investments is not always proportionate to the value of the return (to Australia and to counterparts) generated from the advisory. *G2G* and *Knowledge & Learning* modalities were recognised by multiple respondents to have delivered the most leveraged return on investment for P4I (noting that over time activities related to the latter modality may offer fewer and less impactful long-term effects in comparison with those enabled by other delivery approaches). Similarly with respect to changes over the passing of time, the Review Team notes that criticisms may be in part a reflection of the pressures on P4I during its establishment phase, and these may lessen as the Program and its governance structures and processes mature.

# Establishing the Impact of P4I’s Advisory

**The MTR Team assesses that P4I’s programmatic impact has been positive.** In practice, this means there are strong indications that counterparts are benefiting from improved support which equals or surpasses the quality of what they are likely to have accessed were the Program not in place. At the time of writing, the complexity of P4I’s objectives, coupled with the Program’s nascency, means that it is challenging to identify concrete development and strategic impacts beyond observable contributions at output level.

**Stakeholder consultations indicate that P4I’s G2G modality has facilitated most of the program’s measurable influence to date, and is likely to continue to be an effective modality with which to pursue the program’s goals throughout the second phase**. As a result, the Review Team also considers that *G2G* has so far been the most strategically fruitful modality currently pursued by P4I to further its EOIOs and IOs. This is because it supports counterparts to both sustainably build capacity and establish closer institutional relations that underpin relationship returns.[[28]](#footnote-29) G2G is not, however, intrinsically suited to a number of key domains, such as project preparation, and comes with its own set of discrete challenges.

**Evidence of these benefits were demonstrated most significantly throughout consultations, during which regional counterparts displayed the highest and most consistent positive feedback regarding** **P4I (and by extension, Australia)**. These sentiments were especially acute in instances where P4I was building on earlier phases of Australian Government engagement (as in the case of *AustRoads*), and where Australian Government representatives had been most present throughout delivery, and able to spend meaningful in-person time with counterparts, acknowledging that *G2G* modalities are at times delivered through teams that combine Australian Public Service and Delivery Partner personnel.

Box 6: Battery Energy Storage Systems Capacity Building Program for the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand

Australia, through P4I, is working with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) on the decarbonisation of Thailand’s energy sector. P4I and EGAT have collaborated to co-design the Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) Capacity Building Program, which aims to support EGAT with long-term planning to ensure BESS helps drive increased generation and storage of renewable energy in Thailand.

The program, which included a technical study tour to Australia by a team of 30 engineers from EGAT, was co-led through Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) via a G2G agreement between DFAT and CSIRO. Feedback from EGAT indicated significant enhancements in their policy, strategic and technical capability on BESS following the visit. Knowledge gained during the exchange is also understood to have influenced a Thai government decision to add battery storage to an existing floating solar farm. This engagement has also resulted in deepening relationships and cooperation between EGAT and CSIRO as well as ties being formed between EGAT and Australian commercial entities. For instance, EGAT has sought to partner with *Energy Renaissance* on battery management systems and has held several meeting with *Relectrify* to discuss an MoU ahead of a potential commercial agreement.

**Determining the development-specific impacts of P4I beyond the output level is challenging, particularly at this early stage in the program’s lifecycle because development impacts are commonly realised over longer timeframes**. The time required for P4I outputs to induce desired change at policy level is too great to measure within a few years. Notwithstanding these limitations, the review team judges that measurable development benefits are most likely to materialise from activities where DRRCC and GEDSI have been strategically and meaningfully incorporated. Development impacts can be generated from activities classified as “*mainstreamed*” just as often as from those classified as “*principal*” or “*significant*”).

# Delivery Modality Spread Across the P4I Portfolio

As per the details at Figure 2, *Technical & Policy Advice* has represented the greatest share of P4I’s investments to date (63%), and *Organisational Linkages* (i.e., *G2G*) has represented the least (7%). This was not envisioned for the Program at design stage, when it was anticipated that G2G delivery would constitute “*the largest single budget item*”, although priorities have shifted since then with the expansion of the program to include a number of other modalities.

Figure 2: Delivery Modality Expenditure Spread Pie Chart
Technical & Policy Advice $31,125,521, 63%
Knowledge & Learning, $5,891,816, 12%
Organisational Linkages, $3,235,095, 7%
Project Advice, $8,938,569, 18%

There are a number of additional reasons why the *G2G* modality was not used to the degree that was projected at the initial design phase.[[29]](#footnote-30), [[30]](#footnote-31) In particular, P4I’s *G2G* activities have been hampered by:

* ***Domestic supply side constraints***that limit Australian Government entities’ ability to engage due to their primary mandate to serve Australia domestically, and a lack of resources to engage in *G2G* activities across government more broadly.
* ***Bureaucratic delays, machinery of government changes and staff turnover***for both domestic and international government entities have delayed, or, in certain cases forced the discontinuation of, *G2G* engagement through P4I.
* ***The COVID-19 pandemic*** imposed strict limits on domestic and international travel throughout P4I’s establishment phase and encouraged quicker-than-anticipated scaling of the *Technical & Policy Advice* modality, which was more easily delivered under lockdown conditions.

Each of these risks sit outside DFAT’s sphere of control. The Review Team notes that the G2G component was under-resourced at the start of program implementation, and this may have also contributed to its lack of uptake across P4I, however this was addressed in the most recent contract amendment by building out the P4I G2G team, providing additional resourcing in Canberra, and through evolving ways of working to better embed G2G considerations and programming across activity proposals. Partially in recognition of the challenges, program risk treatments have included:

* **Expanding** the pool of partners that could participate in *G2G* engagement beyond the Australian Government to include research institutions (such as universities) and privately held entities managed by statutory bodies (such as the Port of Melbourne)
* **Incorporating** default consideration of *G2G* delivery modalities into project selection processes to better embed this service at early stages of planning and strategy, and
* **Tasking** the Delivery Partner to “*recraft*” CEPs “*into succinct country strategies [Engagement Strategies] to guide and explain programming decisions*” and which “*inform policy and institutional environments and incentives*”.[[31]](#footnote-32)

In the most recent risk register sighted by the review team, these and other similar controls were deemed “*effective*”.

# Sectoral Engagement and Prioritisation

P4I has conducted activities across seven distinct infrastructure sectors, namely *Energy, Telecommunications, Transport, Utilities,* *Multi-Sector*, *Public Investment Management*, and *Urban Development*.

As per the chart at Figure 3, *Transport* activities have received the greatest share of P4I funding to date, with just over 47% of all expenditure falling in this domain. *Energy* received the second greatest share of funding, with 27% of all activity expenditure, while *Utilities* and *Telecommunications* have together secured less than 6% of all P4I funding to end June 2023.




Figure 3: Sectoral Expenditure Spread

The Review Team notes that evaluating the appropriateness of P4I’s sectoral allocation is highly dependent on the nature of, and intentions surrounding, the Program’s relevancy. Preferences regarding P4I’s ultimate objectives will naturally engender distinct approaches to sectoral prioritisation. For instance, should P4I seek to prioritise relational benefits that stem from responsiveness, sectoral specification will be of marginal importance to the Program’s success. Alternatively, should P4I seek to increase its development impact, sectoral prioritisation would need to assume a greater significance for the Program going forward.

Noting this, and although there is no indication in the existing program logic that sectoral-specific investment allocations are required to enable progress against any IOs or EOIOs, the MTR Team assesses that sectoral prioritisation may need to be elevated in the next phase of the Program in order to align with both counterpart and Australian Government priorities, and with those most likely to achieve development and relational impacts. The flexibility inherent in P4I’s adaptive orientation is likely to have assisted P4I to build strategic connections with key counterparts, but it also risks spreading the Program too thinly.

Cross Cutting Priorities

# Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change

P4I incorporates a commitment to DRRCC via the program’s IO3, namely: “*Southeast Asian agencies increasingly integrate environmental, climate and disaster considerations into infrastructure decisions*”. This ambition is further outlined in P4I’s *DRRCC Toolkit*, which commits to “*ensure that all activities embed climate mitigation, disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation*”. In pursuing this, P4I has sub-divided its DRRCC portfolio into three categories:

1. **Disaster Risk Reduction**,which aims to strengthen resilience by preventing new, and reducing existing, disaster risks.
2. **Climate Adaptation**, which aims to assist in adjusting to the impacts of climate change, and
3. **Climate Mitigation**, which focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

As with GEDSI-related engagements, P4I provides a DRCCC classification of either “*principal*”, “*significant*” or “*mainstream*” to each of its activities. Analysis of all “*active*”, “*concluding*”, and “*complete*” activities as at end October 2023 found that 48% (61 activities) had been classed as DRRCC “*mainstream*”, 20% (26 activities) as “*significant*” and 14% (18 activities) as “*principal*”. The remaining 17% (22 activities) were not classified in the tracker.

ASEAN’s public commitments to enhance climate action and cooperation, strengthen capabilities to address climate-related disasters, and make sustained progress towards the production and dissemination of clean and efficient renewable energy,[[32]](#footnote-33) mean that P4I’s partners are inclined to be more receptive to the incorporation of this cross-cutting theme than that of GEDSI or Indigenous Inclusion (see further discussion below). Indeed, 17% (or three activities) of all projects classified as “*principa*l” were oriented towards internal knowledge creation and management initiatives, while the remaining 83% (or 15 activities) accounted for projects delivered collaboratively with counterparts. This indicates that P4I has capitalised on early efforts to embed internal DRRCC capacity and is acting in line with IO3 to actively integrate this into external activities. Less than 20% of all activities classed as DRRCC “*principal*” included an explicit disaster risk reduction component, with the vast majority dedicated to projects associated with “*energy*”. This finding aligns with the intentions nominated in P4I’s FY2022-23 Workplan, which acknowledged that to date, DRRCC activities have mostly supported decarbonisation and energy transition. The planned work scoping opportunities to engage with the “*DRRCC/Indigenous knowledge nexus*” may provide entry points for more dedicated DRR activities in the future.

**Consultations conducted by the Review Team indicate a high level of satisfaction with P4I’s work in DRRCC, particularly in the period following finalisation of the *Framework* and *Toolkit*.** For instance, in June 2023, just over 80% of MTR survey respondents rated P4I’s DRRCC influence as either “*good*” (52.17%), “*very good*” (26.09%), or “*excellent*” (2.17%) (n= 46, please see **Annex D** for further information). Respondents identifying as DFAT staff were over three times more likely to rate P4I’s DRRCC performance negatively than those that reported that they were employed by a Delivery Partner.

With regards to risk management, the Review Team assesses that DRRCC related risks have been adequately assessed at both the macro program level, and at activity level. For instance, P4I’s *Risk Management Plan* notes the possibility of not having “*realistic opportunities to integrate DRRCC considerations into country engagement*”, and thus the need to balance advocacy with a responsive approach. The Review Team has also sighted evidence that DRRCC risks are considered as part of each activity risk assessment.

Box 7: Assisting ASEAN and member states to assess renewable energy technologies.

Regional governments have expressed interest in the potential of hydrogen for their economies and energy transitions, and in learning about Australia’s hydrogen industry. As a result, P4I is working responsively with Southeast Asian government partners and ASEAN to share knowledge and expertise about technology options for renewable energy.

In February 2023, P4I supported 12 government officials from Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand, and ASEAN to visit Australia to learn about green hydrogen via a two-week study tour. The tour was designed to strengthen linkages between Australia and its regional partners through knowledge sharing on low-emission energy technologies. During the tour, delegates visited hydrogen research, storage, and production facilities, and met with Australian government representatives, including the Department of Climate Change, Energy, Environment and Water (DCCEEW), and relevant state and territory departments in the ACT, Queensland, and Victoria. Delegates also met with stakeholders from academia and the private sector, such as *Evoenergy*.

Building on this momentum, P4I is working with CSIRO and *Climateworks* to support the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) to develop a *Renewable Energy Roadmap* and the 8th *ASEAN Energy Outlook*, deepening Australia’s contribution to regional renewable energy partnerships.

# Gender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion

DFAT classifies P4I as maintaining a “*significant*” gender equality objective, in line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Gender Equality Marker (GEM) standards. In practice, this means that DFAT counts P4I as “*gender equality-focused aid*” and records program expenditure accordingly in annual reporting to the OECD.

**P4I’s “*significant*” GEM status is represented by the dedicated IO2 the program retains for GEDSI**, namely: “*Southeast Asian agencies increasingly embed gender equality and disability and social inclusion into infrastructure decisions*”. Building on this objective, the P4I *GEDSI Strategy* and PAF also commit P4I to:

* **Achieve all outstanding program IOs and EOIOs in a “*GEDSI-responsive manner*”.** In practice this means that the program aims to “*exceed ‘doing no harm’ but* [will] *not* [be] *expected to create transformative impact for gender equality and women – and, by extension, marginalised groups including people with disability and Indigenous peoples*”.
* **Adopt the OECD DAC GEM classification standard for each P4I activity**,[[33]](#footnote-34) ensuring that each P4I engagement is provided with a classification of either, “*principal*”, “*significant*” or “*mainstreamed*” (conventionally referred to as “*not targeted*”).[[34]](#footnote-35)
* **“*Walk the talk’ on GEDSI*”** and demonstrate “*internal commitment to fostering equality and inclusion, and empowering people with disabilities, members of indigenous and ethnic minority groups, and women through operational practices and culture*”.[[35]](#footnote-36) And,

**Establish “*a GEDSI ‘identity’****…that provides a foundation for 2025-2028, including in terms of initiatives being in place related to 1) women in leadership, 2) disability inclusion, and 3) indigenous/ethnic minorities*”.

GEDSI integration efforts have faced a series of challenges which have impacted the Program’s progress against IO2 and GEDSI Strategy commitments. These include:

* **Complex and delicate operating environments**, including political sensitivities that depress counterparts’ appetite to engage fulsomely on GEDSI initiatives (especially those that may concern indigenous or ethnic minorities across Southeast Asia), and COVID-19 travel restrictions which prevented GEDSI advisors from being present in-country throughout P4I’s establishment phase.
* **Delays in core P4I approvals, processes, and procedures** which have deprived staff of a coherent mandate from which to pursue GEDSI outcomes both inside the consortium, and with counterparts. These delays have also meant that for the better part of its operating period, P4I has lacked routine systems through which to integrate GEDSI elements across “*significant*” and “*mainstreamed*” activities where inclusion was not the primary or motivating focus for engagement. Deferrals in approval processes have also delayed key GEDSI knowledge-creation and advisory engagements, with some stakeholders reporting lags of up to a year between contracting and the commencement of work. Similarly, the P4I *GEDSI Strategy* was not finalised until June 2023, more than two years after program commencement.
* **Inadequate GEDSI expertise and resourcing on the part of the Delivery Partner**, which has not demonstrated a GEDSI proficiency commensurate with the development industry-standard typically expected of managing contractors.[[36]](#footnote-37) Stakeholder consultation and document review indicate that staff’s unfamiliarity with GEDSI has engendered variable advisory quality, and also forced P4I to allocate significant (and unforeseen) time and resources to internal learning agendas, rather than counterpart engagement and advisory activities that promote progress against IO2.[[37]](#footnote-38) This lack of GEDSI “awareness”, alongside limited institutional incentives, was also seen to have led to the Delivery Partner not sufficiently prioritising inclusion across operations early in implementation, with stakeholders variously reporting that “*GEDSI is diffuse because people just don’t know what to do*”, that it’s “*very challenging* [for P4I staff] *to find space for GEDSI*”, and that GEDSI is in danger of falling “*between the cracks*”.

Despite these challenges, there are examples of high-potential GEDSI-responsivity across the P4I portfolio (see Boxes 8 and 10 for further detail), and emerging evidence of IO level achievement, with the P4I reporting 3 instances of the achievement of IO2 during 2023, compared to no instances in 2022.

The Review Team acknowledges the tensions inherent in P4I’s commitments to rapid responsivity on the one hand, and the often time-intensive inputs required to establish relationships, promote awareness, and achieve the sensitive and socialised consensus that are key to embedding sustainable GEDSI progress. P4I has made notable progress in establishing a series of practices that have assisted in enabling GEDSI mainstreaming across the consortium and its activities. This has included:

* The conduct of GEDSI-informed country-context analyses and opportunity scans, referred to as “*Deep Dives*” for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam.
* The establishment of the GEDSI Panel, formalised in mid-2023, which provides P4I with a roster of short-term GEDSI-specialist consultants for mobilisation to supplement the consortium on a needs-basis.
* The formation of voluntary GEDSI clinics, which are available for P4I access by activity teams throughout project scoping and planning phases. 33 of these clinics have been held to date, and popularity has risen over time, with an average of seven sessions conducted per month between April and June 2023, as compared to an average of three sessions between January and March 2023.
* The integration of GEDSI analysis into the standard SAN template, which now requires each prospective P4I activity to nominate a “*principal*”, “*significant*”, or “*mainstreamed*” classification, and provide a rationale for this appraisal.

**Moreover, multiple stakeholders also commended the “*dedication*” of P4I’s GEDSI team in Bangkok and nominated their “*collaborative*” and “*supportive”* engagement across the consortium as key drivers of success for P4I’s GEDSI integration to date**. Notwithstanding the achievements noted above, progress against each of the objectives in the P4I GEDSI Strategy has so far been mixed, and while adequate, is not as advanced as might reasonably be expected at this point in the program’s lifecycle. For this reason, the Review Team judges that P4I has overall demonstrated GEDSI-sensitive programming, but cannot be said, at present, to be dependably GEDSI-responsive.

This conclusion is reflected in P4I’s IMR GEDSI scores to date, some of which declined between 2021 and 2022. The most recent appraisal provided the program with rating of “3” or “*less than adequate*” for both Gender Equality, and *Disability 1*,[[38]](#footnote-39) and a rating of “4” or “*adequate”* for *Disability 2*.[[39]](#footnote-40) With respect to Gender Equality, this score was provided due to lack of substantiation of the following criteria:

1. *Analysis of gender equality gaps and opportunities substantially informs the investment.*
2. *The M&E system collects sex-disaggregated data and includes indicators to measure gender equality outcomes,* and
3. *There is sufficient expertise and budget allocation to achieve gender equality related outputs of the investment.*[[40]](#footnote-41)

Box 8: A note on P4I’s Disability Inclusion

To date, disability inclusion has been integrated inconsistently across P4I’s portfolio. For instance, initial design, and core program documents (such as the SDF and Program Operations Manual [POM]) excluded mention of “*disability*”. Similarly, the Review Team could find no official reference to P4I’s disability-inclusion agenda (outside of Schedule 1 of the Delivery Partner Agreement) until its reintroduction as part of the Program Logic, finalised in June of 2022. Further, and although the program’s 2023 PAF now prompts activity teams to collect disability-disaggregated data, the Review Team found no example of this being reported as part of final activity-level MEL and results reports.

These omissions across both strategic and MEL guidance are likely to have contributed to P4I stakeholders’ low awareness of P4I’s disability inclusion commitments, with no respondent independently raising this theme during MTR interviews, and very few activities demonstrating evidence of mainstreaming. It also underscores why the 2022 IMR notes that P4I was “*yet to show any evidence of improvement for people with disabilities*”, although active projects such as the *Integrating gender equality and social inclusion into the Malaysia High Speed Rail*, and P4I’s intention to conduct a *Rapid Disability Appraisal* demonstrate strong potential in advancing this agenda.

Relatedly, the Review Team notes that strategic P4I documentation lacks reference to Universal Design Principles (with only one citation found within the Annexes of the GEDSI Strategy). This absence indicates a significant opportunity for the Program to incorporate this language and standards across its core documentation and guidance with relative ease, in keeping with DFAT’s own standards (such as the internal *Performance Assessment Note on Disability-inclusive development*, and the *Accessibility Design Guide*).

P4I has made efforts to promote internal equality and inclusion, for example the makeup of the P4I PMG and Bangkok office have approached the 50:50 gender equality target set out in the *GEDSI Strategy.* However, the Program could be doing more to strengthen performance across this domain. For instance, women remain disproportionately represented among the program’s LES and junior roles; based on the most recent staffing figures sighted by the Review Team, women represent only 15% of LTA roles in Bangkok. The Program could strengthen PSEAH by maintaining a formalised internal grievance mechanism, including a Thai-language facility available for confidential reporting or support.

**Box 9: GEDSI integration in Malaysian High-Speed Rail**

P4I is supporting the Government of Malaysia (GoM) to foster resilient, inclusive, and sustainable growth by providing technical assistance on meaningfully integrating GEDSI through the design and delivery of the Malaysia’s High-Speed Rail (MyHSR) project. MyHSR is a strategic connectivity activity in Malaysia’s southern corridor that aims to support economic recovery and foster inclusive and sustainable growth by connecting Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. The GoM requested P4I undertake a baseline assessment of GEDSI related regulations, policies, and initiatives relevant to the following five focus areas:

* *Integration of GEDSI considerations during the reference design*
* *Women entrepreneur development programme along the HSR corridor*
* *Economic rebalancing initiatives along the HSR corridor*
* *Making HSR women friendly (planning, construction, operations)*
* *Training programme to develop women engineers in Malaysia.*

The completed baseline study was well received, as evidenced by MyHSR Corp drafting a booklet on Inclusive MyHSR summarising key takeaways from the activity, and drafting a roadmap based on recommendations produced by P4I.

MEL plans and data sighted by the Review Team demonstrated limited measurement of GEDSI-related indicators and metrics. For instance, the Review Team sighted final activity reports for activities with GEDSI “*principal*” and “*significant*” classifications that did not provide sex, gender, or disability disaggregated data. Where GEDSI elements were included, these typically related solely to outputs such as the number of women who participated in training, or the number of counterparts who reported that their awareness of GEDSI issues had been enhanced as a result of engagement with P4I. While these measures are valuable, they cannot indicate anything more concrete than GEDSI-sensitivity on the part of P4I and provide no backing for future assessments of responsivity or transformational contributions. Further, the Review Team also observed a misalignment between the GEDSI indicators outlined in the PAF, and those defined in the *GEDSI Strategy*, despite both these documents having been developed within the same six-month period. Discrepancies such as this pose significant risks for P4I’s future ability to accurately and effectively measure GEDSI progress at the country and program level. As such, a more synchronised approach to GEDSI indicator selection and measurement is advised to support meaningful monitoring and evaluation of P4I’s GEDSI contributions going forward.

Box 10: A note on GEM classification distribution.

As at end June 2023, 8% of all “*active*”, “*concluding*”, or “*complete*” P4I activities had been provided with a “*principal*” GEDSI classification. Of these, however, only 37% (or three activities) accounted for projects delivered with counterparts,[[41]](#footnote-42) with the remaining 62% (or five activities) relating to internal knowledge creation and management initiatives.[[42]](#footnote-43) Of all completed activities to date, those classed as GEDSI “*principal*” account for 2.6%, “*significant*” 10.5%, and “*mainstreamed*” 86.8%.

Numerous stakeholders interviewed as part of this MTR expressed disappointment at this distribution, particularly given P4I’s “*significant*” GEM commitment, which would normally imply a more fulsome demonstration of “*twin track*” GEDSI integration at this point in time.[[43]](#footnote-44)

Although this MTR acknowledges that more could be done to enhance GEDSI responsivity across the Program’s portfolio, a continued skew towards “*mainstreamed*” activities will likely remain an adaptive approach for P4I. This is primarily because infrastructure development practice across Southeast Asia does not routinely or uniformly meet non-malfeasance standards, meaning there is significant scope for P4I to make consequential contributions to GEDSI via “*mainstreamed*” activities, including with respect to the quantum of prospective impact (as with technical advisory to large scale projects such as that provided to support Indonesia’s New Capital City).

# Indigenous Inclusion

Indigenous Inclusion is a core component of P4I’s *GEDSI Strategy*, contributing to its cross-cutting commitment to equal and sustainable development. In mid-2023 P4I finalised its *Indigenous Compendium*, supplementary to the *GEDSI Strategy* which “*aims to provide the initial directions to strengthen P4I’s approach to Indigenous Inclusion*”. This document describes the operationalisation of P4I’s “*two principal areas of focus*” for Indigenous inclusion, which are:

* **“*Service delivery,*** *addressing the inclusion of Southeast Asian Indigenous peoples and ethnically marginalised groups in infrastructure development,* and
* ***Internal operations,*** *addressing the inclusion of First Nations Australians in P4I itself. (Improved inclusion of First Nations Australians can also contribute to improved service delivery outcomes).”*

In doing so, it commits to four priority actions for delivery across 2023. Table 5 lists these commitments and comments on progress to date with data drawn from stakeholder consultations and document review.

Table 5: Indigenous Inclusion Prioritisation and Achievement

Priority[[44]](#footnote-45)

*Build internal capacity*

*Scan Australian practice and potential G2G partners*

*Focused research and analysis to inform programming and dialogue*

*Explore using P4I to host secondment, short-term placement, or internship opportunities* **Comment**

P4I consortium member Ninti One provided an orientation of the Indigenous Compendium for the One Team.

In October 2023 P4I completed a scan of key Australian government bodies and related institutions to assess their mandates, experience, and capacity to engage on Indigenous inclusion in infrastructure development.

Work is currently underway to “*identify opportunities in the DRRCC / Indigenous / Infrastructure nexus to understand how to position this learning in SEA*”. An additional activity to conduct research concerning “*social inclusion in energy*” is currently in “*vetting*”.   
  
In October 2023, P4I completed a renewable energy study tour to the Northern Territory, which incorporated opportunities for delegates from Timor-Leste to “*learn from innovative approaches in* [renewable energy] *RE from indigenous knowledge and practices*” and “*engage with indigenous and research entities to showcase innovative Australian technologies and approaches*”.

P4I also conducted analysis to understand potential impacts of the development of the Laos cross-border facilities on ethnic minorities because the nearby villages consist of large ethnic-minority populations

An intern was hosted in 2023 and further placements are planned.

**Achieved?**

In Progress

Achieved

In Progress

In Progress

The *Indigenous Compendium* includes a dedicated chapter entitled “*Defining Indigenous peoples*”, which distinguishes “*two key groups of P4I stakeholders*”, namely “*First Nations Australians*” and “*Indigenous and ethnically marginalised groups in Southeast Asia*”. The *Compendium* goes on to acknowledge a series of “*key issues affecting indigenous and ethnically marginalised peoples in infrastructure development*” including “*lack of recognition*”, and “*limited political, economic, and social power*”, but does not provide any commentary on how and where P4I will seek to engage with these groups outside of one implicit reference in which it nominates three projects that present an “*opportunity for P4I to have a degree of on the ground engagement*” and “*foster meaningful consultation and active engagement using FPIC* [free prior and informed consent] *as a guiding principle*”. Table 6 below summarises findings drawn from close review of project documentation[[45]](#footnote-46) to benchmark evidence of P4I’s active engagement, and the risk ratings allocated to these activities.

Table 6: P4I’s FPIC Engagement and Risk Ratings for “Indigenous Peoples”

| Project | Evidence of active engagement using FPIC? | “Indigenous Peoples” Risk Presence, and Rating (before controls)[[46]](#footnote-47) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Dili Airport Redevelopment* | No | “No”; “Low” |
| *Laos Australia Connectivity Partnership* | No | “Medium” |
| *Mindanao Transport Connectivity Project* | Evidence of intention | “Yes”, “Medium” |

Given the sensitivities associated with ethnic minority representation, recognition, and repression across ASEAN, the overall low-level of risk apportioned to the projects in Table 6 is surprising. For instance, with respect to the *Dili Airport Development*, P4I noted no risk presence for “*Indigenous Peoples*” nor “*Displacement and resettlement*” within planning documentation despite the fact that the ADB’s *Initial Poverty and Social Analysis* acknowledged risks associated with both these elements (answering “*Yes*” to the questions provided below in footnote 73, and to the prompt “*Does the project have the potential to involve involuntary land acquisition resulting in physical and economic displacement*?”). The ADB analysis also acknowledged that “*Several Austronesian ethnic groups; namely, Tetun, Manbai, Tukudede, and others, may be present in the project area and may be affected by land acquisition and resettlement impacts (potential livelihood impacts)*”.[[47]](#footnote-48) Separate to this, the Review Team notes that the *Laos-Australia Sustainable Energy Partnership* (LASEP), which remains active, also presents opportunities for FPIC engagement, alongside significant exposure to safeguards risk, including those that are likely to disproportionately affect ethnic minority groups; though no evidence of these considerations or appropriate mitigations were present in project planning, risk, and reporting documentation sighted by the Review Team (excluding an acknowledgement within the *Program Design* that “*women and members of vulnerable groups are typically held back by inconsistent and less reliable energy supply”).*[[48]](#footnote-49)

Further to the above, the *Compendium* does not include any discussion of MEL (including indicators, benchmarks, or targets) that would assist in assessing meaningful progress across this domain. At present, P4I’s PAF acknowledges Indigenous Inclusion via 1) a “*performance expectation*” that by June 2024 initiatives relating to “*indigenous/ethnic minorities*” will be in place, and 2) high-level lines of inquiry, namely “*Is there enhanced indigenous inclusion and engagement?*” and “*Has P4I contributed to DFAT’s Indigenous Diplomacy Agenda*?”. While it is commendable that these measures are present in the PAF, they are currently formulated at a level of abstraction that allows P4I to fulfill each requirement merely by virtue of its establishment.[[49]](#footnote-50) Ensuring that a future iteration of the *Compendium*, or a dedicated *Indigenous Inclusion Strategy* included frequently collected, measurable, and meaningful indicators of indigenous inclusion efforts would help to bolster evidence of P4I’s commitment to this cross-cutting theme.

Recommendations in Order of Appearance

1. **Develop a clear decision frame to enable more streamlined decision-making processes on project preparation and other supports**. This will need to take account of feedback indicating that P4I has a conservative risk tolerance that tends to cause delays in decision-making for feasibility and the need for due diligence and considered evaluation as required in quality infrastructure work.

2. **Re-test the optimal balance between fast, flexible, access to delivery partner expertise versus a facility-type model which could open access to broader expertise during the next-phase design**.

3. **Enhance coordination with other relevant infrastructure programs in ways that better align pipeline visibility for both parties**. While resourcing constraints may explain this limited coordination, it also means the broader DFAT strategic ecosystems are not engaged.

4. **Ensure the P4I “brand” more prominently features Australia**. P4I’s brand recognition is substantial for a nascent program, and there are many instances of partners expressing gratitude to Australia for P4Is services. This is a significant achievement across so many countries. Despite this, a significant subset of stakeholders consulted were unaware that the program is Australian led and/or Australian Government funded.

5. **Ensure the next-phase design actively considers the share of funding a future P4I should apportion to project preparation**. Respondents indicated that there is an opportunity for P4I to help governments in the region, particularly the less developed countries, to address their most pressing infrastructure financing needs, and to strengthen relationships in ways that enhance Australia’s influence in the region.

6. **More closely align the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) and Program Logic with DFAT's Design and Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Standards and Facilities PAF Guidance Note**. In response, a review of the PAF baselines and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) has been completed through the quality assurance mechanisms established by DFAT.

7. **P4I should ensure that activity-level MEL plan indicators are standardised to enable real time monitoring of program activities, outputs, and outcomes**, alongside capture of meaningful data relating to cross-cutting thematic integration across P4I. The Review Team found that activity-level MEL Plans were not consistently developed for all activities, and where they did exist, differed in quality and robustness

8. **Separate the supervision and implementation roles in management of the program**. The embedded position of the DFAT Executive Director presents complexities and tensions for the program. In response, DFAT has already refined the program staffing structure, including the role of the DFAT Executive Director. As part of the design of the next phase, DFAT will consider the scope, responsibility, and rationale for embedded roles.

9. **Improve coordination and consultation between P4I and DFAT Posts.**

10. **Further consider opportunities to strengthen localisation during the design of the next phase**. There has been limited use of local staff in technical advisory roles. To address this issue, DFAT has already strengthened selection processes for activity team composition, which will be reflected in program documentation such as the Service Delivery Framework and key performance indicators.

11. **The use, socialisation and coordination of P4I country engagement plans should be improved.** This would help strengthen P4I coherence, articulate the differentiated approach being taken by the program informed by country circumstances and support sector and activity prioritisation. To address this, country engagement plans are being updated by the program. The MTR recommends the use of country engagement plans be more actively considered in the design of the next phase.

12. **Improve the way delivery partners are managed and collaborate, with a view to streamlining processes and optimising resource allocation to enhance operational efficiency**. To address this, P4I has completed Partnership Health Checks to improve ways of working between partners. Team composition is also being given more consideration during the evaluation of Activity Proposals.

13**. Keep in mind the costs and benefits of maintaining a Bangkok presence through the next-phase design.**

14**. Establish more rigour around how decisions are made, in a manner that enables oversight and monitoring by DFAT and the Board** to ensure greater accountability, transparency, and VFM.

15**. Review the current staffing and resourcing model as part of the next-phase design**. In particular it would be beneficial for the next-phase design to consider a clear statement of requirements for procurement among one-team members, including how to best balance the mix of hub staffing, outsourcing and insourcing.

16**. DFAT should procure and conduct an independent due diligence audit of P4I**. In response, a systems audit of P4I has been completed by the DFAT audit team and implementation of recommendations commenced. P4I Delivery Partners will be required to implement the agreed audit recommendations through an adaptation plan tied to contract milestones.

17**. The geographical focus and sector prioritisation of the program could be strengthened**. P4I is refreshing country engagement strategies in collaboration with posts to articulate an agreed approach and focus in key countries. Furthermore, the geographical and sector focus, as well as the location of P4I hubs/spokes, should be retested during the design of the next phase.

18**. Adopt a more synchronised approach to GEDSI indicator selection and measurement** to support meaningful monitoring and evaluation of P4I’s GEDSI contributions.

19. **Ensure that a future iteration of the Indigenous Compendium, or a dedicated Indigenous Inclusion Strategy includes frequently collected, measurable, and meaningful indicators of indigenous inclusion efforts.**

20**. Review the risk ratings and mitigation strategies associated with protection, social inclusion, and indigenous inclusion elements across all P4I projects that may involve engagement with communities to ensure appropriate risk management**. In response, DFAT has updated the risk and safeguards strategy to include appropriate controls. In addition, the MTR recommends that risk and safeguards issues be considered in detail during the design of the next phase.

Annexes

**ANNEX A LIST OF INTERVIEWEES**

**ANNEX B P4I PROGRAM LOGIC**

**ANNEX C KEY RESPONDENT SURVEY**

**ANNEX D KEY RESPONDENT SURVEY RESULTS**

**ANNEX E MID TERM REVIEW TERMS OF REFERENCE**

**ANNEX F MID TERM REVIEW WORKPLAN**

# Annex A: List of Interviewees

| Name | Position | Organisation | Location |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Amber Cernovs | First Secretary – Economic | Australian Embassy in Cambodia | Phnom Penh |
| Andreas Zurbrugg | Deputy Head of Mission | Australian Embassy in Cambodia | Phnom Penh |
| Andrew Bui Phin | Country Engagement Manager | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Andrew Edge | Director, Southeast Asia Infrastructure, Energy and Climate Change Section | DFAT | Canberra |
| Angela Aquino | Programme Manager | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Manila |
| Asha Sharma | Telecommunications Adviser | Ernst and Young | Canberra |
| Becky-Jay Harrington | DRRCC Lead | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Ben Davis | First Secretary – Economic | Australian Embassy in Viet Nam | Hanoi |
| Ben Williams | Global Energy & Resources Digital Operations Leader | Ernst and Young | Canberra |
| Bernard Minn | Country Engagement Manager | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Beth Elson | Principal Consultant | Independent Consultant | Combe Martin |
| Bin Sereyvuth | Team Leader - Cost Efficiency Department | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Bounta Onnavong | Director General of Department of Transport | Ministry of Public Works and Transport | Vientiane |
| Braiden Abala | Inclusion Adviser | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Caroline Scott | Deputy Head of Mission | Australian Mission to ASEAN | Jakarta |
| Chanmanit Muth | Chief of Project Development Facility, The General Department of Public-Private Partnerships | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Chanpisey Ung | Analyst, General Department of Public-Private Partnerships | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Chantho Milatthanapheng | Director General, Department of Energy Efficiency and Promotion | Ministry of Energy and Mines | Vientiane |
| Chao Sopheak Phibal | Officer | Ministry of Public Works and Transport | Phnom Penh |
| Chea Vuthyna | Official Radio Frequency Regulation Bureau | Radio Frequency Regulation Bureau | Phnom Penh |
| Chhau Somethea | Deputy Director General of the General Department of Policy. | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Chris Knight | Group Leader - Energy Systems | CSIRO | Canberra |
| Dan Heldon | Deputy Head of Mission | Australian Embassy in Laos | Vientiane |
| Dana Gilmore | Assistant Director, Southeast Asia Infrastructure, Energy and Climate Change Section | DFAT | Canberra |
| Daniel San Jose | Programme Manager | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Manila |
| Darrin Grimsey | Partner, Infrastructure Advisory | Ernst and Young | Melbourne |
| David Malcolm Brown | Telecommunications Lead | Ernst and Young | Melbourne |
| Declan Sayce | Transport Adviser | Ernst and Young | Perth |
| Dr Angela Macdonald | Head of Mission | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| Elena Rose | Executive Director | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Elizabeth McLeod | Communications Adviser | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Jakarta |
| Emily D’Ath | First Secretary - Development | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| Esther Ewagata | First Secretary - Infrastructure, Water and Sanitation | Australian Embassy in Indonesia | Jakarta |
| Esther Sainsbury | Assistant Director, Southeast Asia Infrastructure, Energy and Climate Change Section | DFAT | Canberra |
| Faith Considine | Second Secretary | Australian Embassy in Cambodia | Phnom Penh |
| Gabrielle Beran | Senior Consultant | DFAT | London |
| Gary Ellem | Head of Regional Engagement | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Gemma Edgar | Counsellor (Development) | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| Geoff Allan | Chief Executive | Austroads | Sydney |
| Georgina Harley-Cavanough | First Secretary – Development | Australian Embassy in the Philippines | Manila |
| Gregg Barton | Associate Partner, Infrastructure Advisory | Ernst and Young | Singapore |
| Hannah Wurf | Second Secretary – Economic and Trade | Australian Embassy in Laos | Vientiane |
| Harumi Toyama | Associate Director, Gender Equality and Social Inclusion & Social Sustainability | Ernst and Young | Singapore |
| Heng Rathpiseth | Director General for Public Works | Ministry of Public Works and Transport | Phnom Penh |
| Henry Severs | ASI Focal Point | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Inthanongsone Inthavongsa | Energy Advisor Laos-Australia Sustainable Energy Partnership | The Asia Foundation | Vientiane |
| Jane Jamieson | Program Manager | Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility and the Quality Infrastructure Investment Partnership (The World Bank) | Washington D.C. |
| Jay Lamey | MERL Adviser | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Jenna Hawes | Project Manager International Development | Ninti One | Sydney |
| Jennifer Mudge | GEDSI Lead | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Jenny Da Rin | Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia Development and Programs Branch | DFAT | Canberra |
| Jessica Clements | Deputy Head of Technical Advisory | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Johann Rebert | Deputy Country Representative | The Asia Foundation | Phnom Penh |
| John Dore | Lead Adviser – MAP Water Energy Climate | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| Julia Feeney | Deputy Head of Mission | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| Juno Barbra Cabotan | Senior Program Officer | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Manila |
| Kang Phirith | Director, Road and Equipment | Ministry of Public Works and Transport | Phnom Penh |
| Kang Sin | Senior Program Manager - Development Cooperation | Australian Embassy in Cambodia | Phnom Penh |
| Karen Brock | Business Development Manager - Energy | CSIRO | Newcastle |
| Katrina Reid | Deputy Head of Performance and Knowledge | Ernst and Young | Canberra |
| Kelsey Atwood | Deputy Head of Regional Engagement | The Asia Foundation | Bangkok |
| Kem Darapisey | Economist | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Keo Sothie | Secretary of State | Ministry of Post and Telecommunications | Phnom Penh |
| Kim Phirum | Officer | Radio Frequency Regulation Bureau | Phnom Penh |
| Kong Phallack | Secretary of State | Ministry of Post and Telecommunications | Phnom Penh |
| Kongkear Soksim | Officer | Ministry of Post and Telecommunications | Phnom Penh |
| Kyle Springer | Country Engagement Manager | Ernst and Young | Perth |
| Laura-Carolin Brandes | First Secretary | Australian Mission to ASEAN | Jakarta |
| Liesl Keam | Climate Change Lead | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Lily Hoo | Head of Performance and Knowledge | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Jakarta |
| Lisa Hansen | A/g Managing Director, Infrastructure and Commercial Advisory Office | The Treasury | Canberra |
| Litta Khattiya | Director General, Department of Roads | Ministry of Public Works and Transport | Vientiane |
| Ludovic Delplanque | Senior Infrastructure Specialist | Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (The World Bank) | Singapore |
| Lynn Tho | ASEAN Infrastructure Advisory Leader; Partner, Strategy and Transactions | Ernst and Young | Singapore |
| Mali Walker | Second Secretary - Water and Regional MAP | Australian Embassy in Laos | Vientiane |
| Marjorie Tang | Associate Director, Infrastructure Advisory | Ernst and Young | Melbourne |
| Martin Aspin | Team Leader, Laos-Australia Connectivity Partnership | The Asia Foundation | Vientiane |
| Matthew Kellam | Deputy Director | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Mia Urbano | Principal Consultant, Equity and Inclusion | Alinea International | Melbourne |
| Michael Ting | Senior Program Manager | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Kuala Lumpur |
| Minysothyvan Nop | PPP Analyst | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Mola Tin | Officer | Cambodia Australia Partnership for Resilient Economic Development | Phnom Penh |
| Nam Le | Energy Lead | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Narin Phoawanich | Assistant Governor – Fuel Management | Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand | Bangkok |
| Ngoun Daravatey | Young Economist of the Cost Efficiency Department | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Nicholas Martinez | Operations Manager | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Octaviana de Carvalho | Program Support Officer | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Dili |
| Oliver Redrep | Associate Partner, Infrastructure Advisory | Ernst and Young | Singapore |
| Oulavanh Keovilignavong | Institutional advisor, Laos-Australia Connectivity Partnership | The Asia Foundation | Vientiane |
| Paul Kelly | Head of Mission | Australian Embassy in Laos | Vientiane |
| Paul Keogh | Director | Cambodia Australia Partnership for Resilient Economic Development | Phnom Penh |
| Pauline Tweedie | Chief Project Management Officer | The Asia Foundation | Bangkok |
| Pheach Sokunthea | Economist (Cost Efficiency) | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Phouvieng Keoboupha | Director General, Research Institute for Energy and Mines | Ministry of Energy and Mines | Vientiane |
| Reth Phoung pagma | Director of Legal Department | Ministry of Post and Telecommunications | Phnom Penh |
| Richard Neumann | Director, Climate Mitigation, and Investment Section | DFAT | Canberra |
| Rob Nicol | Oceania Partner, International Engagement, Strategy and Transactions | Ernst and Young | Canberra |
| Rod Reeve | Executive Managing Director | Ninti One | Adelaide |
| Ros Vanna | Secretary of State | Ministry of Public Works and Transport | Phnom Penh |
| Russell Marsh | Associate Partner, Climate Strategy | Ernst and Young | Singapore |
| Rutmanee Ongskul | Senior Program Manager – MAP Water Energy Climate | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| Sam Porter | Counsellor – Economic Governance and Infrastructure | Australian Embassy in Indonesia | Jakarta |
| Sandhya Nair | Program Manager | Ernst and Young | Canberra |
| Santy Lattanabouavone | Program Manager | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Vientiane |
| Sarak Duong | Partnerships Adviser | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Phnom Penh |
| Sasilada Kusump | Counsellor, Mekong Cooperation Unit | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Bangkok |
| Sean Vincent | Head of Technical Advisory | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Shayne McKenna | First Secretary (Development) | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| Sheila Villaluz | Philippines Partnerships Adviser | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Manila |
| Sim Vireak | Under Secretary of State (on behalf of HE Phan Phalla Secretary of State), Ministry of Economy and Finance | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Simon Cann-Evans | Director, Development Procurement | DFAT | Canberra |
| Simon Cramp | Director, Private Finance for Climate and Development Section | DFAT | Canberra |
| Siripen Nuchachatpong | Senior Operations Manager – Infrastructure (Development) | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| So Sophornvichet | Deputy Director of the Cost Efficiency Department | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Sofia Ericsson | M&E Adviser, Design and Program Advice Section | DFAT | Canberra |
| Sophie Quinn | Second Secretary | DFAT | Kuala Lumpur |
| Sombath Southivong | Senior Infrastructure Specialist | World Bank | Vientiane |
| Sophearathna Ros | Legal Assistant of Legal Department | Ministry of Post and Telecommunications | Phnom Penh |
| Soy Kosal | Acting Director | Radio Frequency Regulation Bureau | Phnom Penh |
| Srun Kimsan | Commissioner | Telecommunications Regulator | Phnom Penh |
| Stuart Brown | First Secretary – Infrastructure | Australian Embassy in Timor-Leste | Dili |
| Surapong Maenmitr | Deputy Director | Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning | Bangkok |
| Tamara Tailor | Acting Country Representative | The Asia Foundation | Vientiane |
| Thipphaphone Chanthapaseuth | Water Energy Climate MAP | Australian Embassy in Laos | Vientiane |
| Thomas Fuller | First Secretary – Economic and Political | Australian Embassy in Thailand | Bangkok |
| Toni Redden | Senior Development Technical Adviser | DFAT | Canberra |
| Thou Samnang | Deputy Director General of Techniques | Ministry of Public Works and Transport | Phnom Penh |
| Tim Paterson | First Secretary, Political | Australian Embassy in Cambodia | Phnom Penh |
| Trishna Rajyalaxmi Rana | GEDSI Adviser | Partnerships for Infrastructure | Bangkok |
| Tristan Bellingham | Facility Manager | NZ-ASEAN Renewable Energy Facility | Vientiane |
| Vanarith Chheang | Director General, General Department of Policy, | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Vanh Dilaphanh | Director General, Department of Planning and Finance | Ministry of Public Works and Transport | Vientiane |
| Varsha Maharaj | Energy Adviser | Ernst and Young | Sydney |
| Vibolsak Pen | Deputy Director, The General Department of Public-Private Partnerships | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Vuthika Hang | Deputy Director General, The General Department of Public-Private Partnerships | Ministry of Economy and Finance | Phnom Penh |
| Will Nankervis | Head of Mission, ASEAN | Australian Mission to ASEAN, Jakarta | Jakarta |
| William Hilton-Throp | Director, China External Section | DFAT | Canberra |
| Worrawut Samuthkalin | Minister Counsellor, Mekong Cooperation Unit | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Bangkok |
| Yit Bunna | Secretary of State | Minister of Public Work and Transport | Phnom Penh |

# Info graphic of the P4I Program Logic - see below for accessible textAnnex B: P4I Program Logic

# Program Logic in accessible text format

Enabling Activities:

* Political Economy Analysis
* Country and sector programming
* Monitoring and evaluation
* Risk Management

Services and Outputs:

* **Organisational Linkages:** Partnership agreements; dialogue platforms; study tours; secondments
* **Technical & Policy Advice:** Quick response advice; capacity building; policy analysis and recommendations; procedures and tools; coaching
* **Project Advice:** Pre-feasibility and feasibility studies; safeguards analysis; inclusion and resilience advice; financing strategy; procurement support; project costing
* **Knowledge & Learning Policy:** and dialogue forums; knowledge products; research; external communications; education and training

Intermediate Outcomes:

* **IO1 Partnerships:** Australian and Southeast Asian government agencies and other institutions jointly program partnership activities
* **IO 2 Inclusive Infrastructure:** Southeast Asian agencies increasingly embed gender equality and disability and social inclusion into infrastructure decisions
* **IO3 Resilient Infrastructure:** Southeast Asian agencies increasingly integrate climate and disaster considerations into infrastructure decisions
* **IO4 Policy Reform:** Southeast Asian agencies improve infrastructure policy and regulatory frameworks
* **IO5 Organisational Capacity:** Southeast Asian agencies improve capacity to deliver quality infrastructure

End of Investment Outcomes:

* **EOIO1**: Strong partnerships among Australian and Southeast Asian government agencies and other institutions build regional commitment to quality infrastructure development
* **OIO2**: Southeast Asian agencies improve decision-making and practice towards quality infrastructure

Program Goal:

* Quality infrastructure development that drives sustainable, inclusive and resilient growth in Southeast Asi

# Annex C: Key Respondent Survey

| Question | Response Type |
| --- | --- |
| *Please indicate your gender* | Female  Male  Non-binary  Prefer not to say |
| *Do you identify as someone with a disability?* | Yes  No  Prefer not to say |
| *Do you identify as culturally and linguistically diverse?* | Yes  No  Prefer not to say |
| *Which P4I One Team member do you work for?* | Adam Smith International  DFAT  EY  Ninti One  The Asia Foundation |
| *[If employed by DFAT] please indicate whether you are:* | Australia Based Staff  Locally Engaged Staff |
| *Where are you based?* | Australia  Cambodia  Indonesia  Laos  Malaysia  Other/Remote [Free Text]  Thailand  The Philippines  Timor-Leste  Vietnam |
| *How long have you worked with P4I?* | [Free Text #] Years [Free Text #] Months |
| *How would you rate P4I’s efficiency? (e.g., value for money, productivity, resourcefulness)* | [Likert Scale: Poor – Fair - Good - Very Good -Excellent] / [Free Text] |
| *How would you rate P4I’s effectiveness? (e.g., influence, impact)* | [Likert Scale: Poor – Fair - Good - Very Good -Excellent] / [Free Text] |
| *Do you feel that P4I’s “One Team” model fit for purpose?* | Yes / No / [Free Text] |
| *What improvements, if any, might you suggest to strengthen the “One Team” model?* | [Free Text] |
| *How would you rate P4I’s influence on improving partners’ outcomes and processes related to gender equality, disability, and social inclusion (GEDSI)?* | [Likert Scale: Poor – Fair - Good - Very Good -Excellent] |
| *Please nominate a project or partnership in which you’ve seen P4I make a positive GEDSI impact.* | [Free Text] |
| *How would you rate P4I’s influence on improving partners’ outcomes and processes Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change (DRRCC)?* | [Likert Scale: Poor – Fair - Good - Very Good -Excellent] |
| *Please nominate a project or partnership in which you’ve seen P4I make a positive DRRCC impact.* | [Free Text] |
| *How effective is P4I’s approach to risks and safeguards?* | [Likert Scale: Very ineffective– somewhat ineffective – neither effective nor ineffective – somewhat effective – Very effective] |
| *Do you feel that current levels of resourcing and staffing are adequate to support P4I to meet its goals and commitments?* | Yes / No / [Free Text] |
| *Do you feel that P4I’s current service offerings and specialist advisory areas meet government partners’ needs?* | Yes / No / [Free Text] |

# Annex D: Key Respondent Survey Results

Overview

To support data capture and analysis for the Mid Term Review (MTR) of Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I), Alinea International developed a Key Respondent Survey (at **Annex C**).

This was distributed via *Survey Monkey* to 75 respondents between 20-30 June 2023.

A total of 46 responses were received throughout this period, representing 61% of all requested.

Key Findings

Effectiveness & Efficiency

Almost 90% of respondents rated P4I’s effectiveness as either ‘good’ (43.48%), ‘very good’ (34.78%), or ‘excellent’ (8.70%). Both DFAT and EY respondents were less likely to rate P4I’s effectiveness as positively as the group as a whole. 29% of DFAT respondents, and 14% of EY respondents, rated P4I’s effectiveness as ‘fair’.

72% of respondents rated P4I’s efficiency as either ‘good’ (45.65%) ‘very good’ (19.57%), or ‘excellent’ (6.52%). DFAT respondents were less likely than average to rate P4I’s efficiency positively, while EY respondents were more likely than average to rate P4I’s efficiency positively.

A subset of respondents also elected to leave further comment in response to the effectiveness and efficiency survey prompts. A representative sample of these comments include:

* “Overall, P4I can only be viewed in the context of the first half of…operations taking place very much in the active context of Covid lockdowns, uncertainties, and travel restrictions. Considering those, we are enormously resourceful and productive. I think [P4I is] increasingly providing VFM, though there is a learning curve”.
* “P4I has immense potential to deliver unique and efficient development work, but it is held back in meeting this potential due to internal governance, resource sharing and strategic design”.
* “P4I is yet to show real value for money”.

GEDSI & DRRCC

Over 50% of respondents rated P4I’s Gender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion (GEDSI) influence as either ‘good’ (34.78%) or ‘very good’ (19.57%). 13% of all respondents indicated that P4I’s performance had been ‘poor’.

Male-identifying respondents were more than 20% more likely than female-identifying respondents to rate P4I’s GEDSI influence as either ‘good’ or ‘very good’. No male-identifying respondent provided a rating of ‘poor’ for this prompt.

DFAT staff were less likely than other One Team members to rate GEDSI performance positively. 71% of EY staff, and 60% of other consortia members provided a rating of either ‘good’ or ‘very good’, while only 35% of DFAT staff did the same.

A representative sample of comments provided in response to the GEDSI prompt include:

* “[GEDSI is] poised for action but need [to] start delivering outputs and outcomes in the coming year.”
* “I have observed instances of P4I sharing knowledge to increase awareness and understanding of why GEDSI is important”.
* “Structures and incentives for GESI are not well integrated at senior levels”.

With respect to Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change (DRRCC), just over 80% of respondents rated P4I’s influence as either ‘good’ (52.17%), ‘very good’ (26.09%), or ‘excellent’ (2.17%). DFAT staff were over three times more likely to rate P4I’s DRRCC performance negatively than EY staff.

A representative sample of comments provided in response to the DRRCC prompt include:

* “Lots of good entry points [are] being pursued [however] more time [is] needed to influence partner processes / outcomes”.
* “Additional and more advanced efforts may be more beneficial.”
* “[DRRCC] has no explicit target within investment decision making [so P4I’s] ability to deliver on this…is limited to the activity portfolio’s scope”.

One Team model

Almost 50% of respondents agreed that the One Team Model is fit for purpose. A further 43% offered comment rather than agree or disagree with this prompt. A representative sample of comments provided by this group include:

* “It…requires ongoing nurturing and support.”
* “I think it has great potential, but it has not yet reached that potential”.
* “With modifications and an adequate amount of time to establish values, culture, and trust, it could be fit for purpose”.

Of all respondents, EY staff reported the most positive views for this prompt, with 65% agreeing that that the One Team Model was fit for purpose. 47% of consortia members (excluding EY), and 36% of DFAT staff also reported that they agreed that the One Team Model was fit for purpose. Locally Engaged Staff (LES) were more likely than any other group to disagree that the One Team model was fit for purpose, with 28% indicating the Model was not functioning.

Resourcing and Staffing

39% of respondents agreed that P4I’s current levels of resourcing and staffing are adequate to support P4I to meet its goals and commitments. Just over 15% disagreed, and the remaining 45% chose to provide comment rather than indicate whether they agreed or disagreed.

A representative sample of comments provided by this group include:

* “P4I has considerable resources. The difficulty [is]…to ensure [our] staffing profile can be adjusted to meet the reality of future program scope and funding.”
* “With a full staff compliment, we should be confident to deliver our commitments, provided there isn’t scope creep”.
* “There are not enough executive level staff with capacity to make informed decisions/and or are not supported enough [to manage] large workloads”.

Risks and Safeguards

Almost 75% of respondents reported that P4I’s approach to risks and safeguards is either ‘good’ (39.13%), ‘very good’ (30.43%), or ‘excellent’ (4.35%).

Staff from EY and other consortia members were more likely than those from DFAT to rate P4I’s approach to risks and safeguards positively. Only 7% of EY staff, and 20% of other consortia members rated P4I’s approach as “fair”, while almost half of all DFAT respondents (47%) rated P4I’s risks and safeguards approaches as ‘fair’.

A representative sample of free text responses to this prompt include:

* “Risk management is generally robust. Safeguards need strengthening at the activity level among technical teams”.
* “More can be done to ensure (especially for project preparation…) that risks and safeguards are taken more robustly into activity plan[s]”

Service offering

Almost 60% of respondents agreed that P4I’s current services offerings and specialist advisory areas meet government partners’ needs. 4.35% of respondents disagreed, and the remaining 37% chose to leave a comment rather than indicate whether they agreed or disagreed.

A representative sample of comments provided by this group include:

* “This could be strengthened with more coordinated alignment with other Australian programs/tools/offerings that are naturally complimentary and would strengthen Australia’s impact in meeting government partner needs”.
* “Our service offerings meet governments’ needs, but government partners’ needs don’t’ always align to P4I objectives”.
* “Consideration [needs to be given] to the messaging [P4I is providing] to partner governments…We have done a lot to communicate its benefits but, in the end, we are unable to offer a substantive amount of programming.

# Annex E: Mid Term Review Terms of Reference

**Attachment C to Services Order No. 75523/29**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)**  
**Mid-Term Review of Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I)**

These TOR are to be further agreed with the Review Team during phase one of the Review.

1. **Introduction**

Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I)[[50]](#footnote-51) is an Australian Government initiative, which commenced in January 2021. It is valued at over $120 million to June 2024 and is financed through Official Development Assistance. It supports resilience and economic recovery through infrastructure partnerships with Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam and ASEAN.[[51]](#footnote-52) P4I advances Australia’s 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper* and *Partnerships for Recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response*.

P4I’s overarching goal is “quality infrastructure that drives sustainable, inclusive and resilient growth in Southeast Asia”. P4I builds on Australia’s longstanding engagement in Southeast Asia and is a key tool to both build Australian influence in, and reinforce our commitment to, quality infrastructure development in Southeast Asia. To achieve this goal, P4I is structured around two end of investment outcomes (EOIOs), revised and agreed on 22 June 2022.[[52]](#footnote-53)

1. EOIO 1: Strong partnerships among Australian and Southeast Asian government agencies and other institutions build regional commitment to quality infrastructure development.
2. EOIO 2: Southeast Asian agencies improve decision-making and practice towards quality infrastructure.

The mid-term review (the “Review”) will consider progress towards these EOIOs and strategic factors.

P4I has the cross-cutting priorities of influencing disaster risk reduction and climate change (DRRCC) and gender equality, disability and social inclusion (GEDSI) in infrastructure - P4I is considered a DFAT investment where gender equality is a ‘significant’ objective. The Review will consider P4I’s progress towards its GEDSI ambitions.

P4I focuses on economic infrastructure (transport, energy, utilities, and telecommunications). The Review will seek to understand whether the breadth and depth of this sectoral focus within economic infrastructure is appropriate considering the aims of P4I.

P4I does not fund the construction of infrastructure, focusing its scope on the practice environment and pre-construction (upstream) phases of the infrastructure lifecycle. The Review will assess whether this program scope and therefore P4I’s points of engagement are sufficiently relevant, and position P4I to deliver program outcomes effectively and efficiently.

It does this through three main delivery modalities (also called ‘service lines’): organisational linkages including government-to-government (G2G) partnerships; technical, policy and specific project advice; and knowledge and learning. While G2G partnerships remain central to P4I’s approach, including through EOIO 1, until early 2022 progress towards program outcomes through G2G partnerships was hindered owing to COVID-19 travel restrictions and the challenges that COVID-19 also presented in Australia for many relevant agencies. Therefore, during that time, most P4I activities were implemented by the delivery partner. While G2G engagement increased in 2022, activities have still been delivered primarily through the delivery partner. The Review will examine whether these delivery modalities are effectively and efficiently used to deliver progress against P4I’s outcomes.

P4I is delivered through a single team (the “One Team”), led by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), together with contracted delivery partners: Ernst & Young (EY), Adam Smith International (ASI), The Asia Foundation (TAF) and Ninti One Limited. The One Team uses a ‘hybrid’ management model, where the delivery partner team is led by a DFAT EL2 officer. P4I’s program office is in Bangkok, Thailand, with staff also spread across Southeast Asia and Australia.

Within DFAT, P4I is managed as follows:

* through a hybrid management model, a DFAT officer (and Counsellor) is the DFAT-appointed Executive Director of P4I, managing the delivery partner team, activity implementation and strategic alignment. A DFAT-appointed Deputy Executive Director (and First Secretary) supports this role, as does a First Secretary (P4I) in the ASEAN Mission who reports to the Counsellor (ASEAN). The Executive Director reports to the Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia Development Policy and Programs Branch in Canberra.
* The Director, Southeast Asia Infrastructure, Energy and Climate Change Section in Canberra, is the DFAT contract representative, managing the service delivery contract, budgets and reporting;[[53]](#footnote-54) as well as the focal point for P4I’s potential and active G2G partnerships with Australian Public Service (APS) agencies. The Director reports to the Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia Development Policy and Programs Branch in Canberra.

In addition, as P4I is a regional program, each Australian Post in the eight partner countries and the Australian Mission to ASEAN is involved in the direction, management and oversight of P4I activities in that country and with ASEAN. P4I funds a locally-engaged staff position in 8 of the 9 Posts to support this. Analysing this complex program management structure and providing recommendations on options to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency will be a key component of the Review.

**2. Purpose of the Review**

The overarching purpose of this Review is to meet DFAT requirements to undertake a review at the program’s mid-term stage, to inform improvements in performance and to inform decision-making about the program going forward, including a potential second phase. This Review will also provide insights to DFAT about infrastructure programming in Southeast Asia.

**3. Scope and focus of the Review**

The Review will examine P4I’s approach, implementation, operations and strategy, and distil lessons in providing responsive, flexible, inclusive, expert services to eight Southeast Asian governments and ASEAN on quality infrastructure. All aspects of the program are available to be considered by the Review including DFAT, delivery partners, the Australian Public Service and other organisational partners, program documentation and delivery.

The Review should capture:

1. Analysis of the effectiveness, efficiency, and value for money of the management and delivery structure of P4I, including how it might compare to other models used for the delivery of infrastructure and strategic programs, for example, a single managing contractor or a facility;[[54]](#footnote-55)
2. Analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery modalities (service lines) of P4I - technical and policy advice, project advice, organisational linkages, knowledge and learning - including analysis of value for money and how well the modalities work together;
3. Evidence of how P4I has contributed, or is on the way to contributing, to Australia’s strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific, as conceived in the 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper* (see 12 A) including openness, inclusivity and prosperity;
4. Analysis of the relevance of the scope - practice environment and pre-construction (upstream) phases, including project preparation - to P4I’s goal and EOIOs;
5. Analysis of the relevance of the focus sectors of P4I - transport, energy, utilities, and telecommunications - to P4I’s goal and EOIOs, including providing recommendations on sectoral prioritisation;
6. Analysis of the ability of P4I to meet its GEDSI ambitions within the current program structure, modalities, scope and sectoral focus, and recommendations for improvement;
7. Recommendations across all areas of inquiry outlining ways in which P4I could operate differently, prioritise if necessary, and be more effective and efficient to meet its goal;
8. Observations for DFAT about the lessons than can be learned from P4I at this stage that might be applicable to future programming and infrastructure influencing strategy.

**4. The intended audience for the Review includes:**

* Office of Southeast Asia Senior Executive and Southeast Asia Heads of Mission
* DFAT’s Southeast Asia Development Policy and Programs Branch
* P4I Program Management Group (PMG), which comprises the Program Executive[[55]](#footnote-56) and the Delivery Partner focal points from EY, ASI, TAF and Ninti One
* P4I Board
* APS agencies and other organisations participating, or considering participating, in G2G partnerships.

**5. Proposed key review questions:** *Note that some of the questions may not be able to be conclusively answered but evidence towards them is desirable. These will be finalised with the Review Team during phase one of the Review.*

1. What can be learned about the **relevance** of P4I (strategic alignment, appropriateness of scope and modality)?
   1. To what extent is P4I contributing to, and aligned with, Australia’s current and emerging strategic rationale for infrastructure engagement in Southeast Asia, especially infrastructure financing?
   2. Given its scale, to what extent is P4I’s scope of support - practice environment and pre-construction (upstream) phases, including project preparation – appropriate to optimise impact?
   3. To what extent is P4I’s sectoral focus on transport, energy, utilities and telecommunications relevant to optimise impact?
2. What can be learned about the **effectiveness** of P4I (progress towards outcomes)?
   1. To what extent is P4I achieving its EOIOs and intermediate outcomes (IOs) as expected? What are the strengths and challenges in achieving outcomes?
   2. To what extent have GEDSI outcomes been achieved? How have partners’ GEDSI approaches and commitments been influenced? What evidence is there of changes in decision-making and practice with relation to GEDSI?
   3. How appropriate is the balance of effort between service lines to achieve P4I’s outcomes?
3. What can be learned about the **efficiency** of P4I and the value for money it provides (value for money, governance and management models, delivery of outputs, and expenditure)?
   1. Is P4I’s One Team management model (including the hybrid management model) operating effectively, including as intended in the design regarding strategic control and relationships with APS partners?
   2. To what extent are the P4I One Team’s location, staffing profile and decision-making approaches fit for purpose?
   3. To what extent is the One Team model providing efficient oversight of program delivery and outcomes? How does the model compare to other delivery approaches and how can best practices from other models be used to guide P4I’s approach?

**6. Method**

The Review will require mixed evaluation methods including document review, stakeholder interviews, and qualitative and quantitative data collection**.** Written sources of data are likely to include project reporting and other documentation, such as design documents, contracts, operations manuals, strategies, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, value-for-money frameworks, performance reports, other reviews including partnership health checks, and other relevant documentation. An internal audit on Australia’s *Enhanced Partnerships in Southeast Asia* (incorporating P4I) will be carried out in April-June 2023 and should be a useful contribution.

The Review will be undertaken in line with DFAT’s Monitoring and Evaluation Standards (see 12 C), DFAT’s Ethical Research Evaluation Guidance Note (see 12 F) and the Australasian Evaluation Society’s Guidelines for Ethical Conduct of Evaluations.

**7. Review Process**

The Review process will comprise the following components:

**Phase one: inception and familiarisation with the program (May – June 2023):**

1. **DFAT briefing session(s):** by videoconference, simultaneously, or prior, to the below components to share information on context and framing, feedback on the initial proposed Review Plan, align expectations for DFAT support and involvement in data collection and representation of the review to stakeholders.
2. **Preparation/familiarisation with the program (desk review)**: The Review Team will examine relevant P4I documentation provided by DFAT to understand the complexities of the program, including its rationale, purpose, evolution since its design, partnerships and partner dynamics, progress and outcomes. Due to the complex nature of the program, frequent check-ins with the DFAT Review Manager will be conducted to align directions and expectations.
3. **DFAT inception workshop**: The Review Team will facilitate a virtual workshop with DFAT to share information to contextualise and frame the Review, align expectations for DFAT engagement, prioritise the review questions, agree ways of communicating and working throughout the Review process, refine the review process and data collection approaches, and refine deliverables and timeframes.
4. **Confirmation of a Review Plan:** Building on its successful proposal, the Review Team will solidify a plan,including confirming the methodology, key review questions, data collection and analysis methods, identification of key data sources (including interviewees), and a structure for reviewing key P4I outputs and outcomes. The Review Plan will include a workplan that outlines the specific roles, responsibilities and expectations of review team members, and includes a timeline. Standards for this review plan can be found at 12 C and a fuller description at 8.1.

**Phase 2: data collection, analysis and sense-making (June-August 2023)**

1. **Literature and evidence review:** Given the extensive body of knowledge available on infrastructure engagement across the region (i.e. DFAT’s strategic evaluation of infrastructure support, the AIFFP system-wide review, KIAT and 3ie evaluations etc), a synthesis of good practice benchmarking approaches and lessons learned will be undertaken to support analysis of P4I’s performance. This literature and evidence review will cover all focus areas of the Review.
2. **Surveys of DFAT posts, program partners and relevant technical experts:** Given the range of partners and Posts involved, the Review Team will conduct surveys to obtain a breadth of sectoral partner and country representatives’ perspectives into all Review focus areas.
3. **Observations of governance and management mechanisms:** This will enable the Review Team to build a deep understanding of the ways of working of P4I’s management model.
4. **Country visits to Thailand, Cambodia and either Indonesia or Laos** (to be confirmed with the Review Team during phase one): The Review Team will conduct three in-country visits to gain in-depth understanding of the P4I modality, and how different service streams are mutually reinforcing at an implementation level to support outcomes and impacts.
5. **Virtual and in-person stakeholder consultations:** The Review Team will conduct semi-structured interviews and workshops if appropriate with key program stakeholders to gather insights on the program’s effectiveness, efficiency and alignment with Australia’s strategic infrastructure engagement goals in Southeast Asia. Stakeholders will include DFAT (Posts and in Canberra), delivery partner focal points (EY, ASI, TAF, Ninti One), other relevant P4I senior management and technical experts, relevant partner government and organisational linkages agencies in Australia and across Southeast Asia, and other relevant stakeholders as identified in the Review Plan.
6. **Templates an analytical tools:** The Review Team will develop several analytical tools to support analysis against the review questions, including, but not limited to:
   1. **A comparative assessment framework for infrastructure support:** covering core criteria (such as transparency, efficiency including responsiveness and adaptability, ability to deliver intended outcomes, cross-cutting issues, and ability to contribute to impact) to facilitate assessment of P4I’s delivery approach;
   2. **A strategic, policy and sectoral alignment matrix:** which will provide an analysis of P4I’s strategic and sectoral alignment with Australia’s current and emerging strategy and policy settings that frame infrastructure engagement in Southeast Asia;
   3. **Case studies to trace outcomes:** a small number of in-depth and outcome-focussed case studies will be developed that unpack and illustrate how P4I’s service streams collectively support achievement of outcomes at the country level, and strengths and weaknesses of P4I’s approach.
7. **Aide Memoire and accompanying presentation on initial findings:** Shortly after data collection and preliminary analysis, the Review Team will prepare a written and PowerPoint presentation (aide memoire) to P4I DFAT teams (Bangkok Post, ASEAN Mission and Canberra) via videoconference, outlining the major findings from the consultations.

**Phase three: reporting (September – October 2023):**

1. **Preparation and submission of a draft report:** The Review Team will submit a draft report to DFAT. DFAT and the delivery partner will require two to four weeks to compile and submit comments on the draft for the Review Team to consider. DFAT will coordinate any comments from partner government agencies who may wish to be involved. The draft report should follow the standards listed at 12 C.
2. **Submission of the final report**: The Review Team will submit a final report within 10 days of receiving feedback from DFAT. The final report is expected to be published on the DFAT website and should be submitted in a format accessible to people with reading difficulties (see 12 D for guidance on this).

The Review Team will meet (virtually) fortnightly with the Review Manager(s) to provide updates on progress, and to allow the DFAT team to respond to information requests, reflect on observations and add insights. Where necessary, P4I teams will also be available to attend these meetings to answer questions and provide real-time feedback.

**8. Key Deliverables**

The Review Team will provide DFAT with the following deliverables:

1. **DFAT inception workshop** as described above.
2. **Review Plan**: articulating key review questions and sub-questions, methodologies to collect data, a timeline linked to key milestones, identification of key review informants, a detailed breakdown of responsibilities between team members, how remote components of the Review will be managed effectively and (as required) a framework for taking into consideration the impacts of COVID-19 on the program. The review plan should meet DFAT standards and be submitted at least 14 days prior to the commencement of primary data collection (5-6 pages, exclusive of annexes).
3. **Templates and analytical tools** as described above.
4. **Aide memoire and presentation**: on the initial findings of the review to be presented to DFAT, at the completion of data gathering processes but prior to draft report finalisation (short document and slideshow, 1-1.5 hours including time allocated for questions).
5. **Draft Review Report**: which includes an executive summary (up to 4 pages) that summarises findings and recommendations of the review; key issues arising from the review questions; and assessments and recommendations to inform decision-making for the remaining program period and the design for possible future iterations of the program. The report should meet DFAT standards (see 12 C) and be submitted to DFAT within 14 days after the presentation on initial findings (25-35 pages, exclusive of annexes).
6. **Final Review Report**: to be submitted within 14 days of receipt of comments from DFAT on the draft report, incorporating any agreed changes. The final report should provide a balanced, evidence-based and clear presentation of key findings, recommendations, and lessons learned, including the populated templates and analytical tools.

**9. Review Team Composition**

The Review Team comprises a Team Leader, Evaluation Specialist, GEDSI and Infrastructure Specialist, and Infrastructure Specialist. The Team Leader is expected to have team management skills and extensive experience of monitoring, review and evaluation of complex programs or facilities in the Southeast Asia context, preferably involving government-to-government partnerships.

The Review Team is expected to offer the P4I program in-depth knowledge of evaluation methods, DFAT delivery approaches, the infrastructure sector, and Southeast Asia’s context. Team members are expected to possess a solid understanding of the Australian Government’s strategic objectives in Southeast Asia, including as expressed through the 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper*, with specialised expertise in GEDSI in infrastructure planning.

The Review Team is also expected to:

* be able to coordinate, manage and deliver complex reviews, backed by strong monitoring and evaluation expertise;
* undertake data collection activities across multiple countries;
  + have relevant experience of regional and multi-country programming/design and evaluation in Southeast Asia; and
* have at least one team member that has an Australian Government security clearance.

DFAT may include a DFAT officer in the Review Team.  This will be discussed and agreed with the Review Team if required.

A translator may be hired in addition to the Review Team where/when appropriate.

DFAT representatives, and delivery partner representatives will be expected to assist where needed.

**10. DFAT Roles and Responsibilities**

Director, Southeast Asia Infrastructure, Energy & Climate Change Section (SIC) (the Review Owner) will be the Review delegate to assess and approve the evaluation plan and approve the procurement method and outcome. They will also join briefing of the Review Team, review and provide comments on the draft report, and provide input into the development and implementation of the management response.

SIC Policy Officers (including the Senior Consultant and LES at Bangkok Post, the Review Managers), will manage the Review process, including planning the Review in close consultation with colleagues, procuring the Review Team, coordinating input throughout the Review and preparing a management response. SIC will also assist in arranging, and participate in, any in-person meetings to be held between the Review Team and Australian-based stakeholders. The Officers will also review and provide comments on the review products set out above, as necessary, and assist with consultation across relevant areas of DFAT Canberra.

P4I Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director, First Secretary (P4I) will be consulted to advise of any risks or considerations regarding procurement, briefing, stakeholder engagement and implementation of the review process.

Director, Southeast Asia Development Policy & Performance Section (SDS) will be consulted for overall oversight of evaluation quality and strategic direction of the Review to ensure it meets DFAT’s evaluation commitments.

Australian Embassy, Bangkok may be called upon to provide support, comments and provide input into the development and implementation of the management response.

Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia Development Policy and Programs Branch (SAB) will approve the independent Review, management response and publication of the final report and management response.

**11. Publication and Management Response**

It is envisaged that DFAT will prepare a Management Response to the Review and will upload both documents to the DFAT website prior to 31 October 2023, as part of DFAT’s mandatory reporting guidelines.

**12. Links and attachments for relevant documents**

A: [Australian Foreign Policy White Paper 2017](https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper/fpwhitepaper/index.html)

B: [Partnerships for Recovery](https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/partnerships-for-recovery-australias-covid-19-development-response.pdf)

C: DFAT Monitoring and Evaluation Standards [DFAT Design and Monitoring and Evaluation Standards | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade](https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/dfat-monitoring-and-evaluation-standards)

D: DFAT Accessibility Guidelines [Creating documents that meet accessibility guidelines | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au)](https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/about-this-website/accessible-documents/creating-documents-meet-accessibility-guidelines)

E: DFAT Value for Money Principles [Value for Money principles | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au)](https://www.dfat.gov.au/aid/who-we-work-with/value-for-money-principles/Pages/value-for-money-principles)

F: DFAT’s Ethical Research Evaluation Guidance Note [Research overview | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au)](https://www.dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/development-issues/research)

Annex 1: DFAT IMR rating matrix

**13. Examples of Key Documents**

* P4I Design Document (SEAEGIF IDD)
* P4I Contracts and Amendments
* P4I Program Logic
* P4I Service Delivery Framework (SDF)
* P4I Program Operations Manual (POM)
* P4I Performance Management Framework (PMF)
* P4I GEDSI Strategy
* P4I Annual and mid-year Program Performance Reports
* Partner Performance Assessment (PPAs) and Investment Monitoring Report (IMR) 2021
* P4I Partnership Charter and partnership health check reports
* P4I Risk Management Plan and Register
* P4I Activity Proposals

**14. Proposed Timing**

The Review will take place over a four-month period, followed by a DFAT management response and publication. A start date for document review and early meetings is likely to be in May 2023; with a Final Review Report delivered by end September 2023.

| **Approximate dates 2023** | **Action** |
| --- | --- |
| May | Initial meeting between Review Team and DFAT Review Owner and Review Manager teams; verbal briefing on key issues, context and background; feedback on review plan; reading materials to commence desk review provided. Regular meetings between Review Team and DFAT Review Manager team recommended in this time to support direction and respond to queries. |
| Early June | **Deliverable**: Review Plan, including finalised Key Review Questions, approach to consultations submitted to DFAT Review Manager |
| End June – end July | Consultations – virtual and in-person as outlined in Review Plan. |
| Early August | **Deliverable**: Presentation on initial findings for DFAT (Bangkok and Canberra) – to include a high-level overview on the structure and scope of the review as it currently stands |
| August | Preparation of first draft report. Post-consultation follow-up (e.g. phone conversations, further document reviews, as needed) |
| Mid-August | **Deliverable**: First draft report is submitted to DFAT (within four weeks of the end of the consultation period) |
| Early -September | Feedback from DFAT provided to Review Team |
| End September | **Deliverable**: Final report submitted to DFAT (within 14 days of receiving written feedback from DFAT on Draft Report) |
| October | DFAT prepares management response and seeks internal approval.  Final report and management response published on website |

END.

# Annex F: Mid Term Review Workplan

**Introduction**

**Partnerships for Infrastructure**

Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I) is Australia's premier initiative for infrastructure development in Southeast Asia. Established by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in December 2020, and valued at over AUD120 million, P4I is a 3.5-year initiative, currently funded out to end-June 2024.

P4I’s primary aim is to support quality infrastructure that drives sustainable, inclusive, and resilient growth across the region. It operationalises this by providing partnership assistance across infrastructure advisory services, government partnerships, and knowledge sharing and networking, which constitute its three principal modalities, or “service lines”. Through these, P4I provides specialised support to sectoral policy and regulation, procurement, and prioritisation and planning activities, alongside its two cross-cutting priorities (gender equality, disability, and social inclusion [GEDSI], and disaster risk reduction and climate change [DRRCC]), which it applies across all advisory and partnership services.

Since its establishment, P4I has formed infrastructure partnerships with eight countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). P4I operates a “One Team” model, led by DFAT, together with delivery partners Adam Smith International (ASI), EY, Ninti One, and the Asia Foundation (TAF).

Box 1: P4I's Overarching Goal and End of Program Outcomes

P4I’s overarching goal is:

“Q*uality infrastructure that drives sustainable, inclusive and resilient growth in Southeast Asia*”.

To achieve this, P4I maintains two end-of-program outcomes (EOPOs). These are:

1. *Strong partnerships among Australian and Southeast Asian government agencies and other institutions build regional commitment to quality infrastructure development.*
2. *Southeast Asian agencies improve decision-making and practice towards quality infrastructure*.

**About this Mid-Term Review**

**Purpose**

In March 2023, DFAT commissioned a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of P4I, to be conducted between May and October 2023. Alinea International (the “Review Team”) was engaged to undertake this consultancy in May 2023.

Consistent with the commitments made within the P4I Design Document, the purpose of this MTR is to:

* ***Inform*** approaches to continuous improvement in P4I’s program performance.
* ***Showcase***P4I’s key achievements to date.
* ***Enrich*** DFAT’s understanding of Southeast Asia’s complex infrastructure programming needs, and
* ***Support***strategic decision-making to inform a possible second-phase extension of P4I.

**Scope**

As per the Terms of Reference ([TOR] at **Annex F**), all aspects of the P4I program are available for consideration by the MTR. As such, the MTR will comprehensively assess all elements of P4I's operations and strategy to inform and enhance the delivery of its responsive, flexible, and inclusive quality infrastructure services.

To support this, the MTR will conduct a thorough analysis of the efficacy, efficiency, relevancy, and value-for-money demonstrated by P4I’s current:

* Contributions to Australia’s strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific
* Cross-cutting priorities
* Delivery modalities
* Focus sectors, and
* Management and delivery structure. A detailed discussion of Key Review Questions and Factors for Exploration to be pursued by the MTR is provided below.

**Audience**

The primary audience of the MTR includes the Southeast Asia Development Policy and Programs Branch; Southeast Asia Heads of Mission; the Office of Southeast Asia Senior Executive; the P4I Board, and the P4I Program Management Group (PMG) (comprised of the Program Executive Level [[56]](#footnote-57), and delivery partner focal points from EY, ASI, TAF and Ninti One).

The secondary audience of the MTR includes other infrastructure financing and partnership programs hosted within DFAT, including the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP), and the Emerging Markets Impact Investment Fund (EMIIF), alongside broader Australian Public Service (APS) agencies, and other organisations participating, or considering participating, in government-to-government (G2G) partnerships**.**

**Key Review Questions**

Table 1 below provides an overview of the MTR’s three Key Review Questions (KRQs), and their attendant Factors for Exploration (FFE) drawn from the TOR (at **Annex F**).

The FFE act to define the scope of the Review in detail, by providing guidance on what performance consistent with P4I’s EOPOs and Intermediate Outcomes (IOs) should reasonably resemble.

Table 1: MTR Key Review Questions and Factors for Exploration

Key Review Questions:

1. What can be learned about the relevance of P4I (strategic alignment, appropriateness of scope and modality)?
2. To what extent is P4I contributing to, and aligned with, Australia’s current and emerging strategic rationale for infrastructure engagement in Southeast Asia?
3. To what extent has P4I enabled and facilitated infrastructure financing in the region? What percentage of this financing, if any, has been private?
4. Given its scale, to what extent is P4I’s scope of support - practice environment and pre-construction (upstream) phases, including project preparation – appropriate to optimise impact, and build bankable project pipelines that are relevant to partner country contexts?

To what extent is P4I’s sectoral focus on transport, energy, utilities, and telecommunications relevant to optimise impact, and responsive to emerging strategic and partner priorities?

Factors for Exploration**: If P4I’s strategic alignment, scope, and modality demonstrate relevance, we would expect to see:**

* **Significant alignment between P4I’s EOPOs, IOs, and priorities with the strategic rationale(s) provided by key Australian foreign affairs policies and frameworks (such as the 2017 Foreign Policy Whitepaper), and those maintained by P4I’s government partners (such as the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025).**
* **Significant alignment between P4I’s sectoral focus domains and Partners’ self-identified infrastructure needs and priorities.**
* **Evidence of P4I’s services having adapted and responded appropriately to the COVID-19 pandemic, and post-pandemic contexts.**

**Evidence of demand from existing and potential partners in the region, including an established pipeline of P4I investments commensurate to the program’s resourcing envelope.**

1. What can be learned about the effectiveness of P4I (progress towards outcomes)?
2. **To what extent is P4I achieving its EOPOs and IOs as expected? What are the strengths and challenges in achieving outcomes?**
3. **To what extent have GEDSI and DRRCC outcomes been achieved? How have partners’ GEDSI and DRRCC approaches and commitments been influenced? What evidence is there of changes in decision-making and practice with relation to GEDSI and DRRCC?**
4. **To what extent has P4I integrated indigenous perspectives throughout its work program, systems, and approaches?**
5. **How appropriate is the balance of effort between service lines, thematic expertise, component inputs, and EOPO’s to achieve P4I’s outcomes? Is P4I’s prioritisation approach aligned with and responsive to partners’ needs?**

Factors for Exploration**: If P4I’s progress towards EOPOs, IOs, and other strategic outcomes has been effective, we would expect to see:**

* **Evidence that P4I’s approaches, frameworks, and best practice have been adopted, and actively sought out, by program partners.**
* **Evidence that GEDSI, DRRCC, and indigenous perspectives are being mainstreamed throughout the program and integrated into partners’ infrastructure investment processes, standards, and approaches.**
* **Evidence of DRRCC mainstreaming and integration in partners’ infrastructure investment processes, standards, and approaches.**

**Evidence of satisfaction with P4I’s service offering among partners and “One Team” members.**

1. What can be learned about the efficiency of P4I and the value for money it provides (value for money, governance and management models, delivery of outputs, and expenditure)?
2. **Is P4I’s One Team management model (including the hybrid management model) operating effectively, including as intended in the design regarding strategic control and relationships with APS partners?**
3. **To what extent are the P4I One Team’s location, staffing profile and decision-making approaches fit for purpose?**
4. **To what extent is the One Team model providing efficient oversight of program delivery and outcomes? How does the model compare to other delivery approaches and how can best practices from other models be used to guide P4I’s approach?**

Factors for Exploration**: If P4I has performed efficiently, and demonstrated value for money, we would expect to see:**

* **Evidence that the impacts generated by P4I to date are reasonably commensurate with the resources invested.**
* **Evidence that P4I is delivering services across all program domains within budget and on time.**
* **Evidence that the allocation of resourcing across P4I’s service domains is appropriately distributed and aligned to promote progress against EOPOs and IOs.**

**That P4I’s staffing composition and structure are fit for purpose, and work to facilitate the achievement of the programs EOPOs and IOs.**

**Methodology**

**Approach**

The MTR will take place between May and October 2023. It will employ a mixed methods approach, incorporating document review, stakeholder interviews, and qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis to comprehensively assess P4I’s progress and performance to date. Sampling sizes and methods will be determined with DFAT.

The MTR will consistently maintain close adherence to DFAT’s *Monitoring and Evaluation Standards* (2022), and proceed in three phases:

**Phase 1: Project Inception**

**Project Pre-Briefing and Inception Workshop**

Prior to formal commencement of Phase 1, the Review Team met with Andrew Edge, Dana Gilmore, and other P4I colleagues for a series of pre-briefing and MTR kick-off meetings, held via videoconference (May 2023). These meetings were used to introduce and familiarise the Review Team with P4I and the primary MTR audience, and to test and share information regarding MTR context, framing, timelines, and approaches. The initial meeting was also used to formalise and establish regular MTR meetings, which will take place weekly throughout Phase 1, and then fortnightly throughout Phases 2 and 3 of the Review (see pages12-13 for further discussion).

MTR Plan

This Review Plan details the purpose and scope of the MTR and provides a comprehensive outline of the key review questions, and factors for exploration to be pursued by the review. It discusses the methodologies and approaches that will be used throughout each review phase, surveys the limitations attendant to the review, and acknowledges the relevant ethical considerations and approaches to be adopted by the Review Team. Finally, it provides an overview of contract outputs, key roles and responsibilities, and details timelines for contract delivery within a formal Workplan. A draft of this Review Plan was shared with DFAT on 17 May 2023, and discussed by the Review Team and DFAT colleagues on 24 May 2023, and 2 June 2023. A final Review Plan was delivered on Thursday 8 June 2023.

**Phase 2: Data Collection, Analysis, and Sense-Making**

**Literature and Evidence Review**

The Review Team will conduct a comprehensive examination and analysis of key P4I documents (including program design, financial, budgetary, and governance documentation) provided by DFAT and P4I partners throughout Phase 1. Additional evidence (including academic, grey literature, and other resources) will also be analysed to inform the Review Team’s assessment of P4I’s performance. Early literature and evidence review research informed the key review questions and factors for exploration presented above (see pages 6-8), the Review Team’s proposed key respondents (at **Annex B**), the pre-consultation stakeholder survey (at **Annex C**), and content of the semi-structured interview guide (at **Annex D**). The Review Team will provide a verbal briefing, and a one-page overview of key learnings, insights, opportunities, and challenges identified by the Desk Review to DFAT on 21 June 2023.

**Stakeholder Confirmation**

This MTR Plan proposes a list of key informants for DFAT’s consideration (**Annex B**), informed by learnings generated throughout Phase 1, and ongoing literature and evidence review. Upon finalisation and confirmation of this list, the Review Team will work closely with P4I colleagues to establish a consultation schedule for both in-person and virtual interviews (template at **Annex E**).

**Key Informant Interviews**

Throughout this phase, the Review Team will conduct in-depth interviews with P4I staff and partners. Semi-structured interview guides (at **Annex D**) will be used to frame consultations and ensure comprehensive and standardised inquiry. In certain cases, a pre-consultation survey (at **Annex C**) may be circulated to key stakeholders to help inform targeted consultations. To maximise nuanced and detailed data capture and analysis, these consultations will be conducted in-person wherever feasible (see below for further discussion of the in-country mission component). All consultations, whether in-person or virtual, will consider reasonable accommodations and accessibility enhancements to support inclusivity and the participation of diverse stakeholders. Please note the Review Team proposes to conduct key informant interviews between Monday 3 July and Friday 4 August 2023.

**In-country Mission**

Consistent with the MTR TORs, and discussions with P4I colleagues undertaken as part of Phase 1 activities, the Review Team proposes to conduct a three sequential in-country missions to support comprehensive in-person stakeholder consultations and data collection.

In close consultation with DFAT and P4I leads, the Review Team proposes to spend a minimum of five business days in Bangkok, Thailand: Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and Vientiane, Lao PDR, and/or Hanoi, Vietnam (with exact order to be determined) between Monday 26 June and Friday 21 July 2023. Pending DFAT’s preferences, further select consultations could also be undertaken by Alinea International employees based in Indonesia. The proposed list of key informants at **Annex B** indicates the key DFAT, delivery partner, technical expert, partner government, and civil society stakeholders who have been identified for consultation at each of these locations and Posts.

**Validation of Initial Findings and Recommendations via Aide Memoire**

Following comprehensive consultation with key informants, the Review Team will present initial MTR findings to P4I DFAT teams (Bangkok Post, ASEAN Mission, and Capital) in a video-conference session. The Aide Memoire will also be provided to DFAT in slide deck (.ppt) format to facilitate internal DFAT consultation, review, and validation prior to formulation of the Draft and Final Review Reports. Please note the estimated date of delivery for this output is Friday 11 August 2023.

**Phase 3: Report Drafting & Submission  
  
Draft MTR Report**

The MTR Report will provide a succinct, evidence-based, and clear presentation of key findings, recommendations, and lessons learned from the Review.

Both the Draft and Final Review Reports will include:

* An executive summary, providing an overview of findings and recommendations of the MTR.
* A detailed discussion outlining and analysing key issues arising from the key review questions and factors for exploration, and
* A curated selection of outcome-focussed case studies that illustrate Review findings and analysis.
* A series of assessments and recommendations designed to support strategic decision-making throughout the remaining program period, and to inform design of future iterations of the program (where relevant).

As per the TORs, DFAT and the delivery partner will require two to four weeks to compile and submit comments on the draft for the Review Team to consider. DFAT will coordinate any comments from partner government agencies who may wish to be involved. Please note the current estimated date of delivery for this output is Friday 22 September 2023. To support internal briefing processes, a document providing an overview of P4I’s key achievements, outcomes, and impacts identified by the Review Team will also be provided to DFAT on or by Friday 1 September 2023.

**Final MTR Report**

The document will be fit for external publication, consistent with DFAT’s accessibility standards. The Final Review Report will be provided within 10 business days of receipt of DFAT comments on the Draft Review Report.

**Constraints and Limitations**

As with any review and research process, this MTR is subject to a small number of constraints and limitations. These are specified below, along with strategies the Review Team will undertake to mitigate and manage these throughout the MTR.

Due to time and resourcing constraints, it will not be feasible for the Review Team to consult with each of P4I’s stakeholders, nor observe P4I staff and projects in-situ in every partner context. This may mean that the views of certain key informants are not captured by the Review Team, and thus do not inform assessments presented as part of the final MTR. To mitigate the effects of this constraint, the Review Team will work closely with P4I and DFAT to ensure the MTR collects qualitative data from the greatest number and diversity of informants possible. All analysis and reporting provided as part of this MTR will note any data gaps or limitations and caveat relevant findings accordingly.

Throughout remote interviews, Review Team members will be comparatively limited in their ability to build rapport with respondents and interpret non-verbal communication, which may constrain the degree to which the respondents are willing to share detailed information or views. Further, P4I’s delivery and government partners may at times find it challenging to provide frank views to the Review Team, as they will likely wish to maintain strong working relationships with Partnership. In part to manage this limitation, all stakeholders will be prompted to provide informed consent prior to commencing their interview and assured that any reporting of subjective views will be anonymised (see page 12 for further detail).

**Ethical Considerations**

All elements of the MTR will be conducted in accordance with the *DFAT Monitoring and Evaluation Standards* (2022), DFAT’s *Ethical Research Evaluation Guidance Note* (2021), and the Australasian Evaluation Society’s *Guidelines for the Ethical Conduct of Evaluations* (2013). In addition to these frameworks, the MTR will be conducted in accordance with best practice standards of:

***Disclosure and reporting:*** If in the course of conducting the MTR, the Alinea team discover, suspect, witness, or a party to a disclosure of violence and/or sexual abuse, they will act in accordance with the disclosure and reporting procedures detailed by DFAT’s *Child Protection* (CP)Policy (2018); and *Preventing Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment* (PSEAH) Policy (2019) in addition to Alinea’s own stringent CP and PSEAH policies.

***Informed consent:*** All participants in consultations will be provided with a verbal brief concerning why they are being consulted, and how the information they provide will be used and stored. All informants will be advised that their participation is voluntary prior to interview commencement, and that they may withdraw their consent and participation at any time prior to publication. Consultations will only be undertaken once verbal consent has been obtained from the informant.

***Privacy and confidentiality:*** The identity of any program beneficiaries involved in the study will be protected by Alinea. Where explicit consent has been obtained by the review team, key informants in professional roles may be referred to by their position title. Informants may also be quoted and referred to as a representative of their organisation (where it remains possible to preserve anonymity, e.g., when several staff from the same entity have been interviewed for the MTR). In all other instances, the Alinea team will ensure that the views of individual interviewees cannot be inferred from the content of MTR deliverables.

**A Note on Review Context**

**Accounting for the Impacts of COVID-19**

Despite the fact that P4I’s design pre-dated the advent of COVID-19, its objectives have gained even greater significance as partners navigate the post-pandemic and recovery environment.

Recognising this, the Review Team will look to incorporate an assessment of the impacts of COVID-19 on P4I as part of the MTR. It will consider the direct and indirect consequences of the pandemic, such as disruptions in project timelines, shifts in priorities and resource allocation, changes in beneficiary needs and circumstances, and the overall resilience of the program in the face of the pandemic and other unforeseen challenges. This analysis will be supported by the detailed factors for exploration (at pages 6-8), and the content of the semi-structured stakeholder interview guides (at **Annex D**).

By thoroughly examining the impacts of COVID-19, the MTR aims to assess how P4I may have adapted and responded to the crisis, and offer recommendations to enhance the program's effectiveness in ways that are sensitive to partners’ post-pandemic needs and contexts.

**Harnessing Remote Work**

Alinea International has over 20 offices worldwide, making flexible work a central and celebrated element of our business model. Building on this experience, the Review Team has established a set of measures, practices, and approaches that will ensure the MTR is conducted comprehensively and collaboratively, even where elements of the review must be delivered remotely.

For instance, the Review Team will:

* Establish regular meetings and communication channels to facilitate ongoing discussions, share learnings, address questions, and provide updates to DFAT, and between Review Team members. In addition to responsive communications (via email, Microsoft Teams, and other DFAT-preferred platforms) these will include routine:
* Weekly virtual meetings between DFAT and the Review team throughout Phase 1, held every Wednesday at 10am,
* Fortnightly virtual meetings between DFAT and the Review team throughout Phases 2 and 3, held every second Wednesday at 10am, and
* Weekly internal Review Team meetings
* Leverage technologies such as Microsoft Teams to save, coordinate, and share MTR data and analysis remotely and efficiently.
* Remain consistently responsive to information requests and inputs from DFAT, supporting a continuous flow of information, learnings, insights, and real-time collaboration.

**Roles and Responsibilities**

**Overview**

**Review Team**

| Team Member | Role and Location | Key Responsibilities |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Dr Bernadette Whitelum | Team Leader, Melbourne | Dr. Bernadette Whitelum will draw on her extensive leadership and program design and evaluation skills to deliver an MTR that offers DFAT the strategic positioning it is looking for, whilst providing key insight into the achievements and successes of the P4I program performance to date and advice on how to leverage this into the possible second-phase extension of P4I. As CEO of Alinea, Bernadette offers extensive experience in design, MERL, GEDSI and humanitarian programming.  Bernadette will provide technical direction and ensure the services and outputs are produced on time and to the highest standards. She will manage the work plan, team inputs and management, and effective and regular communication with DFAT. Bernadette will advise DFAT, facilitate key informant interviews and consultations, and ensure that the MTR reflects DFAT’s objectives. |
| Ingrid van Aalst | MEL Specialist, Wellington | Ingrid van Aalst is a professional monitoring, evaluation, research and learning specialist, focused on providing strategic and operational MERL services to national and international governments, NGO agencies, development partners and donors. Ingrid is experienced in building evaluative cultures that cultivate better decision making, strategic direction setting and activity management and practice.  Ingrid will provide high-level MEL activities and advice throughout the review, capturing key analysis and recommendations. |
| Luigi Toda | Infrastructure Specialist, Singapore | Luigi Toda is specialist in managing multi-country, multi-year programmes addressing complex issues, and has extensive experience and knowledge in managing, providing advice, and developing strategies on urban resilience, resilient built environment, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, adaptation finance, climate and disaster policy, resilient livelihoods, agricultural resilience, environmental sustainability, energy transition, and humanitarian response.  He will provide key infrastructure programme understanding, analysis and technical advice to the review, with respect to his deep contextual understanding of the infrastructure sector and Southeast Asia’s context. |
| Natalia Beghin | Infrastructure & GEDSI Specialist, Canberra | Natalia Beghin will bring her significant experience from leading gender equality and social protection evaluations for government and multilateral organisations to the review team. She is passionate about evidence-based development and supporting clients to establish collaborative and sustained solutions to wicked problems.  Natalia will provide expert technical inputs from her experience in evaluating infrastructure programs, knowledge of DFAT delivery approaches and will contribute to maintaining the reviews commitment to crosscutting GEDSI themes. |

**Southeast Asia Development Policy and Programs Branch**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Team Member | Role and Location | Key Responsibilities |
| Andrew Edge | Mid-Term Review Owner, Canberra | Provides high level oversight and direction to the MTR team. |
| Dana Gilmore | P4I Program Manager, Canberra | As a member of the review team, provides insights into the background of the program, DFAT’s objectives for the program and introductions and liaison with key stakeholders. |

**Annex A: Mid-Term Review Workplan**

**Gannt chart showing timing of MTR components as follows:
Review Plan 15 May-5 June
Key informant interviews and data analysis 22 May - 7 August
Aide Memoire 31 July - 14 August
Draft Review Report 14 August - 18 September
Final Review Report 11 September - 16 October**

\*Please note triangles indicate the anticipated delivery date of milestone and other agreed contract outputs. Fields highlighted in **blue** indicate the period throughout which in-country consultations will be conducted (to be confirmed in consultation with DFAT and relevant Posts).

**Annex B: Key Informant List**

This key informant list will be added to over the course of the review with DFAT approval.

* Civil Society Stakeholders (including Organisations of Persons with Disabilities and Women’s Organisations).
* Climate Diplomacy and Development Finance Division
* DFAT Development Effectiveness and Enabling Division
* DFAT Office of Southeast Asia.
* DFAT P4I Leadership team (Bangkok post).
* Other relevant DFAT investments.
* P4I Delivery Partners (‘One Team members').
* P4I Government Partners.
* P4I Posts in Southeast Asia.
* Program Management Group (PMG members).

**Annex C: Key Respondent Survey**

The Review Team proposes to circulate this survey (via SurveyMonkey) to key respondents employed by P4I’s One Team partners across *all* P4I Posts and Canberra two weeks prior to the commencement of consultations in-country.

The survey gathers information pertaining to One Team members’ background, their views on P4I’s performance across standardised DFAT Investment Monitoring Report (IMR) performance domains, and a series of other performance measures associated with P4I’s overarching goal and EOPOs.

Please note, respondents may be asked to elaborate on their responses, or themes contained within this survey throughout in-person interviews (see **Annex D** for further information).

Respondents will be prompted to provide informed consent as part of the survey process, including information detailing how the data they provide will be used and stored by the Review Team. To protect the anonymity of key respondents, any survey results shared with DFAT will be aggregated, and may be subject to partial redaction.

| Question | Response Type |
| --- | --- |
| *Please indicate your gender* | Female  Male  Non-binary  Prefer not to say |
| *Do you identify as someone with a disability?* | Yes  No  Prefer not to say |
| *Do you identify as culturally and linguistically diverse?* | Yes  No  Prefer not to say |
| *Which P4I One Team member do you work for?* | Adam Smith International  DFAT  EY  Ninti One  The Asia Foundation |
| *[If employed by DFAT] please indicate whether you are:* | Australia Based Staff  Locally Engaged Staff |
| *Where are you based?* | Australia  Cambodia  Indonesia  Laos  Malaysia  Other/Remote [Free Text]  Thailand  The Philippines  Timor-Leste  Vietnam |
| *How long have you worked with P4I?* | [Free Text #] Years [Free Text #] Months |
| *How would you rate P4I’s efficiency? (e.g., value for money, productivity, resourcefulness)* | [Likert Scale: Poor – Fair - Good - Very Good -Excellent] / [Free Text] |
| *How would you rate P4I’s effectiveness? (e.g., influence, impact)* | [Likert Scale: Poor – Fair - Good - Very Good -Excellent] / [Free Text] |
| *Do you feel that P4I’s “One Team” model fit for purpose?* | Yes / No / [Free Text] |
| *What improvements, if any, might you suggest to strengthen the “One Team” model?* | [Free Text] |
| *How would you rate P4I’s influence on improving partners’ outcomes and processes related to gender equality, disability, and social inclusion (GEDSI)?* | [Likert Scale: Poor – Fair - Good - Very Good -Excellent] |
| *Please nominate a project or partnership in which you’ve seen P4I make a positive GEDSI impact.* | [Free Text] |
| *How would you rate P4I’s influence on improving partners’ outcomes and processes Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change (DRRCC)?* | [Likert Scale: Poor – Fair - Good - Very Good -Excellent] |
| *Please nominate a project or partnership in which you’ve seen P4I make a positive DRRCC impact.* | [Free Text] |
| *How effective is P4I’s approach to risks and safeguards?* | [Likert Scale: Very ineffective– somewhat ineffective – neither effective nor ineffective – somewhat effective – Very effective] |
| *Do you feel that current levels of resourcing and staffing are adequate to support P4I to meet its goals and commitments?* | Yes / No / [Free Text] |
| *Do you feel that P4I’s current service offerings and specialist advisory areas meet government partners’ needs?* | Yes / No / [Free Text] |
| *Is there anything else you’d like to share with the Review Team?* | [Free Text] |

**Annex D: Semi-Structured Interview Guides**

The following semi-structured interview guides are designed as a flexible tool to support nuanced, detailed, and comprehensive data collection on matters of key interest to the MTR. These outline a consistent set of questions and prompts to guide interviews in line with the MTR’s KRQs (see pages 6-8), while also allowing for open-ended responses. This provides flexibility for the interviewers and respondents to explore additional topics, or dive deeper on particular matters of interest that emerge throughout the Review.

Please note the questions provided below may be subject to change pending the results of the Key Informant Survey at **Annex C**.

Table 3 overpage provides semi-structure interview guides developed for staff at P4I Posts, the Office of Southeast Asia, P4I Delivery Partners (“One Team members”) and P4I Government Partners. A sample informed consent solicitation is also provided within Box 2 below:

Box 2: Sample Informed Consent Briefing

***Alinea International has been engaged to conduct a mid-term review of Partnerships for Infrastructure. The review will focus on assessing progress against the partnership’s objectives to date, and identifying learnings on what has and hasn’t worked well. The findings will be used by P4I’s management team to strengthen the program’s approach, and findings and recommendations will be published in a public report.***

***This interview will take approximately 1 hour. The information you provide will be kept confidential and will not be directly attributable to you. Should we wish to use a direct quote from you in any review materials, we will seek your permission in writing first.***

***Your participation in this interview and review process is voluntary. You may refuse to answer any question you do not wish to answer, and you may withdraw from the interview at any time. If you withdraw, you can also choose to withdraw any information you have provided to us.***

***Do you consent to proceed with the interview?***

Table 2: Semi-structured interview guides

| Stakeholder Type | Semi-Structured Guiding Questions |
| --- | --- |
| P4I Posts | Please would you provide a short overview of your role, and how long you’ve been working with P4I?  How would you describe P4I’s relationship with Government Partners and ASEAN? Could you provide an example of a strong partnership? Of a comparatively weaker partnership? What characterises these? To what extent do you think P4I is responding to Government Partners’ needs and priorities? How does P4I assess partners’ infrastructure needs and priorities, and how closely are these reflected in the project pipelines P4I has developed to date? How could relationships be improved?  In your view, how well would you say P4I is performing against its strategic goal to provide *quality infrastructure* [advisory] *that drives sustainable, inclusive, and resilient growth in Southeast Asia*? Do you think current approaches to sectoral prioritisation, service lines, and resourcing are appropriate to meet this goal? Have you seen evidence of improved decision-making and practice relating to quality infrastructure among P4I’s government partners?  In your view, how effective do you feel P4I has been in advancing Australia’s strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, consistent with the 2017 Foreign Policy Whitepaper, and other key regional strategies? How does your team work with colleagues within the Office of Southeast Asia and across Posts to monitor and inform this alignment?  How have P4I’s services improved infrastructure standards and practice related to gender equality, disability, and social inclusion, and disaster risk reduction and climate change in the region? Can you provide an example of where you’ve seen this work well? An example of where, perhaps, it hasn’t worked well? How could P4I improve its cross-cutting impact?  How would you rate the effectiveness and efficiency of P4I’s One Team management model? What could be improved about the way delivery partners work together? Is current resourcing fit for purpose? What changes, if any, might you make to the operating model?  How was the partnership first established and nurtured on an ongoing basis?  What are the principles that underpin the partnership and how is this working for P4I?  How do you ensure that P4I initiatives are culturally appropriate and contextually relevant?  Looking forward, what should P4I’s top priority for change and improvement be, and why?  Is there anything else you’d like to share, or which you think may be important for the Review Team to know? |
| Office of Southeast Asia Staff | Please would you provide a short overview of your role, and how long you’ve been working with P4I?  How would you describe P4I’s relationship with Government Partners and ASEAN? To what extent do you think P4I is responding to Government Partners’ needs and priorities?  In your view, how well would you say P4I is performing against its strategic goal to provide *quality infrastructure* [advisory] *that drives sustainable, inclusive, and resilient growth in Southeast Asia*? Do you think current approaches to sectoral prioritisation, service lines, and resourcing are appropriate to meet this goal? Have you seen evidence of improved decision-making and practice relating to quality infrastructure among P4I’s government partners?  In your view, how effective do you feel P4I has been in advancing Australia’s strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, consistent with the 2017 Foreign Policy Whitepaper, and other key regional strategies? How do you work with colleagues at P4I posts to monitor and inform this alignment?  How would you rate the effectiveness and efficiency of P4I’s One Team management model? What could be improved about the way delivery partners work together? Is current resourcing fit for purpose? What changes, if any, might you make to the operating model?  How would you describe your relationship with [other partners]?  How have priorities been set and decisions made?  Would you describe your relationship/partnership/collaboration with [other partners]? as being effective?  Why/why not?  Looking forward, what should P4I’s top priority for change and improvement be, and why?  Is there anything else you’d like to share, or which you think may be important for the Review Team to know? |
| P4I Delivery Partners | Please would you provide a short overview of your role, and how long you’ve been working with P4I?  How would you describe P4I’s ‘value-add’ in comparison to other public infrastructure advisory services available to your government partners (such as those provided by multilaterals ABD and World Bank, and other like-mindeds such as JICA/KOICA)?  In your view, how well would you say P4I is performing against its strategic goal to provide *quality infrastructure* [advisory] *that drives sustainable, inclusive, and resilient growth in Southeast Asia*? Do you think current approaches to sectoral prioritisation, service lines, and resourcing are appropriate to meet this goal? Have you seen evidence of improved decision-making and practice relating to quality infrastructure among P4I’s government partners?  How would you rate the effectiveness and efficiency of P4I’s One Team management model? What could be improved about the way delivery partners work together? Is current resourcing fit for purpose? What changes, if any, might you make to the operating model?  Do you think that current allocations of effort across P4I’s different sectoral and service lines are balanced appropriately? Are there any areas that you think require more or less investment (of time, resourcing, focus) by P4I? Are there new areas you think P4I should expand into?  How have P4I’s services improved infrastructure standards and practice related to gender equality, disability, and social inclusion, and disaster risk reduction and climate change in the region? Can you provide an example of where you’ve seen this work well? An example of where, perhaps, it hasn’t worked well? How could P4I improve its cross-cutting impact?  How would you describe your relationship with [other partners]?  How have priorities been set and decisions made?  Would you describe your relationship/partnership/collaboration with [other partners]? as being effective?  Why/why not?  Looking forward, what should P4I’s top priority for change and improvement be, and why?  Is there anything else you’d like to share, or which you think may be important for the Review Team to know? |
| P4I Government Partners | Please would you provide a short overview of your role, and how you may have engaged with P4I to date?  To what extent would you say P4I has provided support that aligns with and contributes to [country’s] infrastructure development needs and priorities?  How would you rate the quality of support provided by P4I? Are there any areas where you believe P4I's scope of support could be expanded or refined to enhance its impact in [country]?  How do the services provided to you by P4I differ from, or complement those offered by outfits such as the ADB’s infrastructure advisory services arm, or the World Bank’s infrastructure advisory and technical assistance support?  Can you provide an example of how P4I has influenced [country’s] infrastructure approaches, standards, and commitments related gender equality, disability, and social inclusion? Related to disaster risk reduction and climate change?  In your interactions with P4I, how would you assess the effectiveness of P4I's One Team management model?  Looking forward, what should P4I’s top priority for change and improvement be, and why?  Is there anything else you’d like to share, or which you think may be important for the Review Team to know? |
| Civil Society Stakeholders (including Organisations of Persons with Disabilities and Women’s Organisations) | [Please note final text and content TBD following further discussion with DFAT and other stakeholders] |

1. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2017). 2017 Foreign Policy Whitepaper. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. For example, standard P4I templates and branding include a Commonwealth Coat of Arms that is only 40% of the size of the P4I insignia, lacks colour, and is only included as standard on covering pages, all of which likely increase the chances it is not easily noticed. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. World Bank, "*How Can We Ensure Money in the Bank Leads to Shovels in the Ground?*" worldbank.org, 2022, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/how-can-we-ensure-money-bank-leads-shovels-ground#:~:text=On%20the%20other%2C%20there's%20a,(EMDEs)%20suffering%20the%20most>. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Asian Development Bank, 2017 “Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs” Mandaluyong City, Philippines. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Op. Cit. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Rajah, Roland. “Indo-Pacific infrastructure development financing: an agenda for Australia and Europe”. Lowyinsitute.org. 2023. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indo-pacific-infrastructure-development-financing-agenda-australia-europe#footnote2_fylzy5n> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Joint press release EU-Australia Joint Committee” Press Release. 19 October 2020. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-press-release-eu-australia-joint-committee> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Op. Cit. Asian Development Bank, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Australian Embassy Thailand. 2012. “Fun Run – Bridge History: The First Thai-Laos Friendship Bridge”. <https://thailand.embassy.gov.au/bkok/FunRun_Bridge_History.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Please note a 2023 *Value for Money Assessment* of this activity conducted by Tetra Tech found that there was no alternative project preparation mechanism available to AIFFP that was “*feasible in the timeframe available*”. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Commonwealth of Australia. 2023. *Invested: Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040*. Canberra; Australia. p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. At design stage, Myanmar had been intended as a P4I counterpart country, however this engagement was paused in line with Australian Government policy following the 2021 coup d’état. ASEAN members Brunei and Singapore were also excluded because they are not ODA eligible countries, have comparatively high sovereign wealth, and their existing infrastructure stock and market quality. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. “*In Group A countries (Malaysia and Thailand), the program can establish and nurture institutional relationships that will help refine niche elements of the infrastructure ecosystem through the deployment of Australian expertise. In Group B Countries (Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines), we expect impact is more likely to be achieved through finding initiatives complementary to existing bilateral programs that will enhance or deepen engagement. In Group C (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Timor-Leste), there is significant potential for much deeper capacity and relationship building effort”.* [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. International Monetary Fund. “World Economic Outlook Database: April 2023” accessed 21 August 2023. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April/weo-report?c=516,522,536,544,548,518,566,576,578,582,&s=NGDPD,PPPGDP,NGDPDPC,PPPPC,LP,&sy=2021&ey=2028&ssm=0&scsm=1&scc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=0&sort=country&ds=.&br=1> [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Please note the lower the number, the better the infrastructure quality | World Economic Forum. 2019. “Global Competitiveness Report”. Cologny, Switzerland: <https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2023. *Australia’s Official Development Assistance Development Budget Summary 2023-24*. Canberra, Australia. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/oda-development-budget-summary-2023-24.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Please note the data in the final two columns of this table were drawn from the draft P4I *Program Progress Summary* for January-June 2023. For the sake of clarity, we have not included the outstanding expenditure earmarked for “*Regional*” activities, which totals AUD1,055,676, or 2% of P4I activity allocation. The Review Team also notes that these figures only include activities that have been approved by the prioritisation panel or DFAT to advance to proposal stage. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Noting ASEAN’s status [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Please note this also includes funding allocated for “Mekong regional”. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. P4I Performance Management Framework, July 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. This is inconsistent with the DFAT Design and MEL Standards (2022) which state that facility program logics must ensure that “*any vague terms such as ‘improve capacity’ are avoided (or precisely defined in an accompanying narrative)*”. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Southeast Asia Economic Governance and Infrastructure Facility Investment Design Document, December 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. In practice, this also means that DFAT officers who are more junior to the ED must attempt to fulfil their own accountability requirements by asking questions of the P4I ED. This puts both the ED and the DFAT officers in an untenable position. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Content drawn verbatim from Partnerships for Infrastructure. 2022. *Program Logic Narrative*. p.4-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. The Review Team notes that because a disproportionate number of P4I’s activities have been delivered under this modality, it is natural that quality of work within this domain would be more variable than across the portfolio as a whole. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. The Review Team notes that the G2G component of the Aus4ASEAN Futures program may duplicate P4I’s activities in this domain going forward. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. The Review Team notes that one respondent interviewed for this MTR questioned the appropriateness of the *G2G* allocation nominated by the NPP that gave rise to P4I in its current incarnation. In particular they noted that the share of funds allocated to the *G2G* modality were in excess of what it could be reasonably expected to spend on associated activities, especially throughout establishment phase. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. This analysis is also consistent with the findings of the 2022 Investment Management Report (IMR) prepared by DFAT, and reviewed by the DFAT P4I Executive Director and Deputy Director, which noted that “*G2G partners’ agreement targets and milestones are overall not on track, and the volume and depth of partnerships is not proportionate with other service lines*”. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. P4I Program Progress Summary (Draft as delivered on 22 August 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to the 28th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP-28). September 2023. Retrieved: <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/ASEAN-JS-on-Climate-Change-to-the-UNFCCC-COP28.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. The Review Team notes this classification standard has also been adapted for DRRCC and delivery modality classifications**.**  [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. OCED. 2023. *Definition and Minimum Recommended Criteria for the DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker*. Accessible via : <https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/Minimum-recommended-criteria-for-DAC-gender-marker.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. The Review Team notes that contractual clauses related to diversity and inclusion appear to have been subject to revision throughout the life of the program. The *GEDSI Strategy* quotes text, not included in either the original or current contract which states that “*the Delivery Partner will a) ensure at least 50 per cent female personnel at the Program Office, in the PMG and in other key Program mechanisms*” while the relevant December 2022 contract clause states “*the Delivery partner will a)* ***aim*** *to ensure at least 50 per cent women personnel at the Program Office and in the PMG.*” [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. The Review Team notes that while the *P4I Risk Register* acknowledges two key risks that may impact the attainment of GEDSI outcomes (SS12.1, and SS12.2), it does not acknowledge scarcity of GEDSI expertise within the consortium as a source of risk. The possible impacts of this hazard are particularly acute with respect to safeguards and attendant processes and procedures, which multiple stakeholders independently raised as a domain in which the Delivery Partner lacked capability. Where infrastructure engagements associated with P4I’s advisory require consideration of resettlement, and/or enhanced risk of human trafficking, these risks are especially elevated (see pages X-Y below for further discussion). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Although the Review Team has seen evidence of these efforts resulting in increased GEDSI-literacy among Delivery Partner staff, the overall returns on these undertakings do not appear significant enough to clearly merit the degree of investment made to date. Correspondingly, and given that GEDSI expertise was considered a fundamental competency throughout program tendering, whether these internal upskilling efforts should have been required at all is questionable. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. This benchmark pertains to the involvement of people with disabilities and/or organisations of people with disabilities in planning, implementation, and MEL. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. This benchmark pertains to the identification and addressing of barriers to inclusion, providing opportunities for participation, and enabling people with disabilities to benefit equally from the aid investment. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Outside of improvements made against criterion 2 above , and as per the analysis included in this chapter, the MTR judges that ratings of “*3 - less than adequate*” remain appropriate criteria 1 and 3 at this point in time. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. These are: *Achieving Timor-Leste’s Gender in Infrastructure Targets* (Complete); *Integrating GESI into Malaysia High Speed Rail* (Concluding); and *Study Tour to the Norther Territory* (Active). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. I.e., Conduct of the *GEDSI Deep Dives*, and drafting of the *Indigenous Compendium* and *Scoping options for joint DRRCC/Indigenous Activities*. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. The Review Team notes that P4I’s approach to applying these classifications at the activity-level may risk complicating DFAT’s annual reporting to OECD DAC if the relevant “*principal*”, “*significant*”, or “*mainstreamed*” objective isn’t further disaggregated and reported by *type*. For instance, the “*Study tour to the Northern Territory*” is classed as GEDSI “*principal*” due to its indigenous inclusion objective, and it includes no gender equality or disability inclusion objective. When aggregated as part of program level reporting, this will contribute to the “*principal*” share of P4I’s projects, though it is not relevant for DAC reporting against theGEM, and without careful accounting, may accidentally be spuriously included. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. As nominated on page 15 of the *Indigenous Compendium, Supplement to Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion Strategy*. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. n = 56 documents retrieved from the P4I SharePoint site. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Please note these answers are assigned in response to the following questions: “*Could the investment involve activities that adversely impact the: dignity, human rights, livelihood systems or culture of indigenous peoples, land or natural and cultural resources that indigenous peoples own, use, occupy, or claim?*” [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. See: ADB. 2020. [*Initial Poverty and Social Analysis*](https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/52320/52320-002-ipsa-en.pdf) 52320-002. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. This lack of acknowledgement and consideration is particularly concerning given the elevated risk of domestic and international human and sex trafficking in Lao PDR. See: U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. *2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Laos*. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-trafficking-in-persons-report/laos/> [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. The Review Team also notes that the P4I contract requires that there be an annual review of service deliver to identify opportunities to optimise indigenous participation, though it did not sight any documents associated with this process. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Further detail available at: www.[partnershipsforinfrastructure](https://www.partnershipsforinfrastructure.org/).org [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Engagement in Myanmar was paused in line with Australian Government policy. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. P4I’s original EOIO, ‘improved decision-making towards quality infrastructure underpinned by strong Government-to-Government partnerships’ was amended on 22 June 2022. A review of the EOIO was triggered by the changing operating environment caused by COVID-19 following the P4I design and informed by the collaborative procurement process with the market for P4I’s delivery partner throughout 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. This responsibility transitioned from the Counsellor (Development) in Australian Embassy, Bangkok, to Canberra in March 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. P4I was originally conceived of as a facility – the Southeast Asia Economic Governance and Infrastructure Facility – but was determined to be a program upon design approval, December 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. The Program Executive comprises: DFAT-appointed Executive Director, Head of Country Engagement, Head of Performance and Knowledge, Head of Technical Advisory. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. The Program Executive comprises: DFAT-appointed Executive Director, Head of Country Engagement, Head of Performance and Knowledge, Head of Technical Advisory. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)